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### Viewing cable 08PARIS1698, FRANCE'S CHANGING AFRICA POLICY: PART III

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08PARIS1698 | 2008-09-09 16:04 | 2011-01-09 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris

`

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    RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 PARIS 001698

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2018
    TAGS: PREL PINR ECON MARR PHUM XA FR
    SUBJECT: FRANCE'S CHANGING AFRICA POLICY: PART III
    (MILITARY PRESENCE AND OTHER STRUCTURAL CHANGES)

    REF: A. PARIS 1501
    ¶B. PARIS 1568
    ¶C. HOTR WASHINGTON DC//USDAO PARIS (SUBJ: IIR 6 832
    0617 08)
    ¶D. HOTR WASHINGTON DC//USDAO PARIS (SUBJ: IIR 6 832
    0626 08)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: France's new Africa policy may have its
    most immediate impact on France's military presence in
    Africa. The French are planning to consolidate their
    military presence and want to orient it towards cooperation
    with Africa's sub-regional groupings (e.g., ECOWAS, SADC, et
    al.) and away from bilateral efforts. They foresee their
    military presence coalescing into two hubs, one on the
    Atlantic Ocean (Senegal or Gabon) and one on the Indian Ocean
    (Djibouti or French overseas department Reunion Island).
    Even these bases may eventually disappear if Africans prove
    capable of maintaining peace and security. Another priority
    will be the renegotiation of France's Defense Agreements with
    eight African countries, which now feature outdated
    provisions from the colonial era. The French announced in
    June 2008 the set of priorities that will henceforth frame
    French economic assistance to Africa. The Foreign Ministry
    is creating a fourth "sous-direction" (akin to a Department
    Office) that will more closely match Africa's sub-regional
    groups, and may also reconfigure French Embassies in Africa
    on a large, medium, and small basis to align priorities with
    budget constraints. END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (C) Part I of this series (ref A) described the
    "France-Afrique" model that governed France's relations with
    sub-Saharan Africa for most of the 20th century. Even before
    taking office in May 2007, President Nicolas Sarkozy believed
    that relations needed revision in response to globalization,
    changing circumstances, and the waning of the colonial and
    immediate post-colonial periods. He sought a more modern and
    transparent relationship, ostensibly of "equals," that would
    allow both sides to conduct relations on a business-like and
    rational basis. Part II (ref B) discussed France's first
    steps (and missteps) in implementing this policy and African
    reactions to it. This message (Part III) focuses on France's
    military presence in Africa and organizational changes likely
    to occur in conjunction with France's new policy. Post
    welcomes comments from colleagues at U.S. missions in Africa.

    The Bases
     ---------

     ¶3.  (C)  France has long maintained five permanent military
     bases with responsibility for Africa -- in Cote d'Ivoire
     Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal, and on Reunion Island, the French
     overseas department near Madagascar.  There is a de facto
     sixth "base" consisting of the long-term operational
     deployment in Chad (Operation Epervier, in Chad since 1986).
     Basing issues in the four continental African states (Cote
     d'Ivoire Djibouti, Gabon, and Senegal) are governed by
     bilateral Defense Agreements (see below), which include
     certain provisions obligating France to defend those states
     from external aggression.

     ¶4.  (C)  COTE D'IVOIRE  The status of the French base remains
     in doubt given the instability in Cote d'Ivoire and its
     distinctly anti-French overtones.  The French have stated
     that they would not remain in places where they were not
     wanted, and Cote d'Ivoire President Gbagbo has indicated that
     he would not oppose a French departure.  Prior to the 2002
     conflict that divided the country, France's military presence
     consisted of about 550 troops.  Once the current crisis
     began, the French augmented their presence in the form of
     Operation Licorne (presently about 1,880 troops), which is
     working to support the UNOCI peacekeeping mission.

