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### Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE92, NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: GETTING TO YES POST-2010

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09THEHAGUE92 | 2009-02-11 14:02 | 2011-01-17 00:12 | SECRET | Embassy The Hague

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHTC #0092/01 0421457
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 111457Z FEB 09
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2504
    INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2781
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0382
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000092

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: GETTING TO YES POST-2010

    REF: A. 07 THE HAGUE 2025
         ¶B. 08 THE HAGUE 0728
         ¶C. 09 THE HAGUE 0078

    ...

    191568,2/11/2009 14:57,09THEHAGUE92,"Embassy The
    Hague",SECRET,07THEHAGUE2025|08THEHAGUE728|09THEHAGUE78,"VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB
    DE RUEHTC #0092/01 0421457
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 111457Z FEB 09
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2504
    INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2781
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0382
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    ","S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000092
    SIPDIS
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: GETTING TO YES POST-2010
    REF: A. 07 THE HAGUE 2025
    ¶B. 08 THE HAGUE 0728
    ¶C. 09 THE HAGUE 0078
    Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Andrew Mann for reasons
    1.5
    (b,d)
    ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Dutch plans for Afghanistan post-2010 are
    evolving. Many in Parliament and the public think the Dutch
    should withdraw completely in 2010 since their forces have
    been on the ground with the U.S. since December 2001.
    Despite confidence in their own efforts, the Dutch perceive
    there is no winnable game plan for creating a stable
    democratic Afghanistan. Nonetheless, current indications
    from the government suggest the Netherlands may consider a
    request for some sort of follow-on mission after 2010.
    Getting to that ""yes"" will take extended, coordinated and
    discreet engagement by all concerned. END SUMMARY.
    Uncertainty about Dutch Deployment
    ----------------------------------
    ¶2. (S) In December 2007, the Dutch Parliament agreed to
    extend its ISAF mission in Uruzgan for two years - until
    August 2010, followed by a complete withdrawal of Dutch
    troops under Task Force Uruzgan by December 2010. In private
    conversations, senior government officials have emphasized
    that the Dutch will stay on in some capacity in Afghanistan.
    Official public statements, however, are less
    forward-leaning. Foreign Minister Verhagen said during an
    appearance in Parliament on November 19, ""the Netherlands is
    lead nation, in Uruzgan until August 2010 and will then
    cut down its presence and leave by December 2010."" He added
    that the development relationship will continue for years,
    but he would not make any observations about military
    contributions after December 2010. At the same hearing,
    Defense Minister van Middelkoop stated the Dutch ""do not have
    the capabilities to sustain lead operations over several
    years."" During a December visit to Afghanistan, he said the
    Dutch were getting out of Afghanistan, even if incoming U.S.
    President Obama called him 10 times to stay. Prime Minister
    Balkenende later repudiated van Middelkoop,s remarks,
    stating a request by the new administration would be given
    careful consideration. The PM cautioned, however, ""A mission
    with as many troops as currently in Uruzgan is going to be
    difficult."" During his trip to Uruzgan on February 9, the PM
    further stated ""We have always said that we will terminate
    the leading role of the Netherlands in Uruzgan by 2010. But
    that does not mean that we will turn our back on Afghanistan.
    At least we will take responsibility after 2010 in the area
    of development cooperation and strengthening the
    administration.""
    ¶3. (C) In conversations with EUR/WE Director Pamela Spratlen
    January 15, Dutch MPs from the leading parties that supported
    the Afghanistan deployment in 2007 -- Labor (PvdA), Christian
    Democrats (CDA), and Liberals (VVD) -- told Spratlen the
    Dutch military needs a break from the Afghanistan deployment.
    ""It would be suicide for parties at this table"" to extend
    the Dutch mandate in Uruzgan beyond 2010, according to VVD
    member Han Ten Broeke, though this ""doesn't mean we couldn't
    be somewhere else... We made a promise to conclude in 2010.""
    CDA Defense spokesman Raymond Knops said it is ""possible the
