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### Viewing cable 09BAMAKO815, CLOSING CEREMONY OF JCET TRAINING OF MALIAN ARMY

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BAMAKO815 | 2009-12-17 15:03 | 2010-12-06 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Bamako

`

    VZCZCXYZ0004
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHBP #0815/01 3511536
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 171536Z DEC 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0973
    INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0705
    RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY IMMEDIATE 0349
    RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 0304
    RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 0302
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0535
    RUEHAAA/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

` `

    S E C R E T BAMAKO 000815

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019
    TAGS: MARR ML PREL PTER
    SUBJECT: CLOSING CEREMONY OF JCET TRAINING OF MALIAN ARMY
    ETIA 4 IN GAO

    REF: BAMAKO 813

    Classified By: Ambassador Gillian A. Milovanovic, for reasons 1.4 (b) (
    d).

    ¶1. (S) On December 11 the DCM and DATT participated in the
    graduation ceremony of a Joint Combined Exchange Training
    (JCET) exercise of the Malian Army Echelon Tactique Interarme
    (ETIA) 4, in Gao. ETIA 4 is based in Timbuktu. The 10th
    Army Special Forces Group out of Fort Carson, Colorado, and
    led by Captain XXXXXXXXXXXX and Master Sergeant
    XXXXXXXXXXXX, conducted the JCET. Overall,
     XXXXXXXXXXXX said the  approximately 160
    men learned a lot over the five week
    training exercise. The exercise was shorter than planned in
    the wake of a hostage taking incident in Mali which led to a
    change in THREATCON and the US military-ordered temporary
    suspension of training while the JCET team was temporarily
    restricted to its quarters.

    ¶2. (S) The Governor of Gao region, Colonel XXXXXXXXXXXX,
    presided over the JCET graduation and thanked the U.S.
    Government for its commitment to helping Mali defend itself.
    Noting that he had served as military commander of the
    Timbuktu region during the time of the Tuareg rebellion, he
    exhorted ETIA 4 to apply what it had learned in the course of
    the training. A product of numerous IMET training
    opportunities in the United States and recently returned from
    a five year tour in Addis Ababa as Mali,s military attach,
    XXXXXXXXXXXX displayed an unfortunate lack of respect for the
    common soldiers who are being asked to lead the fight against
    AQIM. He distractedly waved on the many troops who stood at
    attention before him after receiving their graduation
    certificates, leaving the DATT to return their salutes.

    ¶3. (S) When the DCM asked him about the security
    situation in Gao, XXXXXXXXXXXX said
     he viewed the kidnapping of  French citizen
     Pierre Cammatte as a worrisome escalation, as
    AQIM had until now refrained from taking hostages on Malian
    soil. Nevertheless, he minimized the risk, saying that
    although many had left, there were still quite a few French
    and other European nationals working in Gao Region. He did
    not reiterate his September 23 request to the Ambassador for
    more development assistance.

    ¶4. (S) After the ceremony XXXXXXXXXXXX called over one,
    rather unimpressive soldier, an older, rail thin man with a
    scraggly beard and bloodshot eyes who had been lounging
    against a motorbike in a dirty T-shirt inside of a warehouse.
    He explained that in spite of appearances, this was one of
    the ETIA's best men, noting that he had been one of the few
    survivors of a July 4 ambush of a Malian Army patrol by Al
    Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (see IIR 6 958 0087 09). When
    asked how the training had gone, the soldier said if he had
    known at the time of the ambush what he had learned over the
    course of the JCET, it never would have happened. He cited
    in particular learning why and how to establish a mobile
    patrol post, digging and manning foxholes which afford 360
    degree, round-the-clock protection from potential assailants.
    The soldier said the Salafists would never confront the Army
    head-on, and if the Army engaged, they would flee, but if
    there is not proper security, they will creep back and murder
    you in the most cruel, unimaginable ways.
    XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the ETIA had done
    simulation exercises to defend, for
    example, the recovery of a broken down vehicle.