     ¶5.  (C)  Operation Licorne has in effect subsumed France's
     "permanent" presence in Cote d'Ivoire  Presidential Advisor

     PARIS 00001698  002 OF 009

     Romain Serman in June told Ambassador Mary Yates (AFRICOM)
     that the French military relationship with Cote d'Ivoire
     would never be the same, and that France's contingent,
     excluding forces associated with Operation Licorne, was
     already being treated as a de facto "operational deployment"
     rather than a permanent garrison.  (See refs D and E for the
     French Presidency's views on France's Africa policy as
     expressed to Ambassador Yates and DASD Theresa Whelan in June
     2008.)   If elections occur successfully in Cote d'Ivoire in
     2008 and UNOCI and Operation Licorne then disband, we expect
     that France's military presence will shrink quickly, with a
     possible French decision to end basing altogether in Cote
     d'Ivoire

     ¶6.  (C)  DJIBOUTI:  The base in Djibouti is France's largest
     in Africa, with about 2,950 troops that can operate at sea,
     on land, and in the air.  These forces use two installations
     (in the city of Djibouti and in Arta) and include two
     infantry regiments, a helicopter battalion, Army Special
     Forces, marine commandos, and a naval element.  The Bouffard
     military hospital is the only Level III military medical
     facility in the region and treated survivors of the USS Cole
     terrorist attack.  French Forces in Djibouti (FFDJ) serve
     primarily to support the bilateral Defense Agreement.  France
     provided intelligence and logistical and medical support to
     Djiboutian forces as recently as July 2008 during Djibouti's
     border dispute with Eritrea.  Additionally, the base serves
     as a pre-positioning point for intervention in the Middle
     East as well as in Africa.  Ref B describes strains in the
     France-Djibouti relationship (largely over the Borrel case).
     The future of the French presence in Djibouti may be affected
     by the base the French intend to establish in the UAE per the
     agreement the two sides signed on January 15, 2008.  It seems
     unlikely that the French would maintain two bases in close
     proximity whose functions would be somewhat redundant.

     ¶7.  (C)  GABON:  The French base in Libreville currently
     numbers about 800 troops, including an air element (two C130s
     and one helicopter), and a helicopter-equipped Special Forces
     unit.  Two parachute companies stationed in Gabon were sent
     to Chad during the February 2008 rebel incursion.

     ¶8.  (C)  SENEGAL:  The French base in Dakar numbers about
     1160 troops, with one infantry battalion and air and naval
     units.  A Defense Ministry official says that the French
     garrison in Senegal is much less operationally oriented than
     the base in Gabon, remarking that, of the French bases in
     Africa, the one in Senegal most closely resembles a "holdover
     from the colonial era."

     ¶9.  (C)  REUNION ISLAND:  This overseas department is the
     home base for about 4,575 French troops and sailors with air,
     land, and sea capabilities.  The main units are the 2nd
     Marine Parachute Infantry Regiment, two surveillance
     frigates, two P400 patrol boats, and a number of aircraft.
     Reunion Island is responsible not only for portions of
     eastern and southern Africa but also for France's Indian
     Ocean interests.  It is the home port for the French naval
     command ALINDIEN.

     ¶10.  (C)  CHAD:  The French have deployed Operation Epervier
     on a "temporary" basis since 1986, in response to Libyan
     provocation in the region.  Given its longevity, it has
     become a de facto permanent base but has not been accorded
     that status.  The French military presence has provided
     support to the Deby regime and also to the Bozize regime in
     C.A.R., in some cases involving combat operations against
     rebel groups.  Combat support has, in theory, ceased under
     President Sarkozy, who has ordered, as part of his policy of
     "equal partnership" between France and Africa, that French
     troops "would no longer fire on Africans" (except, obviously,
     in self-defense), an order that the French claim they
     scrupulously obeyed even during the heavy fighting in Chad in
     February 2008.  The French provided essential support to

     PARIS 00001698  003 OF 009

     Americans (both official and unofficial) in Chad during the
     February rebel incursion.