    Dutch may contribute again in 2013 (after a two-year
    QDutch may contribute again in 2013 (after a two-year
    break)... We need some rest."" PvdA member Samira Bouchibti
    nodded at these comments, adding, ""we have to explain to the
    Dutch people why this matters.""
    ¶4. (SBU) Public support for the mission in Afghanistan is
    tracked monthly by the Ministry of Defense with the long term
    trend being basically stable (approximately 35-41% in favor,
    30-37% opposed and 23-27% undecided). Recent short term
    trends have been somewhat negative with January support at
    30%; April 2008 at 25% was the lowest. A consistent majority
    expresses pride in the Dutch troops in Uruzgan (60% in
    January), but public interest in Afghanistan is diminishing.
    Decision process
    ----------------
    ¶5. (S) The initial, informal and unofficial process of
    deciding what to do after 2010 has begun at the senior levels
    in the Ministries. A meeting of the ""Gang of Six""
    (Balkenende (CDA), Verhagen (CDA), Deputy Prime
    Minister/Minister of Finance Bos (PvdA), Minister for
    Development Cooperation Koenders (PvdA), Deputy Prime
    Minister/Minister for Youth and Family Rouvet (Christian
    Union - CU), and van Middelkoop (CU)) to discuss post-2010
    Afghanistan options was scheduled for January 29. It was
    postponed and has not yet been rescheduled. Following a
    request for post-2010 involvement (from NATO or the Afghan
    government), the Foreign Ministry will notify Parliament and
    with the Defense Ministry and Development Cooperation draw up
    a plan of engagement. The Cabinet will review and approve
    the plan, likely in the fall of 2009. The Cabinet will then
    send a letter to Parliament formally notifying it of the
    government's intent, initiating parliamentary review and
    debate (likely in late 2009 or early 2010). The decision
    will, as in 2007, follow an exhaustive review of key options
    including total withdrawal, reduction of contributions,
    reformation of forces, and repositioning of forces as well as
    testimony by outside experts. Dr. Henk Ormel, Chair of the
    Parliament's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, told a
    university audience Feb. 10 that the wording of the 2007
    mandate to leave Uruzgan left plenty of room for a future
    role in Afghanistan. He believes there will be a ""serious
    national discussion"" in late 2009 on the appropriate role for
    the Dutch focusing on defense, diplomacy and, especially,
    development (the 3D approach).
    KEY FACTORS FOR AFGHANISTAN POST-2010
    -------------------------------------
    ¶6. (S) Robert de Groot, MFA Deputy Director General for
    Political Affairs and the Ministry's point person on
    Afghanistan, counseled the POL/ECON Counselor in December
    2008 not to view any one official's comments in isolation.
    He suggested we balance the Defense Minister's concern about
    an exhausted military with the Foreign Minister's call for
    greater resources for the military. He explained the
    government told Parliament during the 2007 debate the
    Netherlands would stop being the lead nation for Task Force
    Uruzgan in 2010, ""that is all we promised."" Nevertheless, de
    Groot said, before agreeing to a follow-on mission, the Dutch
    would be influenced by:
    - CENTCOM Gen. Petreaus's expected review of Afghan strategy;
    - The U.S. overall plan for stabilizing Afghanistan (perhaps,
    de Groot mused, we need a ""new platform - a post-ISAF Phase
    III"" for the south);
    - Canada's plans (since de Groot characterized its
    government's announcement pulling out of Afghanistan in 2010
    as more categorical than the Dutch position);
    - The capacity of the Dutch military;
    - The new administration's/NATO's request of allies (de Groot
    thought very few allies had the capabilities to contribute
    more, in a meaningful way, in Afghanistan);
    - The ability of the Afghans to sustain development efforts;
    and
    - The willingness of the central government in Kabul to
    address governance issues (e.g., corruption).
    Declining Military Capabilities?
    --------------------------------
    ¶7. (S) The Dutch were one of our first partners in
    Afghanistan, contributing a Special Forces Task Group,
    infantry troops and staff officers to ISAF in December 2001.
    Qinfantry troops and staff officers to ISAF in December 2001.
    Since then, they have served as co-lead of ISAF headquarters
    (Feb.-Aug. 2003), lead at PRT Pol-e-Khumri (Baglan Province
    2004-2006), command of Regional Command-South (Nov. 06-May
    07; Nov. 08-present), and lead of PRT Tarin Kowt and Task
    Force Uruzgan (Oct. 06-present) as well as contributing
    F-16s, attack and transport helicopters, intelligence assets
    and trainers. As recounted to visiting EUR/WE Office
    Director Spratlen by the MFA, the Dutch military, a volunteer
