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### Viewing cable 08MANAGUA573, THE ORTEGA ADMINISTRATION AT 15 MONTHS: SLIPPING

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08MANAGUA573 | 2008-05-08 17:05 | 2010-12-06 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Managua

`

    VZCZCXRO8820
    PP RUEHLMC RUEHROV
    DE RUEHMU #0573/01 1291738
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 081738Z MAY 08
    FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2569
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 1891
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1254
    RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0241
    RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0132
    RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//J2/J3/J5// PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 MANAGUA 000573

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR WHA/CEN AND INR/IAA
    DEPT PASS TO USAID/LAC - CARDENAS AND BATLLE
    DEPT PASS TO USOAS
    ROME FOR VATICAN CITY
    NSC FOR FISK AND ALVARADO
    SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2018
    TAGS: PGOV EAID ECON PTER PREL NU
    SUBJECT: THE ORTEGA ADMINISTRATION AT 15 MONTHS: SLIPPING
    DOWNHILL

    REF: A. MANAGUA 520
    ¶B. MANAGUA 500
    ¶C. MANAGUA 443
    ¶D. MANAGUA 340
    ¶E. MANAGUA 325
    ¶F. MANAGUA 289
    ¶G. MANAGUA 263
    ¶H. MANAGUA 130
    ¶I. 2007 MANAGUA 2135
    ¶J. 2007 MANAGUA 1730
    ¶K. 2007 MANAGUA 964
    ¶L. 2006 MANAGUA 2611

    Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli for reasons 1.4 b & d.

    ¶1. (S/NF) Summary and Background: Fifteen months into his
    second administration, Ortega continues to skillfully use his
    political pact with former President and convicted felon,
    Arnoldo Aleman to keep pro-democracy forces divided,
    vulnerable to coercion, and unable to mount sustained
    opposition. Ortega continues to allow U.S. and other donor
    assistance programs to operate, though he regularly attacks
    the evils of "savage capitalist imperialism." Our
    cooperation with the Police and Military remains good, both
    for training and in fighting narcotics and other forms of
    trafficking--but Ortega continues his quest to bring both
    institutions under his direct control. Ortega's has
    strengthened ties with Iran and Venezuela, and become openly
    sympathetic to the FARC. Our access to the government has
    decreased dramatically, with even routine items requiring
    Ambassadorial intervention. Civil Society and the media are
    under attack. Elections on the Atlantic Coast remain
    suspended. Underlying the political and policy turmoil,
    Nicaragua's economic indicators are not encouraging. This
    message provides an assessment of some of the trends we
    observe from Ortega and his government after fifteen months.
    End Summary.

    Ortega's Faltering Economy
    - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶2. (SBU) In 2007, the Ortega Administration coasted on the
    achievements of the Bolanos government, but that ride is
    about to end. The government essentially adopted Bolanos'
    2007 and 2008 budgets, and used them as the basis for
    negotiating a new Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
    Agreement with the IMF. Foreign investment remained stable
    in 2007 thanks to commitments made during the Bolanos years.
    Exports are up this year by 21% over 2007 levels. In most
    other respects, however, the Ortega government is not faring
    well. Growth expectations have fallen while inflation
    expectations have risen. In 2007, inflation reached 17% and
    annualized inflation is running at 22% for 2008, the second
    highest rate in Latin America. The lack of a strong policy
    response to rising oil and food prices worries independent
    economists, some of whom suspect that hidden foreign
    assistance from Hugo Chavez has created excess liquidity.
    Minimum wages rose 30% in the last year, but still do not
    cover the soaring cost of food and transportation. To quell
    demand and keep prices down, the government removed import
    tariffs on basic food items through December 2008, made
    documenting export shipments more difficult, and instructed
    the state-owned grain storage company to intervene in local
    markets. So far in 2008, the Agricultural Ministry has
    failed to deliver needed seeds to farmers in time for
    planting, although it has become aware of the urgency need to
    do so. More radical measures related to food supply may be
    coming, as President Ortega has just concluded a regional

    MANAGUA 00000573 002 OF 008

    "food sovereignty" summit in Managua on May 7. In other
    areas, line ministries continue to fall short of spending
    targets, leaving needed infrastructure and other capital
    projects on the drawing board and causing the construction
    sector to suffer. Tourism and power sectors, both key to
    national economic development plans, limp along as the result
    of government mismanagement. While the economic slowdown in
    the United States, Nicaragua's largest export market and
    source of investment, has attracted political rhetoric, the
    government has no clear policy response. The Central Bank
    has lowered its expectations for economic growth in 2008 to
    3.8% from 4.5% in January, but most economists believe that
    the figure will be closer to 3.0%.

