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### Viewing cable 06THEHAGUE1991, NETHERLANDS/NATO: AMB. NULAND DISCUSSES ROAD TO

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06THEHAGUE1991 | 2006-09-12 13:01 | 2011-01-26 17:05 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHTC #1991/01 2551339
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 121339Z SEP 06
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6781
    INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0189
    RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA PRIORITY 0169
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001991

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR EUR/UBI, EUR/RPM

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
    TAGS: MARR NATO PGOV PREL AF NL
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/NATO: AMB. NULAND DISCUSSES ROAD TO
    RIGA WITH DUTCH

    Classifi...

    78047

    2006-09-12

    06THEHAGUE1991

    Embassy The Hague

    CONFIDENTIAL

    C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001991

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR EUR/UBI, EUR/RPM

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
    TAGS: MARR NATO PGOV PREL AF NL
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/NATO: AMB. NULAND DISCUSSES ROAD TO
    RIGA WITH DUTCH

    Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary: During her September 8 visit to The Hague,
    U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Victoria Nuland
    discussed the road to Riga with FM Ben Bot, Dutch officials,
    parliamentarians and journalists. Nuland framed discussion
    with three top summit goals: 1) progress in Afghanistan; 2) a
    constructive heads of state dinner; and 3) the global
    partnership initiative. Dutch interlocutors agreed with the
    need to demonstrate progress in Afghanistan, and offered to
    work with NATO SYG Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and other Allies to
    choreograph the heads of state dinner. Dutch officials
    support the global partnership initiative, but have some
    reservations with the explicit use of the word global and
    cautioned against moving too fast. End summary.

    Meeting with FM Bot
    -------------------

    ¶2. (C) Nuland broadly covered U.S. goals for the Riga summit
    with FM Bot. She said the USG views Riga as an opportunity
    to make the case for a global, open NATO for the 21st century
    while demonstrably closing the doors on the NATO of the Cold
    War past. She argued that NATO's role in Afghanistan would
    determine the strategic backdrop for the summit, and
    commended the Dutch for their deployment to Uruzgan and ink
    splot strategy linking population centers in the province by
    development and infrastructure projects. On the day of the
    Heads' Meeting, the quality of discussion at the summit
    dinner would be determinative in terms of Heads' attitudes
    toward NATO; this requires working closely with NATO SYG de
    Hoop Scheffer to script and set the tone for dinner.

    ¶3. (C) Bot was very supportive of ensuring a meaningful
    dinner dialogue. Alluding to countervailing forces at
    NATO, he said he would encourage his French colleague at the
    upcoming EU Foreign Ministers meeting to be more
    constructive. He described the French position --
    strengthen the EU, weaken NATO -- as consistent in recent
    years. Nuland said European nations should push French
    President Chirac; too much U.S pressure could be
    counterproductive. Bot offered GONL assistance in that
    regard.

    ¶4. (C) On enlargement, Bot said events in Ukraine suggest its
    membership aspirations are moving in the wrong direction.
    Nuland noted that NATO's open door policy requires
    candidate countries to want membership, which was not exactly
    clear in Ukraine at the moment. This does not mean, however,
    that NATO should give up on Ukraine -- Russia was working
    behind the scenes to foil closer NATO-Ukraine ties, she said;
    Bot concurred.

    ¶5. (C) On the global partnership initiative, Amb. Nuland
    stressed the need to come as close to a consensus as possible
    at the foreign ministerial in New York. She anticipated
    French opposition, but that should not prevent all other
    Allies from sending a strong signal. Bot supported the
    initiative, but had some reservations regarding the use of
    the word global. Noting problems with EU expansion, he
    cautioned that NATO could be weakened by growing too quickly.
    Nuland stressed that the initiative was not looking to
    create a 26 100 structure with countries around the
    world, but rather strong 26 1 ties with more countries,
    and then mixing and matching in a 26 N format based on
    commitment to common action.