    force, is currently under strength (only 34,000 personnel out
    of an authorized 41,000), and Afghanistan has taken its toll.
    Yet, by August 2010, the Dutch military will be even more
    experienced and heavily invested in the mission in
    Afghanistan. While certain elements may have had ""all they
    can handle,"" the Dutch will retain significant capabilities
    to contribute to the overall ISAF mission in Afghanistan:
    command and staff elements; Operational Mentoring and Liaison
    Teams (OMLT); Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT);
    logistical support elements; limited battle group elements;
    close air support assets; intelligence, surveillance,
    targeting and reconnaissance (ISTAR) elements; and staff
    billets. At the same time, other elements such as armored
    engineers and helicopter transport may not be combat-ready
    and, therefore, could limit the operations of the battle
    groups.
    Progress in Afghanistan Governance and Reconstruction
    --------------------------------------------- --------
    ¶8. (S) The greatest single threat to Dutch engagement is the
    perception there is no coherent, winnable game plan for
    creating a stable, democratic Afghanistan. Dutch confidence
    in their military and civilian engagements at the local
    levels in Uruzgan remains strong. The Dutch, however, are
    frustrated by the ""bungling"" of the central government in
    Kabul. The Dutch question their own involvement in an
    international coalition that appears incapable or unwilling
    to develop a legitimate, sustainable Afghan government.
    Decision Makers
    ---------------
    ¶9. (S) As in 2007, the important players within the Cabinet
    on this issue are Balkenende, Verhagen and, to a lesser
    extent, van Middelkoop. Koenders, interested in Afghan
    development and governance issues, will be key to convincing
    Bos to give Labor/PvdA support in the Cabinet to any
    post-2010 engagement plan. Parties of the left -- D66, the
    Socialist Party (SP), and Greenleft -- will likely oppose any
    continued involvement. The conservative Freedom Party (PVV)
    and the VVD will need to be convinced that any decision is
    clearly in the best interest of the Dutch. Although the
    ruling coalition parties (CDA, PvdA and CU) control enough
    votes in parliament to approve any Cabinet action, Dutch
    political tradition requires more than a simple majority to
    approve such an important action. The government will need
    the support of additional parties.
    Comment and First Steps
    -----------------------
    ¶10. (S) Comment: Embassy The Hague believes the Dutch will
    ultimately stay in Afghanistan for two primary reasons: to
    complete the mission and maintain a seat at the table as a
    ""responsible shareholder"" for international peace and
    security. It is paramount the Dutch view any post-2010
    engagement as partnering toward a viable Afghanistan solution
    and not a continuation of a failing strategy (hence de
    Groot's desire for a ""post-ISAF Phase III"" plan). A strategy
    that provides credible steps towards a central government
    that is responsive to the citizenry and capable of providing
    security will provide the Dutch with political cover to make
    commitments post-2010. Any sense the government is a patsy
    of the U.S. or that Afghanistan is descending into chaos will
    not garner the necessary public or parliamentary support.
    ¶11. (S) Comment Cont,d: The Dutch see themselves as our
    partners in Afghanistan and not mere supporters of U.S. goals
    there. U.S. engagement, from working level contacts to
    parliamentary and public outreach and high level contacts,
    will be necessary to confirm to the Dutch they are a key
    partner with influence whose consultations are meaningful and
    have an impact. Our engagement must be discreet, sensitive
    and timely. During the run-up to the December 2007 decision
    to extend the Uruzgan deployment an extra two years, the
    Qto extend the Uruzgan deployment an extra two years, the
    Dutch did not want a heavy visible USG presence and privately
    urged the U.S. to ""trust us"" on getting the extension. The
    Dutch will want quiet but active consultations and
    collaboration as a partner with the U.S. We have suggested
    (reftel C) using important events for the NY400 celebration
    as a reason for high level visitors to come to the
    Netherlands in 2009, conduct public outreach and quietly
    engage Dutch officials and parliamentarians on Afghanistan.
    At the outset, there will be two critical efforts - ensuring
    PvdA support within the Cabinet for any follow-on mission and
    getting additional parties, support once a Cabinet plan is
    submitted to Parliament. End comment.
    ¶12. (S) Getting to Yes: Dutch leaders will appreciate an
    understanding of both their domestic politics and their
