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### Viewing cable 06PARAMARIBO343, INCREASED VENEZUELAN ACTIVISM IN SURINAME HAS

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06PARAMARIBO343 | 2006-06-09 18:06 | 2011-01-31 15:03 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Paramaribo

`

    VZCZCXRO4185
    RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL
    RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
    DE RUEHPO #0343/01 1601855
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 091855Z JUN 06
    FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8408
    INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
    RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0009
    RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1554
    RUEHBR/USDAO BRASILIA BR
    RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARAMARIBO 000343

    SIPDIS

    NOFORN

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR WHA/CAR-LLUFTIG, WHA/PDQEDETTER, APRUITT
    DEPT FOR INR - RCARHART
    SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: DECL: 06/09/2016
    TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ENRG KCRM MARR SOCI SCUL VE
    NS
    SUBJECT: INCREASED VENEZUELAN ACTIVISM IN SURINAME HAS
    MIXED SUCCESS

    REF: A) PARAMARIBO 175 B) PARAMARIBO 286 C) PARAMARIBO 155
    D) 05 PARAMARIBO 723 E) 05 PARAMARIBO 414 F) 05 PARAMARIBO
    527 G) 05 PARAMARIBO 687 H) 05 PARAMARIBO 783

    Classified by Ambassador Marsha E. Barnes, reasons 1.4 (b)
    and (d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Venezuela's profile in Suriname is on the
    rise thanks to economic initiatives such as PetroCaribe, a
    joint Cuban-Venezuelan health care assistance program, and
    a steady public relations campaign by its Embassy over the
    past year. Despite this heightened engagement, Venezuela's
    activism is not blindly well received, however, as some
    recognize the more obtrusive edges of PetroCaribe or are
    otherwise disappointed by supposed largesse. Local media
    also carry unvarnished views on conditions in Venezuela
    with some regularity. By positioning himself as defender
    of the less developed countries in the hemisphere, GOV
    President Hugo Chavez strikes a chord with many Surinamers
    who bristle at perceived outside interference by larger,
    richer countries in their affairs. Surinamers, though,
    typically center their passion against the Dutch and not
    the U.S. Venezuelan activism here will likely further
    increase, and if Chavez ramps up aid to Suriname, his
    ability to influence may well follow; NDP opposition party
    leader Desi Bouterse is already a fan. End Summary.

    ----------------------------------------
    ECONOMIC TIES: PETROCARIBE AND FISHERIES
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Venezuela's most high profile initiative in Suriname
    is the PetroCaribe agreement. Implementation, however,
    appears further off than officials from both sides are
    publicly claiming (See ref A). Some GOS officials are
    concerned that it will lead to increased political
    indebtedness to Venezuela, according to Terrence Craig,
    Head of the Americas Desk at the Ministry of Foreign
    Affairs (MFA). The Finance Minister is reportedly
    uncomfortable with the increased debt levels resulting from
    PetroCaribe's financing scheme and a GOS proposal to use
    its proceeds to create a social fund designed to provide
    low interest home mortgages. The director of the state oil
    company, Staatsolie, has serious reservations about the
    role his enterprise is expected to play, as it would be
    positioned to be a storage and transport facility,
    undermining its business model to grow as a supplier.

    ¶3. (C) In its impatience to complete the PetroCaribe deal,
    Venezuela is refusing to renew a 1986 fisheries agreement
    that expired in June 2005 until a PetroCaribe delivery
    schedule is finalized, according to Craig. Specifically,
    the GOV is declining to sign a fuel clause allowing low
    cost Venezuelan fuel for Surinamese fishing vessels until
    Suriname commits to PetroCaribe's final steps. Craig said
    the GOS is dismayed at this negotiation tactic even as the
    GOS seeks to restructure the fisheries agreement to make it
    more beneficial for Suriname, which, according to critics,
    has received very little from the deal.

    ¶4. (U) The GOV paid for 15 Surinamese import companies to
    attend the South American Conference on Trade and
    Investment held in Caracas from May 15-19, aimed to explore
    commercial opportunities and ease interregional South
    American trade. An additional 45 companies were invited to
    attend at their own expense.

