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### Viewing cable 09BRASILIA177, UNDERSTANDING BRAZIL'S FOREIGN MINISTRY, PART 1:

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BRASILIA177 | 2009-02-11 19:07 | 2010-12-21 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brasilia

`

    VZCZCXRO9234
    RR RUEHRG
    DE RUEHBR #0177/01 0421928
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 111928Z FEB 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3528
    INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7371
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4857
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6078
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4337
    RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 1652
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 6818
    RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4102
    RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0449
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7673
    RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 1741
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 2691
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0850
    RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9067
    RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7253
    RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3516
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCJ2-I/J5/HSE/DIA REP//

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRASILIA 000177

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR WHA, IIP

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON OIIP BR
    SUBJECT: UNDERSTANDING BRAZIL'S FOREIGN MINISTRY, PART 1:
    IDEOLOGICAL FORCES

    REF: A. 2008 SAO PAULO 497
    ¶B. 2008 RIO DE JANEIRO 236
    ¶C. 2008 BRASILIA 1636
    ¶D. 2008 BRASILIA 1637
    ¶E. 2008 BRASILIA 1638
    ¶F. 2008 BRASILIA 1418
    ¶G. BRASILIA 103
    ¶H. BRASILIA 0068
    ¶I. 2008 STATE 115233

    Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary. As Brazil takes an increasingly prominent
    place on the international stage, its Foreign Ministry, known
    widely as Itamaraty after its headquarters building, finds
    itself under the influence of four powerful personalities
    whose ideologies are shaping its foreign policy priorities
    and interaction with the United States. Over the last six
    years, President Lula's relatively pragmatic effort to expand
    Brazil's outreach to a growing group of countries, including
    the United States, has been implemented differently by the
    GOB's three principal foreign policy actors: the nationalist
    Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, the anti-American Secretary
    General (deputy Foreign Minister) Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes,
    and the academic leftist presidential Foreign Policy Advisor
    Marco Aurelio Garcia. Along with President Lula, the three
    have pulled the Foreign Ministry in unaccustomed and
    sometimes different directions.

    ¶2. (C) The departure of deputy FM Guimaraes in November 2009
    and a new administration in January 2011 are likely to again
    modify the GOB's foreign policy ideologies and priorities.
    As we seek to broaden and deepen our relationship with
    Itamaraty, ideological dynamics will make Itamaraty a
    sometimes frustrating partner. Even so, the opportunity
    exists now to move forward by working with other Brazilian
    institutions, and to shape the views of a large cohort of
    younger, more pragmatic, and more globally oriented diplomats
    who will be moving into senior ranks. Para 16 contains two
    proposals post is actively exploring. (Note: This is the
    first of three cables examining the influences on Brazil's
    Foreign Ministry. A second will report on the institutional
    strains affecting Itamaraty. A third will examine the
    inter-agency struggles that are slowly eroding Itamaraty's
    foreign policy primacy; see also paras 13-14 below. End
    note.) End summary.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    President Lula: The Pragmatic Leftist
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶3. (C) President Lula arrived in office in 2003 with little
    foreign affairs experience and a broadly leftist approach to
    international affairs in which more developed countries stood
    against less developed countries on the world stage. In
    practice, however, Lula has demonstrated a gift for
    personalizing foreign policy through contacts with foreign
    leaders and a penchant for taking a pragmatic rather than an
    ideological approach to working with other countries. As a
    result, Lula has significantly shaped Brazil's foreign policy
    efforts, as his good working relationships with leaders from
    across the political spectrum have helped increase Brazilian
    influence and standing, while paving the way for closer
    cooperation between Brazil and a growing number of global
    actors, including the United States. But there remains a
    notable tension between Lula's actions and his rhetoric,
    which often takes on a North-South, "us versus them" cast.
    This tension keeps Itamaraty on edge, and has opened the door
    for Amorim, Guimaraes, and Garcia to formulate and implement
    Brazil's foreign policy in different ways.

