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### Viewing cable 09MADRID71, SPAIN: DEPARTING AMBASSADOR'S INSIGHTS ON ENGAGING

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09MADRID71 | 2009-01-21 17:05 | 2010-12-07 12:12 | SECRET | Embassy Madrid

`

    VZCZCXRO1700
    RR RUEHLA
    DE RUEHMD #0071/01 0211713
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 211713Z JAN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
    TO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
    RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0092
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
    RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    INFO RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 3749
    RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0472
    RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0105

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 MADRID 000071

    SIPDIS

    PASS TO ELAINE SAMSON AND STACIE ZERDECKI AT EUR/WE,
    JANICE BELL AT INR
    TOBY BRADLEY AT NSC

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2034
    TAGS: OVIP PINS PREL PTER OFDP SP PGOV
    SUBJECT: SPAIN: DEPARTING AMBASSADOR'S INSIGHTS ON ENGAGING
    GOS LEADERSHIP

    REF: A. 08 MADRID 1359
    ¶B. 08 MADRID 518

    Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Arnold A. Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) a
    nd (d)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Aguirre conducted a series of
    farewell calls on key GOS officials in the weeks before
    departing Post on January 20. Those meetings contributed to
    the information in this cable, which offers the Ambassador's
    final thoughts on how the Obama Administration might best
    engage key personalities within the Zapatero Administration.
    END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (C) COMMENT: The GOS is clearly eager to ramp up its
    engagement with the Obama Administration and plans to
    immediately implement a diplomatic full court press to
    "normalize" bilateral ties, after years of Madrid perceiving
    itself to be on the outs with Washington. There is currently
    a wave of goodwill in Spain for President Obama and his
    administration. Zapatero, who feels a spiritual kinship with
    President Obama and identifies with him in a personal way,
    has publicly pledged that "Obama will have in Spain and its
    government a faithful ally and friend." Meanwhile, Foreign
    Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos has publicly voiced the GOS's
    expectation that bilateral relations will enter "a phase of
    greater harmony" in which ties are "more intimate, more
    intense, and more fluid." Senior Spanish officials publicly
    have expressed hope that Zapatero and Obama will have a
    formal meeting in 2009, preferably at the White House.
    Spanish officials also have informed the media that Vice
    President Biden told Zapatero in a November 17 phone
    conversation that he would visit Spain shortly after taking
    office to discuss the global financial crisis. Zapatero
    recently announced his interest in phoning the President soon
    for an in-depth conversation to discuss conflict areas and
    Latin America - including Cuba - and on other occasions has
    signaled his interest in cooperation on global issues such as
    combating terrorism, poverty and climate change. Managing
    GOS expectations on the timetable and the extent of bilateral
    cooperation will be key to maintaining their current
    enthusiasm for collaborating on projects of mutual interest.
    END COMMENT.

    //King Juan Carlos de Borbon//

    ¶3. (S) The Ambassador urges the new Administration to engage
    with King Juan Carlos I, the Spanish Head of State. Juan
    Carlos is well-disposed to the U.S. but he will always act in
    what he perceives to be the best interests of Spain. Where
    U.S. and Spanish interests coincide, he can be a formidable
    ally. In meetings, the King will try to charm interlocutors
    and will bring down the level of formality and protocol to
    make them feel comfortable, thereby seek to guide the
    relationship. It is best to stay at the King's level of
    banter and not be cowed by his aura. If you push back with
    joviality at any verbal jousting, you will win his respect.

    ¶4. (S) The King has a respectful relationship with Zapatero
    and they communicate well. Zapatero consults and informs the
    King on issues from time to time and the King has no
    reluctance to offer his thoughts - but not his advice - on
    issues. The King is selective when he wants the GOS to do
    something, discreetly passing the word through Zapatero or
    his Cabinet. The King does have influence with Zapatero when
    he wants to use it.