    --------------------------------------------- -----
    POLITICAL RELATIONS SOLID, BUT DIFFERENCES REMAIN
    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶5. (SBU) Political ties between the GOS and GOV can be
    considered solid, but neither side sees the other as a
    primary partner. Craig said deepened political cooperation
    still awaited the renewal of a formal bilateral
    consultation mechanism that has been defunct since 2002.
    In public statements on his country's political relations
    with Suriname, GOV Ambassador to Suriname Francisco
    Simancas emphasized Venezuela's backing of Surinamer Albert
    Ramdin's successful drive to become Assistant Secretary
    General of the Organization of American States (OAS) along

    PARAMARIBO 00000343 002 OF 004

    with help provided to Suriname in its bid to join the
    Community of South American Nations. Pending topics of
    discussion include Suriname becoming a signatory to the
    CARICOM-Venezuela cooperation agreement, the establishment
    of a direct flight between Paramaribo and Caracas, and the
    proposal to build a city square in honor of Simon Bolivar
    in Paramaribo.

    ¶6. (U) Suriname and Venezuela appear to be at direct odds
    concerning the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),
    which Suriname supports and Chavez actively opposes.
    Surinamese President Ronald Venetiaan said late in 2005
    small economies have less luxury to engage in debate that
    delays successful integration than countries with large
    domestic markets like Venezuela (and Brazil and Argentina).

    ¶7. (C) Ideologically, the populist politics of President
    Chavez resonate with the long ago leftward leanings of many
    in Suriname's current leadership who still view
    strengthening South-South relations favorably. Entering
    the fold of Chavez's Bolivarian Alliance, though, is not
    on the GOS agenda. Chavez does have an ideological ally in
    Desi Bouterse, the leader of Suriname's single largest
    opposition party, as well as a former military dictator,
    murder suspect (See ref C) and convicted narcotics
    trafficker. Bouterse, who sent Chavez a personal letter of
    congratulations after the 2004 referendum, has a large
    poster of Chavez hanging prominently in his office with the
    quote Against Imperialism for a Free Venezuela, seen
    recently in a front-page newspaper photo.

    ¶8. (C) A Bouterse confidant privately claimed just before
    the May 2005 election that if Bouterse's NDP party were to
    win, he would align Suriname more closely with Chavez.
    Bouterse supposedly made a number of trips to Venezuela to
    secure financial support for his 2005 election campaign,
    despite an outstanding Interpol warrant for his arrest.
    Fears of possible Chavez support to Bouterse and his party
    in the run up to Suriname's next election may drive the GOS
    to accommodate Chavez more than it might otherwise, lest it
    lose its already slim parliamentary majority.

    --------------------------------------------- --------------
    HEADLINES FOR FREE EYE CARE PROGRAM AND DISASTER ASSISTANCE
    --------------------------------------------- --------------

    ¶9. (U) A joint Cuban-Venezuelan program to provide free eye
    treatment and surgery for low income Surinamers has been
    garnering positive headlines for both countries since it
    began in October 2005. (See ref D). The Venezuelan Embassy
    provided key financial and logistical support in the
    initial stages of the program, although with the recent
    opening of a Cuban Embassy, it is not clear that Venezuelan
    role will continue.

    ¶10. (U) During Suriname's recent flooding disaster, a GOV
    delegation arrived to great fanfare to assess needs then
    left the next day without making a commitment. Eventually,
    the GOV donated 20,000 barrels of fuel for planes,
    helicopter, and boats. It also reportedly plans to donate
    14 tons of humanitarian supplies, including rice,
    children's clothing, medicine, tools, school supplies, and
    an electric pump.

    --------------------------------------------- ----------
    HITS AND MISSES OF VENEZUELAN PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN
    --------------------------------------------- ------------

    ¶11. (SBU) Through public relations and cultural outreach,
    the GOV has been raising its profile and spreading Chavez's
    message in Suriname, especially since the arrival of public
    relations coordinator and former Al-Jazeera employee
    Herminia Fernandez one year ago. (See ref E). Upon her
    arrival last year, Hernandez said the GOV would conduct
    journalist training, but to our knowledge, no significant
    formal trainings have taken place. There are increased
    numbers of press releases and newspaper articles covering
    or promoting Venezuelan positions, projects, and events.
    One paper ran a GOV press release in February justifying
    the Venezuelan vote against the IAEA resolution concerning
    Iran's nuclear program.

    PARAMARIBO 00000343 003 OF 004

    ¶12. (U) The Venezuelan Embassy's largest print propaganda
    effort is a glossy 2-4 page color English language
    newspaper dubbed The Venezuelan Emblem. It features
    articles praising Chavez and his policy achievements and
    criticizing the U.S. and Chavez's domestic political
    opponents. It also highlights Venezuelan activities in
    Suriname, such as optimistic predictions for the closing of
    the PetroCaribe deal. The Embassy sponsors a 30-minute
    Spanish language radio and TV program bi-weekly on four
    local broadcasters named Venezuela Presente, which covers
    political, economic, and social news with a Venezuelan
    slant.