     ¶11.  (C)  About 1260 troops now serve in Operation Epervier
     (one Army Task Force with four infantry companies, six Mirage
     F1s, four Puma Helicopters, one C135 refueler, and three C160
     transport aircraft).  Another 1675 French troops participate
     in EUFOR, the EU peacekeeping operation deployed in Chad and
     C.A.R., largely through France's initiative, to support
     MINURCAT, the UN operation to help Darfur refugees and others
     displaced by the region's instability.  The French hope that
     EUFOR will be replaced by a UN operation, perhaps an expanded
     MINURCAT, when EUFOR's mandate expires in March 2009.

     ¶12.  (C)  We expect that the French will continue to deploy
     Operation Epervier in Chad, irrespective of the EUFOR
     mission, so long as instability emanating from Darfur remains
     a serious concern.  Several French officials have stated
     privately that France would like to see the Chad-Sudan
     frontier serve as a breakwater, if not a wall, that would
     impede the spread of radical Islam from the Horn of Africa
     westward and southward into Africa's interior.  That said,
     the French may drawdown or end Operation Epervier as soon as
     an acceptable level of regional stability is achieved.

     ¶13.  (C)  OTHER DEPLOYMENTS:  The French maintain a permanent
     naval mission in the Gulf of Guinea, Operation Corymbe,
     usually with two ships on patrol, that enables rapid crisis
     response, protection for French off-shore oil interests, and
     support for NEOs and ongoing peacekeeping operations.  This
     naval mission cooperates extensively with US NAVEUR's Africa
     Partnership Station.  In addition, the French have deployed
     military forces on an ad hoc basis elsewhere in Africa.  For
     example, French military units have deployed to Togo to
     support Operation Licorne in Cote d'Ivoire and French forces
     have recently served in multinational operations in the DRC
     and Rwanda, generally under UN mandate.  In total, and
     excluding French forces stationed on Reunion Island, there
     are roughly 10,000 French troops either garrisoned or
     deployed in sub-Saharan Africa.

     Realignment
     -----------

     ¶14.  (C)  Well before Sarkozy's announcement of a new French
     Africa policy, French officials told us that France wanted to
     re-orient its military presence away from bilateral
     relationships and towards increased cooperation with Africa's
     sub-regional groupings.  This shift would allow France to
     treat its military relations with Africa on a broader basis
     and not through a series of narrow bilateral relationships
     each with its own peculiarities and history.

     ¶15.  (C)  In 2006 (i.e., before Sarkozy's election in 2007),
     the French began implementing a new command structure in
     Africa featuring four geographic commands, each of which
     would generally conform to an analogous regional
     sub-grouping.  Notably, Cote d'Ivoire was dropped from this
     scheme.  Given the regional (vice bilateral) focus of the new
     commands, the orientation of the new commands may allow more
     ready interaction and cooperation with the USG's new AFRICOM,
     once the later becomes more present and operational in Africa.

     --  French Forces in Djibouti (FFDJ):  Responsible for
     Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, and
     Uganda, or, roughly, the IGAD countries.

     --  French Forces in Cape Verde (FFCV):  Despite its name, a
     command located in Senegal responsible for Senegal, Cape
     Verde, Gambia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Burkina
     Faso, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire Liberia, Sierra
     Leone, and Guinea, roughly paralleling ECOWAS.

     --  French Forces in Gabon (FFG):  Responsible for Gabon,

     PARIS 00001698  004 OF 009

     Chad, C.A.R., Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, DRC, Congo
     Brazzaville, and Angola, corresponding with ECCAS.

     --  Armed Forces in the Southern Zone of the Indian Ocean
     (FAZSOI):  Located on Reunion Island and responsible for
     Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe,
     Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, Lesotho, South
     Africa, and Madagascar,  mirroring SADC.

