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### Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1206, BRAZIL: POLICE PUBLICLY ADMIT AL QAEDA'S PRESENCE;

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BRASILIA1206 | 2009-10-01 15:03 | 2010-12-05 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brasilia

`

    VZCZCXRO9250
    RR RUEHRG
    DE RUEHBR #1206/01 2741515
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 011515Z OCT 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5163
    INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 0018
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6366
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7828
    RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 0343
    RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9985
    RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8248
    RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4607
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//DI//
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRASILIA 001206

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT SHARI VILLAROSA AND WHA.

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR BR
    SUBJECT: BRAZIL: POLICE PUBLICLY ADMIT AL QAEDA'S PRESENCE;
    GOB DENIES TERRORISM A THREAT

    Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i. Lisa Kubiske, reason: 1.4 (b) a
    nd (d)

    ¶1. (U) Summary: The head of the Brazilian Federal Police,s
    (DPF) intelligence division admitted publicly during a
    Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, hearing on terrorism July 7
    that an individual arrested in April on hate crimes-related
    charges was in fact linked to al Qaeda (AQ), the first time a
    Brazilian government official has gone on record admitting
    this link. The admission followed earlier denials by non-DPF
    Brazilian government officials responding to press reports
    that the individual was linked to the terrorist group.
    During the hearing, Minister Jorge Felix, head of the Office
    of the Presidency,s Institutional Security Cabinet (a
    combination DNI, ONDCP, with some NSC-like attributes), stuck
    to the usual script, despite the admission, and denied there
    was any evidence that terrorists had or would be interested
    in establishing a presence in Brazil, even as he asserted
    that Brazil remained vigilant to the threat. As part of this
    vigilance, Felix reported during the hearing that GSI had
    created a new counter-terrorism (CT)-focused entity within
    its structure as well as an interagency working group to
    draft a new national security law, which could end up
    addressing Brazil,s single biggest inadequacy when it comes
    to its CT efforts: lack of CT legislation. While Felix, the
    DPF, and members of Congress agreed on the need for CT
    legislation, there is a lack of will in the GOB to expend the
    political capital to do push it, as a result of ideological
    and historical concerns that such legislation might be used
    against legitimate opposition and social movements. Concerned
    to maintain Brazil,s position as a racially, ethnically, and
    religiously harmonious society, the GOB is hesitant to engage
    in what it thinks might be perceived as provocative foreign
    and domestic policy. Nonetheless, post believes that the good
    operational cooperation on CT between our law enforcement
    agencies enjoy and Brazil,s general commitment to
    international counterterrorism norms provide a basis to
    engage the GOB and spur gradual change in Brazil,s mindset.
    In light of Brazil,s growing global clout, this could pay
    dividends well beyond Brazil. End summary.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    We have and have had Al Qaeda in Brazil
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶2. (SBU) During a 7 July hearing of the Chamber of Deputies
    Organized Crime and Public Security Committee, Daniel Lorenz
    de Azevedo, head of the DPF,s intelligence division publicly
    admitted for the first time that the DPF believed the
    individual arrested on April 26 for hate crimes in Sao Paulo,
    Khaled Hussein Ali was, in fact, believed by the DPF to be
    closely linked to al Qaeda. As global head of the Jihad
    Media Battalion, Lorenz noted during the hearing that Ali had
    performed duties for the terrorist group, from propaganda to
    logistics, recruitment, and other activities. (Note: In late
    May, the press started reporting on the 26 April arrest of
    the then unidentified Ali,s links to AQ, which were followed
    by quick statements by the prosecutor denying that the
    individual had any ties to terrorism. That same week, during
    a meeting with CODEL Thompson, General Felix categorically
    denied the terrorism and AQ connection, even as he noted that
    it was a DPF matter. End note.)

    ¶3. (U) Lorenz further stated that Ali was not the first or
    only AQ-linked individual to have lived in or transited
    through Brazil. He mentioned Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,s trip
    to Foz de Iguacu in 1995 (subject of a cover story in Veja
    magazine several years ago). He further noted that the DPF
    has monitored several other "extremists" that have transited
    through Brazil or had taken up residence in the country.
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    General Felix: We will never admit anything
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶4. (U) During the hearing, Felix testified that it was the
    government,s belief that terrorists could potentially use
    Brazilian territory for transit, to exploit its resources, or
    for safehaven. He further added that, even as Brazil has
    maintained an aggressive posture to prevent such activity

    BRASILIA 00001206 002 OF 005

    from taking place, "we haven,t seen any confirmation that
    such activity has ever taken place, even if the media claims
    otherwise."