    ¶5. (S) For example, the Ambassador is convinced that the King
    was the guiding force - over the objections of Foreign
    Minister Moratinos - in the GOS naming Jorge Dezcallar to be
    the current Ambassador to the United States. The Ambassador
    believes this in part because the King identified Dezcallar
    to the Ambassador as the next Spanish envoy to Washington six
    months before the decision was announced by the GOS. The
    Ambassador believes that Juan Carlos chose Dezcallar because
    he believes Dezcallar will do the best job for Spain in that

    MADRID 00000071 002 OF 006

    position. Of course, it also helps that Juan Carlos likes
    Dezcallar and that Dezcallar has some personal allegiance to
    the King.

    ¶6. (U) Juan Carlos will visit Florida (Pensacola during
    February 18-19 and Miami on February 19) as part of
    celebrations to mark the 450th anniversary of the first
    Spanish expedition to set foot in what is today the United
    States. According to Spanish press reports, Spanish
    diplomatic sources suggest he may meet Obama Administration
    officials during his visit.

    //President Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero//

    ¶7. (S) Zapatero is a wily politician with an uncanny ability
    - like a cat in a jungle - to sense opportunity or danger.
    It is dangerous to underestimate him, as many former rivals
    have found out too late. In making decisions and formulating
    policy, he plays to his domestic audience, especially voters
    outside the Madrid region, which he looks down upon for a
    kind of "inside the Beltway" insularity that he perceives as
    detached from the concerns and views of most Spaniards. He
    is playing to the peanut gallery rather than to the front
    row. Zapatero, who is heading his second minority
    government, is constantly fighting for the support of the 1-2
    million swing voters and traditional non-voters. In the
    Ambassador's judgment, there are no issues that Zapatero
    would fall on his sword over; all options are always on the
    table in order to achieve his immediate political goals.

    ¶8. (C) Zapatero has faced a steep learning curve on foreign
    policy issues, but has developed a broad strategic vision
    that recognizes the inter-relationships and cause and effect
    consequences of his government's actions. Nowadays he is
    well informed on any topic. Zapatero has the capacity to
    learn, absorb, and connect the dots. He is bright and
    continually gets the better of detractors who underestimate
    him.

    ¶9. (S) Zapatero is not a "conviction" politician but
    undoubtedly understands the Spanish people and will support
    whatever policy appeals to them, regardless of U.S.
    interests. However, Zapatero also has shown that if there is
    an issue of particular importance to the USG, he can be
    amenable to working with us despite internal opposition. For
    example, at one point the Ambassador informed Zapatero that
    U.S. CEO's might decide to stop bidding in Spain due to a
    growing perception that the GOS was not welcoming US bidders
    on procurement contracts. Zapatero had told the Ambassador
    to let him know if there was something important to the USG
    and he would take care of it. Later - when the USG had
    agreed to advocate on behalf of GE in a bid against Rolls
    Royce for a Spanish MOD contract to provide helicopter motors
    - GE informed the Ambassador that failure to win the contract
    would cause that branch of GE to cease operations in Spain,
    which the Ambassador duly informed Zapatero's economic
    adviser. Although there was considerable all-source evidence
    to suggest that the MOD decided to award the contract to
    Rolls Royce, Moncloa - the office of the President -
    overturned the decision and it was announced that GE had won
    the bid. The Ambassador is convinced that Zapatero
    personally intervened in the case in favor of GE.

    ¶10. (C) Zapatero is not innately ill-disposed to the USG.
    For him, foreign policy is subordinate to domestic political
    interests and the U.S. relationship is just one more element
    to be viewed according to the circumstances of the moment.
    There is currently a wave of goodwill for President Obama in
    Spain, which is the answer to Zapatero's prayers in that it
    enables him to engage the USG without being dinged by the
    traditional anti-U.S. sentiment among his political base.

    ¶11. (S) The best way to interact with Zapatero in meetings is
    to be pleasant and relaxed and be ready for some initial
    banter. The Ambassador advises to ask him open-ended
    questions and allow him to talk about what's on his mind.

