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### Viewing cable 09PARIS1767, DIVERGENCES WITH FRANCE ON UPCOMING POLITICAL

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09PARIS1767 | 2009-12-31 12:12 | 2010-12-23 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Paris

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    VZCZCXRO8927
    PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
    DE RUEHFR #1767/01 3651233
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 311233Z DEC 09
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7986
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0932
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001767

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    FOR SECRETARY CLINTON FROM AMBASSADOR RIVKIN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PARM FR
    SUBJECT: DIVERGENCES WITH FRANCE ON UPCOMING POLITICAL
    ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON WAY FORWARD

    Classified By: Ambassador Charles Rivkin, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

    ¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Our current relationship
    with France is so profoundly healthy that conventional wisdom
    now asserts that there are no significant differences in the
    foreign policies of our two countries. While it is true that
    the relationship is at a historical peak, it is not the case
    that our objectives and approaches are identical on all major
    issues. Upcoming events in 2010 will bring to the forefront
    some foreign-policy divergences in our relationship with
    France -- primarily in our approaches to multilateral issues
    like arms control, European security, and the Middle East.
    These differences will present challenges, and they risk
    causing last-minute ripples in our bilateral relationship if
    not addressed early in our planning. Some issues are being
    driven by outside deadlines, such as the upcoming May 2010
    NPT RevCon, the global nuclear security summit, and the
    Lisbon NATO summit next fall. Afghanistan, which is
    addressed in other reporting, may also fall into this
    category, since a French decision on further contributions
    will be contingent in part on the outcome of the January
    conference in London. Other divergences come from tactical
    differences towards shared objectives (in particular the
    French President's predilection for proposing high-level
    summits on everything from Middle East peace to European
    security). The most difficult to manage will be those issues
    that Paris believes could potentially impact core French
    values, such as their policy of nuclear deterrence. In such
    cases, the French will show the least flexibility. END
    SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

    --------------------------------------------- -
    NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT
    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶2. (C/NF) BACKGROUND: The U.S. and France are in substantial
    agreement on our goals for the May 2010 Non-Proliferation
    Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon). However, these issues
    will also present some of our biggest challenges. France can
    act -- and has -- as a "force multiplier" for the United
    States with more passive European partners on
    non-proliferation issues from Iran to supporting UN
    counter-proliferation capacity-building efforts. However,
    the approach of the NPT RevCon poses a concrete deadline for
    the United States and France to address our ongoing
    differences on nuclear disarmament. France argues that a
    U.S. focus on disarmament at the RevCon would open the door
    for non-aligned nations to make the conference a referendum
    on actual disarmament progress by the P3. These nations
    would thus make signing on to further concrete
    non-proliferation commitments contingent upon further
    disarmament by the United States, or more worrying from
    Paris' perspective, comparable disarmament or transparency
    efforts by France. As France has already made significant
    disarmament efforts and has a markedly smaller nuclear
    arsenal than the United States, French officials tell us
    additional cuts would negatively impact France's nuclear
    deterrent capabilities. Therefore, France wants to focus as
    much as possible on non-proliferation at the NPT RevCon and,
    ideally, avoid any significant discussion of disarmament.

    -POTENTIAL FOR FRENCH FLEXIBILITY: Low on policy, but medium
    on tactics. The GOF position on disarmament reflects France's
    national obsession with its nuclear deterrent. French
    officials do not hesitate to describe their commitment to
    maintaining their independent deterrent as "psychological."
    This applies not only to the capability itself, but to the
    concept of a deterrent. The French frequently express their
    concern that U.S. calls for a "world free of nuclear weapons"
    serve to delegitimize nuclear weapons as an element of
    strategy. However, the French understand the United States
    is also committed to maintaining a nuclear deterrent force
    for as long as necessary. While the French can probably
    adjust to our differences on ultimate disarmament objectives,
    they are more worried by the arguments we might make to
    achieve our shared non-proliferation goals at the RevCon.
    French officials have explicitly threatened to "stonewall" or
    "put (the United States) on the spot" if they feel their
    disarmament red-lines are jeopardized by U.S. statements.