    ¶5. (U) Faced with questions from Members of Congress who were
    keying off of Lorenz testimony, Felix added that Brazil,s
    public stance regarding the presence of terrorism is part of
    a deliberate strategy on the part of GSI and an assessment of
    what is in Brazil,s best long-term interest. Felix noted
    that over the years he has had the opportunity to meet with
    officials from various countries at all levels, including
    those who affirm that there may be terrorists in Foz de
    Iguacu and Sao Paulo, and to date none of these countries
    that make these statements, going back to the AMIA bombing,
    have ever provided Brazil with evidence that this is the
    case. He further added, with emphasis, that "even if a
    problem were to appear, we won,t admit that the problem
    exists." According to Felix, this "denialism" is a posture
    that he believes will "protect" Brazil. He observed that
    modifying this language could provoke actions by unwelcome
    elements and could set back a policy that, while it
    repudiates terrorism, seeks to avoid inviting or importing
    threats.

    - - - - - - - - - -
    Yet, Threats Abound
    - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶6. (U) Felix characterized the theoretical risks Brazil faces
    as pretty low. He added that, "because of our external
    policy, our domestic characteristics, our international
    projection, our image of a positive peaceful country with
    various ethnicities and religions interacting peacefully in
    harmony" there is little risk of attacks against Brazil. At
    the same time, Felix recognized that the risks are not the
    same when discussing foreign structures within Brazil. The
    situation in those cases is different, particularly when it
    comes to ideological or religious terrorism, which does not
    respect frontiers. He cited Argentina,s experience, which
    suffered two attacks in the 1990,s against its Jewish
    community. It shows, according to Felix, that even in a
    country that faces reduced risks against its own interests,
    it can suffer attacks against foreign interests in that
    country. Felix also added that, because of Brazil,s vast
    territory and porous borders, it can be difficult to monitor
    the movement or activities of terrorists within Brazilian
    territory.

    ¶7. (U) Lorenz disagreed with Felix,s characterization of the
    level of risk Brazil faces. He noted that the DPF has
    followed terrorism since 1995, a year after the AMIA bombing.
    In that time, DPF has seen several phases in the evolution
    of the terrorist threat in Brazil. First, DPF began with the
    notion that terrorists could be transiting or hiding in
    Brazil, but that there was no threat of attacks in Brazil.
    Lorenz used KSM,s travel through Foz de Iguacu in December
    of 1995 to illustrate this phase. Then the DPF started
    noticing that some of those who were transiting or hiding
    were beginning to establish residency in Brazil by marrying
    Brazilian women and adopting Brazilian children. In a third
    stage, DPF began seeing that some Brazilians began to be
    captivated by extremist ideology and the idea of martyrdom.
    Some Brazilians have left Brazil for what the DPF believes is
    extremist religious instruction in Iran and other places in
    the Middle East. Finally, the DPF has begun to see some of
    those foreigners that achieved permanent residency start
    preparations for acts outside the country and helping
    terrorist groups with recruitment, training, logistics
    support, and reconnaissance for terrorist actions not in
    Brazil. This last stage, added Lorenz, was what the DPF saw
    in Ali,s case. He added that the DPF,s perception is that
    things are evolving and that in this continuing evolution of
    activity, which still remains outwardly focused, could
    perhaps evolve in a different direction eventually.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    Consensus on one thing: TBA not a problem
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    BRASILIA 00001206 003 OF 005

    ¶8. (U) While offering differing views in some areas, both
    Lorenz and Felix agreed that the Triborder Area (TBA) is not
    a problem anymore. According to Lorenz, the question of
    financing for groups for Islamic groups out of the TBA is a
    non-issue, adding that "we have found that Zakat is a normal
    thing." He criticized attacks on Brazil from foreign
    countries, including the United States, that accuse Brazil of
    ignoring this fundraising, especially after the DPF has found
    that most of the money that goes from the TBA passes through
    the United States on its way to Lebanon. "We have told the
    Americans, I can guarantee that this money that goes to
    Lebanon passes through the United States, I can prove it"if
    you think this money is for terrorism, why won,t you stop it
    yourselves," adding, we can give you the names and bank
    accounts.," Lorenz continued, "people who know TBA in the
    1990s, like I did, know that it is not now what it once was.
    It is now the Chinese criminal networks who are the most
    active there, not the Arabs."

