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### Viewing cable 04THEHAGUE1717, DUTCH/EU: FM BOT ON IRAQ, CHINA, ASEM, SUDAN, AND

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
04THEHAGUE1717 | 2004-07-09 12:12 | 2011-01-25 19:07 | SECRET | Embassy The Hague

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001717

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2024
    TAGS: PREL PARM EAID NL IZ CH SU EUN
    SUBJECT: DUTCH/EU:  FM BOT ON IRAQ, CHINA, ASEM, SUDAN, AND
    CANADA

    REF: A. THE HAGUE 1701

         ¶B. SECSTATE 1...

    18563

    2004-07-09

    04THEHAGUE1717

    Embassy The Hague

    SECRET

    04THEHAGUE1701

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001717

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2024
    TAGS: PREL PARM EAID NL IZ CH SU EUN
    SUBJECT: DUTCH/EU: FM BOT ON IRAQ, CHINA, ASEM, SUDAN, AND
    CANADA

    REF: A. THE HAGUE 1701

    ¶B. SECSTATE 147536

    Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL. REASONS: 1.4(B) AND (D).

    ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Ambassador Sobel met with Dutch Foreign
    Minister Ben Bot on July 7 to preview the agenda for the July
    12-13 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)
    in Brussels. Bot anticipated that the GAERC would agree to
    take positive steps with regard to Iraq and Sudan, although
    he expressed concern that the EU was not receiving full
    credit for ongoing activities in Sudan. In separate meetings
    with Finance Minister Zalm and at the MFA, EB A/S Wayne
    pressed for greater EU engagement on Iraq debt reduction and
    assistance. Bot said the China Arms Embargo probably would
    be discussed at the September Gymnich, but made clear that
    holding a successful Chinese summit is a top priority for the
    Dutch Presidency. Burma remains a ticklish issue for the EU
    which puts the ASEM summit at risk; for other reasons, the
    EU-Canada summit probably will not take place either. END
    SUMMARY.

    IRAQ
    ----

    ¶2. (S) According to Bot, agreeing on a plan for EU support
    for Iraq would be high on the GAERC's agenda. Iraqi
    President Allawi, he said, had confirmed his intention to
    attend the session and would join the ministers for lunch.
    For security reasons, however, this information was not being
    circulated widely. (Note: We were subsequently told by a
    Dutch MFA contact that Allawi later decided not to attend the
    session. End Note). Bot stressed that the EU sincerely
    wanted to be helpful to the new Iraqi government and would
    look to Allawi for input in identifying critical needs. The
    Solana-Patten letter of June 9, 2004, he added laid out
    general areas in which the EU felt comfortable making
    contributions, i.e. supporting the political process
    (including elections), promoting security and stability in
    Iraq and the region, and engaging with Iraq to lay the
    foundations for longer-term relations.

    ¶3. (C) Bot noted that he had recently had dinner with NATO
    SYG Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and supported his efforts to
    involve NATO in training and other activities inside Iraq.
    It will be important, he noted, to ensure that NATO and EU
    efforts do not interfere with one another.

    ¶4. (C) In separate meetings July 7 with Finance Minister
    Gerrit Zalm and MFA Director General for Political Affairs
    Hugo Siblesz, visiting EB A/S Tony Wayne pressed for greater
    Dutch and EU engagement on Iraq debt reduction and
    assistance. A/S Wayne explained that the USG planned to work
    through the Core Group, which includes the EU, to coordinate
    closely with the UN on supporting political transition and
    economic reconstruction in Iraq. The USG hoped for concrete
    actions by the year's end. Additional USG commitments would
    be based on IMF sustainability analysis. A/S Wayne urged the
    Dutch to use their role as EU President to support EU
    adoption of a similar pragmatic approach. While agreeing
    that such a non-political approach was best, Zalm said that
    additional bilateral Dutch pledges, including debt reduction,
    would need to be drawn from the country's development
    assistance funds, currently capped at 0.8 percent of GDP.
    Any additional funds directed toward Iraq would mean a cut in
    assistance to currently funded programs in other countries
    with possibly greater needs. Siblesz said the EU was clearly
    interested in hearing directly from Allawi; his input on the
    situation on the ground in Iraq could help to engage the EU
    and reluctant Members States (i.e., France). Siblesz added
    that there would be a meeting this week of Member States with
    assistance programs in Iraq to examine how such programs
    could be expanded on an EU-basis in such areas as police
    training, rule of law, and electoral support.

