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### Viewing cable 08STATE116943, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAILY

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08STATE116943 | 2008-11-03 18:06 | 2010-12-04 18:06 | SECRET//NOFORN | Secretary of State

`

    ORIGIN DS-00

    INFO  LOG-00   MFA-00   EEB-00   AF-00    AIT-00   A-00     CIAE-00
          INL-00   DNI-00   DODE-00  DOEE-00  WHA-00   EAP-00   DHSE-00
          EUR-00   OIGO-00  OBO-00   TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    JUSE-00
          LAB-01   L-00     MMP-00   MOFM-00  MOF-00   NEA-00   DCP-00
          ISN-00   NSCE-00  NSF-01   OES-00   OIG-00   P-00     ISNE-00
          DOHS-00  FMPC-00  SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    DPM-00
          USSS-00  NCTC-00  CBP-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-00   SCA-00
          SAS-00   FA-00      /002R

    P 031812Z NOV 08
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO SECURITY OFFICER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
    INFO AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY
    XMT AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
    AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG

` `

    S E C R E T STATE 116943

    NOFORN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: MR
    TAGS: ASEC
    SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAILY

    Classified By: Derived from Multiple Sources

    SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//MR
    Declassify on: Source marked 25X1-human, Date of source:
    October 30, 2008

    ¶1. (U) Diplomatic Security Daily, November 1-3, 2008

    ¶2. (U) Significant Events ) Paragraphs 7-13

    ¶3. (U) Key Concerns ) Paragraphs 14-18

    ¶4. (U) Threats & Analysis ) Paragraphs 19-31

    ¶5. (U) Cyber Threats ) Paragraphs 32-45

    ¶6. (U) Suspicious Activity Incidents ) Paragraphs 46-49

    ¶7. (U) Significant Events

    ¶8. (SBU) EUR - Ireland - Emergency Action Committee (EAC)
    Belfast met October 31 to discuss the armed forces homecoming
    parade scheduled for November 2 and the planned simultaneous
    counter-demonstrations by Sinn Fein and the dissident
    republican group Eirigi. Discussions centered on the parade
    route and the possibility of confrontations and violence in
    different areas, as well as the presence of AmCits along the
    parade and demonstration routes. The EAC decided the U.S.
    Consulate General should release a Warden Message to warn
    AmCits in Belfast. (Belfast 0137)

    ¶9. (SBU) Sweden - Approximately 12 to 15 protesters, carrying
    banners and flags requesting fair treatment for the &Cuban
    Five8 in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, made an unscheduled
    appearance at U.S. Embassy Stockholm November 1. The group
    emerged from the nearby German Embassy and stopped briefly in
    front of Post. The RSO monitored the group; they did not
    attempt to contact Embassy officials, but appeared more
    interested in photographing the front of Post. The protesters
    departed within a few minutes before Embassy police could
    respond. No damages or injuries were reported. (RSO Stockholm
    Spot Report)

    ¶10. (S//NF) NEA - Egypt - EAC Cairo convened October 20 to
    review recent threat reporting and access any threats
    specific to the planned visit by U.S. Secretary of State
    Condoleezza Rice on November 8 and 9. The EAC agreed there is
    no new, specific, and/or credible threat to U.S. interests in
    Egypt, but also assessed that Egypt remains a very tempting
    target for both indigenous and transnational terrorist
    elements. EAC members also agreed to enhance security
    measures at the American Presence Post in Alexandria. The EAC
    continues to assess the Government of Egypt,s (GoE)
    counterterrorism efforts as effective, and Post has a close
    relationship with the GoE on security matters. (Appendix 1)

    ¶11. (S//NF) Kuwait - EAC Kuwait City convened November 2 to
    discuss the security impact of recent threat reporting,
    Embassy Kuwait election coverage, U.S. Marine Corps Birthday
    Ball, and the upcoming visit of the former U.S. President
    William J. Clinton. The EAC was briefed on the recent
    reporting of possible terrorist surveillance of housing areas
    within Kuwait City. Post is coordinating the release of this
    information to the Kuwait Security Service for further
    action. The RSO stated the Local Guard Force (LGF) Mobile
    Patrol unit will increase coverage in the housing occupied by
    Chief of Mission personnel within the named areas, defensive
    counterintelligence training with be given to locally
    employed staff, and a Security Notice reminding personnel to
    remain vigilant in their personal security procedures will be
    released. The EAC concluded that Post,s current security
    posture is appropriate for the planned events. (Appendix 2)