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    Lack of Legislation a Problem
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶9. (U) Federal Deputy Raul Jungmann (PPS, Socialist People's
    Party, opposition; of Pernambuco) questioned Felix on
    Brazil,s failure to pass terrorism legislation. He told the
    story of talking to an advisor to Minister of Justice Tarso
    Genro who told Jungmann that passing anti-terrorism
    legislation could actually invite terrorism into Brazil. He
    finally asked Felix if Brazil could condemn terrorism in its
    constitution and various other laws, sign all 13
    international conventions against terrorism, have
    anti-terrorism divisions in the DPF and ABIN, why couldn,t
    it have it legislation dealing with terrorism? Without
    directly answering Jungmann, both Felix and Lorenz
    acknowledged that the lack of terrorism legislation is a
    limitation for Brazil. The DPF acts, noted Lorenz, via
    connected crimes. Lorenz stated that the DPF looks to see if
    terrorists are committing crimes related to terrorism, such
    as preparatory acts. For example, he noted, a terrorist
    could enter the country to commit a terrorist act and the DPF
    would look at whether he used fraudulent documents or had
    immigration violations; if he were to use a car bomb, they
    would see if he stole a car. In some cases, he added, the
    DPF has already used this approach to neutralize people with
    Islamic extremist leanings.

    ¶10. (U) In the case of Ali, he used the LAN house (or
    cybercafe) he ran to lead and coordinate the activities of
    Jihad Media Battalion. At the beginning, noted Lorenz, he
    used it for to perform propaganda on behalf of AQ,s cause.
    Later it turned ito a space for recruitment, support,
    training, communications, operational security, and battle
    orers for actions outside Brazil. The DPF started te
    investigation after the FBI passed them an IP ddress used by
    a person in Brazil. But, Lorenz dded, we arrested him not
    because of these activities, and not because of the battle
    orders to case places for actions outside Brazil, but through
    technical surveillance to decipher and break encryption his
    messages, which allowed us to find instances of hate crime,
    such as anti-Semitism and preaching hate against West. Ali
    was not just engaging in hate crimes, Lorenz hastened to add,
    but that was enough to charge him for a crime, even if it was
    a lesser crime with low penalties.

    - - - - - - - - - - - -
    Building new structures
    - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶11. (U) Responding to Congressional questions of what
    measures Brazil has taken to prevent terrorist activities in
    Brazil, Felix responded that in addition to signing all 13 UN
    and OAS conventions on the topic, which require actions by
    GOB, Brazil has cooperative relations with police and
    intelligence units with many countries. In addition, he
    added, Brazil has been active in monitoring entry points and
    has progressively improved capabilities in this area. Brazil
    has also focused on of military, federal police, and state
    police forces focused on combating terrorism. Brazil,

    BRASILIA 00001206 004 OF 005

    according to Felix, has closely studied the Spanish model,
    particularly in the area of responding to attacks. Felix
    noted that the Spanish response to the Madrid train bombings
    was very effective, as the trains were running shortly after
    the attacks.

    ¶12. (U) Brazil is also, according to Felix, currently
    elaborating a bill for the "defense of sovereignty", which
    will update the old national security law. The GSI-chaired
    Council on Foreign Relations and National Defense is working
    with MoJ on this proposal. (Note: the Council on Foreign
    Relations and National Defense, or CREDN, is a National
    Security Council-like body not to be confused with the
    Foreign Relations and National Defense Committees in Congress
    which also use CREDN for their initials. End Note.).
    According to Felix, the CREDN working group is going to try
    to come up with a list of crimes that constitute terrorism,
    and noted that "eventual punishments are less important; more
    tricky is which crimes should be included." He added that
    there were still some weeks to go before the working group
    finishes up its work, but that they would soon submit the
    proposal to the ministries and after that to the President
    for approval before being introduced before Congress.

    ¶13. (U) Felix also discussed the newly created Nucleus of the
    Center for the Coordination of Activities for the Prevention
    and Combat of Terrorism, to be housed within GSI. According
    to Felix, this nucleus emerged from discussions the GOB had
    in 2004-05 as part of a project to create a national
    counterterrorism authority, which would have created a
    national agency to prevent and combat terrorism. In the end,
    noted Felix, they concluded that the attributes of an
    anti-terrorism "agency" would render it unworkable within the
    Brazilian system, so GSI decided on creating a "center."
    However, because of bureaucratic difficulties in creating
    such a center, GSI went ahead and proposed the creation of
    this nucleus.

