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### Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE196, SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S MARCH 31 MEETING

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09THEHAGUE196 | 2009-03-23 10:10 | 2011-01-17 00:12 | SECRET | Embassy The Hague

`

    VZCZCXRO6964
    PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
    DE RUEHTC #0196/01 0821038
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 231038Z MAR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2688
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 000196

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
    TAGS: PREL OVIP PINR MOPS PHUM AF NL
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S MARCH 31 MEETING
    WITH DUTCH FM VERHAGEN

    Classified By: Charge d'Affaire...

    198269,3/23/2009 10:38,09THEHAGUE196,"Embassy The
    Hague",SECRET,,"VZCZCXRO6964
    PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
    DE RUEHTC #0196/01 0821038
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 231038Z MAR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2688
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 THE
    HAGUE 000196
    SIPDIS
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
    TAGS: PREL OVIP PINR MOPS PHUM AF NL
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S MARCH 31 MEETING
    WITH DUTCH FM VERHAGEN
    Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael F. Gallagher for reasons 1.5(b
    ,d)
    Madam Secretary:
    --------
    Overview:
    --------
    ¶1. (S) Your participation in the Afghanistan conference and
    the March 31 meeting with Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime
    Verhagen is well-timed to advance key U.S. priorities,
    particularly in securing Afghanistan. Verhagen and the whole
    Dutch government remain among our strongest allies, but Dutch
    domestic politics threatens to limit progress on our common
    agenda. On Afghanistan, Verhagen faces an uphill battle to
    convince parliament and the Dutch people to continue combat
    missions after 2010. At stake is the deployment of 1,700
    Dutch troops in Uruzgan, one of the toughest provinces in
    Afghanistan. By agreeing to host the Afghanistan conference,
    Verhagen is taking the first step to extend the Dutch
    commitment. The Foreign Minister said the Netherlands had
    been asked to host the conference due to the success of its
    comprehensive (&3-D8) approach in Uruzgan.
    ¶2. (C) Verhagen is a skilled politician, having previously
    served in parliament as party spokesman for the Netherlands,
    largest political party, the center-right Christian Democrats
    (CDA). Accordingly, Verhagen is extremely close to Prime
    Minister Balkenende and is trusted to take the lead on
    foreign affairs while most of the Dutch government is focused
    on the economic crisis. The weak governing coalition --
    which includes CDA, the center-left Labor Party (PvdA), and
    the small Christian Union (CU) -- is held together less by a
    common vision than by fear of electoral losses if the
    government were to collapse ahead of the next scheduled
    election in 2011. Despite these divisions, Verhagen and
    Balkenende have successfully steered the Dutch government
    toward an active foreign policy that largely aligns with our
    interests.
    ¶3. (C) Verhagen plans to use his bilateral meeting with you
    to start building a close working relationship. He wants the
    new Administration to see the Netherlands as a reliable
    partner with the U.S., sharing many of our goals. We
    recommend you focus discussions on Afghanistan and human
    rights (including Guantanamo) (paragraphs 5-11), but other
    possible topics are also discussed below (paragraphs 12-17).
    ¶4. (SBU) 2009 marks the 400th anniversary of Henry Hudson,s
    &discovery8 of the Hudson Valley and New Amsterdam in 1609.
    The Dutch government and the city and state of New York have
    planned a yearlong celebration (New York 400 ) NY400)
    honoring our strong bilateral ties and stressing our ""shared
    DNA"" -- including our values of freedom, democracy,
    entrepreneurship, diversity, and tolerance. You may wish to
    comment on our joint history and shared future when you meet
    Verhagen, especially when you talk to the press.
    -----------
    Afghanistan
    -----------
    ¶5. (C) The Netherlands is a small ally making a big impact in
    Afghanistan since 2001. They are the fourth largest aid
    donor in Afghanistan. Ranked by percentage of their military
    forces deployed, the Netherlands is the second largest
    military contributor in Afghanistan )- proportionally they
    are making three to four times the contribution of France or
    Germany. And Dutch soldiers are deployed to the most
    dangerous parts of Afghanistan. However, the Dutch are
    considering dramatically scaling back their combat presence
    in 2010, perhaps to just a few hundred soldiers, and
    concentrating more on development assistance.
    ¶6. (C) Although the public supports its soldiers in the
    Q6. (C) Although the public supports its soldiers in the
    field, involvement in Afghanistan is not popular in the
    Netherlands. Thus far the Dutch have lost 18 soldiers. The
    2007 decision to extend the Dutch military deployment was
    prolonged and politically difficult. Any government decision
    to stay engaged in Afghanistan past 2010 will be even more
    difficult to sustain. Among the challenges is a Dutch
    perception that they have done more than their share. Many