    ¶12. (S//NF) EAP - Indonesia - EAC Jakarta convened October 30
    to discuss the security implications of the anticipated
    execution of the Bali bombers. The Government of Indonesia
    (GoI) recently announced they would be executed during the
    first week of November. Rumors are circulating around Jakarta
    that retaliatory attacks and demonstrations by those who
    support the bombers are possible. However, there is no
    specific or credible information regarding the planning of
    these types of attacks. One report mentioned possible suicide
    bomber attacks on shopping malls in Jakarta, specifically the
    Kelapa Gading mall in northern Jakarta, but without details.
    The U.S. Embassy assesses the likelihood of a terrorist
    attack conducted against U.S. or other Western interests in
    direct response to the executions is low. (Appendix source 3)

    ¶13. (SBU) SCA - Pakistan - A motorcade carrying Pakistani
    Deputy Inspector General of Police Syed Akhtar Ali Shah was
    targeted by a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive
    device (IED) attack in Marden Province on October 31 at
    around 2:30 p.m. Ali Shah and 20 others were wounded, and
    nine police officers were killed in the attack. On November
    1, at approximately 2:33 a.m., an explosion occurred at a
    police substation approximately 2,000 meters from the U.S.
    Consulate Peshawar residential area and official annexes. One
    police officer was killed and several other individuals were
    badly wounded. It is undetermined at this time whether the
    explosion was from a rocket or an explosion charge placed at
    the structure. The RSO will monitor these attacks. (RSO
    Peshawar Spot Report)

    ¶14. (U) Key Concerns

    ¶15. (S//FGI//NF) NEA - Lebanon - Al-Qa,ida affiliate to
    attack U.S. Embassy motorcade: According to a source of the
    Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate, as of
    mid-October, al-Qa,ida-affiliated elements in the Ayn
    al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp plan to attack a U.S.
    Embassy motorcade in Beirut. The men planning the operation
    had already collected an unspecified amount of explosives and
    a white 1983 Mercedes, which was currently inside the Shatila
    Palestinian refugee camp. The Mercedes was to be rigged with
    the explosives. (Appendix source 4)

    ¶16. (S//FGI//NF) SCA - Maldives - Continued monitoring of
    al-Qa,ida associates: The Maldives Police Service continued
    to investigate and monitor the activities of Maldives-based
    al-Qa,ida associates Yoosuf Izadhy, Easa Ali, and Hasnain
    Abdullah Hameedh (a.k.a. Hameed). Izadhy was reportedly in
    contact with a militant group in Waziristan, which allegedly
    maintained unspecified links to al-Qa,ida. Izadhy was
    clandestinely working to recruit others into his
    organization, specifically seeking individuals who had
    undergone basic terrorism training in Pakistan. Izadhy
    planned to create a terrorist group in the Maldives with the
    assistance of the Waziristan-based group. Izadhy planned to
    send his members to Waziristan for training. Hameedh was in
    close contact with a number of individuals who had undergone
    training in Pakistan, including individuals who were members
    of Jamaat-ul Muslimeen and completed basic and advanced
    training by Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) in Pakistan. They followed
    the ideology of Abu Easa.

    ¶17. (S//FGI//NF) DS/TIA/ITA notes, while the operational
    aspirations of Yoosuf Izadhy (Terrorist Identities Datamart
    Environment (TIDE) number 17312323), Easa Ali (TIDE number
    17312652), and Hasnain Abdullah Hameedh (TIDE number
    20686145) are unclear; past reporting suggests Maldivian
    extremists have demonstrated interest in actively
    participating in global jihadi activities by attempting to
    arrange travel and terrorist training in Pakistan. While many
    Maldivian participants of extremist online forums aimed to
    ultimately fight Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan,
    mid-October 2007 debrief information following the September
    29 bombing in Male that targeted tourists indicates at least
    two of the operatives participated in the attack in exchange
    for travel from the islands after the operation and arranged
    study at a madrassa in Pakistan.