    -WAY FORWARD: To maximize cooperation and minimize the risk
    of French obstructionism in P5 negotiations or at the RevCon
    itself, it may be worth again making clear our "rhetorical
    red-lines" as well as our policy red-lines. If it is vital
    to our RevCon strategy to highlight our objective of a "world
    free of nuclear weapons," to stress the link between P5

    PARIS 00001767 002 OF 004

    disarmament and stricter non-proliferation measures under the
    NPT, or to call on other nuclear weapons states to make
    further disarmament efforts, we should make this very clear
    in advance to the French. The French will not like it, but
    advance notice may at least prevent a last minute
    overreaction that could threaten P3 unity on our shared goals
    for the RevCon.

    -DEADLINE: Soon. The RevCon is scheduled for May 2010.
    Reaching a modus vivendi with France on disarmament tactics
    at the RevCon is critical to ensure the success of ongoing P5
    consultations and outreach to Non-Aligned Movement nations.

    --------------------------------------------- -
    MIDDLE EAST PEACE
    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶3. (C/NF) BACKGROUND: France, including President Sarkozy
    himself, wants to be a serious player in Middle East peace,
    and French officials are continually frustrated by a
    perceived lack of progress on an issue that impacts French
    national interests and world standing. Sarkozy's keen
    interest is also evident in his re-balancing of France's role
    by building close ties to Israel and in his attempts to
    marginalize entrenched Middle East experts (in the MFA and
    elsewhere) who do not respond to his calls for new, active
    policy directions. Sarkozy is prepared to support U.S.
    efforts, but he has latched onto the idea of a Middle East
    summit as a way of jump-starting the process. To add
    legitimacy to his initiative, he tried to partner with Egypt,
    as co-president of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), but
    he is not wedded to any particular format. For example,
    French MFA contacts are starting to float ideas of a smaller
    summit, headed by the quartet or other grouping, to achieve
    the same result, and France has reportedly squared this
    initiative with Russian desires, sanctioned by the UN
    Security Council, to host a conference.

    -POTENTIAL FOR FRENCH FLEXIBILITY: High, but at a cost.
    Since U.S. participation in any summit would be a basic
    requirement, France has little room for maneuver without the
    USG's blessing. However, given Sarkozy's personal interest,
    continued U.S. reluctance may become a growing irritant to
    the GOF.

    -WAY FORWARD: Our current strategy for responding to French
    inquiries is to note the conditions-based requirement for a
    successful dialogue. If the USG does not believe the timing
    is currently right for a summit meeting, we may find it
    helpful to provide a more definitive frame of reference to
    our French interlocutors as to the potential timeline or
    specific conditions-based requirements for a summit. As long
    as Sarkozy remains hopeful that a summit could be possible,
    anything less specific is unlikely to dampen his enthusiasm
    or efforts and contribute to raised expectations that could
    harm our effort.

    -DEADLINE: Ongoing. Sarkozy will continue to seek
    opportunities to present his ideas to us and to others,
    particularly in the context of other international
    summit-level meetings.

    --------------------------------------------- --
    EUROPEAN SECURITY
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶4. (C/NF) BACKGROUND: France has been pushing for a
    high-level discussion on European security ever since
    President Sarkozy surprised allies in October 2008 by
    publicly proposing a summit to address the Medvedev proposal
    for a new treaty covering European security architecture.
    The French goal is two-fold: to engage Russia and to break
    the logjam on intractable issues like the Conventional Forces
    in Europe (CFE) treaty. While we succeeded this June in
    anchoring this discussion in the OSCE Corfu Process, divisive
    Russian tactics and high-level French impatience are likely
    to keep this issue simmering in the foreseeable future. The
    impetus in Paris comes from the highest level; it is
    President Sarkozy himself who believes that any non-response
    by the allies to Russian proposals leaves the ball in our
    court. French officials admit they were "surprised" by the
    draft text that Russia is now circulating, but continue to
    stress that a response by allies is required. Further,
    Sarkozy is reportedly very impatient with the slow Corfu
    process and is already tasking his staff to come up with
    alternate proposals to make progress -- including following

    PARIS 00001767 003 OF 004

    up on his original idea for an OSCE summit in 2010. GOF
    officials fear that without a concrete deadline/goal, the
    Corfu process will simply lose momentum and we will have a
    "lost year" in 2010. All indications are that there is
    nothing Sarkozy abhors more than what he perceives to be a
    vacuum. On CFE, French officials are becoming increasingly
    vocal that we need to re-engage on next steps once START
    negotiations are complete and have evidenced a willingness to
    de-link CFE from Russia's fulfillment of its Istanbul
    commitments. Further, MFA Strategic Affairs Director Patrick
    Maisonnave recently said that Paris supports including the
    human dimension in our broader security discussions, but that
    it should not be used to halt progress entirely. "Human
    rights is not at the heart of the question of security,"
    Maisonnave stated. Post understands from Presidency contacts
    that Paris is preparing a non-paper to argue once again that
    the deadline of a summit will add the necessary stimulus for
    progress on issues from CFE to Nagorno-Karabakh.

