Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 4953 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF ASEC AM AE AG AR AS AU AORC AJ AMGT AGMT AFIN APER ABUD ATRN AL AEMR ACOA AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC ASIG ABLD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AVERY APCS AER ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AEC
BR BA BM BRUSSELS BL BK BO BILAT BTIO BEXP BH BE BX BU BIDEN BY BG BF BB BC BBSR BMGT BTIU
COUNTER CH CO CG CE CA CASC CU CLINTON CI CVIS CDG CIA CACM CDB CS CBW CD CV CMGT CJAN CF CN CAN CIS CM CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CJUS CARSON COUNTERTERRORISM
DA DJ DEAX DR DHS DOE DEA DK DISENGAGEMENT DS DTRA DOD
ECON EG EAID EFIN ELAB EUN ETRD EU EXTERNAL ENRG ETTC EPET EINV EMIN ECIP ECPS EINDETRD EAGR EN EZ ER ET ES EUC EI EAIR EIND EWWT ELTN EREL ECIN EFIS EINT EC ECONEFIN ENVR ECA ELN EINVETC ENIV EINN ENGR EUR ESA ENERG EK ENGY ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN
FR FJ FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FMLN
GTMO GOI GM GG GV GH GA GE GT GR GTIP GCC GAZA GZ
HILLARY HA HU HR HUMAN HO HYMPSK HURI HK HSTC
IS IR IZ INRB IAEA IN IT ID IO IV ICTY IQ ICAO INTERPOL IPR IRAJ INRA INRO IC IIP ITPHUM IWC ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC IMO IF ILC IEFIN INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF INR IRC ITALY ITALIAN
JAMES JO JA JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JUS
KDEM KJUS KCOR KOLY KIPR KNNP KU KWBG KPAL KN KS KZ KAWK KISL KPAO KCRM KSEC KGHG KIFR KTFN KDRG KV KSUM KWAC KAWC KDEMAF KFIN KGIC KTIP KOMC KHLS KSPR KGCC KPIN KG KBIO KHIV KSCA KE KFRD KPKO KNUC KMDR KPLS KUNR KIRF KIRC KACT KRAD KCOM KMCA KHDP KVPR KDEV KWMN KMPI KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KCFC KTIA KPRP KCIP KCFE KOCI KTDB KMRS KLIG KBCT KICC KGIT KSTC KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KO KTER KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTBT KCRS KRVC KSTH KREL KNSD KPAI KHSA KR KPWR KMIG
LY LE LG LH LU LI LO LOG LT
MARR MOPS MCAP MNUC MZ MO MASS MY MEPP MA MR ML MX MIL MTCRE MPOS MOPPS MTCR MAPP MU MG MASC MCC MK MTRE MP MDC MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MASSMNUC MERCOSUR
NATO NI NZ NG NU NO NL NIPP NPT NE NS NAR NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NGO NP NSF NATIONAL
OTR OVIP OVP OREP ODIP OPDC OPRC OIIP OFFICIALS OSAC OAS OEXC OFDP OTRA OSCE OPIC OECD OPCW OSCI OIE OIC
PREL PGOV PTER PHUM PINR PAK PREF PL PBTS PHSA PARM PO PINS PK PINT PROP PE POGOV PINL POL PBIO PSOE PKFK PGOF PA PARMS PORG PM PMIL PTERE PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRGOV PNAT PROV PEL PINF PGOVE POLINT PRL PRAM PMAR PGOVLO PHUMBA POLITICS PEPR PSI PU POLITICAL PARTIES PECON
QA
RS RU RO RW REGION RP RIGHTS RICE ROBERT RF RFE
SP SY SOCI SCUL SNAR SA STEINBERG SENV SF SO SR SG SW SU SL SMIG SN SHUM SZ SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI
TIP TERRORISM TI TU TC TRGY TX TS TBIO TW TSPA TH TR TT TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TPHY TK TNGD
UN US UK UG UNSC UP USEU UNMIK UV UZ UY UNGA UNO USUN UNESCO UE UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS UNAUS UNCHC
VZ VT VE VTPREL VN VM
WTRO WTO WA WI WMO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WEU
XF XA XG XT XM XR XS XL XK XH XY XC XZ XW XD XE
YE YM YI
ZI ZU ZP ZR ZB ZF ZK ZANU ZOELLICK ZA ZO ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09UNVIEVIENNA220, IAEA/EGYPT: SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION REPORT CITES