    CHINA ARMS EMBARGO
    ------------------

    ¶5. (S) Ambassador Sobel reiterated to Bot the strong U.S.
    interest in avoiding a decision to lift the China Arms
    Embargo. Noting that the issue was not on the agenda for the
    upcoming GAERC, Bot said that it probably would be discussed
    at the September 13-14 Gymnich instead. As EU president, the
    Dutch were working to strengthen the code of conduct while
    encouraging China to make progress on human rights.
    Personally, Bot said, he wished that the Dutch had not
    inherited this difficult and emotional issue from the Irish
    presidency, but they would have to deal with it one way or
    another. Lots of EU member states, he added, were pushing to
    abolish the embargo, and as president the Dutch had to remain
    objective. Bot made clear that his top priority was to
    ensure that a successful China-EU summit occurred during the
    Dutch presidency; he was explicitly less concerned with what
    steps would be necessary to make this happen. Bot indicated
    that France and China were suggesting that the summit might
    be canceled unless action was taken on the embargo.
    Ambassador Sobel stressed that we did not want to be
    surprised in this area.

    ASEM SUMMIT AND BURMA
    ---------------------

    ¶6. (S) Noting that Burma was another ticklish issue for the
    EU, Bot said that he hoped for a compromise that would allow
    the EU-ASEM summit to go forward as planned. The Burmese, he
    said, needed to make some sort of credible good-will gesture
    with regard to Aung Sang Suu Kyi to move the process forward.
    The parliament and NGO community in the Netherlands was
    following this issue closely; even though they were not as
    influential as in Britain, he added, the GONL still needed to
    take their concerns seriously. So far, the EU had been
    unable to agree on a compromise solution for the ASEM summit,
    such as agreeing to let Burma participate in a lesser
    capacity. Having the Burmese represented at the ministerial
    level, for example, would still be too high according to
    Bot. Bot said that he had discussed this issue with
    Secretary Powell in Istanbul and had sought his support in

    SIPDIS
    influencing Indonesia and other Asian countries to put
    pressure on Burma to be more accommodating.

    SUDAN
    -----

    ¶7. (C) Turning to Sudan, Bot said that the EU is already
    doing a lot with regard to the Darfur crisis but does not
    get credit for it. Noting that the Dutch have been pushing
    this issue within the EU, Bot said the GAERC would consider
    not only additional steps, but also how to publicize those
    measures the EU is already taking. Bot noted that he had
    discussed this issue briefly with Secretary Powell in
    Istanbul.

    CANADA
    ------

    ¶8. (C) Bot noted with some exasperation that the EU-Canada
    summit scheduled for the Dutch Presidency probably would be
    postponed. The Canadian Prime Minister, he said, was worried
    about his domestic political situation and had proposed
    impossible dates for the summit. Unless they could come up
    with better dates, Bot said, the summit would not take place.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶9. (S) The Dutch presidency has barely started, and already
    faces the possibility of three failed summits: ASEM, Canada,
    and China. Of the three, the Chinese is clearly the most
    important -- and the one by which the Dutch presidency is
    most likely to be judged. Bot's determination to hold a
    EU-China summit at almost any cost, and his insistence that
    the Dutch must remain objective on the Arms Embargo
    question reinforces the message we have heard elsewhere that
    the Dutch will not take a leading or facilitating role in
    delaying a decision on lifting the arms embargo if the
    Chinese (and, Bot suggested, France) make it a precondition
    for a summit.
    SOBEL

`