    ¶18. (S//NF) Specific links to al-Qa,ida remain unclear;
    although, reporting from May detailed recruitment activity by
    Maldivian national Ahmed Zaki of Maldivians into the Kashmiri
    extremist group LT madrassas and training camps in Pakistan.
    A variety of reports from 2006 details linkages between
    Maldivians belonging to a group known as
    Jama-ah-tul-Muslimeen (JTM) and individuals participating in
    an anti-American Islamic extremist online forum called Tibyan
    Publications. JTM is an extremist group based in the UK that
    follows an extremist ideology known as Takfiir that actively
    encourages violent jihad and supports criminality against
    apostate states. (Appendix sources 5-18)

    ¶19. (U) Threats & Analysis

    ¶20. (S//NF) WHA - Mexico - Violence spikes again in Tijuana:
    According to a mid-level Baja California state police
    official, a turf war between the Arellano Felix Organization
    (AFO) and the Sinaloa Cartel has caused another increase in
    violence in Tijuana. The Mexican Government,s
    counternarcotics efforts -- in the form of 3,300 military and
    police assets patrolling the area under Operation Tijuana --
    have severely weakened the AFO,s operations. The Sinaloa
    Cartel, hoping to capitalize on the AFO,s weaknesses, is
    battling for control of Tijuana,s drug plaza. While the AFO
    assassins are skilled, Sinaloa Cartel hit men are poorly
    trained and have no aversion to public shootings; however, if
    the Sinaloa Cartel successfully ousts the AFO from Tijuana,
    DS/TIA/ITA notes the levels of violence should decrease.
    While residents and visitors are not being targeted, the
    likelihood of being in the wrong place at the wrong time is
    of increasing concern. Cartel targets are being killed during
    daytime hours in public areas of Tijuana, including
    restaurants, shopping centers, and near school buildings. The
    DoS, Travel Alert for Mexico was extended for six months on
    October 14 to reflect the current and widely reported crime
    and violence occurring throughout Mexico. (Open sources;
    Appendix sources 19-20)

    ¶21. (U) AF - Cameroon - An examination of the background,
    goals, and tactics of the Niger Delta Defense and Security
    Council and the Bakassi Freedom Fighters: (S//NF) The October
    31 kidnapping of approximately 10 hostages off the shores of
    the Bakassi Peninsula has magnified the role of two groups --
    the Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF) and the Niger Delta
    Defense and Security Council (NDDSC) -- in the increasing
    insecurity in the Bakassi. The kidnappings, an overview of
    the NDDSC,s and BFF,s background, and an examination of
    their past operations, highlight the groups, possible intent
    to use novel, deadly, and unprecedented tactics to achieve
    their goals.

    ¶22. (SBU) In the early morning of October 31, a group of
    armed men in three boats attacked a French Total vessel named
    Bourbon Sagita, which was located off the Cameroonian shore
    between Bakassi and Limbe. Although no Americans were
    directly impacted, at least seven French citizens, one
    Tunisian, one Senegalese, and several Cameroonian nationals
    were kidnapped; five remaining oil workers were left on the
    boat. Nobody was injured in the attack.

    ¶23. (SBU) According to unconfirmed media reports, shortly
    after the raid, the BFF, part of a larger and shadowy
    alliance of the NDDSC, claimed responsibility for the attacks
    and threatened to kill the hostages, stating, &The 10 are in
    our hands. If you don,t tell the government of Cameroon to
    come here and discuss with us, we will kill them all in three
    days.8 On November 1, the NDDSC/BFF withdrew the threat, but
    stated it would hold the hostages until the government opened
    negotiations with them.

    ¶24. (S//NF) The NDDSC/BFF is likely referring to discussions
    over the status of the Bakassi Peninsula in its statement.
    The region was transferred from Nigeria to Cameroon on August
    14, per an International Court of Justice ruling. According
    to e-mails it sent to media outlets, the NDDSC/BFF merged
    into an official alliance at the end of July in an attempt to
    forestall the hand over. Led by Commander Ebi Dari and
    General A.G. Dasuo, who claim they are fighting for
    &self-determination and freedom8 of the Bakassi Peninsula
    which contains a majority of Nigerian citizens. They are also
    demanding that two of their fighters captured in July be
    released and that Nigerians on the Bakassi Peninsula be
    compensated.

