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### Viewing cable 09HAVANA221, THE U.S. AND THE ROLE OF THE OPPOSITION IN CUBA

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09HAVANA221 | 2009-04-15 13:01 | 2010-12-16 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | US Interests Section Havana

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHUB #0221/01 1051333
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 151333Z APR 09
    FM USINT HAVANA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4310
    INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU

` `

    CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
    MISC:
    DESTINATION: VZCZCXYZ0001
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHUB #0221/01 1051333
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 151333Z APR 09
    FM USINT HAVANA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4310
    INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU

    C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000221

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PHUM CU
    SUBJECT: THE U.S. AND THE ROLE OF THE OPPOSITION IN CUBA

    Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  As the Raul Castro government of Cuba
    (GOC) appears to have settled into a position of undisputed
    authority internally, it is worth asking what the Cuban
    political opposition is doing and the role it may play in the
    future.  Two recent op-ed pieces in the international press
    that have infuriated dissident leaders argue that the answers
    are: not much and none.  Though the op-ed pieces do not
    mention it, this assessment should carry the caveat that part
    of the reason for the relative inaction of the opposition is
    that the GOC is taking active steps to undermine it.   Many
    opposition groups are prone to dominance by individuals with
    strong egos who do not work well together and are therefore
    easy targets for manipulation by the Cuban security services.
    The Agenda para la Transicion, which was launched with much
    promise one year ago, is on the verge of breaking apart.
    Oswaldo Paya's Dialogo Nacional has picked up some stray
    dissidents, but has not taken any significant action in
    months.   Though dissidents have reacted very negatively to
    the articles in the international press, the fact is that
    they contain more than a grain of truth and it would have
    been better if the criticism had been taken as a wake-up call.

    ¶2.  (C) Without some true epiphany among the opposition
    leadership and a lessening in official repression of its
    activities, the traditional dissident movement is not likely
    to supplant the Cuban government.  The dissidents have, and
    will continue to perform, a key role in acting as the
    conscience of Cuba and deserve our support in that role.  But
    we will need to look elsewhere, including within the
    government itself, to spot the most likely successors to the
    Castro regime.   End Summary.

    Public Criticism Touches a Nerve in the Dissident Community
    --------------------------------------------- --------------

    ¶3.  (C) Two recent op-ed pieces that ran in the Miami press,
    one by Ivette Leyva Martinez entitled "the Wall of
    Dissidence," and the other by Fernando Ravsberg entitled
    "Cuba, the Dissidents and the World," argued that the
    dissident movement in Cuba has become as old and as out of
    touch with the lives of ordinary Cubans as the regime itself.
    The articles represented comprehensive and fairly balanced
    critiques of the dissident movement, and appeared at a time
    when the dissidents are under more pressure than ever from
    the Cuban government.  As such, they might have generated a
    reform debate among the dissident leaders, but instead they
    simply focused dissident frustration with the Cuban exile
    community.

    ¶4.  (C) In general, we would make the same criticisms of most
    of the official dissident movement that we have contact with
    in Havana.  In fairness to the dissidents we would add--as
    the op-ed pieces did not--that being an anti-GOC activist in
    Cuba is enormously difficult, and that any effort to move
    beyond small meetings in private homes would almost certainly
    be quickly and firmly repressed by the security services.
    That said, we see very little evidence that the mainline
    dissident organizations have much resonance among ordinary
    Cubans.  Informal polls we have carried out among visa and
    refugee applicants have shown virtually no awareness of
    dissident personalities or agendas.  Judging from the
    reactions we have heard from our dissident contacts, the most
    painful accusation made by the commentators was that the
    dissidents are old and out of touch.  Many of the leaders of
    the dissident movement are indeed comparatively old.
    Long-time dissidents like Martha Beatriz Roque, Vladimiro
    Roca, Felix Bonne, Roberto de Miranda, Oscar Espinosa Chepe,
    Elizardo Sanchez and Hector Palacios are in their 60s.
    Others such as  Francisco Chaviano and wife Ana Aguililla,
    Rene Gomez Manzano and Oswaldo Paya are well into their 50s.
    They have little contact with younger Cubans and, to the
    extent they have a message that is getting out, it does not
    appeal to that segment of society.  Their very valid focus on
    the plight of friends and relatives being held as prisoners
    of conscience, and on the government's failure to uphold
    basic human rights, does not address the interests of Cubans
    who are more concerned about having greater opportunities to
    travel freely and live comfortably.