     Further Consolidation
      . . . and Departure (?)
     ------------------------

     ¶16.  (C)  Establishing the four commands appears to be only
     the first step in France's plan to consolidate and centralize
     its military presence in Africa.  Consistent with the White
     Papers on Defense and on Foreign Policy issued in June-July
     2008, the French tell us that they envision an eventual
     configuration with two hubs that would serve as crisis
     response centers and headquarters.  From these hubs, the
     French would direct their bilateral and regional military
     cooperation programs, which would center on supporting and
     training African forces that would in turn perform stability
     operations until now largely performed by the French and
     other non-Africans.  The two White Papers generally call for
     a streamlining of French diplomatic and military operations
     worldwide, with an emphasis on efficiency, the elimination of
     redundancies, and greater rationality in the apportionment of
     ever-decreasing resources.

     ¶17.  (C)  Concerning Africa, the Defense White Paper states:
     "France will conserve a capacity for conflict prevention and
     for action on the western and eastern sides of the African
     continent, as well as in the Sahel region, notably for
     combating illicit trafficking and terrorist acts.  France
     will radically convert the present system of defense
     agreements and military cooperation agreements (see below) in
     order to evolve towards a partnership between Europe and
     Africa and towards cooperation on defense and security,
     favoring the rise in strength of African capacities to carry
     out peacekeeping."

     ¶18.  (C)  Sarkozy's Africa Advisors (Deputy Diplomatic
     Advisor Bruno Joubert and Romain Serman) have told us that
     the Defense White Paper was deliberately vague in defining
     these "hubs" in order to avoid the suggestion that France
     intended to stay forever in Africa, a suggestion that would
     contradict one of Sarkozy's statements about France's not
     having a mandate to provide for Africa's stability
     indefinitely.  (See refs C and D.)  Indeed, Foreign Minister
     Kouchner has publicly stated that in perhaps 15 years there
     may not be a French military presence in Africa, and Joubert
     says that even as early as 2012, if the AU's standby force
     becomes fully operational, it may be possible to reduce or
     even close some of France's African bases.

     ¶19.  (C)  The scenario involving a large-scale, near-term
     French military withdrawal from Africa, however, remains
     speculative.  For now, the French are looking at Senegal or
     Gabon as the possible western hub and Djibouti as the eastern
     hub (assuming that Djibouti is not closed in deference to the
     new base in the UAE).  Joubert and Serman indicate that the
     French military prefers Senegal because of its proximity to
     France, the long French presence there, and Senegal's
     generally stable political environment.  However, Joubert and
     Serman believe Gabon may be a better hub because of its more
     central location and proximity to the Gulf of Guinea and
     Africa's troubled interior.  Joubert has said that if
     Djibouti could no longer serve as a hub, Reunion Island could
     assume that function.

     ¶20.  (C)  Serman notes that another reason for reducing
     France's military presence in Africa is to meet domestic
     political expectations.  The GOF recently announced the

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     closure of several military facilities in France, to the
     dismay of localities dependent on the revenue associated with
     the facilities.  The Sarkozy government could not close
     domestic installations without also making reductions in
     France's overseas presence, Serman observes.

     Defense Agreements
     ------------------
     ¶21.  (C)  Sarkozy announced many of aspects of France's
     Africa policy in his speech in Cape Town on February 28, 2008
     (see refs A and B).  Among these was France's intention to
     renegotiate all eight of its Defense Agreements in Africa.
     Sarkozy said that:  "Africa should take charge of its
     security problems....  France's military presence in Africa
     still rests on the agreements concluded 'the day after'
     colonization, more than 50 years ago....  It's not a question
     of France's disengaging militarily from Africa but rather
     that Africa's security is first of all, naturally, the
     business of Africans."  These agreements should be "adapted
     to the realities of the present time....  Contrary to past
     practice," the renegotiated agreements "will be entirely
     public."

