Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 4872 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF ASEC AE AR AG AJ AU AFIN AM APER ABUD ATRN AORC AL AEMR AMGT ACOA AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC AS ASIG ABLD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AVERY APCS AER ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AEC AGMT
BU BR BL BO BM BA BE BH BTIO BEXP BIDEN BK BY BG BF BB BC BBSR BMGT BRUSSELS BTIU BILAT BX
CJAN CH CU CASC CVIS CMGT CO CI CLINTON CIA CG CF CN CS CAN COUNTER CDG CIS CA CBW CM CE CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CD CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CJUS CARSON COUNTERTERRORISM CACM CDB CV
DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DJ DISENGAGEMENT DS DTRA DOD DEAX
ELAB EU ECON EFIN EG ETTC EINV ENRG EI ECPS EINT EIND ETRD EPET EUN EZ EMIN EAID EAGR ET EC EAIR ECONEFIN ENVR ES ER ECA ELN EN EWWT ECIN ELTN EFIS EXTERNAL EINVETC ENIV EINN ENGR EUR ESA ENERG EK ENGY ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FJ FMLN
GM GG GH GE GV GT GR GTIP GOI GCC GAZA GZ GA GTMO
HA HILLARY HR HUMAN HO HYMPSK HU HURI HK HSTC
IR IZ IS IT INRB IRAJ IN INRA INRO IO IC IAEA ID IIP ITPHUM IV IPR IWC IQ ICTY ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC ICAO IMO IF ILC IEFIN INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF INR IRC ITALY ITALIAN INTERPOL
JO JA JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JUS JAMES
KE KTFN KDEM KNNP KJUS KGHG KZ KIPR KWBG KIRF KPAO KDRG KHLS KCRM KSCA KPAL KISL KG KN KS KACT KGIC KRAD KU KCOM KBIO KMCA KCOR KV KHDP KTIP KVPR KDEV KMDR KWMN KMPI KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KCFC KSPR KTIA KHIV KPRP KAWC KOLY KCIP KCFE KOCI KPKO KTDB KMRS KFRD KLIG KBCT KICC KGIT KSTC KUNR KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KOMC KAWK KO KTER KSUM KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFIN KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTBT KCRS KRVC KSTH KREL KIRC KNSD KPAI KHSA KR KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KGCC KPIN KNUC KPLS
LE LY LU LG LH LI LO LOG LT
MARR MOPS MU MY MASS MNUC MCAP MA MO MTCRE MG MASC MX MCC MZ ML MEPP MK MTRE MP MIL MDC MTCR MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MR MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MASSMNUC MPOS MOPPS MAPP
NATO NIPP NL NO NG NI NPT NE NS NAR NZ NU NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NGO NP NSF NATIONAL
OVIP OPRC OREP OEXC OIIP ODIP OTRA OSCE OAS OFDP OPIC OPDC OECD OPCW OSCI OIE OIC OTR OVP OFFICIALS OSAC
PGOV PINR PREL PINS PO PTER PK PHUM PARM PL PE PREF PHSA PBTS PGOF PROP PA PARMS PORG PM PMIL PTERE POL PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRGOV PNAT PROV PEL PINF PGOVE POLINT PRL PRAM PMAR PGOVLO PHUMBA POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PSOE PU POLITICAL PARTIES PBIO PECON POGOV PINL PKFK
QA
RS RU RW RP RO RIGHTS RICE ROBERT RF RFE REGION
SOCI SU SA SY SP SNAR SENV SCUL SW SF SO SR SG SMIG SL SN SHUM SZ SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI STEINBERG
TI TIP TBIO TR TX TU TC TSPA TS TRGY TH TT TW TERRORISM TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TPHY TK TNGD
UK UNSC UG US UZ UP UNO UNMIK UY UN UNGA UNESCO UE UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS UNAUS USUN USEU UV
VZ VE VT VM VTPREL VN
WA WI WMO WTRO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WEU WTO
XA XT XM XY XG XF XC XH XL XZ XW XR XD XE XS XK
YM YI YE
ZI ZP ZK ZF ZB ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU ZA ZO ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 08BEIJING1454, HU JINTAO IN CHARGE OF TIBET POLICY; LEADERSHIP

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08BEIJING1454.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08BEIJING1454 | 2008-04-16 10:10 | 2010-12-04 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing
Appears in these articles: http://www.spiegel.de

`

    VZCZCXRO9478
    OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
    DE RUEHBJ #1454/01 1071034
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 161034Z APR 08
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6606
    INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 001454

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2033
    TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KOLY CH
    SUBJECT: HU JINTAO IN CHARGE OF TIBET POLICY; LEADERSHIP
    UNIFIED, BUOYED AND CONSTRAINED BY NATIONALIST SENTIMENT