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09UNVIEVIENNA220.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09UNVIEVIENNA220 | 2009-05-11 14:02 | 2011-01-28 00:12 | SECRET | UNVIE

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHUNV #0220/01 1311416
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 111416Z MAY 09
    FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9444
    INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0227
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1646
    RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

` `

    S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000220

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR ISN/RA AND IO/T

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2034
    TAG PARM, PREL, KNNP, IAEA, MNUC, EG
    SUBJECT: IAEA/EGYPT: SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION REPORT CITES
    INVESTIGATION OF LEU/HEU PARTICLES FOUND AT INSHAS NUCLEAR
    CENTER

    REF: 05 UNVIE 00136

    Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRE GEOFFREY PYATT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AN
    D (D)

    -----------------------------------
    Summary, Comment and Recommendation
    -----------------------------------

    ¶1. (SBU) The IAEA's Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR)
    for 2008, an annual report on safeguards worldwide, includes
    a country-specific section on Egypt citing for the first time
    an ongoing investigation of findings in 2007 and 2008 of HEU
    and LEU particles at the Inshas research center.  The key
    sentence reports that although the Agency "has no indication
    contrary to Egypt's explanations" for the presence of the
    enriched uranium (i.e., the uranium particles came from
    contamination on imported radioisotope containers), the
    Agency "has not yet identified the source of the particles"
    and will continue to investigate according to its "procedures
    and practices." The Report specifies that additional
    environmental samples will be required.  The SIR section on
    Egypt also concludes that earlier issues of undeclared
    nuclear activities and material reported to the Board in
    February 2005 (GOV/2005/9) are no longer outstanding,
    effectively de-linking the current issue of contamination
    from the past safeguards problems.

    ¶2. (S) The SIR report refrains from characterizing safeguards
    implementation in Egypt as "routine."  Rather, for purposes
    of presentation in the SIR, Egypt is placed on similar
    footing with Iran, Syria and DPRK with a country-specific
    section in the table of contents.  Including Egypt in the SIR
    report in this manner is a step short of making Egypt the
    subject of a country-specific safeguards report as in 2005,
    and as has been the case for Iran, Syria and DPRK.
    Nevertheless, the optics of being classed in the same
    category as the others in the SIR report are not good for
    Egypt.  Egypt has already begun playing down the report as
    "old news" by conflating the new HEU/LEU finding with the
    2005 issues.  We fully expect Egypt to take this tack in the
    June Board meeting which will consider the SIR report along
    with country-specific reports on Iran and Syria.  Prompted by
    the Syrian case, the June Board will also discuss the issue
    of "de-restricting" Board documents, such as the DG's reports
    on safeguards investigations.  The immediate leak of the
    restricted draft SIR will likely be cited by Egypt as it
    argues against release of the DG's reports, a likelihood
    foreshadowed by statements already appearing in press from
    the Egyptian MFA spokesman.  As an IAEA Board member and
    representative of the NAM troika, Egypt is one of the more
    unhelpful delegations (next to Cuba) on the Board,
    particularly on Iran and Syria issues, and in the IAEA
    General Conference (GC) on Middle East safeguards.

