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### Viewing cable 08TELAVIV1005, SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISIT TO ISRAEL

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08TELAVIV1005 | 2008-05-06 17:05 | 2010-12-19 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv

`

    VZCZCXRO6640
    OO RUEHROV
    DE RUEHTV #1005/01 1271759
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 061759Z MAY 08
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6600
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001005

    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR ABRAMS AND PASCUAL

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2018
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS IS XF
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISIT TO ISRAEL

    Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

    ¶1. (C) Israel is preparing to celebrate the sixtieth
    anniversary of its declaration of independence on May 8 with
    a characteristically Israeli mix of pride in their
    achievements and worry about the future. One point that
    unites virtually all Israelis -- except for the extreme left
    and right -- is their appreciation for President Bush's
    friendship and support throughout his two terms. When the
    President arrives here next week, he will be greeted warmly
    as a friend not just by Israel's political and military
    elite, but also by the vast majority of its seven million
    people. As one average Israeli who wrote to the Ambassador
    put it, the silent majority of Israelis want to thank the
    President for sharing with them the celebrations marking
    Israel's sixtieth year.

    Israeli Pride Justified
    -----------------------

    ¶2. (C) Israelis' sense of pride in their achievements is
    fully justified. The vision of a strong, democratic Jewish
    state that would be a haven for Jews everywhere started as a
    desperate dream, as Israel's fledgling army was bolstered by
    the arrival of tens of thousands of Holocaust survivors and
    hundreds of Jewish WW II veterans who arrived just in time to
    help counter the invasion of the new state by the armies of
    Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, not to mention the
    Palestinians' irregular forces. Today, Israel is very much a
    reality, with a vibrantly original Hebrew-speaking cultural
    life, a Tel Aviv skyline dominated by gleaming skyscrapers, a
    booming high tech-based economy, and the strongest army in
    the Middle East. Israel at sixty is firmly Western in its
    values but also more diverse ethnically and culturally, less
    Europe-oriented, and decidedly more capitalist than the
    Israel founded largely by East European-born socialists. For
    all of its problems with finding the right electoral formula
    to bring about stable governments, Israel's democracy is also
    a thriving reality. Israel is the only Middle Eastern
    country in which its citizens take for granted the peaceful
    transfer of political power via the ballot box.

    And Anxieties are Real
    ----------------------

    ¶3. (S) Yet this year's celebrations are also tinged with
    anxiety. The looming threat of a nuclear-armed Iran, whose
    leaders constantly declare their determination to wipe Israel
    off the map, weighs heavily on the minds of Israelis, who
    regard their country not only through the prism of the
    Holocaust but also as the only UN member-state to be
    routinely threatened with annihilation. Iran's success in
    projecting power directly into the core of the Arab-Israeli
    conflict through its ties to Syria, Hizballah and Hamas
    compounds the sense of threat. Despite the great diplomatic
    achievements represented by the peace treaties with Egypt and
    Jordan, Israelis worry about the frayed nature of their
    relations with Egypt and are unsure about the outlook of the
    Egyptian leadership that will follow Mubarak. Israel enjoys
    excellent relations with the Jordanian royal palace and
    security services, but virtually no contact with Jordan's
    largely Palestinian civil society, most of which boycotts any
    connections to Israel. Israelis are watching carefully to
    see how the U.S. manages the next few years of our
    involvement in Iraq and whether we can succeed in stabilizing
    Iraq in a way that avoids its becoming either an Iranian
    client state or a source of instability that overwhelms
    Jordan's fragile balance.

    Changing Views on Palestinians
    ------------------------------

    ¶4. (S) Closer to home, Israelis' views of their relations
    with their Palestinian neighbors are changing as well. In
    the aftermath of the Second Intifada, a solid majority of
    Israelis has come to accept the need for a Palestinian state
    and for Israel to relinquish control of most of the West Bank
    (although the exact percentage is still a topic for
    discussion, as are the timing and circumstances under which
    this would occur). Gone are the days when many Israelis
    questioned the existence of a Palestinian national identity,
    and today only a small minority -- though still an outspoken
    and determined one -- continues to articulate a demand to
    retain control of all of the West Bank for
    religious/historical reasons. Prime Minister Olmert and
    Foreign Minister Livni, both of whom grew up and began their
    political careers as strong advocates of Israel's historic
    right to all of Jerusalem and the West Bank, are among the
    leading examples of Israelis who have become convinced that
    only a two-state solution and painful territorial compromise

    TEL AVIV 00001005 002 OF 003

    will enable Israel to preserve its identity as a democratic,
    Jewish state. The growing assertiveness of Israel's large
    Arab minority, now about twenty percent of the total
    population, is both a further source of concern and an
    additional impetus to create a Palestinian state.

