Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 4950 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF ASEC AE AR AG AJ AU AFIN AM APER ABUD ATRN AORC AL AEMR AMGT ACOA AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC AS ASIG ABLD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AVERY APCS AER ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AEC AGMT
BU BR BL BO BM BA BE BH BTIO BEXP BIDEN BK BY BG BF BB BC BBSR BMGT BRUSSELS BTIU BILAT BX
CJAN CH CU CASC CVIS CMGT CO CI CLINTON CIA CG CF CN CS CAN COUNTER CDG CIS CA CBW CM CE CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CD CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CJUS CARSON COUNTERTERRORISM CACM CDB CV
DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DJ DISENGAGEMENT DS DTRA DOD DEAX
ELAB EU ECON EFIN EG ETTC EINV ENRG EI ECPS EINT EIND ETRD EPET EUN EZ EMIN EAID EAGR ET EC EAIR ECONEFIN ENVR ES ER ECA ELN EN EWWT ECIN ELTN EFIS EXTERNAL EINVETC ENIV EINN ENGR EUR ESA ENERG EK ENGY ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FJ FMLN
GM GG GH GE GV GT GR GTIP GOI GCC GAZA GZ GA GTMO
HA HILLARY HR HUMAN HO HYMPSK HU HURI HK HSTC
IR IZ IS IT INRB IRAJ IN INRA INRO IO IC IAEA ID IIP ITPHUM IV IPR IWC IQ ICTY ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC ICAO IMO IF ILC IEFIN INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF INR IRC ITALY ITALIAN INTERPOL
JO JA JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JUS JAMES
KE KTFN KDEM KNNP KJUS KGHG KZ KIPR KWBG KIRF KPAO KDRG KHLS KCRM KSCA KPAL KISL KG KACT KN KS KGIC KRAD KU KCOM KBIO KMCA KCOR KV KHDP KTIP KVPR KDEV KMDR KWMN KMPI KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KCFC KSPR KTIA KHIV KPRP KAWC KOLY KCIP KCFE KOCI KPKO KTDB KMRS KFRD KLIG KBCT KICC KGIT KSTC KUNR KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KOMC KAWK KO KTER KSUM KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFIN KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTBT KCRS KRVC KSTH KREL KIRC KNSD KPAI KHSA KR KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KGCC KPIN KNUC KPLS
LE LY LU LG LH LI LO LOG LT
MARR MOPS MU MY MASS MNUC MCAP MA MO MTCRE MG MASC MX MCC MZ ML MEPP MK MTRE MP MIL MDC MTCR MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MR MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MASSMNUC MERCOSUR MPOS MOPPS MAPP
NATO NIPP NL NO NG NI NPT NE NS NAR NZ NU NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NGO NP NSF NATIONAL
OVIP OPRC OREP OEXC OIIP ODIP OTRA OSCE OAS OFDP OPIC OPDC OECD OPCW OSCI OIE OIC OTR OVP OFFICIALS OSAC
PGOV PINR PREL PINS PO PTER PK PHUM PARM PL PE PREF PHSA PBTS PGOF PROP PA PARMS PORG PM PMIL PTERE POL PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRGOV PNAT PROV PEL PINF PGOVE POLINT PRL PRAM PMAR PGOVLO PHUMBA POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PSOE PU POLITICAL PARTIES PBIO PECON POGOV PINL PKFK
QA
RS RU RW RP RO RIGHTS RICE ROBERT RF RFE REGION
SOCI SU SA SY SP SNAR SENV SCUL SW SF SO SR SG SMIG SL SN SHUM SZ SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI STEINBERG
TI TIP TBIO TR TX TU TC TSPA TS TRGY TH TT TW TERRORISM TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TPHY TK TNGD
UK UNSC UG US UZ UP UNO UNMIK UY UN UNGA UNESCO UE UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS UNAUS USUN USEU UV
VZ VE VT VM VTPREL VN
WA WI WMO WTRO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WEU WTO
XA XT XM XY XG XF XC XH XL XZ XW XR XD XE XS XK
YM YI YE
ZI ZP ZK ZF ZB ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU ZA ZO ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 05PARIS5539, PUTTING OUT BRUSHFIRES: FRANCE AND ISLAMIC

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05PARIS5539.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05PARIS5539 | 2005-08-17 08:08 | 2010-12-01 12:12 | SECRET | Embassy Paris

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 005539

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2015
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KISL AL MO PTER FR
    SUBJECT: PUTTING OUT BRUSHFIRES: FRANCE AND ISLAMIC
    EXTREMISM