    ¶3. (S) Recommendation and Guidance Request: Mission requests
    any guidance for responding to the SIR.  We recommend that
    our statement to the June Board supports the strengthened
    safeguards approach in Egypt and clearly welcomes and
    appreciates Egypt's full cooperation with those efforts.  We
    believe such a U.S. posture would be the best means for using
    the SIR report as a source of leverage against Egypt to
    persuade Cairo to be more cooperative in the Board and GC.
    For example, expressing concern about the HEU finding in
    Egypt, or threatening to do so (as Israeli Ambassador
    Michaeli suggested to us), in national statements on the SIR
    (which would be reflected in the Board Chair's Summary) could

    be a point of leverage.  However, overplaying our hand in
    this regard could also provoke a defensive reaction from
    Cairo, making Egypt even less cooperative at the IAEA.  We
    recommend a measured, positive approach calibrated to the
    knowledge (as the Secretariat has told us in confidence) that
    there is likely a benign explanation for the presence of the
    uranium contamination, not the tip of a nuclear weapons
    program iceberg.  A positive approach, both in Vienna and
    Cairo, taking account of other equities we may have with
    Egypt, could be used to build some currency toward a renewed
    sense of common purpose with Egypt at the IAEA.
    End Summary, Comment, and Recommendation.

    -------------------------------------
    Safeguards Implementation Report 2008
    -------------------------------------

    ¶4. (SBU) The annual Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR)
    for 2008 was issued on May 5 as GOV/2009/24.  The SIR
    provides a description and analysis of the Agency's

    safeguards operations worldwide in 2008 and summarizes the
    problems encountered.  Egypt received its own section in the
    report (see para 13 below for full text), along with Iran and
    Syria.  The SIR addresses two distinct issues on Egypt: 1)
    for the first time informing the Board of HEU and LEU
    particles found in environmental samples taken at Inshas
    Nuclear Center in 2007-2008; and 2) closing out other
    outstanding issues related to Egypt's past undeclared nuclear
    activities and materials (reported to the Board in February
    2005 in GOV/2005/9).  There is no change to the Agency's
    conclusion that all declared nuclear material in Egypt
    remained in peaceful activities for 2008.  As Egypt does not
    have an Additional Protocol, there is no conclusion on
    undeclared nuclear material or activities.

    ¶5. (S) Although this new finding of HEU and LEU contamination
    at Inshas is established as a distinct issue from the past
    safeguards problems reported to the Board in February 2005,
    the Secretariat/Director General reports both issues in
    tandem in the context of the SIR document.  (Comment:
    Although we suspect access/procedures related to the previous
    investigation may have contributed to the finding of uranium
    contamination, Mission believes the IAEA reported it as "new"
    to illustrate Egyptian cooperation on the earlier issues,
    therefore making the reporting of the new issue more
    palatable to Egypt.  The optics of the alternative, issuing a
    special report on Egypt as is the case with Iran, Syria and
    DPRK would have been far more damaging.  End comment.)

    ----------------------------------
    Reaction to the IAEA's HEU Finding
    ----------------------------------

    ¶6. (S) According to the SIR, Egypt has stated to the IAEA
    that it "believed the particles could have been brought into
    the country through contaminated radioisotope transport
    containers."  The Agency notes that it will continue its
    investigation - including taking additional environmental
    samples - to determine the source of the uranium particles
    but "has no indications contrary to Egypt's explanation."
    The Secretariat notably does not characterize this
    investigation as a "routine," but instead says it will be
    investigated in accordance with the Agency's "procedures and
    practices."  The Secretariat's investigation will be geared
    toward confirming the origins of the HEU and LEU and how they
    may have ended up in Egypt.  Secretariat contacts have told
    us (strictly protect) they do not so far see any indication
    that this finding could be the tip of a covert nuclear
    military or weapons program.  They see as much more likely
    possible benign explanations, such as the contamination
    originating from an old uranium standard or some other very
    small quantity of uranium that was enriched elsewhere.

