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### Viewing cable 04THEHAGUE3333, TURKEY ACCESSION/EU: THE MYSTERIOUS CASE OF THE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
04THEHAGUE3333 | 2004-12-23 15:03 | 2011-01-26 17:05 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003333

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2014
    TAGS: PREL NL TU CY EUN INRB
    SUBJECT: TURKEY ACCESSION/EU: THE MYSTERIOUS CASE OF THE
    MISSING DECLARATION

    Classified By: Political Couns...

    24576

    2004-12-23

    04THEHAGUE3333

    Embassy The Hague

    CONFIDENTIAL

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003333

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2014
    TAGS: PREL NL TU CY EUN INRB
    SUBJECT: TURKEY ACCESSION/EU: THE MYSTERIOUS CASE OF THE
    MISSING DECLARATION

    Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b) a
    nd (d).

    ¶1. SUMMARY: (C) According to Dutch diplomat Pieter de
    Gooijer, the intense Dutch-led negotiations leading to the EU
    Council's invitation to Turkey for accession talks were one
    for the history books. In a recent conversation with DCM
    and Poloff, he provided the inside story of the last hours
    of the talks in Brussels, which he witnessed first hand. De
    Gooijer claimed three events were especially critical in
    bringing about a positive decision: President Chirac's
    seigniorial push to Cypriot President Papadopoulos; PM Blair
    fetching Turkish PM Erdogan back from his hotel before he
    could hold a fatal fatal press conference; and Dutch
    finessing of the Council Conclusions text that welcomed and
    quoted a Turkish declaration on the Ankara Agreement that
    never really existed. END SUMMARY

    ¶2. (C) Pieter de Gooijer (MFA European Integration director
    and main working negotiator for the Presidency) related the
    inside story of the final Turkey accession negotiations to
    DCM and Poloff on the margins of a reception hosted by the
    DCM on December 20. De Gooijer was at the center of Council
    negotiations with PM Balkenende and FM Bot, starting
    Thursday, December 16. Looking back, de Gooijer said, PM
    Balkenende was still angry on the following Monday about how
    the Turkish delegation treated him last week and how Erdogan
    behaved after the fact back home. De Gooijer, a veteran of
    Turkish postings (as is FM Bot), said Balkenende had missed
    the back slapping and bear hugs that marked the elated
    reactions of Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. I had to remind
    him, as I had done all during the negotiations themselves,
    that the Turks came to this like a negotiation for a rug in
    the bazaar. If things had run in a straight line, they would
    have suspected they could have gotten a better deal. By the
    same token, he added, bazaar psychology dictated that PM
    Erdogan appear dissatisfied with the result after the fact as
    well.

    ¶3. (C) At the beginning on Thursday, December 16, De
    Gooijer said that the Netherlands Presidency delegation met
    the Turks around 4:30 pm, where the Dutch told them they had
    to do something on Cyprus. There was an immediate and
    negative Turkish reaction to signing anything, he recalled.
    With this in mind and while the heads of state were
    sequestered at dinner, de Gooijer said he proposed that
    Turkey could initial the protocol to the Ankara Agreement.
    Initialing is not as final as signing, he had postulated.
    It was a way for Turkey to acknowledge that this was where
    the Cyprus issue stood, that they could accept the text ad
    ref. Following this plan, the Dutch had circulated an
    Annex to the Council Conclusions paragraph 19 (which
    referred to Turkey's signing the protocol of Ankara
    Agreement) that acknowledged the initialing by the
    Commission and Turkey of the Protocol. (Council document SN
    220/04). Difficult talks between the Balkenende, FM Bot,
    Erdogan and FM Gul ensued, with the Turks eventually
    rejecting initialing as too much like signing. They never
    appreciated the subtle, negotiator's distinction between the
    two, de Gooijer said.