    REF: A. OSC cpp20080407530001
    ¶B. OSC cpp20080408507001
    ¶C. OSC fea20080407617427

    Classified By: Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (C) President Hu Jintao remains firmly in charge of
    China's policy on Tibet, with the leadership unified over
    Beijing's current hard-line stance and buoyed by rising PRC
    nationalist sentiment, xxxxx.
    Given Hu's background and experience in Tibet, as well as
    the "extremely sensitive" nature of the issue, no one would
    "dare" challenge Hu or the Party line, contacts say. While
    there may be differences in how various leaders publicly
    articulate China's Tibet policy, there are no substantive
    differences among the top leadership. Similarly, Embassy
    sources do not believe that two recent articles in
    Party-controlled southern newspapers signaled leadership
    debate or a review of policy, instead arguing the pieces
    perhaps reflect an adjustment in the Party's media strategy.
    The Party has been buoyed by rising nationalist sentiment,
    fueled in part by anger at the West over "biased" media
    reporting on Tibet and Olympic-related protests, but this
    nationalistic fervor also constrains future policy choices.
    Regardless, any modification of Tibet policy is unlikely in
    the short term, at least until after the Olympics, contacts
    say. End Summary.

    Hu Jintao Firmly in Charge, Leadership Unified
    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶2. (C) President Hu Jintao is firmly in charge of the PRC's
    Tibet policy, with the leadership unified over Beijing's
    current hard-line stance, several Embassy contacts told
    PolOffs over the past week. Sources argued that given Hu
    Jintao's own expertise and experience regarding Tibet (Hu was
    provincial party secretary in Tibet in the late 1980s), as
    well as the "extreme" importance and sensitivity of the Tibet
    issue, it would be virtually "impossible" for any leader to
    challenge Hu on Tibet. An issue as sensitive as Tibet policy
    would be controlled by a small group of top leaders, limited
    primarily to the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee
    (PBSC), meaning it is difficult to know precisely the content
    of leadership discussions on Tibet, longtime Embassy contact
    xxxxx.
    Nevertheless, "it is still quite clear," xxxxx argued, that Hu
    Jintao is "completely" in charge of the Tibet issue, and no
    other leader would "dare" confront Hu or the Party line over
    such a critical issue. Doing so would be "political suicide"
    and would make any leader vulnerable to charges of being
    "soft," or even being a "traitor," risking eventual removal,
    a la the ouster of former Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang
    in 1987, xxxxx averred.

    ¶3. (C) There is "absolutely no division" within the
    leadership on Tibet, xxxxx. For the
    Chinese leadership, Tibet is even more sensitive than Taiwan.
    Among the nine members of the PBSC who are controlling
    China's Tibet policy, no one has the stature or experience to
    challenge Hu, xxxxx said, noting that four are brand new
    members of the PBSC, and no one on the PBSC other than Hu has
    direct experience in Tibet. It was Hu Jintao, as then-Party
    Secretary in Tibet, who oversaw the "quick and effective

    Sipdis
    suppression" of protests there in 1987 and 1989, which earned
    him "great praise" from then-paramount leader Deng Xiaoping
    and which was an important factor in his elevation to the
    PBSC in 1992, xxxxx recalled. Thus, Hu has "great confidence"
    when it comes to Tibet, putting him in a virtually
    unassailable position. There may be room within the
    leadership for expressing differences with Hu on issues such
    as Taiwan, economic development or political reform, but not
    on Tibet, xxxxx asserted.

    Different Views Exist in Party, but No Disagreement at Top
    --------------------------------------------- -------------

    ¶4. (C) A range of contacts have acknowledged that there are
    differences of opinion within the Party and among elites
    regarding Tibet, though none believed this reflected any
    disagreement among the top leadership. For example,xxxxx acknowledged the presence of
    more "moderate" voices on Tibet within the Party, but he
    nevertheless stressed that it is Hu Jintao who is
    "completely" in charge of China's Tibet policy. Moreover, it

    Beijing 00001454 002 of 004

    is clear that those such as Hu favoring a "hard line" are
    calling the shots. (Note:xxxxx view
    that Tibet policy is more sensitive for China's leadership
    than even Taiwan, noting that despite its rhetoric, Beijing
    has de facto accepted the involvement of the United States in
    Taiwan, but China can never accept the "interference" of
    foreign powers in Tibet.)xxxxx,
    confessed that he "personally" favors a more "measured"
    approach to Tibet, to include dialogue with the Dalai Lama,
    given that "only the Dalai Lama" can unify the majority of
    the Tibetan community both within China and abroad.

    ¶5. (C) Separately, xxxxx "many elites" are advocating
    a reassessment of policy toward the Dalai Lama, questioning
    the wisdom of demonizing and refusing to negotiate with him.
    According to xxxxx however, apart from a "minority" of
    "elites" and "intellectuals," the majority of the Party
    rank-and-file, as well as "98 percent" of the public, support
    the current policy. Any serious disagreement over Tibet
    among the Party leadership is "simply unimaginable," xxxxx
    stated, a view separately shared xxxxx.