    ¶5. (S) The commander of ETIA 4, a major, also spoke
    highly of the training. He noted that he had already reached
    the end of his six month rotation, but had been extended so
    as to be able to lead participation in the JCET. He said he
    does not want to leave his men, and spoke about the logic of
    having a longer tour so as to develop skills over time and to
    build on training rather than starting from the beginning
    each time there is an opportunity for a JCET or other
    training. Nevertheless, it was evident from the preponderant
    number of black African faces in the ranks that most of ETIA
    4 was not from the North, and service in the North will
    clearly be a significant hardship on them and their families,
    most of whom live in the South.

    ¶6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that each soldier had expended some
    1,000 rounds of ammunition during the course of the training.
    Although a U.S. Special Forces soldier might expend that

    much in a day of training, he noted that a number of the
    Malian soldiers said it was probably more than they had used
    in their entire careers. He said the JCET had revealed, and
    made an effort to correct, some simple lacunae. For example,
    when the survivors of the July 4 ambush were asked why they
    had left behind so many vehicles to be captured by AQIM, they
    said the drivers had been killed and no one else in the unit
    knew how to drive. When asked why they had not used a heavy
    machine gun, they answered that the gunner who knew how to
    operate the weapon had also been killed, and he was the only
    one who knew what to do. Although it detracted from their
    initial training objective, the U.S. trainers taught everyone
    in the ETIA to drive and to fire and maintain all of their
    weapons systems.

    ¶7. (S) When asked from a non-scientific perspective to
    rate ETIA 4 with other comparable army units,
     XXXXXXXXXXXX said that, based on
    conversations with the Officer in Charge of
    the September 2009 training of ETIA 1 (Bamako 538), he
    believes that ETIA 4's capabilities are better overall. On a
    scale of 1 to 10 compared to other forces in Africa and the
    Middle East, including Iraqi Army regulars, ETIA 4 ranks
    about 6 out of 10. This compares to Algerian Army regulars
    that he ranked about 7 or 8. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that, with
    maintenance of the skills they had learned during the JCET
    and additional, follow-up training, ETIA 4 could easily
    improve.

    ¶8. (S) The JCET moved on December 7-8 to Amakouladji, a
    town approximately 35 kilometers north of Gao on the road to
    Bourem. There, they conducted a live fire exercise with
    rocket-propelled grenades and mortars at a firing range
    XXXXXXXXXXXX said was safe and well-suited to simulate geographic
    conditions in the North. In the town itself, they
    distributed supplies to some 240 grateful primary school
    students and vaccinated 250 farm animals.
    XXXXXXXXXXXX and several of his men said they
     had seen no/no evidence of AQIM
    surveillance or activity during the course of the five week
    JCET.

    ¶9. (S) Although the JCET was an overall success, it was
    not without problems. The 14 Landcruisers designated for
    ETIA 4, that were part of the 37 the Ambassador handed over
    to the Minister of Defense on October 20, did not show up in
    Gao until the last week of the training. While the vehicles,
    five equipped with Harris HF radios, are with the unit now,
    and will move with the ETIA 4 back to Timbuktu, the hand held
    radios that should also have been part of the ETIA 4 vehicle
    allocation had not yet arrived. Only about two thirds of
    the 160-strong unit were wearing the boots and desert
    fatigues provided by the United States, but additional boots
    and other equipment arrived on the CASA 212 flight from
    Bamako the day of the ceremony. XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that the
    Gao base commander had initially tried to keep him out of a
    warehouse which stored replacement gun barrels and other
    parts. He was told that the materiel was being held in
    reserve, but he overcame the base commander's objections and
    succeeded in procuring what was needed to replace broken or
    missing equipment held by the ETIA.
    XXXXXXXXXXXX was asked to make that part of his
    report, as the Ambassador had raised
    the problem with President Amadou Toumani Toure in September
    (Bamako 619).

    MILOVANOVIC

`