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### Viewing cable 10BERLIN164, WESTERWELLE ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, TAC NUKES

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10BERLIN164 | 2010-02-05 15:03 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Berlin

`

    VZCZCXRO7703
    OO RUEHSL
    DE RUEHRL #0164/01 0361532
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 051532Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6496
    INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0690

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000164

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2020
    TAGS: OTRA MARR NATO PARM PINS PREL PGOV GM AF IR
    SUBJECT: WESTERWELLE ON AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, TAC NUKES

    Classified By: Classified by Political M-C George Glass for reasons 1.4
     (b,d).

    ¶1.  (C) German FM Westerwelle told Amb February 5 that it was
    important to refocus Afghanistan efforts on civilian
    reconstruction; that we needed to avoid suggesting German
    troops engaged in less risk than other countries; that he did
    not invite Iranian FM Mottaki to Germany or seek a meeting
    with him; that any discussion of non-strategic nuclear
    weapons needed to be conducted at 28 at NATO; and that he
    could not influence any decision by the European Parliament
    on the SWIFT agreement.  END SUMMARY.
    ¶2.  (C) The Ambassador asked about Westerwelle's first 100
    days in office.  Though in an ebullient mood, Westerwelle
    said things were very difficult (FDP slipped another
    percentage point in the polls hours before the meeting).  He
    said he had been in France February 4 for a joint cabinet
    meeting, but that nothing substantive came of it.  He
    observed that one never really knew what was going to happen
    with Sarkozy involved.

    --------------
    AFGHANISTAN
    -------------

    ¶3.  (C) The Ambassador reviewed his own recent trip to
    Afghanistan.  He shared his impression that the Germans were
    doing a superb job at all levels from the RC-North commander
    on down.  He learned how critical mentoring and partnering
    with Afghan security forces had become.  He noted that the
    U.S. was sending substantial forces to RC-North, where they
    would conduct training and be under German command.
    Westerwelle responded that this was important for Germany and
    for international cooperation.  The Ambassador added that the
    U.S. was sending substantial helicopter support as well.  He
    said that Germans could be proud of their troops in
    Afghanistan.  Westerwelle responded that this was good news.
    He said that the London Conference bore an excellent
    conclusion, and was particularly useful for its focus on
    civilian progress.  He emphasized the importance of
    underscoring civilian reconstruction.
    ¶4.  (C) With a request for confidentiality, Westerwelle
    referred to the January 20 "Bild Zeitung" interview with
    General McChrystal, in which the general is quoted as urging
    the Germans to take more risks.  Westerwelle recounted that
    he himself had had to answer questions about this article for
    ten days, explaining that the Germans were not "peace
    soldiers" while  other countries provided the combat troops.
    He said it was important that German troops not be
    "relativized" and cast as second-class troops.  He observed
    that Germany had originally deployed 3,500 troops, increased
    that mandate to 4,500, and was now planning an increase of
    another 500 plus a reserve.  He emphasized that this was a
    major contribution compared with other European countries.
    ¶5.  (C) The Ambassador noted that he had gained the
    impression in Afghanistan that police training was more
    challenging than he had originally understood.  Troops were
    usually required to provide force protection.  But German
    police training was the best.
    ¶6.  (C) The Ambassador asked how the prospective February 26
    Bundestag debate to extend the Bundeswehr mandate in
    Afghanistan would play out.  Westerwelle said the question
    was how large a majority would approve the new mandate.  He
    said that SPD caucus chief Steinmeier displayed good will on
    this issue.  However, SPD chairman Gabriel wanted to
    politicize the issue for domestic political gain.
    Nevertheless, he thought some in the SPD would support the
    new mandate.  However, Westerwelle expected no support from
    the Greens.  Westerwelle noted that the May NRW state
    elections were also affecting the issue in a negative way.
    That said, he said he could not see Steinmeier opposing the
    larger mandate.  He hoped the Ambassador would speak with
    Steinmeier.

    ------
    IRAN
    ------

    ¶7.  (C) Asked about the February 5 visit of Iranian FM
    Mottaki to the Munich Security Conference, Westerwelle
    emphasized that he (Westerwelle) had not invited Mottaki to
    come to Germany, and Westerwelle had also not requested a
    meeting with Mottaki.  Rather, it was Mottaki who was asking
    to see Westerwelle.  Westerwelle said he had still not
    decided whether he would talk to Mottaki or not.  He
    reflected concern that Tehran might try to exploit Mottaki's
    visit to Germany as a distraction, and continue executing
    people during the visit.  In any case, Westerwelle said his
    position was exactly the same as the U.S. on Iran, and he
    would share the results of any meeting with Mottaki, if it
    took place.