    BRASILIA 00000177 002 OF 005

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    'Three Foreign Ministers' Make for Unhappy Diplomats
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶4. (C) Most analysts agree that Lula is not the principal
    architect of his administration's foreign policy vision, nor
    the principal overseer of its implementation. In this
    regard, contacts almost universally cite FM Amorim, SG
    Guimaraes, and Advisor Garcia as nearly co-equal with regard
    to their influence in determining the broad outlines and
    scope of Brazil's foreign policy. All three are leftist in
    their basic ideology, but each has taken on a specific
    leadership role, approaches his job with a different slant,
    relates in a different manner to President Lula, and receives
    support from a different base. Each has carved out his own
    foreign policy niche: trade, developed country relations,
    multilateral issues, Africa, and the Middle East for Amorim;
    political-military issues, relations with some developing
    countries, and Foreign Ministry inner workings for Guimaraes;
    and South American and leftist countries in Latin America and
    elsewhere for Garcia. The effect is a somewhat disjointed
    vision and implementation of Brazil's foreign policy that can
    lead to frustration on the part of Brazilian diplomats.

    ¶5. (C) Where the interests of these three advisors coincide
    in their views, Brazil's direction has been unequivocal:
    prioritizing regional political integration, deepening
    relations with emerging economies (e.g., through the BRICs
    and IBSA--India, Brazil, South Africa--fora), expanding
    south-south relations (e.g., through Arab States-South
    America, South America-Africa, and Latin America-wide fora),
    and increasing dialogue with other regional powers (Iran,
    Venezuela, China, North Korea) to highlight its position as a
    friend of both the United States and its adversaries. None
    of the three admits that there is any interest or effort to
    place relations with Europe and the United States on a second
    plane, and staffing at Brazil's foreign missions seems to
    bear this out (see septel). However, there is a growing
    debate among the non-government foreign policy elite in
    Brazil (refs A and B), and substantial opposition from the
    private sector, regarding the wisdom of what is widely
    acknowledged as a heavy south-south focus. This debate
    expresses publicly the discomfort that many diplomats express
    privately with the direction of Brazil's foreign policy under
    Lula. Diplomats tell us that the leftist slant to policy has
    resulted in "exile" either overseas or to domestic postings
    outside Itamaraty (at universities, for example), self-exile
    overseas, or early retirement for more senior colleagues.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    FM Amorim: the Nationalist Leftist
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶6. (C) For all the sniping at Lula's foreign policy from
    senior ex-diplomats--and such criticism is constant, public,
    and widespread--Foreign Minister Amorim is one of their own,
    a respected career diplomat steeped in traditional Itamaraty
    nationalism. Historically, this expressed itself in
    opposition to the United States, and it is still
    unquestionably true that, within South America, Itamaraty
    resists almost without exception regional initiatives
    involving the United States. When the United States is at
    the table, in Itamaraty's view, Brazil cannot lead. This may
    explain why Itamaraty remains lukewarm regarding the Summit
    of the Americas, has rejected cooperation with us in South
    America on biofuels, and has launched a number of initiatives
    in South America that do not include the United States. Most
    recently, the December 2008 Bahia summits (refs C, D, E),
    including the first-ever meeting of Latin American and
    Caribbean heads of state and government, represented an
    effort by Brazil to expand the scope of its leadership in the

    BRASILIA 00000177 003 OF 005

    region, without having to play second fiddle to the United
    States.