    ¶7. (S) The SIR section on Egypt has already generated
    negative press for Egypt, including the fact that the HEU may
    have been near weapons-grade.  Thus far the Egyptian reaction
    in Vienna has been "no comment" (both the Ambassador and DCM
    were absent when it came out) and Cairo seems inclined to
    downplay the issue (incorrectly) as "old news" by conflating
    the issue with the 2005 report.  One press report even
    speculated that it could have been prompted by Bechtel losing
    a contract bid to build a reactor in Egypt.  Another press
    report foreshadowed Egypt citing the immediate leakage of the
    "Board restricted" SIR draft during the upcoming June Board
    discussion of deristriction of Board documents.  Egypt helped
    prompt the coming June Board discussion by joining others in
    resisting release of DG ElBaradei's reports on Syria.  The
    reaction among other delegations in Vienna has also been
    relatively muted.  The Australian Mission assessed that the
    SIR did not give rise to proliferation concerns at this stage
    but that the issue remains open until the Agency is able to
    determine the source of the HEU particles.  The Canadian
    Mission was still assessing the implications and importance
    of the report.  France also awaits guidance from Paris.

    --------------------------------------
    Background of Past Egypt Noncompliance
    --------------------------------------

    ¶8. (SBU) Egypt was cited in the 2004 SIR report after
    findings of undeclared material and activities.  The Director
    General issued a report to the Board on February 14, 2005
    with details of the problems that the Agency had uncovered in
    Egypt.  (Comment:  Discovery of the undeclared activity was
    particularly noteworthy for the fact that the IAEA launched
    the investigation on its own after reviewing open source
    documents that suggested activities not yet declared to the

    Agency, i.e., there was no tip-off from member state
    intelligence.  End comment.)  The undeclared activity related
    to uranium extraction and conversion, irradiation of uranium
    targets and reprocessing that had not been reported to the
    Agency.

    ¶9. (SBU) The 2005 DG report noted Egypt's active
    participation in addressing the Agency's outstanding
    questions, and the Chairman's conclusion from the March 2005
    Board of Governors meeting supported the Agency's
    investigation and welcomed Egypt's cooperation.  No
    resolution was passed at the March 2005 Board on Egypt's
    failure to report nuclear materials and activities; thus, the
    Board made no formal finding of noncompliance and made no
    report to the UN Security Council.  The U.S. statement at the
    March 2005 Board welcomed Egypt's cooperation with the
    Agency, while also noting the safeguards failures were a
    matter of concern.  As noted, the newly released 2008 SIR
    closes out these past issues.

    ¶10. (SBU) The DG concluded in his February 2005 (GOV/2005/9)
    report that the Agency identified a number of failures by
    Egypt to act in accordance with its obligations under its
    Safeguards Agreement and that these failures were a matter of
    concern:

    -- Failure to report on its initial inventory of imported
    UF4, imported and domestically produced uranium metal,
    imported thorium compounds, small quantities of domestically
    produced UO2, UO3, and UF4, and a number of unirradiated low
    enriched and natural uranium fuel rods;

    -- Failure to report the uranyl nitrate and scrap UO2
    pellets, and their use for acceptance testing of the
    Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant;

    -- Failure to report the irradiation of small amounts of
    natural uranium and thorium and their subsequent dissolution
    in the Nuclear Chemistry Building laboratories, including the
    production and transfer of waste;

    -- Failure to provide initial design information for the
    Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant and the Radioisotope Production
    Facility, and modified design information for the two
    reactors.

    ¶11.  (SBU) During the March 2005 Board (see reftel), Members
    uniformly expressed their satisfaction with Egypt's
    cooperation with the IAEA and concluded that Egypt's failures
    to declare nuclear material, activities, and facilities in a
    timely fashion were not a matter of proliferation concern.
    Members justified this conclusion by arguing that some
    activities were published in open sources and were,
    therefore, not clandestine; that some of them occurred 15-40
    years ago, even before Egypt signed the NPT and concluded a
    Safeguards agreement; and that only small amounts of nuclear
    material were involved.  Egypt, at the time, added that any
    failure to report arose from different interpretations of
    Egypt's Safeguards Agreement.