    ¶25. (S//NF) An intelligence and open media search of the BFF
    provided negligible results. Meanwhile, although little
    background information is known about the NDDSC, it claims to
    have approximately 1,050 fighters. It has been in existence
    since at least 2002 and previously conducted low-level
    attacks against Cameroonian troops on the Bakassi. It can
    also be linked to three deadly operations prior to the hand
    over of the controversial region. In the most macabre raid,
    on June 9, the NDDSC allegedly killed and mutilated six
    members of a Cameroonian delegation visiting the Peninsula,
    including the deputy subregional commander. It also claimed
    responsibility for a November 2007 raid on a Cameroonian
    military outpost which killed 21 soldiers; this claim remains
    unconfirmed. (Please see the July 26 DS Daily for further
    information on the pre-hand over security incidents in the
    Bakassi.)

    ¶26. (S//NF) Although the post-hand over period has been
    defined by a series of attacks, the NDDSC/BFF has released
    statements denying culpability in some of those operations.
    These include a September 28 bank robbery in Limbe and a
    September 13 attack against a trawler off the Bakassi
    Peninsula. The NDDSC/BFF may be responsible for some
    post-hand over operations, while others may have been
    conducted by different militants in the region, including in
    the Niger Delta. Despite similar tactics in all these
    operations, including the use of speedboats carrying heavily
    armed masked men, at this time, there are no clear
    indications the NDDSC/BFF has a defined relationship with the
    Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) or
    any other prominent Niger Delta group.

    ¶27. (S//NF) Instead, the series of raids by the NDDSC/BFF may
    possibly signify new tactics being pursued in the Bakassi
    region. In its early raids, the NDDSC/BFF primarily used
    deadly and brutal force against the Cameroonian military, but
    often spared expatriates and civilians. Two recent attacks,
    however -- the June 9 attack and the October 31
    hostage-taking operation -- have demonstrated its desire to
    expand its targets. In the June 6 raid, the NDDSC targeted a
    political delegation and mutilated a deputy subregional
    commander, the equivalent of a governor. It is unclear if the
    NDDSC was directly targeting the governor; but, nevertheless,
    the group demonstrated its desire to also kill politicians.
    For its part, the October 31 attacks was the first kidnapping
    of expatriates off the coast of Cameroon.

    ¶28. (S//NF) Also of concern is the NDDSC/BFF,s intent to
    hold hostages indefinitely after initially threatening to
    kill them. Whereas MEND and other Delta groups kidnapped
    hostages primarily to garner ransom money or to force oil
    companies to scale back operations, they had seldom directly
    harmed or threatened to kill hostages. They also often
    released hostages shortly after their capture. Moreover,
    given its intent to hold the hostages for a political
    objective, the NDDSC/BFF may find it convenient to continue
    operations against expatriates in the region to pressure the
    Cameroonian Government and to ensure that its political
    demands are met. (Open sources; Yaound 1071; 0754; 0706;
    Appendix sources 21-28)

    ¶29. (S//FGI//NF) SCA - Bangladesh - Rejection of IDP to
    register for December elections: As of late October, the
    Bangladeshi Election Commission was set to reject the Islamic
    Democratic Party,s (IDP,s) attempt to register for the
    December parliamentary elections. The IDP is a nascent
    political party formed by senior members of the Islamic
    terrorist group Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh
    (HUJI-B). Bangladesh,s Directorate General of Forces
    Intelligence (DGFI) supported the formation of the IDP as a
    way to bring HUJI-B into the mainstream and reported it
    tightly monitored the group,s activities; although, HUJI-B
    has never renounced the use of violence to implement its
    vision of transforming Bangladesh into a Muslim theocracy.
    According to U.S. Embassy Dhaka, which strongly opposed the
    creation of the IDP, the party and its leadership will likely
    be angered by the decision and may respond with violence
    possibly against the commission or the U.S. Mission or
    interests.

    ¶30. (S//NF) Arrests and monitoring have undoubtedly hindered
    HUJI-B,s capabilities in recent years, and it is entirely
    plausible the group is pursuing the creation of a political
    wing to improve its ability to support and carry out
    terrorist activity. A late-September assessment from
    Bangladesh,s National Security Intelligence Organization
    (NSI) voiced concern that the party,s creation would free
    extremists to pursue extremist activity under the cover of a
    moderate front organization. Indeed, there are no indications
    IDP would garner a significant number of votes. Analysis from
    the DoS, Office of Research noted the majority of
    Bangladeshis want Awami League and Bangladesh National Party
    leaders Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia to participate in the
    December elections. Interestingly, 80 percent stated they
    would ignore a call by either party to boycott the vote.
    One-third further stated they would join street protests in
    the face of a cancellation of elections.

