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### Viewing cable 09MOSCOW2903, SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF UNDER SECRETARY ROBERT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09MOSCOW2903 | 2009-11-27 14:02 | 2010-12-01 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHMO #2903/01 3311459
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 271459Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5534

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002903

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR UNDER SECRETARY HORMATS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2019
    TAGS: ECON ETRD EAGR PREL PGOV RS
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF UNDER SECRETARY ROBERT
    HORMATS

    Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (C) Your visit to Moscow provides an opportunity to
    strengthen bilateral economic relations at a time when both
    our economies are beginning to show signs of recovery
    following an extremely difficult year. Because our economic
    relations with Russia were relatively stable even prior to
    the political "reset" we've seen this year, we are
    well-positioned to press for progress on a few key issues,
    including Russia's WTO accession, agricultural trade and
    intellectual property rights, where more work is needed. End
    Summary.

    U.S.-Russian Relations
    ----------------------

    ¶2. (C) Four meetings this year between Presidents Obama and
    Medvedev, including the President's July visit to Moscow, and
    Secretary Clinton's numerous discussions with Foreign
    Minister Lavrov have given impetus to real change in our
    bilateral relations. Addressing the ruling United Russia
    party congress November 21, President Medvedev even used the
    phrase "reset" - heretofore reserved for issues involving the
    U.S. and Russia - and called for an "economic reset" as well.
    We want to see this will applied not just to the
    modernization that Medvedev is advocating for Russia itself,
    but to its interaction with foreign investors and integration
    into global financial institutions, all of which force
    reforms deeper into the system. The challenge, as always, is
    to translate rhetoric into specific decisions and joint
    actions.

    ¶3. (C) For the first time in years, we have structure in the
    relationship to do this. The Obama-Medvedev Commission has
    four working groups--business development and economic
    relations, energy, nuclear energy, and agriculture--with a
    remit to broaden the economic base of interaction between us.
    The Commission will give us regular, focused interaction
    with influential centers of Russia's business and economic
    decision-making. In early contacts, some Russian
    participants in the working groups have shown a preference
    fro form over substance, though. We need to continue to set a
    higher standard. The Commission needs to produce results,
    not reports, and decisions, not dialogue.

    Global Economic Crisis And Russia's Response
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) The global economic crisis hit Russia particularly
    hard, as the economy remains heavily dependent on commodities
    exports (primarily oil and gas) for growth, and on foreign
    capital for investment. The abrupt drop in the price of oil
    combined with a decline in foreign investment strained the
    Russian economy, beginning in mid-2008. Throughout the
    following twelve-month period, Russian industrial production
    plummeted, with double-digit declines in month-on-month
    production occurring on a regular basis. Key sectors such as
    steel and automobiles were hit particularly hard, with
    Russian domestic automobile production declining by over 50%
    in the first half of 2009. The industrial sector,
    particularly the single-company towns, was hard hit, with
    unemployment remaining at an unprecedented high. Predictions
    for 2009 GDP decline grew from 3% early in the year, to the
    current estimates of 7.5%.

    ¶5. (C) At the beginning of the crisis, the Russian government
    held the third largest quantity of reserves internationally
    and relatively little sovereign debt. Thus, the GOR was much
    better positioned to react than many other countries. The
    GOR burned through a third of these reserves (an estimated
    $200 billion) to slow the decline of the ruble. The GOR also
    provided large infusions of capital into the domestic
    financial sector in an effort to keep stressed banks afloat.
    In addition, the Russian government instituted a series of
    "temporary crisis measures," including tariff increases and
    other import restrictions, in an effort to protect domestic
    production in key sectors and increase demand.

    ¶6. (C) While these measures were successful in staving off a
    complete collapse of the financial sector a la 1998, they
    have come at a price. Official Russian reserves are
    significantly lower than at the start of the crisis and we
    expect the GOR will be required to borrow, including on
    international markets, in order to cover its expected federal
    budget deficit in 2010. Also, while the infusions of cash
    into the financial system prevented a total meltdown, banks
    used much of the funding to make provisions for
    non-performing loans and other distressed assets. The
    infusions of cash did not result in a resumption of lending,
    and domestic financing remains hard to come by, constraining
    efforts to stimulate the real economy.

