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### Viewing cable 09DOHA502, ASD VERSHBOW'S MEETINGS IN QATAR

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09DOHA502 | 2009-08-10 11:11 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Doha

`

    VZCZCXRO8648
    PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
    DE RUEHDO #0502/01 2221157
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 101157Z AUG 09
    FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9316
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000502

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2019
    TAGS: PREL MASS QA XF ZP ZR YM IR JO LE
    SUBJECT: ASD VERSHBOW'S MEETINGS IN QATAR

    Classified By: Amb Joseph LeBaron for reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

    (C) SUMMARY
    -------------

    ¶1.    (C)  During their July 20-21 visit to Qatar, Assistant
    Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Security
    Affairs, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, and State
    Political-Military (PM) Assistant Secretary Andrew Shapiro
    held meetings with Qatar's military Chief of Staff, Major
    General (MG) Hamad al-Attiyah and the Crown Prince Tamim bin
    Hamad al Thani.  MG al-Attiyah and the Crown Prince tried to
    assure the Assistant Secretaries that Qatar used the Chief of
    Staff's visit to press Iran to respond to U.S. offers of
    engagement and to dismiss as "rubbish" Iranian efforts to
    blame the election crisis on U.S. and UK special services.
    The U.S. affirmed displeasure with Iranian behavior, and said
    the U.S. would not tolerate Iranian pursuit of nuclear
    weapons.  ASD Vershbow suggested now was the time for Qatar
    to distance itself from Iran and its proxies and urge Iran to
    end its destabilizing behavior.
    ¶2.    (C) MG al Attiyah and the Crown Prince repeated the
    Qatari position that they felt the need to engage all their
    neighbors and that Qatar could perhaps influence Iranian
    behavior through its engagement.  MG al-Attiyah also
    expressed disappointment that the Large Aircraft Infrared
    Counter Measure (LAIRCM) system is not available to be
    installed on Qatar's recently purchased C-17 aircraft.  ASD
    Vershbow said he would look into the issue further and that a
    formal response from the SecDef would be forthcoming.  The
    Chief of Staff also said no decision had been made on
    fulfilling an earlier U.S. request to provide funding for the
    refurbishment of Jordanian tanks being provided to Lebanon.
    When ASD Vershbow requested that Qatar use its good offices
    to help the U.S. in Yemen and induce a change in Hamas's
    behavior, the Chief of Staff expressed irritation that
    U.S.-Qatar friendship did not extend to issues of importance
    to Qatar, such as LAIRCM.  END SUMMARY

    U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP
    -----------------------

    ¶3. (C) U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for
    International Affairs Vershbow and Assistant Secretary of
    State for Political-Military Affairs Shapiro, joined by
    Ambassador, met July 20-21 over dinner and in a separate
    office call with Chief of Staff (COS) Major General Hamad
    al-Attiyah.  The U.S. visitors thanked the COS for Qatar's
    continued hospitality and support and for hosting our
    presence at both Camp As Sayliyah (CAS) and Al-Udeid Air Base
    (AUAB).

    C-17 PURCHASE
    -------------

    ¶4. (C) BG General al-Malki (Commander of the Fighter Wing and
    Chairman of the Transport Committee) informed ASD Vershbow
    that the first C-17 was on schedule for delivery and would
    depart California on August 11 with an ETA at AUAB O/A August
    ¶15.  In addition, BG General al-Malki mentioned his
    disappointment at the delay of the pilot training program,
    which will further delay the aircraft from becoming
    operational.  In response, ASD Vershbow reassured him that
    USG would work to resolve the issue.

    ¶5. (C) COS al-Attiyah expressed his concern to ASD regarding
    the C-17 LAIRCM.  The COS stated that he was greatly
    disappointed over USG disapproval of Qatar's application for
    LAIRCM.  Al-Malki pointed out that other nations had acquired
    the system and that Qatar's exclusion added to his
    frustration.  The COS said he did not want to elevate the
    matter to Qatar's civilian leadership.  He believed that
    Qatar's leaders would question the benefits of the
    U.S.-Qatari military relationship if the concern were to be
    raised.

    ¶6. (C) ASD Vershbow responded that a letter would be
    forthcoming from SECDEF explaining that Qatar would be
    receiving the same aircraft as received by the United States
    Air Force (USAF).  Vershbow further clarified that the LAIRCM
    was an additional add-on, for which transfer to Qatar had
    been disapproved.  Vershbow recommended that Qatar pursue
    other options, noting he was unaware that other nations had
    access to the LAIRCM system for transport aircraft.  ASD
    Vershbow said he would look into the matter, adjust the
    SECDEF letter as necessary and respond formally to the GOQ.
    COS and al-Malki stressed Qatar's desire to use aircraft
    jointly with the U.S. and Coalition Forces.