    ¶31. (S//FGI//NF) Although there is little information
    available regarding HUJI-B,s current capabilities, its
    membership likely does retain the ability to manufacture and
    use explosives and has previously favored targeting
    high-profile individuals for attack. While there is no
    specific reporting at the present time detailing plots
    against U.S. interests in Bangladesh, the group has publicly
    articulated its anti-Western and -Indian stance, including
    signing Usama Bin Ladin,s 1998 fatwa against the West. In
    regards to HUJI-B,s capabilities, DGFI,s, Rapid Action
    Battalion,s (RAB,s), and NSI,s assessments vary
    significantly. Following the early-March U.S. designation of
    HUJI-B as a foreign terrorist organization, RAB assessed
    HUJI-B would not respond with violence due to the severe
    degradation of the group,s capability and leadership
    structure from arrests and active surveillance. Some member
    who wanted to independently attack Western interests,
    however, remained technically capable of carrying out
    low-level attacks using small arms, grenades, and IEDs. DGFI
    likewise reported HUJI-B was &an organization on the run8
    and that it did not pose a threat to U.S. interests in
    Bangladesh. NSI conversely assessed HUJI-B would react
    violently to the designation and would attempt to conduct an
    attack against the U.S. official presence in Dhaka; although,
    there was no information available detailing such an
    operation. Thus far, HUJI-B has not carried out an attack
    against American interests in Bangladesh, but the group has
    been linked to assassination attempts on intellectuals,
    journalists, and politicians, including two thwarted attempts
    on the life of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina during public
    addresses and a grenade attack that injured the British high
    commissioner in May 2004. (&Bangladeshis have high hopes for
    national elections,8 DoS Office of Research; Appendix
    sources 29-40)

    ¶32. (U) Cyber Threats

    ¶33. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) WHA - CTAD comment: On October 16,
    at least one e-mail account within the Government of Canada
    received a Trojanized message from a Yahoo account claiming
    to represent a U.S. embassy. The bogus subject line was an
    invitation for a private meeting with a named DoS employee.
    The attached Microsoft Word document was a malicious
    &invitation8 file that, when opened, attempts to beacon and
    create a connection to &jingl.cable.nu8 via port 8080. The
    &cable.nu8 domain remains one of concern, as it has
    historically been associated with activity from Chinese
    hacker organizations.

    ¶34. (U) EUR - CTAD comment: The European Commission (EC) this
    week proposed legislation to establish a Critical
    Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN) to improve
    information sharing among European Union (EU) member nations.
    The proposed legislation would enable the EC to launch and
    manage the CIWIN, a secure information technology (IT) system
    aimed at sharing knowledge on threats, vulnerabilities, and
    protection of critical infrastructures. The CIWIN would be a
    voluntary tool for transmitting sensitive information and
    would also include a rapid alert system for critical
    infrastructure, allowing EU nations to post alerts on
    immediate threats.

    ¶35. (U) AF - CTAD comment: Sudanese law enforcement recently
    reported the arrest of three hackers who have allegedly
    attacked more than 300 government and public websites during
    the last few months. Among the hacked sites was that of the
    National Telecommunication Corporation, which is responsible
    for oversight of telecommunication service providers as well
    as many other aspects of Sudanese IT and network stability.
    The three highly skilled hackers, all of whom are Sudanese,
    reportedly caused significant damage to their targets, but
    their motivation for the attacks and any potential group
    affiliations are yet undetermined.

    ¶36. (C) NEA - CTAD comment: On October 21, officials from the
    Kuwaiti Central Agency for Information (CAIT) and the
    National Security Bureau (NSB) expressed concerns for foreign
    and domestic threats to Kuwaiti information systems.
    According to these organizations, some of the issues plaguing
    Government of Kuwait (GoK) networks are suspected attacks
    from Iranian hackers, insider corruption and misuse of
    resources, and a lack of sufficient interagency coordination
    and guidance for monitoring users, activities and
    investigating incidents. For example, the groups, inability
    to adequately examine malicious software (malware) injections
    or internal abuse of system access continues to hinder the
    GoK,s capacity to ensure the protection of sensitive
    information. Therefore, the CAIT and NSB are interested in
    learning more about U.S. cyber security programs as well as
    receiving additional training and support.

