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### Viewing cable 06SEOUL2238, ROK REACTIONS TO DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES-DAY TWO

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06SEOUL2238 | 2006-07-06 09:09 | 2010-11-29 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Seoul
Appears in these articles: www.spiegel.de

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHUL #2238/01 1870941
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 060941Z JUL 06
    FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8863
    INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0907
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7391
    RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0977
    RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1286
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
    RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
    RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
    RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002238

    SIPDIS

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR CHA

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
    TAGS: PREL MNUC KNNP KN KS
    SUBJECT: ROK REACTIONS TO DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES-DAY TWO

    REF: SEOUL 2211

    Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

    Rokg reaction
    -------------

    ¶1. (C) xxxxx that despite its
    decision to suspend humanitarian aid to the DPRK, it would
    ship another 24,700 metric tons of fertilizer 6-7 July. This
    final shipment will complete the delivery to the North of the
    pledge of 350,000 metric tons South Korea made earlier this
    year. MOU officials have explained that the ROKG is
    proceeding with this shipment because it is a small, final
    portion of a pledged commitment.

    ¶2. (U) Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok on July 6 told the
    National Assembly Unification, Foreign Affairs, and Trade
    Committee that Seoul would hold inter-Korean ministerial
    talks set for July 11-14 in Busan as scheduled, adding that
    it was not consistent to urge the North to return to talks
    over its nuclear weapons programs but refuse to talk with the
    North itself. Lee said it was still important to limit
    Seoul's measures against the North to avoid further
    escalation on the Peninsula.

    ¶3. (C) The A/DCM xxxxx to verify the items above. In a
    frank exchange, A/DCM expressed disappointment that things
    appeared to be "business-as-usual," with the shipment of
    fertilizer this week and the holding of inter-Korean
    ministerials next week. This was sending the wrong signals
    to Pyongyang for its inexcusable behavior, A/DCM said.
    xxxxx replied that a lot of internal
    discussions had taken place, but that political-levels
    concluded that breaking off the dialogue was not wise because
    restarting it would be too costly and difficult. Moreover,
    the dialogue must be used to send a stern message to North
    Korea. Next week the ROK delegation would definitely make
    the point that Pyongyang's demand for an additional 100,000
    tons of fertilizer and 500,000 tons of rice was threatened.
    Also, in response to the missile launches, xxxxx, Seoul
    had decided to cancel North-South military liaison officers'
    talks that were planned for July 7, which essentially meant
    that General Officers' talks would not be held as hoped. In
    addition, Seoul was holding back on approving new investment
    permits for the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). A/DCM
    encouraged xxxxx develop further measures and to publicize
    them (septel).

    ¶4. (U) Senior Secretary for National Security Suh Choo-suk
    said on the radio on July 6 that the ROKG has initially
    concluded that the DPRK's failed missile launch was due to a
    technical failure. He also defended the ROKG's reaction to
    the missile launches as quick and appropriate.

    ¶5. (U) ROK Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-woong on July 6 told
    the National Assembly Defense Committee that the North might
    launch more missiles, citing an assessment of the equipment
    and groups going to and from the launch sites during DPRK
    preparations over the past two months. He also rejected the
    argument of an opposition lawmaker that there was a delay in
    the ROKG reaction to the launches. Separately, an unnamed
    senior official at the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff publicly
    denied media reports that the DPRK was preparing to launch a
    second Taepodong II missile.
    .
    Political reaction
    ------------------

    ¶6. (C) During a July 6 opposition Grand National Party (GNP)
    leaders' meeting, the GNP criticized the ROKG for its "idle"
    approach to the DPRK missile launches and called for the
    resignation of all the security-related ministers. The GNP
    proposed a national investigation on the ROKG's reaction,
    proposed an "emergency National Assembly committee," and
    urged the ROKG to review its inter-Korean policies, including
    the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the Geumgang Tourism Project,
    and humanitarian assistance. xxxxx told
    xxxxx that all cash support to the DPRK should be stopped
    and that sending fertilizer north as missiles were being
    fired was "nonsensical." xxxxx predicted that the missile
    test could have a deciding effect on the July 11 GNP party
    chair selection, to replace xxxxx who stepped down
    last month. xxxxx said the lawmaker who could make people
    feel the most secure would be selected and hinted that Kang
    Jae-sup, with his more conservative prosecutor's background,
    might be the more attractive choice in light of the current
    situation.

    ¶7. (C) The spokesman for smaller opposition Democratic Party
    (DP)xxxxx stated that the ROKG should recognize the
    importance of closely coordinating with Washington and Tokyo
    and improve its crisis management system that the DP said
    failed to operate effectively. One Democratic Party staffer
    noted to poloff that the missile tests should be viewed as "a
    test" and nothing more.

    ¶8. (U) The progressive Democratic Labor Party (DLP)
    spokesman said xxxxx that the ROKG should maintain
    dialogue with the DPRK and prevent further DPRK provocations.
    At the same time, the ROKG should encourage Washington to
    negotiate directly with Pyongyang.