    political leaders supported the previous deployment decisions
    with statements that another NATO ally would replace the
    Dutch at the conclusion of their tour. Dutch opinion leaders
    are also concerned about the effect of the deployment on
    military readiness and recruitment. Often cited is the
    shortfall of 7,000 personnel in a 42,000-member service. The
    Dutch are also daunted by reports that the ISAF mission is
    THE HAGUE 00000196 002 OF 004
    failing to bring security to the Afghan people, and that
    development assistance programs are ineffective. The public
    at large is skeptical that the situation in Afghanistan
    presents a threat to Europeans. Finally, although casualties
    have been relatively light by U.S. standards, their emotional
    impact on a small country with limited recent combat
    experience cannot be overstated. In April 2008, for example,
    the country was shocked to learn of the death of First
    Lieutenant Dennis van Ulm on the same day that his father,
    General Pieter van Ulm, was sworn in as the new Dutch Chief
    of Defense.
    ¶7. (C) Such traumatic events have not swayed Verhagen and PM
    Balkenende's commitment to the NATO/ISAF mission and the
    Afghan people. In 2009, just as in 2007, we expect that both
    Verhagen and Balkenende will be strong and effective allies
    in winning support from the parliament. The support of the
    Labor Party, particularly Development Cooperation Minister
    Koenders, will be essential. The Dutch are expecting a
    request through NATO for continuing military support, but it
    is important the request come in the form of consultations
    among equals rather than through public pressure, which would
    backfire with the Dutch public and politicians. The
    Afghanistan Conference this month will do a great deal to
    show that the Dutch are not only active participants but
    leading members in the review and strategic planning process.
    Your meeting with Verhagen will further emphasize this
    point. Other &selling points8 for the public will be (1)
    recognition that Afghanistan poses a clearly defined threat
    to international stability and (2) an improved military
    strategy that shows that we can and will prevail. Most
    importantly to the Dutch public, perhaps, will be concrete
    success stories that we are creating a better life for the
    Afghan people. Finally, Dutch policy-makers believe in the
    &3D8 approach and welcome your effort to integrate defense,
    development, and diplomacy. A previous Dutch commander of
    Task Force Uruzgan argued that the Dutch 3D approach can
    &make the Taliban irrelevant8 by winning hearts and minds.
    ¶8. (C) The Dutch will be interested in the U.S. analysis of
    Pakistan,s role in solving the Afghanistan quandary. After
    suspending aid to Pakistan in 2008, the Dutch expect to
    provide as much as 112 million euro in development aid to
    Pakistan over the next three years, with the timing of a
    public announcement yet to be determined. The government
    will continue to watch political developments there closely
    out of concern the government may not live up to its
    democratic commitments.
    ---------------------------
    Human Rights and Guantanamo
    ---------------------------
    ¶9. (S) Verhagen has made human rights a priority for the
    Dutch government and his hallmark as Foreign Minister. The
    Dutch are anxious to work closely with us on human rights
    issues and welcome the return of the U.S. as an observer to
    the Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva. The Dutch are
    serving a second consecutive term on the Council, and while
    they share our frustration with the results, Verhagen will
    probably encourage you to seek an HRC seat in 2009 or 2010.
    In addition, Verhagen may suggest a joint U.S.-Dutch
    initiative to counter violence against women or to attack
    child labor. The Dutch are also trying to salvage the Durban
    review conference on racism, including by circulating an
    abbreviated draft that removes references to Israel that are
    offensive to us and the Dutch. Perhaps the best opportunity
    Qoffensive to us and the Dutch. Perhaps the best opportunity
    for expanding cooperation is in the area of development
    assistance. The Netherlands is the world,s sixth largest
    aid donor, providing over 4 billion euro ($6.1 billion)
    annually, and Dutch programs are rated as highly effective
    compared to other nations.
    ¶10. (S) Verhagen has been critical of Guantanamo, and did not
    lose an opportunity to raise his concerns about Guantanamo
    with the previous administration. The Dutch parliament,s
    debate and fierce criticism of Guantanamo have permeated the
    Dutch press and public,s perceptions. Closing Guantanamo,
    therefore, will go a long way toward improving Dutch
    skepticism of U.S. policies on human and civil rights.
    Verhagen publicly saluted the President,s decision to close
    Guantanamo, but he also publicly told Parliament that the
    Dutch government has no plans to accept detainees.
    Nonetheless, Verhagen,s personal staff recommended that you
    raise the issue with him privately, to encourage him to stay
    open to the idea of supporting an EU proposal to help the
    United States. A less difficult alternative for the Dutch
    than accepting detainees would be providing funding to assist
    with the transfer of detainees to third countries. With an
    eye to the future, FM Verhagen is funding a two-year study of