    ¶37. (S//NF) EAP - CTAD comment: Between September 29 and
    October 2, a conference was held by the German Federal Office
    for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). During this
    conference, the BfV delivered a briefing on its analysis of
    the cyber threat posed by the People,s Republic of China
    (PRC), which appears to mirror conclusions drawn by the U.S.
    Intelligence Community. The BfV surmises the intention of PRC
    actors is espionage, and the primary attack vector used in
    their malicious activity is socially engineered e-mail
    messages containing malware attachments and/or embedded links
    to hostile websites. According to reporting, &from October
    2006 to October 2007, 500 such e-mail operations were
    conducted against a wide range of German organizations,8 and
    the attacks appear to be increasing in scope and
    sophistication. The socially engineered e-mail messages
    delivered to German computer systems were spoofed to appear
    to come from trusted sources and contain information
    &targeted specifically to the recipient,s interests,
    duties, or current events.8 This malicious activity has
    targeted a wide variety of German organizational levels to
    include &German military, economic, science and technology,
    commercial, diplomatic, research and development, as well as
    high-level government (ministry and chancellery) systems.8
    In addition, German intelligence reporting indicates an
    increase in activity was detected immediately preceding
    events such as German Government, or commercial, negotiations
    involving Chinese interests.

    ¶38. (U) SCA - CTAD comment: The National Science Foundation
    and the Pakistan Higher Education Commission recently
    announced the establishment of a Pakistan extension to an
    international high-speed network already connecting U.S. and
    EC systems. The new portion of the network links Pakistani
    scientists and students to facilities in the U.S. through
    additional connections to Singapore and Japan. This project
    emerged from February 2007 discussions of the U.S.-Pakistan
    Joint Committee on Science and Technology that sought to
    promote cooperation and innovation among education and
    business sectors. (Open sources; Appendix sources 41-43)

    ¶39. (S//NF) Worldwide - BC conducting CNE on USG systems:

    ¶40. (S//NF) Key highlights:
    BC actively targets USG and other organizations via
    socially engineered e-mail messages.
    BC actors recently compromised the systems of a U.S. ISP
    to carry out CNE on a USG network.
    Additional IP addresses were identified this month as
    compromised and used for BC activity.
    BC has targeted DoS networks in the past and may again in
    the future via spoofed e-mail.

    ¶41. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Source paragraph: &Byzantine
    Candor (BC) actors have compromised multiple systems located
    at a U.S. Internet service provider (ISP) and have used the
    systems as part of BC,s U.S.-based attack infrastructure
    since at least March, targeting multiple victims including at
    least one USG agency.8

    ¶42. (S//NF) CTAD comment: Since late 2002, USG organizations
    have been targeted with social-engineering online attacks by
    BC actors. BC, an intrusion subset of Byzantine Hades
    activity, is a series of related computer network intrusions
    affecting U.S. and foreign systems and is believed to
    originate from the PRC. BC intruders have relied on
    techniques including exploiting Windows system
    vulnerabilities and stealing login credentials to gain access
    to hundreds of USG and cleared defense contractor systems
    over the years. In the U.S., the majority of the systems BC
    actors have targeted belong to the U.S. Army, but targets
    also include other DoD services as well as DoS, Department of
    Energy, additional USG entities, and commercial systems and
    networks. BC actors typically gain initial access with the
    use of highly targeted socially engineered e-mail messages,
    which fool recipients into inadvertently compromising their
    systems. The intruders then install malware such as
    customized keystroke-logging software and command-and-control
    (C&C) utilities onto the compromised systems and exfiltrate
    massive amounts of sensitive data from the networks. This
    month, BC actors attempted to compromise the network of a
    U.S. political organization via socially engineered e-mail
    messages (see CTAD Daily Read File dated October 16).