    Meeting with Dutch Interagency
    ------------------------------

    ¶6. (U) Nuland had more in-depth consultations with members of
    the Dutch interagency, including MFA Director General for
    Political Affairs Pieter de Gooijer, MOD Director for General
    Policy Affairs Lo Casteleijn, Dutch Permanent Representative
    to NATO Herman Schaper, Principal Foreign Affairs Advisor to
    the Prime Minister Karel Oosterom, and MOD Chief of
    Operations Gen. Eikelboom.

    ¶7. (C) De Gooijer described current Allied positions in
    Brussels as obstructionist, potentially leading to a negative
    summit in Riga. A more optimistic Amb. Nuland said the
    summit presents an opportunity for NATO to demonstrate that
    it had taken on global responsibilities, capabilities, and
    partners. She outlined three make or break objectives: 1)

    progress in Afghanistan by the summit; 2) constructive and
    meaningful dialogue during the summit heads of state dinner;
    and 3) an alliance strong, open, and flexible enough to work
    with current and new partners through the global partnership
    initiative.

    ¶8. (C) On Afghanistan, Casteleijn identified three urgent
    priorities: 1) force generation issues, as illustrated by
    SACEUR's request for an additional battalion; 2) the
    transition to ISAF IV; and 3) improving ISAF security and
    reconstruction integration. Nuland noted French
    intransigence with regard to using the Strategic Reserve
    Force or the NATO Response Force (NRF) should the alliance
    fail to generate an additional battalion. She suggested the
    seven Allies contributing in the south pressure those not
    contributing, and push the French hard at the North Atlantic
    Council (NAC). De Gooijer cautioned against a showdown;
    instead, Allies should appeal to France's political
    responsibilities -- it needs to be a victory for Chirac, he
    said. Amb. Nuland agreed to work together closely to turn
    the French around.

    ¶9. (C) De Gooijer expressed frustration with Karzai; Amb.
    Nuland commended the Dutch for holding Karzai's feet to the
    fire on changing the Uruzgan governor before they deploy,
    noting that sometimes Karzai needs this kind of pressure to
    focus. She also complimented the well-balanced Dutch ink
    splot strategy, and described the Dutch approach with the
    Afghan National Army and Police as a model for other Allies
    to follow. Longer term, she suggested the Alliance think
    about re-balancing the reconstruction work load.

    ¶10. (C) De Gooijer agreed the Alliance must demonstrate real
    progress in Afghanistan prior to the summit, including the
    integration of security and reconstruction efforts. He
    stressed the need to learn from the situation on the ground,
    and to present these lessons to the public in order to temper
    expectations. Amb. Nuland concurred, noting that Afghanistan
    is a long-term effort for NATO. She recommended NATO senior
    civilian representative Dan Everts organize an Allied
    ambassadorial group in Kabul.

    ¶11. (C) De Gooijer agreed that the heads of state dinner
    needed to be a constructive, meeting of the minds with a
    sense of commonality and purpose. This requires
    choreography -- any participant could potentially ruin the
    dinner by saying the wrong thing during opening statements,
    he said. De Gooijer offered Dutch assistance in working with
    other Allies and NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer to ensure the
    dinner is scripted. That said, de Gooijer suggested the
    conversation also address where NATO is heading in upcoming
    summits. Going global might initiate a fight among Allies
    -- better to explain how NATO is a global organization rather
    than stating it explicitly, he said.

    ¶12. (C) On the global partnership initiative, Nuland pointed
    to the importance of getting as close as possible to
    consensus on a general framework for the initiative at the
    New York foreign ministerial. The initiative should make
    available a single-box of tools from which partners can
    choose, and create flexibility for Allies to meet with
    interested partners at a 26 N format based on themes.
    This will also help identify advanced partners and give them
    more, if they want it.

