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### Viewing cable 10BAGHDAD70, IRAQI PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT DISCUSS

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10BAGHDAD70 | 2010-01-11 15:03 | 2010-12-05 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Baghdad

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHGB #0070/01 0111553
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 111553Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6076
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2//
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000070

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/I. NSC FOR PHEE AND VROOMAN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2020
    TAGS: IR IZ KDEM PGOV PREL
    SUBJECT: IRAQI PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT DISCUSS
    IRAN-IRAQ BORDER DISPUTE, ELECTIONS, AND SECURITY WITH
    CODEL MCCAIN

    REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 3334
    ¶B. B) BAGHDAD 0028

    Classified By: DCM ROBERT S. FORD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Senators John McCain (R/AZ), Joseph Lieberman
    (I/CT), John Barrasso (R/WY), and John Thune (R/SD) on
    January 5, 2009 held meetings with Iraqi President Jalal
    Talabani and Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi to discuss the
    recent Blackwater ruling, upcoming Iraqi national election,
    and Iraq's regional relations. In separate meetings, both
    Talabani and Abd al-Mahdi discussed the status of Iraqi
    relations with Iran relative to the Fakkah oil field
    incident. Additionally, Talabani commented on the
    seriousness of recent demonstrations inside Iran and
    cautioned the U.S. against showing public support for the
    Iranian opposition, which could undermine their credibility.
    For his part, Abd al-Mahdi discussed the need for Iraqi
    elections to be seen as transparent and legitimate, and noted
    the importance of a timely government formation period. With
    regard to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, Abd
    al-Mahdi acknowledged progress made in strengthening the
    Iraqi Army, but stressed the importance of not overestimating
    Iraq's capabilities. He called for the U.S. and Iraqi
    governments to reassess the current security situation and
    revise the security agreement accordingly after the new Iraqi
    government is established. End Summary.

    ----------------------------------
    REPERCUSSIONS OF BLACKWATER RULING
    ----------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) President Talabani remarked that he hoped the incident
    would not affect the relationship between Iraq and the U.S.
    and commented that even in Iraq, courts are independent and
    sometimes issue decisions that those in the government do not
    agree with, but such rulings must be obeyed regardless. The
    Vice President stressed the importance of an appeal as the
    Iraqi people are looking for justice. Abd al-Mahdi noted
    that in a separate incident one of his personal guards was
    killed by an intoxicated Blackwater employee.

    ----------------------------
    THE IRAN-IRAQ BORDER DISPUTE
    ----------------------------

    ¶3. (C) Abd al-Mahdi commented that Iraqi relations with Iran
    are at a low point, noting that what the Iranians did in
    Fakkah was a mistake. (Ref A) He said that both countries
    acknowledge that the Fakkah oil well is in a disputed area,
    because of the unclear border between Iran and Iraq, but he
    believed the situation was returning to normal as evidenced
    by the Iranians removing their flag from the field. The Vice
    President stressed that because of Iraq's shared border with
    Iran, it is very important to maintain good relations between
    the two countries, just as the same is true for Iraqi
    relations with Turkey and Syria. He believed that Iraq could
    not risk its future by entering into a new conflict with
    Iran. Abd al-Mahdi stated that Iraq cannot wage war against
    its neighbors, and said that the more problems Iraq has with
    its neighbors, the more they must negotiate to overcome those
    problems.

    ¶4. (C) Talabani commented that the 1975 Algiers Agreement (on
    border delineation) is the root of many problems surrounding
    the Iran-Iraq border. The President commented that in some
    places the Iranians are moving toward the border because of
    what they see as laid out in the 1975 Agreement, but said
    Qwhat they see as laid out in the 1975 Agreement, but said
    that the Iraqis do not recognize the agreement because it was
    formalized under the Saddam regime.

    ---------------------------------------------
    TALABANI: U.S. SHOULD BE MINDFUL OF IMPACT OF SUPPORTING IRAN
    OPPOSITION
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶5. (C) When asked about the ongoing demonstrations in Iran
    and whether such events pose a real threat to the Iranian
    regime, Talabani said that the current demonstrations are
    very serious and represent the division among the political
    leaders and religious authorities trickling down to the
    street level. The President commented that Iran has a
    diverse population, with differences among all groups running

    deep with a long history. He stressed that it was not that
    the Iranian regime was weak, but rather that the opposing
    side was strong. Talabani said that the Iranian opposition
    included both experienced Iranian politicians, to include
    Mousavi, Rafsanjani, and Karrubi, and important religious
    figures. He also commented that whereas the demonstrations
    at first were attacking Iranian President Ahmadinejad, they
    have now shifted to being against Supreme Leader Khamenei.
    Talabani said that the Iranian government feels threatened.
    In response, Iran has threatened to use any force necessary,
    and was presently trying to pass a law in the Parliament to
    hang those found to be against the regime. Talabani also
    commented that historically major leadership changes in Iran
    begin in the main cities and spread throughout the country.
    He opined that what is currently transpiring is reminiscent
    of past major changes in Iran. However, he believed that
    unlike in previous scenarios, the current regime is able to
    threaten people without any fear of a third party stepping
    in. Talabani said for example that the Shah was somewhat
    tempered by his fear of the U.S. intervening, but that no
    such moderating force presently exists.

    ¶6. (C) With regard to any possible show of U.S. support to
    the Iranian people, Talabani cautioned that the U.S. must
    consider how the Iranian regime could use a show of U.S.
    solidarity toward the Iranian opposition to further label the
    opposition as agents of the U.S.