    MADRID 00000071 003 OF 006

    Zapatero will be well prepared on substance. Zapatero
    welcomes dialogue and an exchange of ideas. He does not
    respond well to being lectured and will end the conversation
    if he perceives that is what is occurring. Similarly, do not
    corner him politically or ambush him publicly. Give him room
    and he will listen to your ideas. If there are political
    differences, they would be best discussed behind closed
    doors. It is best to have open lines of communications with
    Zapatero's team, which has access to him at all times. The
    USG needs to maintain and further cultivate access to the
    people who have access to Zapatero, the most well-connected
    of which are listed below.

    //GOS Officials with Access to Zapatero//

    I) Maria Teresa Fernandez de la Vega, the First Vice
    President and Minister of the Presidency

    ¶12. (S) Fernandez de la Vega is a key player with access to
    Zapatero. She is his able lieutenant and the executor of his
    policies. Fernandez de la Vega has an icy personality and
    brings a sterile, surgical approach to her work. There are
    rumors that Fernandez de la Vega may be removed during an
    impending Cabinet shuffle by Zapatero. The Ambassador
    believes that Zapatero has no personal allegiance to her
    beyond being a strong member of his team. She delivers and
    is effective at what she does, but the moment she ceases to
    be useful to him, he will let her go at the first politically
    convenient moment. The Ambassador does not believe she
    aspires to higher office and suggests she knows this post
    will be the peak of her career. She is not especially a
    friend of the USG, but is a pragmatist and interacts with the
    USG as needed. U.S. interlocutors would be well advised to
    use a firm backbone when dealing with Fernandez de la Vega,
    which the Ambassador suggests will help develop mutual
    respect.

    II) Bernardino Leon, Secretary General of the Office of the
    President

    ¶13. (S) Leon is a smart and impressive interlocutor who is
    well-connected to and has the ear of Zapatero (As highlighted
    in REFTEL A). He is the golden boy of the GOS and his
    influence is on the rise. The Ambassador opines that Leon's
    career will take him far beyond where he is now and envisions
    that he could easily become Foreign Minister one day. At
    present, Leon is more important to Zapatero than Foreign
    Minister Moratinos or any other single cabinet minister
    because the breadth of his duties transcends any individual
    ministry and has virtually no parameters. Although his
    expertise is in foreign policy, Leon is currently Zapatero's
    go-to guy on both international and domestic issues (for
    example, he is even involved in budget negotiations between
    Spain's central government and the regional governments).
    Leon commands an impressive capability to digest incredible
    quantities of information on a range of topics, connect the
    dots and present them in a insightful, cogent and persuasive
    fashion. The Ambassador likened Leon's talent to a human
    version of Google. Leon also has an aptitude for creative
    problem-solving, such as his efforts in 2005 - as Deputy
    Foreign Minister - to ensure that a scheduled speech by
    Venezuela's Hugo Chavez in Salamanca, Spain did not upstage a
    cross-town meeting of the Summit of the Americas. Leon has
    been displeased with recent press reports touting his growing
    influence with Zapatero at the expense of Fernandez de la
    Vega or Moratinos. The Ambassador suggests Leon's ego is fed
    by what he accomplishes rather than by what people tell him
    or write about him. Leon has a passion for his work and
    interlocutors will find him very well informed on Latin
    America, Africa, the Middle East, and Russia.

    ¶14. (C) The Ambassador cites Zapatero's recruitment of Leon
    to the Office of the Presidency as the result of a rare
    instance in which foreign policy unfavorably impacted
    Zapatero domestically. Zapatero decided to shuffle his
    foreign policy advisers when the blowback from unflattering

    MADRID 00000071 004 OF 006

    media coverage of Zapatero at the NATO Summit in Bucharest
    impacted his standing at home. (See REFTEL B).