    REF: A. STATE 144222
    ¶B. PARIS 5203
    ¶C. PARIS 4644
    ¶D. 04 PARIS 2981
    ¶E. PARIS 4750
    ¶F. PARIS 1732

    Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS
    ONS 1.4 B/D

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Through surveillance, arrests and other
    methods, the GOF prevents or puts out brushfires of Islamic
    extremism on an almost daily basis, and has been doing so for
    decades. According to recent press reports, the RG, France's
    police intelligence service, estimates that 6 million Muslims
    live in France, approximately 10 percent of the population.
    The RG estimates that approximately 9,000 of them might be
    extremist. These numbers, coupled with a widespread
    recognition that France continues to struggle mightily to
    integrate its immigrant/Muslim population, provide a sober
    counterpoint to the past success and unquestionable
    capabilities of the counter-terrorism apparatus. Although in
    the short and medium-term, France clearly can rely on its
    police, security and judicial services to aggressively combat
    terrorism, in the long-term it must focus on giving a place
    to Muslims (be they first-generation immigrants, their
    second- and third-generation children, or the growing number
    of converts) in the French identity. End summary.

    THE POTENTIAL OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM
    ----------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) In the Muslim community of some six million, 70
    percent are estimated to be of North African (Algeria,
    Morocco, and Tunisia) origin. Other sizable groups include
    Turks and Pakistanis. Within this overall population, the RG
    estimates (according to recent press reports) that roughly
    9,000 could be considered extremist, or, just over one-tenth
    of one percent. The RG also estimated that of the 1,500
    mosques and prayer halls in France, fewer than 40 were
    considered extremist. GOF officials routinely claim that 90
    percent of French Muslims are non-practicing. Among the
    minority of French Muslims considered "practicing," there is
    a small but distinct current of fundamentalist thought. On
    August 5, Poloffs toured a number of Islamic bookshops in
    Paris, and found that the literature extolled strongly
    conservative views on the role of Muslim women and also
    included numerous guides (in French) of how to pray. The
    bookstores did not present any moderate alternatives to
    conservative dogma.

    ¶3. (U) Two specific sources of Islamic extremism are of
    special interest. First is the French prison system, with a
    population that is estimated at over 50 percent Muslim.
    According to another leaked RG report from May 2005, Islamic
    extremism here is growing in popularity, with scattered
    reports of prisoners hanging up posters of Bin Laden,
    destroying Christmas trees and bibles, and cries of joy at
    the news of American soldiers killed in Iraq or suicide
    bombings in Israel. It is often the shock of prison,
    detailed the RG report, that transforms petty criminals into
    Islamic extremists. The shortage of Muslim chaplains in
    French prisons fuels potential for extremist ideologies to
    spread unabated. Radicalized prisoners, once released, are
    "time bombs," said the RG report. It estimated that within
    the prison system, 200 inmates "merit attention," and 95 of
    these should be considered "dangerous." A second source of
    Islamic extremism is the growing number of conversions to
    radical Islam by European-origin French citizens. In a
    report submitted to Interior Minister Sarkozy in June, the RG
    profiled new French converts to Islam, and found that most
    were young males in urban areas and/or in areas largely
    populated by those of North African descent. Of those
    converts profiled, the RG reported 49 percent did not have
    any diploma, and a full 44 percent opted for Salafist or
    Tabligh-inspired versions of fundamentalist Islam. The
    unemployment rate among new converts of European-French
    origin is five times the national average, according to the
    RG report. More than ten percent of the new converts had
    discovered Islam in prison. The RG report also revealed that
    approximately 3.5 percent of the French military, including
    officers, had converted to Islam. (Note: Although this is a
    striking statistic, many military converts have presumably
    done so in order to marry Muslims, and not necessarily for
    ideological reasons. End note.)

    FRANCE'S LONG HISTORY WITH ISLAMIC EXTREMISM
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶4. (S) The sheer number of recent "terrorism conspiracy"
    arrests in France involving Islamic extremists underscores
    the GOF's counter-terrorism challenges. Since 2002, it has
    arrested 322 people linked to terrorism, of whom 91 were
    charged and imprisoned. Islamic extremist violence has
    struck France in the past, especially Paris. A year after a
    failed hijacking attempt of an Air France jet in 1994, the
    Algerian terrorist group GIA conducted a wave of bombings in
    Paris subway stations and landmarks, killing 8 and wounding
    over 200. Spillover from Maghreb-based Islamic extremists
    continues to this day, with the Algerian-based GSPC group and
    the Moroccan-based GICM group both present covertly on French
    soil. Furthermore, French intelligence believes that the
    GSPC has increasingly taken on the goals of worldwide
    jihadism and is seeking to position itself as a complement to
    al-Qaida. A terrorism investigating judge told us recently
    that the GSPC is expanding its reach in France, and is
    working to take advantage of old connections within the
    well-organized Algerian community. As for the GICM, French
    judiciary officials told us that those arrested in 2004 were
    frighteningly professional and maintain to this day a strict
    discipline when interrogated (ref D). (Comment: The GOF
    prides itself on its ability to keep tabs on extremist
    groups; their discovery of the GICM cell shocked them because
    they had stumbled upon it by chance, further evidence of the
    GICM group's operational security. End comment.)