    ¶7. (C) Referring to his conversations with Syrian President
    Bashar al-Asad, Talabani said that the Syrians deny suicide
    bombers enter Iraq via Syria and say they support Iraqi unity
    and security. Talabani opined that certain parts of the
    Syrian regime were supportive of such terrorists. Talabani
    also commented that none of Iraq,s neighbors are happy about
    Iraq's success and do not want a strong, united Iraq, as they
    fear Iraq as a model of democracy in the region and Iraq,s
    ability to assume its share of the oil market. However,
    Talabani stated that regardless of the positions held by its
    neighbors, Iraq will continue to advance in achieving its
    goals.

    --------------------------------------------- -----
    ABD AL-MAHDI HINTS FASTER GOVERNMENT FORMATION IN 2010
    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶8. (C) Adil Abd al-Mahdi in response to an inquiry into his
    assessment of the upcoming Iraqi national election said that
    he believed that elections are always good, especially in a
    country working to move past a history of tyranny and
    dictatorship and embrace democracy. He hoped to see a
    transparent and legitimate election, free from foreign
    interference, and noted that the provincial elections
    demonstrated that Iraq is moving in the right direction with
    this regard. The Vice President believed that holding a
    successful national election would help to further stabilize
    the Iraqi political system. He hoped that participation in
    the election would be as high as that of previous elections,
    but acknowledged that turnout could be somewhat less. Abd
    al-Mahdi commented that the four-month delay in forming a
    government following the previous national election was
    damaging to Iraq and sent the wrong message to Iraq's
    enemies. He noted that Iraqi blocs currently are engaged in
    Qenemies. He noted that Iraqi blocs currently are engaged in
    negotiations in an effort to minimize the length of the
    government formation period.

    ¶9. (C) Abd al-Mahdi said he believed "popular mobilization"
    was the best method to campaign for the national election,
    whereby candidates get out to visit various neighborhoods and
    go house to house engaging the Iraqi population. The Vice
    President also commented that campaigning will utilize both
    radio and television, and that during this campaign season
    there would also be several debates. Abd al-Mahdi noted that
    elections in 2010 will differ from the previous national
    elections, in that the Iraqi people will vote for individuals
    as opposed to lists, which he believed was a positive change
    and would result in less polarization. Additionally, he
    observed that there were good and respected names on the
    candidate lists.

    ¶10. (C) When asked, Abd al-Mahdi acknowledged that he is a
    contender for the prime ministership, but noted that as is
    the case in all elections, the election outcome and alliances
    formed would ultimately determine the next prime minister.

    (Comment: It was evident that Abd al-Mahdi clearly remembers
    the role that the U.S. Ambassador played in preventing him
    from becoming Prime Minister in 2006 because of his ties to
    Iran. End Comment.)

    ----------------------------------
    TALABANI: SHIA LISTS WILL DOMINATE
    ----------------------------------

    ¶11. (C) President Talabani when queried as to his election
    predictions said that he believed the winning bloc would
    either be Maliki's State of Law or the Iraqi National
    Alliance (INA), with Allawi's list coming third. Regarding
    the Kurdish bloc, Talabani said that the PUK and KDP lists
    will be united, but that all Kurdish parties will be working
    to advance themselves. However, he stated that regardless of
    election outcome, the Kurds will remain a united force in
    Baghdad.

    --------------------------------------------- --------------
    ABD AL-MAHDI CAUTIONS AGAINST OVERESTIMATING IRAQI FORCES
    --------------------------------------------- --------------

    ¶12. (C) In response to an inquiry into concerns surrounding
    the U.S. withdrawal and the readiness of the Iraqi Army (IA)
    to fill that void, Abd al-Mahdi said that there are less
    fears of this prospect than there were two years ago. The
    Vice President acknowledged that there are good signs of
    development in the IA, but said he thought all parties
    overestimated progress made and said he would qualify the
    current situation in Iraq differently than some of his
    colleagues would. He said that two months ago others within
    the GOI believed Al-Qa'ida was finished and argued for the
    removal of T-walls, but that he believed Al-Qa'ida was not
    finished, but rather would spread if left to its own devices.
    Abd al-Mahdi believes the GOI and U.S. government must
    reassess the current security situation in Iraq and the next
    Iraqi government and the U.S. should revise the security
    agreement accordingly, especially in light of recent attacks
    targeting government buildings in the center of Baghdad.

    ¶13. (C) The Vice President said that logistically and
    strategically we are winning the war, but that all parties
    must remain aware that this reality could shift. Abd
    al-Mahdi stressed that we should not "underestimate our enemy
    or overestimate our forces." He said that with all of the
    positive developments in Iraq, one can see a certain light at
    the end of the tunnel, but that Iraq can do better in all
    areas, from regional relations to countering terrorism.

    --------------------------------------------- ---------
    SECOND ROUND OF OIL BIDDING, ABSENCE OF U.S. COMPANIES
    --------------------------------------------- ---------

    ¶14. (C) President Talabani expressed disappointment that more
    American companies did not participate in the second round of
    oil biding in Iraq. Talabani said that for many years he has
    encouraged President Bush, and now President Obama, to
    support U.S. companies' investment in Iraq, noting that the
    U.S. administration was always waiting for the Iraqi oil law
    to be adopted by parliament prior to encouraging such
    investment. (Ref B)

    ¶15. (U) CODEL McCain cleared this message.
    HILL

`