    BERLIN 00000164  002 OF 002

    ¶8.  (C) Westerwelle said he would meet Russian FM Lavrov and
    (separately) Chinese FM Yang February 5.  He suggested that
    Moscow had been changing course on Iran sanctions since the
    Qom revelations.  The Russians now saw Iran as playing games
    on the nuclear issue.  However, he observed that China was
    "hesitant," or even in opposition to sanctions.  Reflecting
    on his recent visit to China, Westerwelle said he had not
    perceived any "good will" there at present.  He said he would
    ask Yang again about Iran and then share the results with the
    U.S.  Westerwelle opined that it was important also to focus
    on Brazil as an opinion leader in the Third World.  He noted
    that President Lula had received Ahmadinejad warmly several
    months ago.  He added that he was uncertain what the Saudis
    thought, but that the other Persian Gulf countries seemed to
    be in an existential panic about the Iranian nuclear program.

    -----------
    TAC NUKES
    -----------

    ¶9.  (C) Touching briefly on arms control, Westerwelle stated
    unequivocally that tactical nuclear weapons was an issue for
    NATO.  He said that when he had received Kissinger, Schulz,
    Perry and Nunn on February 3 to talk about their global zero
    proposal, tactical nuclear weapons was not discussed.  He
    said that the four statesmen were very supportive of
    President Obama.

    ----------
    TFTP
    ---------

    ¶10.  (C) The Ambassador raised the challenge of getting the
    European Parliament to approve an agreement to share data
    with the U.S. on tracking terrorist finance.  The Ambassador
    noted the extensive efforts of the Treasury Department and
    other U.S. agencies to explain the importance of the program
    to our common security.  He asked how one could get better
    support for the program.  Westerwelle replied that the German
    government had been able to come up with a solution for
    itself a few months ago when the issue first surfaced.
    (Comment: In fact, German Interior Minister de Maziere's vote
    to abstain in the EU Council vote on TFTP on November 30
    reflected the complete deadlock within the Coalition
    Government between TFTP advocates in the CDU-controlled
    Interior Ministry and TFTP opponents in the FDP-controlled
    Justice Ministery. End Comment.) However, Westerwelle said
    that now that the issue was in the European Parliament, he
    had no ability to influence it.  He said that he was very,
    very aware of the Secretary's interest in this issue.
    Nevertheless, he had a sense that almost all groups in the
    European Parliament had concerns with the proposed agreement.
     He emphasized that this was not an issue that only concerned
    his party, the FDP, but rather many others as well.
    ¶11. (C) Westerwelle shared that he had not yet appointed a
    new Coordinator for German-American cooperation.

    ----------
    COMMENT
    ---------

    ¶12.  (C) Westerwelle (who spoke with ease in English) was in
    a buoyant mood and more confident on his issues than we have
    seen him so far.  He seemed ready to defend any intimation
    that he was less than supportive of a troop surge (Defense
    Minister zu Guttenberg told the Ambassador two days ago that
    Westerwelle had worked for no increase of German troops for
    Afghanistan, see Berlin 157) with invocations of the
    importance of civilian reconstruction.  On Iran, he leapt at
    the chance to tell us he had not invited Mottaki.  His dodges
    on both tactical nuclear weapons and terrorist finance were
    all but practiced.  His comment that he was unable to affect
    the vote in the EU Parliament on TFTP was a bit disingenuous;
    on February 4, an MFA official acknowledged to visiting
    Treasury officials in Berlin that German MEPs were in fact
    leading the charge against TFTP in the EU Parliament with the
    tacit support of the FDP, if not of specialists in the
    Justice Ministry and MFA themselves. Westerwelle still cuts a
    good image in meetings and in the press here, even though his
    party continues a bout of free fall in the polls.  His
    ministry, though, still wonders (privately to us) where he
    gets his policy direction from.  END COMMENT.
    ¶13.  (U) The Ambassador did not have the chance to clear this
    cable before departing Berlin.

    Murphy

`