    ¶5. (S) France has also seen Islamic extremist cells appear
    with seemingly little to no support from terrorist
    organizations such as the GICM and the GSPC. One example is
    the eleven "jihadists to Iraq" arrested in January in Paris'
    19th arrondissement. Those involved were arrested days
    before leaving for Iraq. The DST told USG interlocutors (ref
    E) that the suspected ringleader, 23-year old Farid
    Benyettou, had never studied theology but by force of
    personality, had managed within a few months to convince a
    group of teenagers to fight jihad in Iraq. One example that
    demonstrates the fluid interconnectedness of many Islamic
    extremists was revealed during the trial of Ahmed Laidouni
    and David Courtailler, two French citizens convicted and
    sentenced in 2004 for organizing recruitment networks for
    terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Laidouni and
    Courtailler (who converted at the age of 27 to fundamentalist
    Islam) have been linked to members of the Beghal network that
    were convicted in March 2005 of plotting to bomb the U.S.
    Embassy in Paris (ref F). They have also been linked to
    extremist circles in the UK. Members of the Beghal network
    are suspected of having ties with (among others) members of
    the "Chechen" network (a loose grouping of individuals from
    Lyon that attempted to develop chemical agents to commit
    terrorist attacks), the "Frankfurt" network (which attempted
    in 2000 to attack cultural sites in Strasbourg), and Lionel
    Dumont, a member of the Islamic extremist "Roubaix gang" that
    in the late 1990s terrorized the north of France. Dumont
    spent a number of years in Japan, and is suspected of
    building links there to Islamic extremism. In short, Islamic
    political extremism in France takes on many forms: it has
    bubbled up on its own, in cooperation with other autonomous
    groups, and also in cooperation with al-Qaida linked groups
    such as the GSPC.

    ¶6. (SBU) Islamic extremism is connected in the public mind to
    the poor suburbs outside of major French cities, especially
    Paris, Lyon, Strasbourg and Marseilles. However, pockets of
    low-income housing are scattered throughout France, and
    recent arrests in Grenoble, a medium-sized university town in
    the southeast, and Lorraine, a region near the French-German
    border, illustrate the fact that Islamic extremism is not
    confined to the suburbs of France's largest cities. French
    residents and citizens of North African extraction are
    scattered throughout France. The Turkish community is based
    largely in Paris and in eastern France, and the Pakistani
    community is based almost exclusively in the Paris
    metropolitan area.

    THE GOVERNMENT AS FIREFIGHTER
    -----------------------------

    ¶7. (SBU) Although attention since the July bombings in London
    and Sharm el-Sheikh is on new enforcement and security
    initiatives, the GOF continues its work to integrate the
    Muslim community into what is still a historically Catholic
    country. High-profile Muslims in government, politics and
    culture are relatively rare, and in general, Muslims are
    underrepresented in positions of power. The GOF reached back
    into its history of dealing with other religious/ethnic
    communities when in 2003 it created the Council for the
    Muslim Faith (CFCM), an umbrella organization of various
    Muslim groups which serves as the official French Muslim
    interlocutor with the government on a range of
    civil-religious issues, including mosque construction. The
    CFCM includes a broad brush of Muslim groups, including the
    fundamentalist-leaning UOIF (considered by some to have links
    to the Muslim Brotherhood), the FMNF (also considered
    fundamentalist, but backed by the Moroccan government), and
    the Tabligh (an ultra-orthodox Pakistani origin group
    described as a way-station for some French jihadists). GOF
    officials also point out that around 40 percent of French
    mosques are not CFCM-affiliated. Moreover, the CFCM is
    riddled with internal conflict (ref C), and for many who
    espouse a highly fundamentalist worldview, it is considered
    too close to the GOF.

    ¶8. (U) Another GOF initiative to spur the growth of a
    moderate, France-centric Islam is to encourage imams to speak
    French and learn more about French culture. More than half
    of the imams in France either do not speak French or speak it
    very poorly. In addition, less than 20 percent have French
    nationality. New immigration policies stipulate that those
    wishing to attain French citizenship must receive a GOF
    certification of French fluency. Although this new policy
    does not specifically target imams, their participation is
    encouraged. A similar initiative, proposed by PM Villepin
    when he was Interior Minister, has been stymied. Villepin
    said he would push French universities to inaugurate specific
    courses for imams on French culture. Only the Sorbonne
    university evinced any interest, although it finally
    announced in early August that it would not proceed with the
    imam program because it ran counter to the principles of
    secularism.