    III) Milagros Hernando, President of the International
    Department of the Office of the President

    ¶15. (C) Known as Mila, career diplomat Hernando acts as chief
    of staff to Leon, to whom she owes her job. Her geographic
    expertise is Europe - Leon's weakest area - which makes them
    a Yin & Yang team that complement each other. Their
    relationship is based on mutual trust. There is no daylight
    between them on policy issues. Hernando's role is for Leon's
    aggrandizement; she will protect him and will not take credit
    behind his back. With Leon as busy as he is, Hernando is
    more accessible to USG interlocutors.

    IV) Gen. Felix Sanz, High Representative for the Spanish
    Presidency of the EU on Defense Issues

    ¶16. (C) On defense issues, Sanz, the Chief of the Defense
    Staff (CHOD) during 2004-08, might prove an alternate channel
    to Zapatero. Sanz has very positive views of the United
    States, despite knowing that in 2008 the USG did not vote for
    him to be the next Chairman of the Military Committee at
    NATO. He is not bitter about the incident, but knows he owes
    the USG no favors for it.

    //Zapatero's Inner Circle//

    ¶17. (S) Zapatero keeps his own counsel and rarely asks for
    his subordinates' input on key issues. As his confidence has
    grown while he has been in office, he is doing so less
    frequently and will do so only with a select inner circle of
    three additional advisers besides Leon. The Ambassador
    suggests that Zapatero's thinking is that he does not need
    the advice of others and/or they are not useful to his
    decision-making process, so he does not reach out for their
    views.

    I) Jose "Pepe" Blanco, Vice Secretary General in Zapatero,s
    Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE)

    ¶18. (S) Zapatero consults Blanco, the #2 official in the
    PSOE, on political issues. The Ambassador describes Blanco
    as a very important element in the equation for maintaining
    strong bilateral relations. Contact with him must be
    maintained to continue providing messages to Zapatero.
    However, Blanco leaves a bad taste in the mouth of some past
    U.S. interlocutors, whom he strikes as particularly
    untrustworthy. Blanco has an unfailing idiosyncrasy of never
    looking interlocutors in the eye when he shakes hands.
    Furthermore, he has a reputation for being especially
    ruthless on political issues, which he appears to relish.

    ¶19. (U) Blanco and Jesus Caldera, the PSOE's Secretary for
    Ideas and Projects, will travel to Washington, DC in
    mid-February to attend a conference on the "historical
    change" in the United States that the new President
    represents.
    II) Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba, Minister of Interior

    ¶20. (S) Zapatero also consults Rubalcaba, who tops the
    Ambassador's list of the most impressive GOS officials. The
    Ambassador suggested that Rubalcaba sees himself as the
    smartest person in Cabinet but conveys no hubris. Rubalcaba
    is smart enough to know that he needs the USG on
    counter-terrorism (CT) issues and therefore he has been
    cooperative with U.S. interlocutors on that topic. Rubalcaba
    excels out putting out fires, but also fully understands the
    extent of the lack of inter-agency cooperation in his
    Ministry between the Spanish National Police and the Civil
    Guard. The Ambassador suggests Zapatero is consulting with
    Rubalcaba for ideas on who should succeed intelligence
    director Alberto Saiz, whose five-year mandate expires in
    April, but the Ambassador also places the odds at better than
    even that Zapatero renews Saiz's mandate since it is the path

    MADRID 00000071 005 OF 006

    of least resistance.

    ¶21. (S) Rubalcaba is feeling the weight of power and is
    looking for an opportunity to leave his Ministry and possibly
    the GOS, suggests the Ambassador. Rubalcaba - whose wife
    reportedly wants him to step down - takes the deaths of
    Spaniards to heart, whether at the hands of ETA terrorists,
    traffic deaths on the highways or criminal violence. It is
    starting to wear on him, and he has suggested he is no longer
    at his peak performance. He told the Ambassador he intended
    to step down in early 2008 at the end of the first Zapatero
    government, but he miscalculated and informed Zapatero too
    late in the latter's planning process. Rubalcaba is
    extremely loyal to Zapatero, who understands that he needs
    Rubalcaba and will make it difficult for him to step down.
    The Ambassador recommends that Rubalcaba - who is very
    accessible to the Embassy despite his busy schedule - remains
    a contact that the USG cultivates, whether he remains in his
    current post or not. He will continue to be an important
    player in Spanish politics in either case.