     ¶22.  (C)  French officials tell us that the eight Defense
     Agreements are simply obsolete.  The Agreements are with Cote
     d'Ivoire (1960), C.A.R. (1960), Djibouti (1977), Gabon
     (1960), Senegal (1960, revised 1974), Cameroon (1960, revised
     1974), Comoros (1973, revised 1978), and Togo (1963).
     Presidential Advisors Serman and Remi Marechaux say that the
     Agreements contain mutual defense provisions that are no
     longer realistic -- "If France is attacked, are we really
     going to expect, much less rely on, Togo to go to war with
     whoever attacks us?"  More troublesome is the obligation
     placed on France to defend its treaty partners.  Serman was
     quite uncomfortable with the possibility that Djibouti would
     invoke its Agreement with France and demand that France come
     to its defense during the recent Djibouti-Eritrea border
     skirmish.  Serman indicated that France was quick to provide
     significant rear-area logistical support to Djibouti in order
     to avoid a Djiboutian request to engage in combat per the
     Agreement.

     ¶23.  (C)  Equally troublesome and outdated are certain
     "secret" portions of some of the Agreements.  According to
     Marechaux, the Defense Agreements with Cameroon and Gabon,
     for example, contain "absurd" provisions obligating France,
     upon request, to provide internal security in case of
     domestic unrest in those countries -- "There is no way we are
     going to act as an internal security police force at the
     request of a regime with domestic unrest."  Serman says that
     some of the Agreements contain "secret" clauses giving France
     monopoly rights to exploit natural resources in the countries
     concerned.  "This is so ridiculous today that we can only
     laugh about it.  Can you imagine us invoking our Agreement
     with Togo and ordering Togo to tell China to get out of 'our'
     country?"

     ¶24.  (C)  French officials say that the renegotiated
     Agreements will be stripped of these outdated provisions and
     "secret" clauses.  Everything will be open and transparent,
     with the revised Agreements reflecting today's realities and
     both sides' priorities in terms of shared interests.  They
     will also avoid the paternalism inherent in the original
     Agreements.  The French have already sent negotiating teams
     to the eight countries and hope to make significant progress
     in revising them by the end of 2008.

     ¶25.  (C)  African reaction seems positive, albeit qualified.
     President Wade of Senegal, according to the press, in July
     2008 commented on French intentions:  "It is a very good
     thing.  There are  protection, agreements in the event of
     an internal or external threat to a regime.  These agreements
     are secret.  There must be an end to this, things must be
     clear.  But some countries need this protection.  It is a

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     factor in deterring opposition movements accustomed to
     resorting swiftly to violence and weapons.  If France
     withdraws from those countries, we should not be surprised to
     see oppositionists attacking the government.  But this is not
     the case in Senegal, which has a solid regime and a loyal
     army.  I am therefore willing to annul the Defense Agreement
     between France and Senegal.  The other issue is France's
     military bases, including the one in Dakar.  This French
     presence does not bother me if it is useful to France.  But
     President Sarkozy believes that this base is no longer
     necessary (sic)."

     ¶26.  (U)  Major General Salimou Mohamed Amiri, Army Chief of
     Staff of the Comoros, reportedly stated in July 2008 that the
     Comoros favored a new military cooperation arrangement with
     France in lieu of the present Defense Agreement, noting that
     it would be anomalous for the defense of the Comoros to fall
     under France's authority.  He expected that military
     cooperation would take the form of training and exchange
     programs.

     Military Cooperation Agreements
     -------------------------------
     ¶27.  (C)   Indeed, the renegotiated Defense Agreements will
     likely resemble the Military Cooperation Agreements France
     maintains with some three dozen African countries.  The focus
     of the Military Cooperation Agreements is training and
     professionalism.  France's Directorate for Military and
     Defense Cooperation (DMCD) supports a staff of about 300
     permanent personnel in Africa who are embedded within African
     militaries, in some cases wearing the local uniform.  DMCD
     runs about 150 projects in Africa featuring support of
     military schools, technical training, French language
     training, armed forces reform and restructuring, equipment
     maintenance, communications, and infrastructure support.
     African military personnel attend 35 military schools in
     France and there are 14 regional military vocational schools
     spread across francophone Africa.

