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### Viewing cable 09SANAA1402, S/NF) PROGRESS ON US-ROYG COOPERATION TO REDUCE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09SANAA1402 | 2009-08-04 11:11 | 2010-12-03 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Sanaa

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHYN #1402/01 2161158
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 041158Z AUG 09
    FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2444
    INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0236
    RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0458
    RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1652
    RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

` `

    S E C R E T SANAA 001402

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND PM/WRA SPICO AND
    SCOSTNER

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019
    TAGS: PARM PREL PTER MASS YM
    SUBJECT: (S/NF) PROGRESS ON US-ROYG COOPERATION TO REDUCE
    MANPADS THREAT

    Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY.  On June 20-22, a PM/WRA delegation
    visited Yemen to discuss MANPADS threat reduction efforts
    with ROYG officials.  Since 2004, US-ROYG cooperation has
    dramatically reduced the availability of MANPADS on the black
    market in Yemen. Although the program has likely recovered
    the bulk of the illicit MANPADS available on the black
    market, several more will likely be collected in the coming
    years.  MOD insists that there are no official MANPADS
    stocks, and that they have already implemented necessary
    stockpile security and inventory controls, but the
    intelligence community and the National Security Bureau (NSB)
    believe that is not the case.  The USG will offer the MOD,
    through NSB interlocutors, payment for destruction of MOD
    MANPADS and stockpile security upgrades.  ROYG officials seem
    more receptive to a TSA-sponsored MANPADS Assist Visit.  END
    SUMMARY.

    BACKGROUND
    ----------

    ¶2. (S/NF) After years of uncontrolled weapons imports and the
    chaos of the 1994 civil war, MANPADS were widely available on
    the illicit arms market in Yemen, making these systems a
    critical proliferation threat.  MANPADS that leaked from
    official Yemeni stocks were used in al-Qaeda (AQ) operations
    in Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen in 2001 and 2002.  In 2003,
    the ROYG began collecting MANPADS from weapons souks
    throughout the country, and in 2004 the USG agreed to
    compensate the ROYG for the acquisition and destruction of
    these and other black market MANPADS.  In February 2005,
    US-ROYG cooperation resulted in the destruction of 1,161
    MANPADS.

    MEETINGS READOUT
    ----------------

    ¶3. (S/NF) On June 20-22, a PM/WRA delegation consisting of
    Dennis Hadrick, PM/WRA Program Manager; Santo Polizzi, DHS
    liaison; Nils Talbot, PM/WRA technical expert; and Laurie
    Freeman, PM/WRA Foreign Affairs Officer, visited Yemen to
    discuss US-ROYG cooperation to reduce the threat of MANPADS.
    The delegation began with a June 20 meeting at the NSB with
    Col. Hefed Al-Jamrah, the NSB official in charge of airport
    security in Sana'a.  Polizzi briefed Jamrah on the MANPADS
    threat to civilian aviation.  He also offered a MANPADS
    Assist Visit (MAV), in which experts from the Transportation
    Security Administration (TSA) identify airport
    vulnerabilities to MANPADS attacks and recommend ways to
    mitigate them.  Following the meeting, the delegation toured
    the current airport and the site of the new airport.  During
    the tour, several lapses in airport security practices were
    observed regarding passenger screening, cargo security, and
    Secure Identification Display Area (SIDA) badge and access
    procedures.  Polizzi recommended that the TSA Representative
    (TSAR) in Amman, Jordan be contacted for follow-on
    discussions with airport officials.  NSB officials seemed
    receptive to the MAV offer.

    ¶4. (S/NF) On June 21, the delegation met with NSB Deputy
    Director Ammar Saleh to discuss ongoing efforts to acquire
    MANPADS from the black market in Yemen.  Since the program's
    inception in August 2004, this program had resulted in the
    destruction of 1,161 black market MANPADS in 2005.  Hadrick
    thanked the ROYG for its efforts, expressed the USG's
    continued interest in supporting the program, and pressed the
    ROYG to destroy an additional 102 MANPADS they had collected
    since 2005.