    international contributions. Guidance from Washington on the
    changing strategy in Afghanistan, including growing
    deployments and expectations for Allies, will be essential.
    Post has already convened an Afghanistan Working Group
    involving POL, DAO and PD to develop a game plan for
    engagement and monitor developments. Embassy The Hague will
    continue to analyze and report on political developments in
    the Netherlands and how those events affect prospects for the
    Dutch post-2010 development. We will look for opportunities
    for Washington leaders to engage Dutch decision-makers (e.g.,
    having the USNATO ambassador as the guest of honor at
    Dutch-American Friendship Day in April; inviting General
    Petreaus to speak at the May 24 commemoration services at the
    Netherlands-U.S. cemetery at Margraten; having Special
    Representative Holbrooke visit Uruzgan and/or The Hague as he
    reviews U.S. strategy for Afghanistan; arranging an early
    meeting between Minister Koenders and the new USAID
    Administrator and senior Department officials on development
    issues). The upcoming meeting between the Secretary and FM
    Verhagen is an excellent opportunity to lay out what we want
    the Dutch to do post-2010 and how we can help get them to
    that decision.
    ¶13. (SBU) The following talking points will be a ""living
    document"" updated regularly for use with Dutch officials:
    - WE VALUE OUR PARTNERSHIP: We are proud to be partners with
    the Dutch in promoting a safe and secure Afghanistan and know
    that you have consistently punched above your weight in
    Afghanistan. (NOTE: The Dutch have been more involved in
    Afghanistan than many in NATO that have more capabilities.
    They were part of the initial ISAF forces and continue to
    contribute vitally important enablers. END NOTE.)
    - WE RECOGNIZE YOUR SACRIFICE: We are grateful for your work
    and recognize your sacrifices in extended command in the
    south and lead of Task Force Uruzgan. We know your
    leadership has stretched your military capacity. (NOTE: The
    Dutch made a difficult political decision to retain the lead
    in Task Force Uruzgan in 2007 and extended their commitment
    for two years as lead nation; Dutch Major
    General de Kruif is the Commander of Regional Command South.
    The Dutch have suffered 18 casualties in Uruzgan, including
    the son of Chief of Defense General van Uhm. It has been
    reported that as much as half of the military forces are
    either in Afghanistan, preparing to go to Afghanistan, or in
    a recovery mode from deployment at any one time. END NOTE.)
    - WE SHARE THE SAME GOALS FOR AFGHANISTAN: The President is
    committed to a 3D approach in Afghanistan. Your leadership
    in the use of development funds has been impressive in
    improving the lives of Afghan citizens. (NOTE: The Dutch
    have long been advocates of the 3D approach and strongly push
    the development aspect in their efforts in Afghanistan.
    Kathleen Ferrier, a skeptical CDA MP, actually used the three
    words of democracy, defense and development to describe her
    view of what is needed in Afghanistan. She and many in the
    Dutch arena feel they actually initiated the concept. We can
    use this language to build Dutch support. END NOTE.)
    - WE NEED TO WORK TOGETHER ON THE CHALLENGES: As Vice
    President Biden said in his Wehrkunde speech in Munich, we
    are at a tenuous stage in Afghanistan, and we cannot afford
    Qare at a tenuous stage in Afghanistan, and we cannot afford
    to backslide. This makes every contribution from our Allies
    all the more important. Adding to the urgency of the
    situation are the upcoming Presidential elections in August;
    we must all do everything in our power to head off potential
    violence if the Taliban pull out all the stops to derail the
    process, as we expect them to do. With this in mind, we plan
    to significantly increase our efforts in Afghanistan and urge
    Allies to join us in meeting the need for additional
    diplomacy, development and defense assets. We are planning
    on an extensive infusion of our forces as reinforcements, not
    replacements for current forces from all troop contributing
    nations already in Afghanistan. (NOTE: Some in the
    Netherlands have begun to believe that with the significant
    additional U.S. forces there is no longer a need for their
    own forces in theater. END NOTE.)
    - WE BELIEVE DUTCH CONTRIBUTIONS ARE CRITICAL: Dutch
    experience in running successful PRTs and the irreplaceable
    local knowledge you have gained in Uruzgan are of crucial
    importance to ISAF. Additional U.S. capabilities in the
    region may offer some relief to strained elements of your
    military, but we all need to continue to work together in
    Afghanistan to give a coordinated 3D approach time to work.
    GALLAGHER

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