    THE HAGUE 00000196 003 OF 004
    the nexus of human rights, humanitarian law, and use of
    force, thus aiming to resolve the knotty legal issues
    surrounding Guantanamo.
    ¶11. (SBU) Finally, Verhagen may ask you about U.S. support
    for the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Dutch are
    proud of serving as the &home of international law8 and
    hosting many international legal institutions such as the
    International Court of Justice. If you or the President
    chose to make a major announcement on the ICC, or U.S.
    commitment to international law and human rights, no setting
    in Europe would be more appropriate than The Hague, the
    Netherlands.
    ------------------------------
    Other Issues - Economic Crisis
    ------------------------------
    ¶12. (U) The Dutch financial sector has been hit hard by the
    global financial crisis, due in part to exposure to U.S.
    mortgage-backed securities and other toxic assets. The
    government has responded assertively with several measures to
    assist banks and their customers, most dramatically by
    nationalizing the Dutch operations of Fortis Bank and by
    providing capital to ING and guaranteeing part of its U.S.
    mortgage portfolio.
    ¶13. (U) The Dutch real economy is struggling. After 2
    percent GDP growth in 2008, the latest official estimate is a
    3.5 percent contraction in 2009. Dutch exports are expected
    to decline by 12 percent this year, a major blow to this
    trade-dependent economy. The Port of Rotterdam, Europe's
    largest, has already seen a 15 percent decline in port
    traffic since October. Several Dutch industry giants have
    announced layoffs. The current unemployment rate of 3.9
    percent is forecast to climb to 5.5 percent in 2009 (still
    considerably lower than the EU average). The GONL has passed
    two stimulus packages and is expected to announce a third
    shortly.
    ¶14. (U) An invitation to the G-20 summit in London is a major
    win for the Dutch, who fought hard to be included in the
    November 2008 Washington G-20 summit. Although not a G-20
    member, the Dutch argued successfully that they play a major
    role in the international financial system (for instance, it
    is an active member of the Financial Stability Forum). Now,
    with a second invitation, the Dutch hope to have assured
    their seat at the table for future G-20 events. At the
    London summit, we can expect the Dutch to support Germany and
    other key member states in a call for much broader financial
    regulation ) but to refrain from supporting new stimulus
    packages until the results of current stimulus measures can
    be determined. They will support the G-20,s expansion to
    include more developing countries. In keeping with their
    reputation, the Dutch will also stress open markets and free
    trade. They have called on fellow EU Member States to avoid
    protectionist measures, and they were highly critical of the
    proposed ""Buy American"" provisions in the U.S. Recovery and
    Reinvestment Act. The Dutch have repeatedly expressed their
    hope to see the economic crisis spur the U.S., China, India,
    and others to make the concessions necessary to conclude the
    WTO Doha Round
    ¶15. (SBU) Prime Minister Balkenende and his cabinet enjoyed
    widespread public support in late 2008 for their quick
    intervention in the financial sector. However, domestic and
    international criticism of the GONL's cautious, incremental
    approach to the crisis has gathered steam in recent weeks.
    Balkenende,s cabinet continues to consult closely with
    parliament, labor, and industry on the way forward. While
    Finance Minister Wouter Bos, the politically savvy Deputy
    QFinance Minister Wouter Bos, the politically savvy Deputy
    Prime Minister and leader of the Labor Party (PvdA), has
    taken the lead on the Netherlands, international response to
    the economic crisis, Foreign Minister Verhagen has been less
    visible on this issue.
    -----------
    Middle East
    -----------
    ¶16. (SBU) Verhagen will welcome your readout on the Middle
    East; he is eager to play a constructive role. With an eye
    toward supporting a peace agreement, the Dutch participate in
    the Gaza maritime interdiction initiative to stop arms
    smuggling and thereby address Israel,s security concerns.
    Along with the Danish, the Dutch have proposed resurrecting
    the EU Gaza-Egypt border monitoring mission. At the same
    time, the Dutch push for greater access for humanitarian aid
    in Gaza. The Dutch are substantial donors to Gaza economic
    development and governance initiatives, providing 72 million
    THE HAGUE 00000196 004 OF 004
    euro in 2008.
    ¶17. (S) The Dutch strongly support the UN sanctions regime
    against Iran and quickly follow up on efforts to curtail
    proliferation activities. The Dutch reported that sanctions
    are starting to work -- slowly )- although they are not
    targeting the right people. Nonetheless, the Dutch believe
    there is substantial interest among Iranian parliamentarians
    for an exchange with U.S. counterparts. The Dutch are
    willing to deepen our U.S.-Netherlands cooperation on
    information-sharing on Iran. On Syria, the Dutch welcome
    U.S. outreach to Syria and agree that the U.S. and the EU
    will get more from the Syrians if we keep a united front as
    we push for a peace agreement with Israel, a secure and
    stable relationship with Lebanon, and an end to support for
    militants.
    GALLAGHER

`