    ¶5. (S/NF) Ammar Saleh agreed with USG assessments that the
    majority of black market MANPADS had been collected in Yemen,
    and said that a few more might trickle in with the increase
    in price.  (Note: In July 2008, the price for first
    generation systems was increased from $7,700 to $15,000. End
    Note.)  The small quantity of illicit MANPADS that still
    exist outside of state control in Yemen are in the hands of
    tribal leaders or AQAP, neither of which is likely to part
    with them at any price.  He could not estimate how many
    MANPADS Yemeni tribal leaders possess, but he believes that
    AQAP has six MANPADS (NFI).  Finally, he expressed skepticism
    that the MOD would accept U.S. assistance to destroy its

    official MANPADS stocks (an offer on the table since 2005).
    He believes MOD would want a more modern air defense system
    in return, not cash payment or stockpile security upgrades.
    He offered to attempt to broker a cash-for-destruction deal.

    ¶6. (S/NF) Accompanied by NSB official Akram al-Qassmi, the
    delegation visited a warehouse to view 96 MANPADS collected
    between 2005 and May 2009 that were awaiting destruction.
    (Note: These systems had already been verified by U.S.
    personnel and disabled. End Note.)  The delegation verified
    an additional six SA-7s, four SA-7 gripstocks, and six
    batteries collected by the NSB since May 2009.  The
    delegation disabled the six MANPADS and expended the six
    batteries.

    ¶7. (S/NF) On their last day, June 22, the delegation
    accompanied the Ambassador to a meeting with Minister of
    Defense Mohammed Nasser Ahmed.  Ahmed denied that the MOD has
    any MANPADS in its official stocks, saying that they had
    already been handed over to NSB and destroyed.  (Note: This
    is in direct contradiction to NSB,s June 21 assertion that
    the MOD had excess stocks of MANPADS, but would part with
    them only in exchange for a more modern air defense system.
    End Note.) The Minister described the MOD's progress on SA/LW
    issues since S/E Bloomfield's July 2008 visit.  He noted that
    more than 250 weapons souks had been closed and more than 140
    weapons dealers prosecuted.  Furthermore, he remarked that
    the MOD has established an inventory system for all Armed
    Forces and MOD weapons, all of which are now marked.  He
    invited U.S. officials to visit the warehouses to see how the
    system works.  Finally, the Minister shared the delegation,s
    concerns about the airport,s MANPADS vulnerability, and said
    that as a member of the Supreme Security Committee, he would
    support a MAV.

    NEXT STEPS
    ----------

    ¶8. (S/NF) Post worked with NSB to ensure that all 102
    collected MANPADS were destroyed on July 27 (septel).  Post
    has requested a meeting with the MOD Chief of Staff to
    observe the stockpile security and inventory control system
    reportedly in place.  Post will follow up with NSB to find
    out whether it will accept a MAV and, if so, identify
    possible dates for the assessment.  (Note: Despite
    ministerial-level support, the final decision on the MAV will
    be made by President Saleh.  End Note.)  Finally, Post will
    work with the Department to present a specific offer to the
    Yemeni government for assistance with physical security and
    stockpile management (PSSM) and destruction and marking of
    Yemeni SA/LW.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶9. (S/NF) It is hard to know what to believe regarding the
    presence or absence of MOD MANPADS.  In a subsequent meeting
    on June 27, XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOffs that the MOD does indeed have
    MANPADS, but would never speak of them because they are
    considered a state secret.  While MOD realizes their MANPADS
    are of little military value, they consider them better than
    nothing and would turn them over for destruction only if they
    were able to get a modern air defense system in return,
    according to XXXXXXXXXXXX.  PolOffs agreed to continue negotiating
    the destruction of MOD MANPADS through NSB interlocutors,
    since the MOD appears unwilling to discuss the issue with USG
    officials directly.  END COMMENT.
    SECHE

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