    ¶9. (C) Several Uri Party staffers told poloff that further
    assistance would be difficult due to the lack of popular
    support, but that aid already agreed upon should continue.
    One staffer noted that the tests put the Uri Party in a
    "difficult position" because they showed the ineffectiveness
    of the current engagement policy. The Uri Party echoed much
    of the GNP's frustration with the related ministers, but
    stopped short of calling for them to step down. A common
    theme also heard was that the ROK reaction to the tests was
    "by the manual" developed by the Uri Party and not late at
    all.
    .
    Press coverage
    --------------

    ¶10. (U) ROK media reports on July 6 highlighted UNSC
    discussions, criticisms that Seoul was caught flat-footed,
    and speculations about DPRK motivations and prospects for
    inter-Korean relations. The Dong-A Ilbo, a moderate daily,
    criticized the ROKG government for responding too slowly,
    delivering a weaker announcement than Washington or Tokyo,
    and for poorly coordinating with the USG, which, the paper
    said, created the information lag.

    ¶11. (U) As to why the North launched the missiles, opinions
    ranged from (1) to get attention and negotiation leverage;
    (2) to use for internal purpose to demonstrate DPRK strength;
    and/or (3) for technical reasons to demonstrate DPRK missile
    achievement. The progressive Hankyoreh opined that the
    timing of the launch, on July 4, was special because it was
    the 34th anniversary of the North-South Joint Statement from
    1972, and it was the U.S. Independence Day, suggesting that
    the DPRK was exhibiting brinkmanship and wanted to generate
    more attention.

    ¶12. (U) Press stories quoted some analysts who opined that
    North Korea might stand to gain from the launches. Kim
    Tae-hyo, a political scientist at Sungkyunkwan University,
    was quoted as saying that Kim Jong-il probably gambled that
    Beijing and Seoul would not change their stances and that
    this gamble was likely to pay off. Paik Hak-soon, a senior
    researcher at Sejong Institute, suggested that the DPRK
    launch was probably an effort to strengthen its position in
    the Six Party Talks because it was unsatisfied with proposed
    compensation for scrapping its nuclear programs. Peter Beck,
    Director of the International Crisis Group's Seoul office
    said that at most Seoul would probably only delay aid
    shipments, versus a real change in its current policies.
    .
    Dprk watchers caution against sanctions at symposium
    --------------------------------------------- -------

    ¶13. (SBU) The prevailing sentiment among North Korea experts
    gathered at a July 6 symposium in Seoul on North Korean
    Development and International Cooperation was for all parties
    to exercise restraint in responding to the North Korean
    missile launches.

    ¶14. (SBU) Amb. Sun Jun-young, Professor at Kyungnam
    University and Former ROK Ambassador to the UN, said that the
    missile launches were the DPRK's "last card" and showed not
    its strength, but its weakness.xxxxx
    that the DPRK felt so pressured by U.S. banking sanctions
    that it felt compelled to show its might in some manner. xxxxx
    believed that it would be a mistake to punish DPRK with
    sanctions and that it would be a mistake for the ROKG to
    suspend ministerial discussions scheduled for July 11. The
    best decision, he said, would be to perhaps delay the
    meetings, but to keep lines of communication open.

    ¶15. (SBU) xxxxx that the
    Bush Administration's "neglect and containment policy" caused
    North Korea to break its moratorium on missile testing. xxxxx
    expressed concern that the launches would result in
    sanctions. According xxxxx, every time sanctions were
    applied to North Korea, the nuclear and missile situation
    became aggravated. He said that the missile launches were a
    signal from North Korea to the United States that it wanted
    direct negotiations. Kyungnam University Prof. Lim Eul-chul
    also said that the missile launches appeared to be a way of
    bringing the United States back to the negotiating table. It
    was North Korea's way of getting American attention, he
    shrugged.

    ¶16. (SBU)xxxxx
    that it would not be helpful to cut off assistance and
    contacts, particularly in a time of crisis. It would be
    important to keep channels of communication open in order to
    facilitate an exchange of positions.

    ¶17. (SBU) Visiting xxxxx that
    the best reaction to the launches would be to continue with
    business as usual. He said that to overreact would be to
    play into North Korea's expectations and fulfill its goal of
    seeking attention. By minimizing public reaction and
    continuing to seek opportunities for exchange and assistance,
    there would be greater possibility of making a long-term,
    positive impact. Also, imposing sanctions would only harm
    ordinary North Koreans, who had nothing to do with the
    missile launches. xxxxx advised at most a delay in
    engagement activity with the DPRK.

    ¶18. (SBU) xxxxx, likened the missile crisis to a cold winter
    before a warm spring. He criticized the USG for taking a
    harsh line toward North Korea and precipitating the current
    situation. But, he said, the situation could be salvaged if
    the USG provided a security guarantee and food to North
    Korea. This, he said, would initiate the process of
    separating the regime from its leaders.xxxxx said
    that imposing sanctions would be as effective as a dog
    barking outside a city's walls. It would be much better to
    use humanitarian aid like a Trojan Horse to start change from
    within.
    .
    Dprk tourism and kic unaffected by missile launches
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶19. (SBU) Hyundai Asan President Yoon Man-joon said during
    his keynote address at xxxxx that the
    launches have had no impact on Hyundai Asan's operations in
    North Korea. He said that of the 315 persons scheduled to
    tour North Korea's Mt. Geumgang xxxxx, there was only one
    cancellation. Noting that far more people usually canceled
    at the last minute because of personal reasons, Yoon said
    that people seemed determined to continue with their plans.
    Yoon added that there has been no abnormal investor activity
    with regard to the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and
    predicted that investors who were planning to invest in KIC
    would probably delay their investments for a short time, but
    then push ahead with their original plans. xxxxx
    "political, not military, missiles" and predicted that travel
    and investment in the DPRK would remain stable.
    Vershbow

`