    ¶14. (U) The problem for GSI in creating a "center" is that it
    does not have its own personnel. GSI officials are all
    seconded from other agencies. According to Felix, GSI will
    be sending proposal to Congress to allow GSI to have its own
    personnel. It will be staffed on a part-time basis by the
    officers that are detailed to GSI. The nucleus will follow
    actions related to terrorism; promote threat assessment
    studies; and provide coordination among the various
    ministries. (Comment: The "center" Felix referred to does
    not exist. GSI needs statutory authority to be able to
    create a center that will have its own staff. The newly
    created "nucleus" is in essence a proto-center, similar to
    the U.S. Terrorist Threat Integration Center, that could,
    after gaining statutory authority, eventually morph into a
    "center", or something somewhat equivalent to the U.S.,s
    National Counterterrorism Center. End comment.)
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    Comment: Long-Term Engagement Needed
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶15. (C) Lorenz,s admission represented a rare instance in
    which a Brazilian public official admits that AQ-linked
    individuals are either in, or have transited through, Brazil.
    That it was admitted publicly by one of Brazil,s top
    authorities on the subject of terrorism should give the
    United States some cover when engaging in
    counterterrorism-related dialogues with Brazil, including at
    the 3 Plus 1. It will also be helpful as we engage Brazilian
    audiences on the issue of passing CT legislation. In a
    surprising public admission, Felix, Lorenz, and members of
    Congress present at the hearing all agreed on the need to
    pass anti-terrorism legislation, with Lorenz stating point
    blank that the reason the Jihad Media Battalion,s Ali could
    not be charged with a more serious crime was inadequacy of
    current laws.

    ¶16. (C) Unfortunately, the admission appears unlikely to
    change Brazil,s public posture. While there appears to be
    an agreement in the GOB on the need to pass CT legislation,
    there is a lack of will to expend the political capital to do
    so. General Felix stuck to the script even as he was being

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    contradicted, a script we have also heard from interlocutors
    at Brazil,s foreign ministry. Revealingly, Felix admitted
    that no matter what evidence is presented Brazil,s posture
    is deliberate and will not change. The argument boils down
    to this: Brazil is a racially, ethnically, and religiously
    harmonious society that engages in a correct and
    un-provocative foreign policy. As a result, Brazil is not a
    target of terrorists. In order to maintain this position,
    Brazil must do nothing that will make it a target, such as
    taking a higher-profile or more confrontational approach to
    counterterrorism efforts or actively looking to pass
    anti-terrorism legislation.

    ¶17. (C) To further complicate matters, many senior officials
    in both the government and the opposition were labeled
    terrorists and suffered exile, prison, or in some cases
    torture, under the military regime that ended in 1985. This
    is the case, for example, of the two most prominent
    presidential candidates to replace Lula in 2011, Lula,s
    minister of the Civil Household Dilma Rousseff and Sao
    Paulo,s opposition governor Jose Serra. In addition, many
    in the current government fear that members of what they
    consider to be legitimate social movements fighting for a
    more just society might be branded terrorists. Finally,
    Brazilians express concern that anti-terrorism legislation
    would be viewed as directed at Arab-Brazilians or Foz do
    Iguacu, and thus would become a divisive issues. As a
    result, many Brazilian officials are uncomfortable with
    giving the state greater authority to fight terrorism.

    ¶18. (C) This mindset presents serious challenges to our
    efforts to enhance counterterrorism cooperation or promote
    passage of anti-terrorism legislation. At the same time, with
    good operational cooperation on the issue between our law
    enforcement agencies, Brazil,s stated commitment to
    international anti-terrorism regimes, and work underway to
    draft a new national security law, there is every reason to
    enhance our engagement with the Brazilian government on this
    issue. Although there is little chance of an immediate
    change in posture or that a new national security law will be
    seriously considered in Congress before the 2010 presidential
    elections, we should begin engaging the GOB now on this
    issue. Securing passage of anti-terrorism legislation,
    changing the mindset of senior officials with regard to the
    threat that terrorism poses, and finding acceptable ways to
    cooperate on terrorism will be a long-term effort requiring
    commitment and creativity on our part. In light of Brazil,s
    role as a regional leader and its growing role as a global
    power, the investment will likely pay dividends well beyond
    Brazil.
    KUBISKE

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