     ¶28.  (C)  The French will also likely continue to support the
     RECAMP program (Reinforcing African Capabilities for
     Maintaining Peace), designed to improve Africans'
     peacekeeping capabilities and their ability to participate
     successfully in multinational peacekeeping.  The French have
     welcomed U.S. participation in RECAMP's activities, and the
     program seems to mesh well with the U.S. ACOTA program, which
     has similar objectives.  The French recently integrated the
     EU into RECAMP, which is now formally called EuroRECAMP,
     giving an EU face to the program (important to the French in
     their effort to multilateralize their presence in Africa) and
     providing additional resources for the program.

     ¶29.  (C)  In sum, French military objectives in Africa
     parallel the non-military aspects of Sarkozy's Africa policy
     in terms of strengthening African capabilities; reducing, if
     not ending, African dependence on France; promoting openness
     and transparency; abandoning colonial-era sentiments and
     "special" treatment; engaging the EU and other bodies into
     French-led programs; and identifying and exploiting shared
     interests and priorities.  Ancillary benefits would include
     increased commitment to democratization, meritocracy,
     professionalism, and self-reliance.

     New Priorities for Economic Assistance
     --------------------------------------
     ¶30.  (C)   New Secretary of  State for Cooperation and
     Francophonie Alain Joyandet, who replaced Jean-Marie Bockel
     following Bockel's dismissal (see ref B), outlined French
     economic assistance priorities for Africa in a June 19, 2008
     speech:

     --  Strengthening private sector investment in Africa and
     support for young African entrepreneurs;
     --  Reinforcing agricultural programs in Africa on a

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     sustainable basis;
     --  Expanding the role of women in small business enterprises;
     --  Tripling the number of international volunteers in Africa
     within four years;
     --  Increasing support to French NGOs ("the role of French
     NGOs is too modest when compared to the powerful Anglo-Saxon
     and German organizations");
     --  Increased support for education and teaching the French
     language; and
     --  Modernizing France's military cooperation with Africa, in
     line with Sarkozy's February 2008 speech in Cape Town.

     ¶31.  (C)  For the past several years, the French have been
     using the Partnership Framework Agreement (PFA) as the
     umbrella document formalizing French assistance to a
     recipient country.  Formulated during the final years of the
     Chirac Presidency, the PFA has emerged as an efficient way to
     package French assistance.  Each PFA runs for five years and
     describes the various projects the two sides will undertake.
     Notably, the sum of money the French intend to spend is
     presented as a range, for the PFA is intended to be a
     flexible instrument that will allow for changes and
     refinements during its five-year run.  The PFA is usually
     generated by the French Embassy in a partner country, which
     identifies needs and possible projects.  The proposal is then
     sent to Paris where it is vetted by Joyandet's organization
     and by the French Development Agency, a separate body that
     reports to both the MFA and the Finance Ministry.  After
     being refined and adopted, the PFA is offered to the
     recipient country as the starting point for a final mutual
     decision on how and how much French aid is to be provided and
     administered.  The arrangement seems to be working well and
     we expect that the priorities Joyandet mentioned will shape
     any new PFAs concluded with partner countries.

     Other Structural Changes
     ------------------------
     ¶32.  (C)  As noted ref A, the MFA is planning to create a new
     "sous-direction" (comparable to a State Department regional
     office) within its Africa Bureau.  There will then be four
     "sous-directions" in the Bureau, which would create a
     structure resembling the four military commands covering
     Africa and which would align the MFA with Africa's
     sub-regional organizations (ECOWAS, SADC, et al.).  We are
     told that a fourth sous-direction could lead to more desk
     officers -- at present, there are only 15 desk officers in
     the entire Bureau, many of whom are first- or second-tour
     officers and at least two of whom (the Chad and Great Lakes
     desks) are seconded from other GOF agencies.  (The present
     Chad desk officer, like his predecessor, is an Army
     Lieutenant Colonel and the Great Lakes desk officer is on
     loan from the Interior Ministry.)

     ¶33.  (C)  MFA Africa Bureau contacts say that other changes
     are under consideration, including making it easier for
     officials from other ministries to serve at the MFA, and even
     an idea to make France's diplomatic corps less distinct and
     more like other branches of France's civil service.  While
     this is perceived as a possible dilution of traditional
     "diplomacy," some believe that making MFA staff more fungible
     could reinvigorate the diplomatic corps, strip it of its
     perceived elitist nature, and allow it to profit from the
     experiences and backgrounds of non-diplomats.