    ¶43. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) CTAD comment: Also discovered this
    month by USG analysts was the compromise of several computer
    systems located at a commercial ISP within the United States.
    According to Air Force Office of Special Investigations
    (AFOSI) reporting, hackers based in Shanghai and linked to
    the PRC,s People,s Liberation Army (PLA) Third Department
    have been using these compromised systems as part of the
    larger BC attack infrastructure to facilitate computer
    network exploitation (CNE) of U.S. and foreign information
    systems. Since March, the responsible actors have used at
    least three separate systems at the unnamed ISP in multiple
    network intrusions and have exfiltrated data via these
    systems, including data from at least one USG agency. AFOSI
    reporting indicates, on March 11, BC actors gained access to
    one system at the ISP, onto which the actors transferred
    multiple files, including several C&C tools. From here, the
    intruders used the tools to obtain a list of usernames and
    password hashes for the system. Next, on April 22, BC actors
    accessed a second system at the ISP, where they transferred
    additional software tools. From April through October 13, the
    BC actors used this computer system to conduct CNE on
    multiple victims. During this time period, the actors
    exfiltrated at least 50 megabytes of e-mail messages and
    attached documents, as well as a complete list of usernames
    and passwords from an unspecified USG agency. Additionally,
    multiple files were transferred to the compromised ISP system
    from other BC-associated systems that have been previously
    identified collecting e-mail messages from additional
    victims. The third system at the U.S. ISP was identified as
    compromised on August 14, when BC actors transferred a
    malicious file onto it named
    &salaryincrease-surveyandforecast.zip.8 According to AFOSI
    analysis, BC actors use this system to host multiple webpages
    that allow other BC-compromised systems to download malicious
    files or be redirected to BC C&C servers.

    ¶44. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CTAD comment: Additional DoD
    reporting this month indicates BC actors have used multiple
    other systems to conduct CNE against U.S. and foreign systems
    from February through September. A October 23 DoD cable
    states Shanghai-based hackers associated with BC activity and
    linked to the PLA have successfully targeted multiple U.S.
    entities during this time period. The cable details dozens of
    identified Internet Protocol (IP) addresses associated with
    BC activity as well as the dates of their activity. All of
    the IP addresses listed resolve to the CNC Group Shanghai
    Province Network in Shanghai, and all the host names of the
    addresses contained Asian keyboard settings as well as China
    time zone settings. Most of these IP addresses were
    identified as responsible for direct CNE of U.S. entities,
    including unspecified USG organizations, systems and
    networks. Interestingly, although the actors using each IP
    address practiced some degree of operational security to
    obfuscate their identities, one particular actor was
    identified as lacking in these security measures. On June 7,
    the BC actor, using an identified IP address, was observed
    using a Taiwan-based online bulletin board service for
    personal use.

    ¶45. (S//NF) CTAD comment: BC actors have targeted the DoS in
    the past on multiple occasions with socially engineered
    e-mail messages containing malicious attached files and have
    successfully exfiltrated sensitive information from DoS
    unclassified networks. As such, it is possible these actors
    will attempt to compromise DoS networks in the future. As BC
    activity continues across the DoD and U.S., DoS personnel
    should practice conscientious Internet and e-mail use and
    should remain informed on BH activity. (Appendix sources
    44-46)

    ¶46. (U) Suspicious Activity Incidents

    ¶47. (SBU) EUR - Azerbaijan - A vehicle with Iranian license
    plates was parked adjacent to U.S. Embassy Baku October 29.
    The driver was the only occupant in the car. Another subject
    appeared and got into the car, which then took off. The
    police have been asked to check the vehicle registration.
    Post is awaiting the results. (SIMAS Event: Baku-00507-2008)

    ¶48. (SBU) EAP - Taiwan - An Asian male with a professional
    video camera stood across the street from the American
    Institute in Taiwan (AIT) October 29. He filmed a number of
    buildings in the area and possibly the AIT. After a few
    minutes, the subject departed the area on a motor scooter.
    (SIMAS Event: Taipei-00194-2008)

    ¶49. (SBU) Taiwan - An Asian male stood in front of the Bank
    of Taiwan and photographed various buildings -- including the
    AIT -- on October 31. An LGF member stopped and questioned
    the man, who refused to show identification or the pictures
    he took. He left the area on foot shortly afterward. (SIMAS
    Event: Taipei-00195-2008)

    SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//MR
    Full Appendix with sourcing available upon request.
    RICE

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