    Public Statements: Difference in Nuance, not Substance
    --------------------------------------------- ----------

    ¶6. (C) While there may be differences in how various leaders
    have publicly articulated China's Tibet policy, there are no
    substantive differences among the top leadership, contacts
    asserted. For example, xxxxx said he
    does not believe there is disagreement between President Hu
    Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao over Tibet, as some have
    speculated based on Wen's purportedly more "moderate"
    comments to UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown and his statement
    to the media in Laos on March 30 regarding the Dalai Lama.
    xxxx asserted that, on Tibet, Hu and Wen are like a
    "restaurant sugar packet," black on one side and white on the
    other, but still part of the same whole. In other words, Hu
    and Wen merely emphasize different aspects of the same
    policy. xxxxx said xxxxx"sensed" Wen may be
    "slightly more moderate" on Tibet than some other leaders,
    but he thought that represents Wen's style and does not imply
    a disagreement over official policy. xxxxx shared this view,
    attributing the Prime Minister's March 30 remarks to "Wen
    simply being Wen" and appearing more "moderate and
    reasonable" on almost every issue, even though his comments
    represented no serious departure from the official line.

    Southern Media Pieces Reflect No Division over Policy
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶7. (C) xxxxx did not think that two
    recent articles in Party-controlled southern newspapers
    signaled leadership debate or divisions, instead offering
    that the articles perhaps reflected an adjustment in the
    Party's media strategy. Both articles appeared on April 3 in
    Guangdong Provincial Party papers that have a reputation for
    pushing the limits of Central Propaganda Department (CPD)
    guidelines. The first, which appeared in a blog run by
    Southern Metropolis (Nanfang Dushibao), was critical of the
    Party's restrictions on reporting in Tibet, arguing that
    allowing foreign reporters to cover the story directly would
    provide a more accurate picture of events. The second,
    published in Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumou), argued that
    most Tibetans are not separatists and do not support or
    participate in the unrest or advocate violence, and that such
    distinctions should be made when responding to the issue.
    The article also called for talks with the Dalai Lama. (See
    refs A-C.)

    ¶8. (C) xxxxx with whom
    PolOffs met in the last week had not read or heard of either
    article, which PolOffs interpreted as a sign that the pieces
    are not terribly significant. xxxxx, explicitly made
    this point, arguing that the article in the Southern
    Metropolis did not represent anything other than the
    "pro-Western slant" of the Southern Daily Media Group and
    "liberal southern journalists." The piece would only be
    significant if more "authoritative" media outlets had picked
    it up. xxxxx, thought it represented a desire among some
    elites for a review of Tibet policy but also noted that the
    piece was criticized by many internally in the Party. xxxxx, saying that
    the articles merely reflected the "traditionally liberal"
    stances of both newspapers, which are noted for "pushing the
    envelope" ("da cabianqiu," literally "playing edge ball").

    Beijing 00001454 003 of 004

    It is too early to tell whether these pieces have crossed a
    red line, xxxxx said, noting that both papers have often
    gotten into trouble with propaganda officials in the past.

    ¶9. (C) Surprisingly, even the xxxxx had
    not read either article that appeared in his group's
    newspapers. In response to PolOff's summary of the pieces,
    he strongly doubted they carried any political significance.
    Perhaps, he said, they represent an adjustment in the Party's
    media strategy. The Southern Weekend editor-in-chief must
    have had prior approval from Party authorities to publish the
    piece, xxxxx surmised, otherwise the editor would have been
    "dismissed immediately" for publishing such a sensitive
    article on his own. With Hu Jintao himself in charge of the
    media response to Tibet, xxxxx asked rhetorically, what
    newspaper editor would dare challenge the official media
    line, even implicitly? Therefore, the article's import, xxxxx
    claimed, is that it demonstrates the "slight loosening" of
    Party propaganda guidance on Tibet coverage beginning in late
    March, which purportedly allows for the "more nuanced"
    reporting advocated in the Southern Weekend article itself.

    ¶10. (C) Similarly, xxxxx was not aware of the articles. After
    listening to PolOff's explanation of them, however, xxxxx
    commented that the pieces likely represent the fact that
    there is "room for diversity" under the Propaganda
    Department's latest guidance. (Note: Despite this supposed
    "room" for more nuanced reporting on Tibet, xxxxx
    said Tibet is "far too sensitive" and his magazine has
    therefore decided "not to touch" the story for now.xxxxx,
    reportedly have been "ordered" to produce cover stories on
    Tibet under "very strict" guidelines from the Propaganda
    Department.)