    ¶7. (C) Under Amorim's most recent tenure as Foreign Minister,
    however, Itamaraty nationalism has undergone a subtle shift.
    (Note: Amorim also served as FM for 18 months under President
    Itamar Franco, 1993-1994. He has served as FM under Lula
    since 2003. End note.) Over the last several years, a
    broader, once nearly knee-jerk anti-Americanism has given way
    to a growing desire to have a seat among global players
    addressing global issues, to be and be perceived as being an
    equal to Europe, China, India, Japan, and the United States
    on the world stage (ref F). The most notable expressions of
    this tendency have been the renewed primacy given Itamaraty's
    long-standing effort to secure a permanent seat on the UN
    Security Council, a constructive and engaged role in the WTO
    negotiations (under pressure from Brazil's private sector),
    interest in playing in the Middle East peace process, and
    most recently active engagement in discussions on the global
    financial crisis. Compared with Guimaraes and Garcia,
    Amorim's leftist views tend to be held in check by
    traditional Itamaraty care for diplomatic niceties and an
    almost reverential respect for reciprocity and
    multilateralism. Brazil's recent decision to grant refugee
    status to an Italian terrorist (ref G), for example, was
    clearly made by the Justice Minister for ideological reasons,
    and almost certainly without Amorim's support.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    Secretary General Guimaraes: the Anti-American Leftist
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶8. (C) One former diplomat told PolCouns that SG Guimaraes, a
    career diplomat who was shunted aside by President Cardoso,
    owes his influence and independence to being the Labor
    Party's (PT) first choice for FM after Lula was elected.
    Guimaraes believed he was not confirmable and suggested
    Amorim, with himself as Secretary General--a move the PT
    made, but which required congress to pass a waiver, as
    Guimaraes had not served as ambassador, a legal requirement
    to hold the post. Along with family connections (Guimaraes'
    daughter is married to Amorim's son), this history may
    explain his outsized authority and substantial autonomy.

    ¶9. (C) Guimaraes is virulently anti-American, and anti-"first
    world" in general. He has advocated extreme positions--for
    example, that in order to be taken seriously on the world
    stage Brazil must develop nuclear weapons--and as the senior
    official in charge of personnel matters, he issued a required
    reading list of anti-American books that has only recently
    been toned down. He has been accused by current and former
    diplomats of using ideological requirements in handing out
    promotions. And he is known to have gone out of his way to
    provoke and stall initiatives by U.S. and European countries.
    Politico-military affairs, which are managed largely out of
    his office, and counter-crime/counter-drug issues (managed by
    him until earlier this year, and still subject to his
    influence) remain two of our most difficult areas for
    bilateral cooperation at the policy level, with initiatives
    regularly stalled or stymied by Itamaraty. According to
    European and Canadian diplomats, our problems with Guimaraes
    are not unique, and they are awaiting as eagerly as we are
    his mandatory retirement in November 2009, when he turns 70.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    Advisor Garcia: the Academic Leftist
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶10. (C) Many contacts, including most recently Defense
    Minister Nelson Jobim (ref H), tell us that Marco Aurelio
    Garcia is one of President's closest advisors, enjoying a

    BRASILIA 00000177 004 OF 005

    longstanding personal relationship with him and exercising an
    outsized influence. An academic leftist and long-time PT
    member, Garcia has championed closer relations with leftist
    governments in the region and beyond, as well as the
    prioritization of south-south relations. Talking with
    Americans, he tends to couch negative views of the United
    States as good-natured jokes from the past ("When I was
    young, we used to call the OAS 'the Ministry of U.S.
    Colonies'"; "When I was a young man, the joke was, 'Why has
    the United States never had a coup? Because it doesn't have
    a U.S. embassy!'"). In the present, he has taken on
    President Lula's pragmatic approach to foreign policy,
    dealing with the United States and other non-leftist
    countries in order to achieve Lula's objectives. Since the
    new U.S. Administration has come on board, he has been
    emphatic in passing along Lula's keen desire to meet soon
    with President Obama.