    Meeting with MOD
    ----------------

    ¶13. (C) In a separate meeting, Amb. Nuland and Casteleijn
    assessed the current situation in southern Afghanistan.
    Casteleijn said he would call his Norwegian counterpart prior
    to the upcoming NATO CHOD's meeting to encourage a Norwegian
    contribution in response to SACEUR's request for an
    additional battalion in the south. They also discussed the
    unlikelihood that France and Germany would support the use of
    the NRF in Afghanistan should NATO fail to generate a
    battalion. Amb. Schaper repeated earlier points that the
    best strategy in gaining French support should be to allow
    them to be the heroes, instead of jamming them publicly.

    ¶14. (C) Casteleijn inquired if it made sense for NATO to
    pursue an approach similar to the USG's Commander Emergency
    Reconstruction Program (CERP). Nuland suggested the NATO
    bureaucracy might make such an approach difficult, and added

    the Canadians are already doing something similar to the CERP
    while the Brits are considering it. Casteleijn suggested the
    idea be discussed further at NATO to better coordinate
    reconstruction efforts. Nuland said the UN and EU should
    also be challenged to do more in terms of reconstruction
    efforts in Afghanistan.

    ¶15. (C) Moving on to Riga, Amb. Nuland referred to SACEUR's
    plea for more NRF contributions -- especially logistics
    support -- to achieve full operational capability (FOC) by
    October 1. She stated the gaps in logistics was the main
    impediment to reaching FOC.

    ¶16. (C) Amb. Nuland thanked the Dutch for their difficult
    decision during a caretaker government to purchase 500 hours
    for 2007 in the Strategic Airlift Initiative (SAI).
    Casteleijn was optimistic that the GONL will decide to
    purchase additional hours, but would have to wait until after
    the parliamentary elections in November. He said the Dutch
    require more hours than they had initially signed up for.
    Amb. Nuland said post-Riga, the Alliance should look at
    common-funding for aspects of the initiative.

    ¶17. (C) Amb. Schaper and Casteleijn asked for USG
    expectations regarding the NATO Special Operations Forces
    (SOF) initiative. Amb. Nuland suggested the Alliance begin
    with a coordination cell staffed with 40-60 personnel by a
    framework nation, and accompanied by 2-3 personnel by
    interested Allies. She hoped the framework nation would be
    announced at the upcoming informal defense ministerial in
    Podoroz, and said the coordination cell could be unveiled at
    Riga. Casteleijn commended the SOF model, noting situational
    awareness and training benefits.

    Meeting with Parliamentarians
    -----------------------------

    ¶18. (U) During a lunch hosted by Amb. Arnall, Amb. Nuland and
    Amb. Schaper related their recent trip to Afghanistan to
    Dutch parliamentarians. In attendance were current and
    former party members of the collapsed coalition, as well as
    from the main opposition Labor Party (PvdA). Nuland
    commended the Dutch deployment to Uruzgan, noting that she
    was very impressed by how the Dutch have linked security and
    development efforts through their ink splot strategy. She
    praised Dutch soldiers for their willingness to fight, and
    said Parliament should continue to support its troops.

    ¶19. (U) In a spirited discussion, parliamentarians posed a
    number of questions and comments, including plans for the
    transition from ISAF III to IV, efforts to get Allies not
    contributing in Afghanistan to do more, SACEUR's call for
    more troops, the ISAF detention policy, criticism of the
    Karzai government, the porous border with Pakistan, poppy
    eradication efforts vs. alternatives, reconstruction efforts
    and the inability for NGOs to work in the region.

    ¶20. (U) Nuland acknowledged the fight against the Taliban was
    difficult, as many of the enemy combatants killed thus far
    have been poor farmers while hard-line Taliban operatives
    remain across the Pakistan border. She argued that
    Afghanistan is at a tipping point with the Afghan people as
    to whether the Afghan government can provide them security.
    She praised the GONL's strategy with Karzai, and pressed the
    Dutch to push the UN and EU to do more in Afghanistan,
    especially with regard to reconstruction efforts.

    ¶21. (U) Amb. Nuland has cleared on this cable.
    ARNALL

`