    ¶12.  (SBU) The 2008 SIR indicates that between 2004 and 2006,
    Egypt made available to the Agency nuclear material,
    submitted design information for three additional facilities,
    and gave the Agency access to information, such as logbooks
    and operating records.  Egypt also strengthened the authority
    of its Atomic Energy Authority to exercise effective control
    of all nuclear material and activities in the State.  As a
    result of Egypt's actions, the Agency concludes in the 2008
    SIR that it has been able to verify all declared nuclear
    material in Egypt and that Egypt's statements are consistent
    with the Agency's findings.  (See para 13 for full text.)

    -----------------
    SIR Text on Egypt
    -----------------

    ¶13.  (SBU)  Begin text of SIR (GOV/2009/24) paragraphs 42-47
    dealing with Egypt:

    B.1.7. Arab Republic of Egypt

    ¶42.  Following Agency enquiries, Egypt, between 2004 and
    2005, disclosed past undeclared nuclear activities and
    material to the Agency, as reported to the Board in February
    2005 (GOV/2005/9) and in the Safeguards Implementation Report
    for 2005 (GOV/2006/31, paragraph 124).  The results of the

    Agency's investigation since the issuance of these reports,
    and the Agency's current assessment thereof, are described
    below.

    ¶43.  Between 2004 and 2006, Egypt made available to the
    Agency nuclear material that it had failed to report.  Egypt
    characterized and provided information about the material and
    submitted design information for three additional facilities
    located at the Nuclear Research Centre of Inshas (the Nuclear
    Chemistry Building, the Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant, and the
    Radioisotope Production Facility).  Egypt also gave the
    Agency access to information, such as logbooks and operating
    records, and access to personnel and locations related to its
    conversion and irradiation experiments and its preparatory
    activities related to reprocessing.

    ¶44.  The Agency was informed in 2004 by Egypt's SSAC, the
    Atomic Energy Authority (AEA), that it did not have the
    authority necessary for it to exercise effective control of
    all nuclear material and activities in the State.  A
    Presidential Decree was issued in May 2006 to redefine the
    AEA's authority.  Ministerial Decrees were issued in October
    2006 for the practical implementation of the Presidential
    Decree.  The AEA then undertook a State-wide investigation of
    its nuclear material holdings, during which additional,
    previously unreported, nuclear material was identified,
    including several depleted uranium items for which Egypt
    subsequently provided accounting reports.

    ¶45.  The Agency has received relevant nuclear material
    accounting reports, and has been able to verify all declared
    nuclear material in Egypt.  Egypt has also clarified issues
    relating to its past undeclared activities carried out at the
    laboratories of the AEA at Inshas and at the laboratories of
    the Nuclear Material Authority at El Qattamiyah.  The Agency
    has concluded that Egypt's statements are consistent with the
    Agency's findings, and that the issues raised in the report
    to the Board are no longer outstanding.

    ¶46.  In 2007 and 2008, some high enriched uranium (HEU) and
    low enriched uranium (LEU) particles were found in
    environmental samples taken at Inshas.  Egypt stated that, as
    a result of an investigation carried out to identify the
    source of the particles, it believed the particles could have
    been brought into the country through contaminated
    radioisotope transport containers.  Although the Agency has
    no indications contrary to Egypt's explanations, it has not
    yet identified the source of the uranium particles.  It will
    continue, in accordance with its procedures and practices, to
    seek to clarify this issue as part of its ongoing
    verification activities; this will include taking additional
    environmental samples.

    ¶47.  For 2008, the Agency found no indication of the
    diversion of declared nuclear material in Egypt.  Therefore,
    the Agency was able to conclude for Egypt that all declared
    nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.
    PYATT

`