    IRAN
    ----

    DOHA 00000502  002 OF 003

    ¶7. (C) ASD asked the COS to recount his visit to the Islamic
    Republic of Iran.  COS briefed that his first visit to Iran
    was short in duration.  The Qatari delegation praised
    President Obama's Cairo Speech while in Iran and urged the
    Iranians to take steps to avoid isolating themselves
    internationally.  Further, the Qataris suggested that the
    Iranians seek engagement and rapprochement.  ASD Vershbow
    said this was the right message, and those who have contacts
    with Iran should use every opportunity to persuade Iranian
    leaders to end their destabilizing behavior.

    ¶8. (C) ASD Vershbow reiterated the need for Iran to take
    steps to convince the international community that it was not
    pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, and to end its support
    for Hamas, Hizballah, and other extremist groups.    He said
    we understand why Qatar, because of its close proximity and
    its economic and political ties to Iran, felt the need to
    engage with Iran.  Qatar should help the Iranians to avoid a
    conflict with the U.S. and the international community,
    remarking that "friends do not let friends drive drunk."

    ¶9.  (C) COS al-Attiyah responded that while Iran expresses a
    desire privately to change its behavior, these could be
    meaningless platitudes.  The COS reiterated that the GOQ
    opposes any Iranian pursuit of a military nuclear capability,
    noting that it would destabilize the region.  COS further
    suggested that the USG continue its own dialogue with the
    Islamic Republic.  COS al-Attiyah closed the discussion by
    making clear that, with respect to Iran, "while we're
    neighbors, we're not friends."  He summed up his recent visit
    to Tehran as an overture to maintain open channels of
    communication with Iran.

    LEBANON
    -------

    ¶10. (C) ASD asked if the GOQ had a response to an earlier
    request to the Prime Minister by Secretary Gates to help fund
    the transfer of 55 M1A1 tanks from Jordan to Lebanon.  COS
    said he was aware of the request, but that no decision had
    been made.  He added that he had discussed the issue during a
    recent CHOD conference with Jordanian and Lebanese
    representatives.

    HAMAS
    -----

    ¶11. (C) ASD Vershbow raised Qatar's ties with Hamas, and told
    the COS that Hamas needs to be encouraged to rejoin the
    Palestinian Authority and the Peace Process.  He added that
    there should be "no blank checks, no checks at all," for
    Hamas.  ASD suggested that Qatar was in a position to
    influence Hamas; if Qatar helped bring about a change in
    Hamas's behavior, it could enhance the U.S.-Qatar strategic
    relationship.  COS undertook to relay that message to the
    Amir and Crown Prince.  While the COS underscored that Qatar
    wants a good relationship with the U.S., he noted there were
    times when USG decisions sent a different signal, such as the
    USG's decision on LAIRCM.  COS al-Attiyah rhetorically asked,
    "Are we friends or not?"

    YEMEN
    -----

    ¶12. (C) ASD Vershbow asked if Qatar, or the GCC as a whole,
    would be renewing efforts to help solve the troubles in
    Yemen, citing Qatar's previous mediation efforts.  COS
    al-Attiyah responded that GOQ had engaged Yemen in the past,
    but noted that maintaining productive dialogue is difficult,
    given Yemen's economic plight and decentralized tribal
    society.  The COS added that the GOQ was unsure how Yemeni
    President Saleh plans to curtail the violence there.  He also
    noted that there is little military cooperation between the
    Qatar Armed Forces (QAF) and Yemen, but that he would make
    the GOQ leadership aware of the ASD's interest.  The COS said
    that the GCC had earlier presented a "unified package," but
    its efforts in Yemen had failed.  COS al-Attiyah recommended
    that this subject be addressed at the Manama Dialogue in
    December.

    NSS and CIP
    -----------

    ¶13. (C) ASD commended the COS on the upcoming
    CENTCOM-GOQ-Naval War College effort to develop a National
    Security Strategy.  Qatar and others in the region need to
    place more emphasis on Critical Infrastructure Protection,
    added the ASD.  COS al-Attiyah agreed and said he was looking
    forward to this effort. (Note: OMC Qatar will escort an
    interagency Qatari delegation back to Tampa August 11-13 to

    DOHA 00000502  003 OF 003

    begin this process.)

    CLOSING REMARKS
    ---------------

    ¶14. (C) COS ended the discussions by stating that he valued
    the U.S.-Qatar relationship.  The GOQ was committed to the
    friendship forged between the two nations, he said.  COS said
    he is looking forward to the P4 visit and expressed his
    desire to invite the P4 to his beach house as schedules
    permit.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶15.  (C) Qatar clearly registered its disappointment in not
    receiving LAIRCM for its C-17.  We believe this could fester
    into an open wound in the vital U.S.-Qatar security
    relationship.  The Chief of Staff is particularly sensitive
    about the issue, since Qatar's senior leadership (the Amir
    and Crown Prince) holds him responsible for maintaining a
    close and productive U.S.-Qatar military relationship.
    However, given the Qatari leadership's perception of the
    Chief of Staff's inability so far to get LAIRCM, senior
    leadership may start to question the Chief of Staff's
    assurances about the strength of the U.S.-Qatar military
    relationship.  End Comment.

    ¶16. (U) This cable was cleared by Assistant Secretary of
    Defense Alexander Vershbow.
    LeBaron

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