    ¶7. (C) The tariff and other trade barriers did slow imports
    during the first half of 2009, but the reduced competition
    did not appear to do much to help domestic producers.
    Domestic demand, particularly in the automotive and real
    estate sectors, remains extremely weak. The GOR has pushed
    companies to retain workers during the economic downturn, in
    an effort to slow unemployment growth and avoid potential
    social difficulties. As a result, many companies have used
    their limited reserves to continue paying workers and are not
    well placed to take advantage of an economic up-turn when it
    arrives. That said, Russia appears to have muddled through
    the worst of the crisis and, aided by higher oil prices and a
    strengthening ruble, GOR officials are now considering how to
    encourage a return to strong economic growth.

    Key Challenges To Russian Economic Growth
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) Dmitriy Medvedev has made a central theme of his
    presidency Russia's need to diversify its economy, develop an
    innovation economy based on its strong intellectual
    resources, integrate itself into the global economy and deal
    with the problems created by corruption. While we support
    these objectives, we are concerned that progress has been
    limited, at best. The recent economic crisis dealt yet
    another blow to Russia's limited industrial base. The lack
    of domestic financing limits entrepreneurs' efforts to move
    into new sectors. Weak enforcement of intellectual property
    laws and gaps in key areas, such as protections on encryption
    technologies, restrict growth in IT and other innovative
    sectors. Russia's on-again, off-again approach to WTO
    accession has not only slowed down Russia's own accession
    process, but has also made it difficult for others, such as
    the U.S. and EU, who are interested in supporting Russia's
    accession. Russia's continued tariff and non-tariff
    restrictions on agricultural trade also present challenges to
    increasing bilateral U.S.-Russia trade, as many U.S.
    producers are simply not able to export their products to
    Russia. Finally, corruption and "legal nihilism" continue to
    plague the Russian governance system; the death in custody of
    Russian lawyer Sergey Magnitskiy is only the latest example.

    Domestic Political Context
    --------------------------

    ¶9. (C) After a year and a half of tandem leadership of
    Russia, Medvedev and Putin continue to function based on a
    division of labor. The President plays to his strengths of
    clear public presentation and a long-range focus on a modern
    economy, and underscores his constitutional responsibilities
    for foreign policy. His November 12 annual address to the
    nation again highlighted and expanded on the theme of
    economic modernization, and to a lesser extent political
    reform as well. Putin, meanwhile, has built on his image of
    a domestic problem solver, employing his trademark
    street-wise rhetoric in dressing down oligarchs or critics.
    His November 21 address to the annual congress of the United
    Russia party (which he heads) reaffirmed public perceptions
    of him as the man who is making sure government pays pensions
    and salaries. A just-published poll supports this: though
    their ratings had been declining, they shot up to 74 and 79
    percent, respectively, after their strong performances.

    ¶10. (C) Although there is evidence that their closest
    advisors spar over specific policies and personnel matters,
    the two leaders themselves share state-run national media
    coverage (to the near-exclusion of other political figures)
    and project an aura of ease with one another in public.
    Medvedev has yet to make major changes to the senior staff he
    inherited from Putin. Putin's prominence in tackling crises
    - whether conflict with Georgia, gas supply negotiations with
    Ukraine, or localized unrest or frustration due to the
    economic crisis - earns him higher public opinion ratings and
    elite group allegiance than Medvedev. This, combined with
    his suggestions that he might stand for a third presidential
    term, all ensure that major decisions are not made without
    Putin's approval. The complete national dominance of the
    ruling United Russia party under the leadership of Putin,
    reinforced through the party's overwhelming, yet tainted
    victory in October 11 regional elections, has made it
    difficult for opposition parties to function, let alone
    capitalize on economic discontent.

    Conclusion
    ----------

    ¶11. (C) In sum, your visit comes at a promising moment--both
    our bilateral relations and our economies are beginning to
    move in a more positive direction, but challenges remain. We
    encourage you to use your meetings with key Russian
    governmental and private interlocutors, as well as with the
    American business community, to push for continued dialogue
    leading to concrete positive action. We want Russia to
    integrate into the global economy, to join the WTO, to
    diversify its productive base and to move forward in the
    fight against corruption and we stand ready to work with
    Russia on these issues. Your meetings with Medvedev's top
    economic adviser Dvorkovich and First Deputy Foreign Minister
    Denisov, in particular, are a chance to move beyond improved
    atmospherics and examine in greater depth how we can support
    the best of Medvedev's modernization goals--e.g., greater
    energy efficiency--in ways that pay dividends to both
    economies and broaden the economic base of the relationship.

    Beyrle

`