    Dissident Movement Not a Coherent Whole
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶5.  (C) Whether or not the opposition organizations have
    agendas that can be made to appeal to a broad range of
    interests on the island, they must first begin to achieve
    some level of unity of purpose as an opposition, or at least
    stop spending so much energy trying to undercut one another.
    Despite claims that they represent "thousands of Cubans," we
    see little evidence of such support, at least from the
    admittedly limited vantage point we have in Havana.  When we
    question opposition leaders about their programs, we do not
    see platforms designed to appeal to a broad cross section of
    Cuban society.  Rather, the greatest effort is directed at
    obtaining enough resources to keep the principal organizers
    and their key supporters living from day to day.  One
    political party organization told the COM quite openly and
    frankly that it needed resources to pay salaries and
    presented him with a budget in the hope that USINT would be
    able to cover it.  With seeking resources as a primary
    concern, the next most important pursuit seems to be to limit
    or marginalize the activities of erstwhile allies, thus
    preserving power and access to scarce resources.

    ¶6. (C)  Younger individuals, including bloggers, musicians,
    and performing and plastic artists do not belong to
    identifiable organizations, though they are much better at
    taking "rebellious" stands with greater popular appeal.
    However, these individuals are still tightly controlled by
    the GOC, eschew the label of "dissident," and do not seem to
    aspire to any leadership role.  The international fame gained
    by a few, such has blogger Yoanny Sanchez, fuels further
    jealousy among the traditional dissident organizations and
    prevents them from working with the incipient networks that
    the younger generations are beginning to form.

    Internal Divisions and Limited View Hamper Activity
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶7.  (C) The current feud among the leadership of the Agenda
    para la Transicion is a case in point.  When the organization
    was founded one year ago, it was ground breaking in that it
    brought together an unusually broad array of dissidents.  The
    only significant groups missing were those of Oswaldo Paya,
    who was invited to join but refused, and the Arco Progresista
    led by Manuel Cuesta Morua, a group that is considered by
    other dissidents to be a "tame" opposition organization that
    is controlled by the GOC.  However, after only a year in
    which its signal accomplishment was presenting a prize to a
    young graphic artist for designing a logo for the
    organization, the Agenda para la Transicion seems close to
    flying apart.  The crux of the dispute appears to be a power
    struggle between Hector Palacios and several followers on one
    side and Martha Beatriz Roque and Vladimiro Roca and some of
    their followers on the other.  But the main problem lies in
    the fact that, while the concept of unifying the opposition
    under one umbrella organization has a great deal of merit,
    the members have not been able to overcome the challenge of
    keeping several very strong and uncompromising personalities
    working together.  The splits that would be natural among the
    members of such a group are aggravated by active measures
    being taken by Cuban state security, which works to coopt
    certain members and infiltrate the organization with its own
    agents whose job it is to stoke any discord that exists.

    ¶8.  (C) Oswaldo Paya and his supporters, who now include
    former Agenda member and lawyer Rene Gomez Manzano and
    dissident economist Oscar Espinosa Chepe, continue to be a
    very sober and serious force.  Paya has outlined great plans
    to organize his "National Dialogue" in the same way he did
    the Varela Project in the late 1990s with grassroots support
    throughout the island, but there is little activity apparent.
    The fact that 41 of the 54 prisoners of conscience arrested
    in the Black Spring of 2003 and still being held are Varela
    Project volunteers clearly weighs heavily on Paya.
    Therefore, much of his focus has been on defense of human
    rights and demands for the release of political prisoners.
    While these are laudable goals that must be pressed forward,
    as noted above, they have little resonance within Cuban
    society and do not offer a political alternative to the
    government of Cuba.