    ¶13. (U) Venezuela's relatively large cultural center is
    popular among Surinamers and a significant part of the
    GOV's public diplomacy outreach. The center offers
    inexpensive Spanish language, dance, and art lessons, and
    often hosts art exhibitions, sport competitions and film
    festivals. The Venezuelan Embassy in Suriname also has a
    newly designed website, www.suriname.gob.ve, to promote its
    efforts. The website houses biographies of the Ambassador
    and DCM.

    ¶14. (U) The GOV suffered a public relations setback when
    local media reportedly widely on a Surinamese delegation's
    nightmare experience at the August 2005 World Youth
    Festival in Caracas. (See ref F). Delegates returned home
    bitterly complaining to the press of horrible logistics
    failures and the propagandist and pro-Chavez political
    nature of the conference, saying they felt duped and
    misinformed. Despite their bad experience, Suriname's youth
    representatives are not adverse to further offers of
    training and travel. For example, out of the ashes of the
    festival, grew an exchange program between the Venezuelan
    state of Carobobo and Suriname.

    ¶15. (SBU) Other public diplomacy setbacks for Venezuela
    include the occasional sharp editorial enumerating the
    failures of President Chavez's government in print media
    (See reftel G), and a documentary-style series on Venezuela
    with quite negative factual commentary on the country's
    social and economic situation on local TV.

    ----------------------------------------
    LAW ENFORCEMENT AND MILITARY COOPERATION
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶16. (C) There is very limited cooperation between the GOV
    and GOS in the law enforcement realm. Our police and
    prosecutorial contacts complain of a lack of Venezuelan
    aggressiveness in combating the flow of narcotics through
    the region, and some see Venezuela as the region's weakest
    law enforcement link.

    ¶17. (C) Military cooperation between the two countries
    remains limited to exchanges and training, but is
    expanding. Pilot training on Casa 212 aircraft to members
    of the Surinamese air wing is planned for later this year.
    The first Surinamer graduated from the Venezuelan Military
    Academy in 2005 and Suriname has another spot this year.
    The GOV offered a Coast Guard development assistance
    program for two years in a row, but the GOS deemed the GOV
    plan inappropriate for Suriname because it was based on
    Venezuela's own civil authority system. (NOTE: A U.S.
    military delegation also recently visited Suriname for
    consultations on possible USG assistance in developing a
    Coast Guard or other maritime enforcement presence. The
    Dutch have held discussions on and off with Surinamese over
    the last several years regarding establishment of a Coast
    Guard. End Note.)

    ¶18. (C) Venezuala's armed forces took center stage during
    Suriname's 30th independence anniversary in November 2005
    with paratroopers parachuting into the middle of the main
    ceremony. (See ref H). Chavez was supposedly scheduled to
    attend, as he had in 2000, but canceled at the last minute.
    Surrounding the festivities, Venezuelan Defense Attache
    Orlando Alvardo Osorio decorated the Commander of the
    Surinamese Armed Forces, Colonel Ernst Mercuur, with the
    Venezuelan army's second highest honor for his service and

    PARAMARIBO 00000343 004 OF 004

    professional achievements.

    ¶19. (U) In December 2005 parliamentarian Ruth Wijdenbosch,
    a senior member of President Venetiaan's NPS party, in
    speaking about her opposition to Suriname's signing an
    Article 98, said that if Suriname were to lose U.S.
    military assistance, she would push for closer ties with
    Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina to replace U.S.
    cooperation.

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶20. (C) By positioning himself as a hero of independence
    and a leader willing to stand up to bigger, richer
    countries, Chavez appeals to Surinamers, many of whom
    resent their former colonial power, the Netherlands, and
    would like to see more Chavez-style rhetoric and actions
    employed against it. This admiration for Chavez is more
    visceral than intellectual. Suriname is likely to remain
    receptive to increased Venezuelan engagement, hoping that
    it will lead to cheap oil and assistance, both financial
    and materiel. Surinamers are not uniformly unsceptical,
    however, and the case of PetroCaribe shows that Venezuela
    may face some resistance from those leery of deals with
    strings attached. Under the current government, it is not
    likely that Suriname's increased engagement with Venezuelan
    will mean a detoriation of relations with the U.S. Given
    the close ties of Bouterse, the leader of the largest
    single party, the government may feel a need to watch its
    flank and take a more flexible approach to ties with the
    GOV.

    BARNES

`