    ¶4. (C) The Annex was withdrawn on Friday morning, December
    ¶17. The Dutch fell back to a proposal that Turkey could make
    a declaration of intent to sign the Protocol prior to the
    actual start of accession negotiations. The Secretariat
    published this as a revision to Council Decision paragraph 19
    (Council Document SN 208/04). They got Turkish approval of
    the concept in principal and then turned to sell it to
    Cyprus. De Gooijer recalled a small meeting among President
    Chirac, Chancellor Schroeder, PM Blair, Commission President
    Barroso, and PM Balkenende with President Papadopoulos; the
    full Council was meeting in a nearby room. Both PM Blair and
    Chancellor Schroeder had made clear their intent to leave
    Brussels around 1:30 pm, due to pressing business elsewhere
    in Europe. With time slipping away for a deal, Papadopoulos
    balked at a mere declaration. Finally, de Gooijer recalled,
    President Chirac said, Tassos, look. Tony, Gerhard and I
    all think this is a good solution. We have not much time. I
    know you will agree. Chirac reportedly then stood up and
    reached out for Papadopoulos, saying, Now let us go into the
    meeting. And with that, de Gooijer said, Chirac shepherded
    a slightly stunned Papadopoulos back to the Council
    meeting. That is how the EU works in the end, de Gooijer
    said, with the big countries ganging up on a small hold
    out.

    ¶5. (C) The Dutch still needed Turkey's formal acquiescence
    on the Declaration. De Gooijer said the Turks were
    quibbling over words down to individual letters in the
    Conclusions text. Worse, they refused to make the formal
    declaration as foreseen in the text of Paragraph 19, which
    welcomed it and supposedly quoted from it. By this time,
    Erdogan had apparently abandoned the negotiations and was
    heading back to the Conrad Hotel for an already scheduled 2
    p.m. news conference. Balkenende called PM Blair, de Gooijer
    said, and asked him to help. Blair volunteered to get in his
    car and go after Erdogan; some time later, both men returned
    to the Council building for the final round.

    ¶6. (C) At this point, de Gooijer said he proposed that
    Erdogan, Balkenende, and Barroso sign the page from the newly
    issued draft Conclusions on which the revised Paragraph 19
    stood, as a way of acknowledging agreement to its contents
    and intent. I just tore the page from my book and drew
    three lines at the bottom of it, de Gooijer recalled.
    Erdogan refused to sign, as did Gul. De Gooijer said that he
    then pointed out that someone from the political level
    would have to accept Paragraph 19 in such a way that the rest
    of the Council, especially Cyprus, would be satisfied that
    Turkey agreed to sign the Protocol before October 3.
    Finally, Erdogan instructed his State Secretary to sign on
    behalf of Turkey; State Secretary Arzo Nicolai signed for the
    Dutch, and Commissioner Rehn signed for the Commission; this
    paper was then copied and circulated to the Council, de
    Gooijer said. With this, the men returned to the Council,
    where representatives of the other three candidate states
    joined the 25 EU Member States for a final session and the
    traditional family photograph.

    ¶7. (C) As an addendum, a Council staffer who was note-taking
    for the final session told USEU PolOff that things still
    remained tense even after the agreement was reached. In the
    final formal Council session, the EU-25, at the request of
    Greece, had amended para 20 of the Conclusions (referring to
    resolution of border disputes) so that it referred to Member
    States (plural) vice Member State. When the four
    candidates joined the 25 for champagne toasts, after
    Romanian, Bulgarian and Croatian remarks about the historic
    decisions, Erdogan took the floor. He, too, noted the
    historic nature of the day, but then offered two substantive
    comments. First, he said Turkey understood para 20 to still
    be referring to one Member State in particular. And second,
    the GoT underlined that it did not view signing of the
    Protocol to the Ankara Agreement as recognition of Cyprus.
    (NOTE: USEU's source said Council discussion had already made
    clear the EU was not going to include such a point in the
    formal Conclusions, but the Dutch had agreed with the Turks
    that, if the topic came up, Balkenende in the closing press
    conference would note that the EU did not view the Protocol
    signing as being the same as recognition.). Cypriot
    President Papadopoulos responded to Erdogan that the
    Conclusions were already agreed among the EU-25 and could not
    be rewritten post-facto. Balkenende, who USEU's source
    described as growing visibly twitchy, stepped in to say
    that all could agree that today had seen a historic
    decision, and brought the discussion to a welcome close.

    ¶8. (C) As for Turkey's Declaration? It will forever be
    missing; historians will search in vain for a paper since
    there never was one, de Gooijer said with a grin. It was
    the intent that counted. Summing up, de Gooijer said, We
    all know what Turkey has to do, preferably sooner rather than
    later and certainly not as late as October 2 (the day before
    negotiations are supposed to start). And if the Turks come
    in and quibble over the Declaration and their intent as
    reflected in Paragraph 19? The EU would not start
    negotiations, de Gooijer concluded.

    ¶9. (U) This cable was coordinated with USEU.
    SOBEL

`