    Incipient Political Parties in Cuba
    -----------------------------------

    ¶9.  (C) The COM met on March 31 with the leaders of several
    self-professed political parties, most of them in some way
    claiming to be a successor to the old Cuban Liberal Party.
    These individuals at least claim to have political
    objectives.  Each of the groups presented a platform, all of
    which were very similar.  But they were also quite
    impressive, attacking tough issues like constitutional
    reform, the status of the armed forces and security forces,
    and domestic and international economic policy.  However,
    when the COM asked representatives of each group to explain
    how they would appeal to the Cuban public at large if there
    were open national elections tomorrow, none had a good
    answer, and it was apparent that they had not given a great
    deal of thought to that possibility.  The groups expressed
    their thanks to USINT for bringing them together in such a
    forum, and seemed prepared to contemplate the function of
    grassroots politics in their planning.  There is as yet no
    indication that there is any general movement in that
    direction, however.

    Relations with the Exile Community
    ----------------------------------

    ¶10.  (C) A consistent problem, and one that is becoming more
    acute as the eventual end of the Castro brothers' regime
    comes into sight, is the relationship between the on-island
    opposition and the exile community.  Even though much of
    their resources continues to come from exile groups,
    opposition members of all stripes complain that the intention
    of the exiles is to undercut local opposition groups so that
    they can move into power when the Castros leave.  The
    islanders accuse Miami and Madrid-based exiles of trying to
    orchestrate their activities from afar, and of
    misrepresenting their views to policy makers in Washington.
    Ironically, the "exile community" in many cases includes
    former dissidents who only just recently were able to get off
    the island.  Their closeness to the remaining dissidents on
    the island does not appear to keep them in the latter's good
    graces.  Instead, they are almost immediately lumped into the
    "them" that defines the exile community for the on-island
    opposition.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶11.  (C) COMMENT:  Various dissident leaders have maintained
    their focus on specific issues like treatment of political
    prisoners, and such work is valuable and worthwhile.  This is
    especially true of groups like the Damas de Blanco, whose
    very narrow focus on the plight of their imprisoned family
    members has made it one of the most effective organizations
    on the island.  It is the dissident movement that holds the
    GOC accountable for its violations of basic human and civil
    rights.   From our standpoint, however, there are few if any
    dissidents who have a political vision that could be applied
    to future governance.  Though the dissidents will not
    acknowledge it, they are not widely known in Cuba outside the
    foreign diplomatic and press corps.  A key factor that
    contributes to this is the GOC's focused effort to keep
    dissidents divided and unable to reach out to ordinary
    Cubans.  We have no doubt that, as alleged, the dissident
    movement is heavily penetrated by state security.  This
    penetration allows the government to play on the egos and
    personal feuds that are normal in any society, and exacerbate
    the divisions that would exist naturally among the
    dissidents.  Unless the GOC relaxes its suppression of
    opposition organizations, and the dissidents themselves
    become more capable of cooperative behavior, it is unlikely
    that they will play any significant role in whatever
    government succeeds the Castro brothers.  Nevertheless, we
    should continue to support the good work being done by the
    dissident movement in promoting observation of
    internationally recognized human rights and making public the
    plight of political prisoners.

    ¶12.  (C) COMMENT CONTINUED:  We believe it is the younger
    generation of "non-traditional dissidents," XXXXXXXXXXXX
    XXXXXXXXXXXX that is likely to have a greater long term impact on
    post-Castro Cuba.  However, the most likely immediate
    successors to the Castro regime will probably come from
    within the middle ranks of the government itself.  We do not
    know yet who might eventually rise to leadership positions in
    place of the old guard from within the government. The recent
    purge of younger officials like former Vice President Lage
    and former Foreign Minister Perez Roque must have given pause
    to any in that cadre who had considered thinking out loud
    about the future.  Still, we believe we must try to expand
    ou contacts within Cuban society on leadership and democracy
    initiatives as broadly as possible.  We also must continue to
    open up Cuba to the information age through measures such as
    those announced on April 13, to facilitate and encourage the
    younger generations of Cubans seeking greater freedom and
    opportunity.   End Comment
    FARRAR

`