    ¶5. (S) One problem, however, is the lack of a broad-based
    Israeli confidence in the Palestinians' capacity to hold up
    their end of the land-for-peace bargain. Olmert publicly
    stresses his confidence in Mahmoud Abbas' determination to
    achieve peace, and virtually all Israeli leaders tell us how
    much they respect Salam Fayyad, yet few believe that Abbas or
    Fayyad enjoy much popular legitimacy among Palestinians. The
    public generally accepts the admonitions of Defense Minister
    Barak and those of the leaders of the IDF and Israel's
    security services that the Palestinian Authority Security
    Forces lack the determination to stand up to Hamas if push
    comes to shove. The precedent set by Gaza is one that no one
    wants to see repeated in the West Bank. The IDF's strategic
    concept is heavily rooted in the absolute need to prevent the
    hills of the West Bank from becoming sites from which rockets
    could be launched at Israel's heavily populated central
    plain. Hamas' control of Gaza and the daily rain of rockets
    from Gaza on southern Israel pose another kind of problem.
    The political leadership is grappling with whether an
    Egyptian-negotiated ceasefire in Gaza would calm the
    situation or make it worse by strengthening Hamas politically
    and militarily while undermining Abbas. The only other
    options on the table involve a broader armed conflict with
    Hamas, but Israel is constrained by the potential for high
    casualties, international condemnation, and most of all, the
    lack of a good exit strategy should it decide to invade Gaza
    to topple the Hamas regime there. All of these calculations
    could be upset at any time by a rocket from Gaza that strikes
    a busy school or hospital, thus forcing the Israeli
    leadership to order massive retaliation. Israel is working
    with us on missile defense options, but their preferred
    system will not be operational for two years. One way we
    could help would be by offering to provide the kinds of
    short-range defenses against rockets that we are using in
    Iraq.

    Inertia Favors Settlers
    -----------------------

    ¶6. (S) Another outstanding issue is how and when to confront
    the settler movement and get serious about outposts and
    settlements. Inertia is on the side of the settlers. Even
    if they no longer have the sympathy of the Israeli public,
    they have powerful allies in the bureaucracy, wealthy backers
    in Israel and abroad who are willing to fund the settlement
    enterprise, and an IDF that will not challenge the settlers
    without clear instructions from the political echelon (and
    even then may drag its feet). Barak, Deputy PM Ramon, and
    others are engaged in discussions with the settler
    leadership, and after Secretary Rice's latest visit the PM's
    office leaked to the media that he has discussed with Abbas
    moving 60,000 settlers out of the West Bank. If true, this
    is a dramatic development. Olmert's need to retain the
    support of the Shas Party and his political ups and downs
    have so far resulted in the settler leadership being much
    more determined to hold on than the GOI is to start moving
    them out.

    Olmert's Political Woes Return
    ------------------------------

    ¶7. (S) Even as we finalize the preparations for the
    President's visit, Prime Minister Olmert is once again facing
    a political crisis. Having survived the Winograd Committee's
    final report and weathered four separate, interminable
    corruption investigations, in the past few weeks Ehud Olmert
    appeared to have regained his political footing and was
    openly declaring his plans to run for reelection, possibly in
    early 2009. Then suddenly last week, the media was full of
    reports that the Attorney General had authorized the police
    to initiate a fifth criminal investigation of Olmert. At the
    same time, the Attorney General imposed a gag order that
    prevented the public from knowing the specifics of the
    charges and barred the Prime Minister from mobilizing a
    public defense against them. We do not know the details,
    though leaks in the media indicate that an American investor
    may be involved with the PM in alleged financial misdeeds
    sometime before Olmert became Prime Minister. And although
    Olmert has survived the four previous investigations,
    informed Israelis are suggesting that this time he may be in
    much more serious trouble.

    ¶8. (S) Labor Party insider and Minister of Infrastructure
    Fuad Ben Eliezer told the Ambassador May 6 that, according to

    TEL AVIV 00001005 003 OF 003

    his information, the nature of the charges is such that
    Olmert may be forced to resign in the near future. Ben
    Eliezer echoed comments from other political analysts that if
    Olmert resigns, the most likely scenario will be for Livni to
    become interim Prime Minister and head of the Kadima Party.
    If Livni becomes PM, Ben Eliezer was confident that Barak
    would keep Labor inside the Coalition and that elections
    could be delayed until some time next year. As Ben Eliezer
    put it, the political weakness of the constituent members of
    the coalition is the key to its strength, since none of them
    have an interest in early elections. At this point, we
    cannot predict how accurate Ben Eliezer's prediction is
    likely to be, and no one should discount Ehud Olmert's
    determination to hold on. But at a minimum, the latest
    charges represent an exceptionally unwelcome cloud over
    Olmert's head as he prepares to greet the President.

    ********************************************* ********************
    Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

    You can also access this site through the State Department's
    Classified SIPRNET website.
    ********************************************* ********************
    JONES

`