    -POTENTIAL FRENCH FLEXIBILITY: Medium. Strong USG and
    allied opposition to French support for a summit may not make
    the idea go away, but could encourage the French to morph
    their plans for engagement into something more acceptable.

    -WAY FORWARD: To maximize the chances for constructive
    cooperation, post recommends beginning a regular dialogue
    with the French on these over-arching issues of European
    security, using the "2 plus 2" political-military discussions
    currently scheduled for January 20 in Washington as a good
    step. German influence and actions can also play a big role
    in channeling French activity, so additional follow-up in a
    Quad format may be worth considering. Finally, we may want
    to think about taking a page from the French handbook and
    suggest an alternative proposal that may include a deadline
    for progress -- this could be a lower-level conference,
    formation of a working group, or other event. This could
    give Paris the target it claims is currently lacking, channel
    some of the French energy and allow us to selectively move
    forward on the issues that we deem sufficiently ripe, without
    forcing a broader preliminary discussion at the highest
    level.

    -DEADLINE: Ongoing. We can expect this to be a continuing
    discussion in 2010 given the enduring interest by the French
    President, even if few allies are on board.

    --------------------------------------------- --
    MISSILE DEFENSE
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶5. (C/NF) BACKGROUND: Thus far, France has taken pains to
    be supportive of U.S. missile defense efforts in Europe,
    including agreeing to positive language for the declaration
    at the 2009 NATO summit in Strasbourg and in the communique
    issued at the December NATO ministerial meeting. However,
    French officials have warned us that the "devil is in the
    details," and we will be hard-pressed to get agreement at the
    2010 NATO summit in Lisbon in the absence of a clearer idea
    of what the U.S. is proposing, and more specifically, what we
    expect NATO common funding to pay. Maisonnave has noted to
    us that it is still unclear how our "Phased Adaptive
    Approach" (PAA) will interact with NATO's Active Layered
    Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) and what
    modifications and concomitant costs may be required. Even
    more fundamental to French interests is the impact of missile
    defense on France's nuclear deterrent capability. The impact
    of MD on the French deterrent could be simple cause and
    effect -- if other countries develop more strategic missiles
    due to NATO implementation of a MD system it could call into
    question French deterrent capabilities. However, potential
    MD disagreements can also run deeper, such as when France
    recently balked at calling missile defense a "mission of
    NATO" in the December ministerial communique, which to French
    ears called into question the core purpose of NATO and had
    potential implications on French deterrence policy. French
    officials concede that MD could complement their deterrent,
    but emphasize that it can never become a substitute for this
    core element of French defense.

    -POTENTIAL FRENCH FLEXIBILITY: High. GOF officials are
    blunt in stating that French reluctance is tied to financing
    rather than political will, and in an era of financial
    constraints and growing public deficits, the financial
    question is not a negligible one. However, France is fully
    prepared to work with us on missile defense as long as we are
    cognizant of their nuclear deterrence red-lines and consult

    PARIS 00001767 004 OF 004

    fully on costs and technical parameters of our proposed
    system.

    -WAY FORWARD: The sooner we are able to share more concrete
    information with the French and our other NATO partners, the
    more time we will have to make our case for why territorial
    missile defense is essential to NATO and how we can make PAA
    work with ALTBMD to implement it. The French hope that early
    in the new year we will be able to provide more technical
    information about what the United States envisions so that
    discussions can begin in earnest about what Allies will be
    expected to pay for or to contribute.

    -DEADLINE: The first half of 2010. The more we can do to
    provide early and concrete information, the less likely we
    are to have any disagreements in the run up to the Lisbon
    NATO summit in November 2010.
    RIVKIN

`