    III) Jose Antonio Alonso, PSOE Spokesman in the Congress of
    Deputies

    ¶22. (C) According to the Ambassador, Zapatero also consults
    Alonso, a judge and childhood friend whom Zapatero recruited
    to be his Minister of Interior (2004-6) and later his
    Minister of Defense (2006-08) in his first government, before
    asking him to assume his current post. The two are close and
    Alonso is keenly loyal to Zapatero.

    //Three Other Key GOS Personalities in the Bilateral
    Relationship//

    ¶23. (S) Foreign Minister Moratinos is not the most impressive
    member of cabinet, but he is an honest broker who should be
    taken seriously. He is well meaning albeit egotistical,
    according to the Ambassador. The Foreign Minister belongs to
    a second, outer ring of Zapatero advisers. His allegiance is
    to Spain - rather than to Zapatero or even to his own career
    advancement - and he is idealistically motivated to "do the
    right thing." The Ambassador discounts speculation, which
    has existed since before the Ambassador arrived, that
    Zapatero will shuffle Moratinos out of his current post any
    time soon. The Ambassador believes that Moratinos suits the
    bill well enough for Zapatero's purposes. The Ambassador
    knows of no ill-will or jealousy on the part of Moratinos for
    Leon's growing influence with Zapatero.

    ¶24. (S) In meetings, Moratinos often tries to overpower or
    bully his interlocutors in an attempt to establish a superior
    negotiating position. It is fairly well known in Madrid
    among the Ambassadorial corps that Moratinos is given to
    screaming at foreign Ambassadors and chastising them at the
    first opportunity to put them in their place. It is a tactic
    that has caused many Ambassadors to leave with their tail
    between their legs. The Ambassador recommends that his
    successor and other senior-level USG interlocutors stand
    their ground against Moratinos and force him to deal with
    them on an even level. Once this happens, the relationship
    will likely prove far more harmonious. Meanwhile, Moratinos
    had a very healthy professional admiration for former
    Secretary of State Rice, whose attention he craved and whose
    approval he sought.

    ¶25. (S) Carme Chacon is smart and has gained enough respect
    to be effective as Defense Minister. She has also been a
    real asset to Zapatero in the way she has handled the
    portfolio in the public eye. However, she is immature in a
    political sense, according to the Ambassador. She is too
    focused on the little things - such as the lack of parity in
    the bilateral defense relationship or by implying that she
    needs to be treated with more deference - and is not focused
    on larger issues like weapons systems. She does not have a
    huge ego, but she is wearing the Spanish ego. The Ambassador
    says the USG will not be able to change her, so it will need

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    to adapt and work with her. She is still developing her
    political senses and will be an important player in Spanish
    politics for years to come. The Ambassador predicted that
    she will grow in her job and recommends future U.S.
    interlocutors treat her with an eye to the future. The
    Ambassador also remarked that Chacon is finding that all of
    the media attention she has received since she became Defense
    Minister can be a double-edged sword. Early favorable
    coverage (when she inspected the troops while pregnant) has
    lately given way to more negative, if irrelevant reports (as
    when she wore a controversial smoking jacket to a military
    parade).

    ¶26. (C) Finally, the Ambassador identified his Spanish
    counterpart in Washington, Ambassador Jorge Dezcallar (also
    discussed in Paragraph 5 above) as an important contact for
    the new Administration to cultivate in the bilateral
    relationship, predicting that Dezcallar will be a linchpin in
    the bilateral relationship in the year ahead. The Ambassador
    also suggests that Dezcallar would likely respond well to
    increased social interaction with USG officials.
    CHACON

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