    ALTHOUGH CONFIDENT IN ITS "OFFENSIVE" C/T STRATEGY, FRANCE
    STILL STRUGGLES WITH INTEGRATION
    --------------------------------------------- -------------

    ¶9. (U) Notwithstanding the recent spurt of GOF
    counter-terrorism proposals (ref B), the French government
    and media generally believe the GOF's method of fighting
    Islamic extremism works well. A July 12 article in Le Figaro
    outlined the two basic approaches, France's "offensive"
    strategy and the UK's "communitarian" strategy. Louis
    Caprioli, former head of the DST's counter-terrorism bureau
    (the DST is France's internal security service), said the
    French strategy emphasizes total cooperation between the
    security/police services and the specialized
    counter-terrorism judiciary. This allows for constant
    surveillance of suspects and a focus on maximum disturbance
    of Islamic extremists, hence the "offensive" nature of the
    strategy. Alain Chouet, former head of the DGSE (France's
    external intelligence service), added that the presence of
    the RG throughout French territory allows for "permanent
    surveillance and penetration of problematic communities."
    Furthermore, said Chouet, "It is hard to imagine the
    Anglo-Saxon countries imitating our harassment tactics, which
    sometimes take place without any real proof of wrongdoing."
    (Comment: There is undoubtedly a whiff of traditional Gallic
    competitiveness regarding the "Anglo-Saxons" in these
    comparisons of counter-terrorism models. Of all those
    calling for additional C/T proposals in France following the
    July attacks, only the unabashedly pro-Anglo-Saxon Sarkozy
    pointedly said France had something to learn from the British
    public transport surveillance system. End comment)

    ¶10. (U) Although most believe the GOF's "offensive"
    counter-terrorism approach has been successful, many consider
    that the GOF has failed in its quest to integrate those in
    the marginalized suburbs, or "cites". Jean-Marie Colombani,
    the editor-in-chief of Le Monde, wrote in a rare front-page
    editorial on July 26: "Stories abound of the young, born in
    our 'cites,' that incomprehensibly swung from complete
    integration to marginalization to then becoming
    irretrievable." Guillaume Bigot, a French researcher who
    recently co-wrote a well-reviewed book on Islamic extremism
    in France, is even more biting: "The Muslim community in
    France...is massively excluded at the social and economic
    level, and is accustomed to a sense of humiliation. These
    youth, whose first or last names become obstacles to finding
    work, do not have a past or a feeling of belonging to a land,
    and have absolutely no future. It is not necessary to invent
    a James Bond of Islamist extremism. You only need people who
    can be manipulated with a simplistic ideology."

    ¶11. (SBU) Poloffs recently visited the northern Paris suburb
    of La Courneuve, which has recently become a living metaphor
    for violence and Islamic extremism in France. Interior
    Minister Sarkozy visited La Courneuve several times over the
    past months, and has vowed to make it an example of his new
    efforts to foster integration. Members of the "Chechen"
    network (see para 6) were arrested there in 2002 with
    explosive material and the chemical agent ricin. Originally
    a small town independent from Paris, La Courneuve now
    features many large HLM (low-income housing projects). The
    streets are relatively wide and empty, with little
    street-level commerce aside from government services and
    larger supermarkets. No one background dominated and we saw
    no visible signs of an Islamic presence (we passed only one
    synagogue and no mosques). The suburb did not feel
    dangerous; instead it seemed more bleak and deserted than
    anything else, as if everybody was inside their apartments or
    out of town. Satellite dishes sprouted from many apartments.
    The presence of planters with flowers and tree-lined
    sidewalks gave the impression of a municipal government
    trying to improve the area. Indeed, the local government's
    slogan was "La Courneuve is inventing another future for
    itself." Overall, and despite its terrible reputation, La
    Courneuve looked to be a modest, multicultural place. Its
    appearance confirmed what statistics report: the overwhelming
    majority of Muslims in France (whether from Africa, the
    Maghreb, or the newly converted) are moderate. The problem
    lies with the one or two apartments that harbor Islamic
    extremists hidden within the tens of thousands that do not.

    ¶12. (C) Comment: As is widely recognized, the GOF wields a
    muscular and effective counter-terrorism apparatus that
    identifies potential terrorists and thwarts potential
    terrorist operations. Although there is always room for
    improvement, the GOF appears to have done what it can in the
    short- and medium-term to combat Islamic extremism. Over the
    long-term, however, much work needs to be done. France does
    not only have an integration/immigration problem; it must
    also work to give a place to Muslims in the French identity.
    Despite claims that its commitment to secularism nullifies
    prejudice against any religion, it is an open secret that
    historically Catholic France has heretofore failed to muster
    sufficient will and understanding to truly accept Muslims as
    French citizens. Although Islamic extremism may never
    completely disappear from France, acceptance of Muslims as
    full, participating members of French society will go a long
    way to minimizing its reach. End comment.
    Hofmann

`