    ¶11. (C) Garcia's influence as Lula's most trusted foreign
    policy advisor remains undiminished despite harsh criticism
    from Brazil's foreign policy elite for being too "soft" on
    its neighbors, which temporarily gave Itamaraty the upper
    hand in managing the spate of problems between Brazil and
    Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Argentina in late 2008.
    Garcia maintains the lead on contacts with South America's
    leftist governments, and where he is not the author of
    Brazil's outreach to countries such as Cuba, South Africa,
    Iran, and Russia, he is fully supportive and active in
    advancing these relationships.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    Comment: Prepare for the Challenge...and the Change
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶12. (C) The ideological forces currently dominating Itamaraty
    mean that, in the near term, the Foreign Ministry will
    continue to represent a challenge for U.S. engagement on many
    issues. At least through the end of the Lula administration,
    the ideological bent of certain key policymakers will
    constrain cooperation in some areas. Pursuing initiatives
    with Brazil--and particularly those not dear to the principal
    foreign policymakers--will continue to require a substantial
    investment of time, strategic preparation, and effort to
    overcome ideological headwinds, bureaucratic inertia, and
    more pressing priorities (see also septels).

    ¶13. (C) In particular, although Itamaraty will remain a
    significant player on almost all U.S. initiatives and
    interests in Brazil, the way forward with the GOB will in
    large measure involve working with other significant players
    as well. In the first instance, this means the Presidency,
    as Lula has made clear his interest in developing a closer
    relationship with the United States and Garcia, his closest
    advisor, is the most dependable in reflecting views. Second,
    this means working with other GOB ministries and agencies
    that will act as advocates for closer cooperation. Finally,
    it means drawing in congress, the judiciary, governors, and
    non-governmental players, and the private sector in
    particular, which generally support working with the United
    States and often have the ability to sway decisions in favor
    of our initiatives.

    ¶14. (C) Building supportive coalitions with other Brazilian
    players as a way to overcome MRE opposition is a tested
    strategy: on the Tropical Forests Conservation Act debt swap,
    enhanced visa terms, our NAS LOA, civil aviation, defense
    cooperation, biofuels cooperation, information sharing,
    climate change, and a host of other issues, developing
    initiatives with and working through players other than
    Itamaraty have been critical elements in our success. Most
    recently, excellent relations with the Ministry of Justice,

    BRASILIA 00000177 005 OF 005

    Federal Police, and the Presidency were crucial to overcoming
    last-minute MRE refusal to issue visas to DEA agents
    preparing to transfer from Bolivia to Brazil (see septel).
    We expect that gaining Brazilian cooperation on climate
    change and hemispheric energy security will also depend
    heavily on working closely with players outside Itamaraty.

    ¶15. (C) Over the longer term, in light of the GOB's current
    efforts to adjust to broader participation on the world
    stage, we expect that senior Itamaraty policymakers will
    continue to expand the range of issues on which they are
    comfortable working in tandem with industrialized countries.
    During the next decade, the older generation of diplomats,
    who still often defined their interests as a regional power
    in opposition to the United States, will be replaced by a
    large cohort of younger, more pragmatic, and more globally
    oriented officers. The recognition by at least some senior
    Itamaraty officials that they have not done a good job of
    training "Americanists" who understand the United States
    suggests that there may well be increased openness to new
    initiatives on this front, especially following the departure
    of Samuel Guimaraes in 2009. Openness may increase further
    in 2011 if the Lula government is replaced by one with a less
    ideological set of senior policymakers.

    ¶16. (C) Post believes that it is critical to influence
    Brazil's new generation of diplomats, which we generally find
    more accessible and, while still strong nationalists, more
    ready to consider cooperation where U.S.-Brazil interests
    coincide. Among the new near-term possibilities we are
    exploring is the possibility of establishing a more regular
    program of speakers and digital video conferences with Rio
    Branco to promote engagement between their diplomatic
    trainees and U.S. diplomats and other interlocutors.
    Depending on how this is received, we might consider
    establishing a "young diplomats" group to allow for
    additional contact and exposure with U.S. diplomats. Post
    has also learned that the French instituted a diplomatic
    exchange program with Itamaraty in 2008, similar to our
    Transatlantic Diplomatic Fellowship, and now have a diplomat
    working in Itamaraty's Europe Department. We believe a
    similar proposal would be a valuable way both to test the
    waters for cooperation and, if implemented, both to gain
    further insight into the workings of this key ministry and to
    give Brazilian diplomats greater understanding of how the USG
    executes foreign policy.
    SOBEL

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