    Party Buoyed by Nationalist Sentiment...
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶11. (C) Almost all of xxxxx the Party has been
    buoyed by rising nationalist sentiment, fueled in part by
    anger at the West over "biased" media reporting on Tibet and
    Olympic-related protests.xxxxx all emphasized to
    PolOff that Chinese "anger" over the West's "bias" on Tibet
    is real, widespread and will have long-term effects. xxxxx
    them seemed themselves to be angry over Western
    media reporting, refusing to recognize the irony that for
    most Chinese, their only access to this "biased Western
    reporting" is through the official PRC press agency Xinhua's
    characterization of it. xxxxx emphasized that virtually
    "everyone" he knows is angry and believes that Western
    reporting, together with calls for boycotting the Olympic
    opening ceremony, implies support for Tibetan independence
    and makes the public feel that the West is trying to "keep
    China down." xxxxx, meanwhile, said
    nationalism is definitely surging, but he thought this
    sentiment is largely concentrated in the 25-35-year-old age
    group among both Hans and Tibetans.

    ¶12. (C) Whatever the causes of the surge in nationalism, the
    result has been a dramatic increase in support for the
    Party's policy on Tibet, contacts say. xxxxx said this outcome is partly a "natural"
    reaction to the fact that Chinese have in recent years become
    more nationalistic as a result of growing pride over China's
    rapid development, with the Tibet furor merely providing the
    most recent "spark" to inflame passions. xxxx separately acknowledged, however, that the Party's
    propaganda line has also purposefully stoked nationalistic
    feelings in order to rally the public in support of the
    Center's Tibet policy, and so far, it has been very
    successful in doing so. The recent Tibet crisis has
    "completely unified" the people behind the Party and
    Government, something that had been "unthinkable" throughout
    most of the 1980s and 1990s,xxxxx asserted.

    ...But Also Constrained by Popular Passions
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶13. (C) Although support for the Party over Tibet is
    currently quite high, popular passions also serve to
    constrain the leadership's options, xxxxx
    warned. Nationalism remains one "pillar" of Party rule, but
    central leaders do not want to let these feelings "spin out
    of control," xxxxx said. Perhaps reflecting these concerns,
    the Propaganda Department earlier this month reportedly
    directed that attacks on the Western press in China's
    official media be curtailed, according xxxxx

    Beijing 00001454 004 of 004

    xxxxx. That has not, however, stopped Chinese bloggers
    from continuing their attacks via the Internet, xxxxx
    observed.xxxxx also expressed concern about the
    long-term implications of the surge in nationalism, noting
    that "nothing is ever completely good." At any rate, there
    is "virtually no way" the Center could initiate a change in
    policy toward Tibet and the Dalai Lama, at least in the short
    term, given the popular anger over such issues, xxxxx said.

    Policy Change Unlikely in the Short Term
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶14. (C) Major policy adjustment on Tibet is highly unlikely
    for the foreseeable future for a host of reasons other than
    popular sentiment, at least until after the Olympics,
    contacts say. Given Hu's own legacy in Tibet, where he
    cracked down on similar demonstrations in 1987 and 1989, Hu
    Jintao will likely be loath to adopt a "softer" line, lest
    his own policies and past actions come under criticism,
    xxxxx argued. Moreover, it will be
    almost "impossible" for Chinese leaders to reorient policy if
    they look like they are doing so under international
    pressure, xxxxx assessed. Moreover,
    xxxxx observed, domestic stability remains the
    leadership's top priority above all else, meaning there will
    "almost surely" be no relaxation of the current hard line on
    Tibet or in places like Xinjiang. xxxxx said he sensed
    Chinese leaders worry they could lose control of Tibet if
    they do not maintain tight control there, which would have
    both domestic consequences and could invite "unwanted
    interference" from India.

    ¶15. (C) While staging a successful Olympics is also a
    priority, xxxxx said he senses the leadership has
    assessed that at a minimum, athletes will show up to the
    Games. As a result, the Center is starting to adjust public
    expectations about the Games by saying that, even if there is
    a "boycott" of the opening ceremony, that is not important,
    given that it is the IOC and respective National Olympic
    Committees, not the Chinese Government, hat decide whether
    to invite national leaders. (Note: xxxxx disagreed,
    saying that, in his view, the success of the Games for
    Chinese leaders hinges on whether President Bush attends the
    opening ceremonies.) xxxxx said
    that Hu Jintao's comments on April 12 to Australian PM Rudd
    on the margins of the Bo'ao Forum, which were reported via
    Xinhua and reflected China's hard-line stance on Tibet to
    date, signaled that domestically there is "no room for
    debate" on the Tibet issue. Only after Tibetan areas have
    "settled down" and the Olympics have concluded, will there be
    any chance for a possible review of Tibet policy, he asserted.
    Randt

`