     ¶34.  (C)  The Diplomatic White Paper issued in July also
     suggests, without specificity, that France could consider
     working with EU partners to create shared or co-located
     diplomatic facilities abroad, which would permit cost savings
     among those involved.  While joint ambassadorships would not
     be possible in the near term for legal reasons, the consular
     function, for example, could be exercised jointly by several
     partner countries.

     ¶35.  (C)  Finally, Nathalie Delapalme, a respected expert and

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     an MFA Africa Advisor for several Foreign Ministers during
     the Chirac Presidency, reportedly has suggested that France
     could further rationalize its presence in Africa by dividing
     its diplomatic missions into three classes, which would allow
     a better use of resources.  FM Kouchner echoed some of these
     ideas during his speech at the French Chiefs of Mission
     conference in August 2008.

     --  "Full service" missions:  South Africa, Cameroon, Cote
     d'Ivoire Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, DRC, and
     Senegal.  The missions in South Africa, Cameroon, Kenya, and
     Senegal would also have regional economic responsibilities.

     --  "Priority" missions:  Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina
     Faso, Burundi, Comoros, Congo Brazzaville, Djibouti, Gabon,
     Ghana, Guinea, Mauritius, Niger, C.A.R., Chad, and Togo.
     Some of these could offer some of the services provided by
     "full service" missions.

     --  "Limited" missions:  Botswana (if not classed higher),
     Cape Verde, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea,
     Liberia, Namibia, Seychelles, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  These
     missions, each with only about a dozen staff, would be more
     "diplomatic presence posts" (akin to the USG APP concept)
     working in a "simplified format."

     For now, this kind of reorganization still appears in an
     embryonic stage, but changes of this sort could take place if
     the Sarkozy government implements its broader plans for
     restructuring.

    Conclusion
    ----------
    ¶36. (C) In saying that he would "reform" France's Africa
    policy, Sarkozy has taken on a task of formidable
    proportions, which is no less than to break once and for all
    from the colonial and post-colonial world and its mindset and
    to bring relations into today's era. To do so, he must
    overcome inertia and a certain level of comfort on both sides
    that have accumulated over many years. Yet, as in other
    areas of French policy, he seems determined to move forward
    and has taken his first steps. In our view, this is a
    positive development, for France-Afrique was becoming an
    increasingly creaky, costly, and potentially dangerous
    vehicle for dealing with a continent rife with challenges,
    less amenable to heeding its former colonial masters, and
    inescapably engaged in global issues of all kinds, from
    terrorism, to the environment, to drug trafficking, to energy
    resource management, and well beyond.

    ¶37. (C) But, will France-Afrique and old habits ever
    completely fade? One MOD contact, not known for
    sentimentality, believes that certain parts of France-Afrique
    will endure, if for no other reason than the common use of
    the French language and long intertwined histories.
    Prefacing his remarks by noting their lack of "political
    correctness" and their triteness, he says that the
    relationship was for a long time similar to a parent-child
    relationship. "Now, the child is an adult, capable of and
    deserving of more autonomy, yet still welcoming our help and
    guidance. What Sarkozy is doing is kicking the fledgling out
    of the nest, which is sort of the way he approaches a lot of
    problems. A heavy dose of what you might call 'tough love,'
    not always dispensed lovingly. Eventually, the now-grown
    adult child will be replaced by something resembling a cousin
    or a nephew. We will grow farther apart and less apt to look
    to each other reflexively, but some familial bond will
    remain, however much we may seek to deny it, and familial
    bonds are always to be nurtured. Our job is to make sure
    that this inevitable drifting apart takes place positively on
    both sides, does not completely extinguish the bond, and,
    most importantly, does not turn into an estrangement. That
    would be a loss for everyone -- French, Africans, and
    Americans."

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