    Manipulating Economics for Political Ends: CENIs
    - - - - - - -

    ¶3. (C) In December 2006, we identified several key
    indicators (REF L) that would guide our assessment of how
    well Ortega was fulfilling his campaign promises to the
    Nicaraguan people, including adherence to fiscally
    responsible, sound macroeconomic, free market policies.
    Fifteen months later the results are disturbing. On April
    15, the government failed to pay on a set of government bonds
    (CENIs) that it has issued to compensate healthy banks for
    absorbing the assets and liabilities of insolvent banks at
    the beginning of the decade (REF C) . The bond issue was
    originally politicized in 2006 by Arnoldo Aleman, but
    resurrected by President Ortega to investigate the leading
    opposition figure, Eduardo Montealegre, who is running for
    Managua Mayor against the FSLN candidate, former three-time
    world champion boxer, Alexis Arguello. Nonpayment on the
    bonds may damage Nicaragua's relationship with the IMF and
    other international financial institutions, and already
    caused credit rating agencies to put two Nicaraguan banks on
    a ratings watch. As a consequence, since April 15, the
    government has been unable sell public debt instruments--no
    one is buying. Nevertheless, key government officials are
    seemingly convinced that they can navigate this slippery
    slope to their political advantage, much as they did when
    they deployed Sandinista judges and government institutions
    to force ExxonMobil to buy Venezuelan oil.

    (C) U.S. Citizen Property Claims ) A meltdown in the works?
    - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶4. (C) Another of the vital markers we identified in 2006
    was government progress on resolving outstanding U.S. citizen
    property claims (REF L). Here again the trend is worrisome.
    As of May 1, 2008, the Ortega Administration had resolved
    just 12 Embassy-registered claims for the 2007-2008 waiver
    year; significantly fewer than the 86 resolved during the
    last full year of the Bolanos Administration. We have
    continued to press for the resolution of the remaining 657
    U.S. citizen claims, which include some of the most difficult
    and complex. Our efforts have been frustrated by the decided
    lack of cooperation on the part of the government. The
    Property Superintendent limits her agency's contact with
    Embassy staff to just one meeting per month and no longer
    allows Embassy staff to accompany U.S. claimants to
    individual meetings with the government. The Attorney
    General requires that all communications on property be
    directed to him via Ambassadorial letter. In the meantime,
    the Attorney General has administratively dismissed 54 U.S.
    citizen claims; then categorized them as having been
    "resolved." He recently passed to us a list of an additional
    88 claims that he dismissed because the claimants were
    somehow connected to the Somoza regime. If the situation

    MANAGUA 00000573 003 OF 008

    fails to improve, we may need to consider implementation of
    Section 527 sanctions. While implementing Section 527
    sanctions would conflict with the January 2007 Deputies
    Committee-approved strategy of "positive engagement" with the
    Ortega Administration, we fear that taking no action would
    undercut the credibility of Section 527 as a tool to pressure
    action on outstanding claims. For this reason, we suggest as
    third way, such as a letter from the Secretary putting the
    government on notice.

    (C) Security Forces: Still Independent, for the time being
    - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶5. (C/NF) The security forces continue to be a bright spot.
    The Nicaraguan Army and the Nicaraguan National Police (NNP)
    remain two of the few independent, apolitical forces in
    Nicaragua despite the Ortega Administration's clear goal of
    reverting both the NNP and the Nicaraguan Army back into
    completely subsidiary organs of the Sandinista Front, as they
    once were during the days of the Sandinista Revolution (REF
    G). The continued institutional independence and
    professionalism of the NNP and the Nicaraguan Army has been
    one of the few positive indicators remaining under Ortega's
    increasingly authoritarian regime and has been the foundation
    of our strongest remaining areas of cooperation with the
    current administration. However, Ortega's continued attacks
    against the NNP, in general, and against popular NNP Chief
    Aminta Granera, in particular, have taken their toll. Most
    notably, since Ortega's dismissal of several high-level NNP
    officials in March 2008 (REF F), Granera has shied away from
    the public spotlight and avoided even the appearance of
    acting against Ortega's interests. The NNP's failure to
    intervene in the violent protests that recently erupted in
    the RAAN have cost both the organization, and Granera
    herself, credibility in the eyes of the Nicaraguan public and
    is a clear indication of Ortega's success in his drive to
    reassert personal control over the organization (REF A). A
    recent spike in crime rates has further damaged the NNP's
    image, especially a worrisome increase in brazen,
    foreigner-targeted crimes. Granera's long term prospects as
    police chief are uncertain at best. If the FSLN does well in
    November's municipal elections, most observers of the NNP
    believe that Granera will retire and make way for her current
    second in command, Carlos Palacios. Palacios is an Ortega
    loyalist who has alleged, albeit unproven, ties to organized
    crime and corruption in Nicaragua. Despite this, we believe
    that he will still be a cooperative, if difficult, partner to
    work with on future law enforcement assistance efforts.

    ¶6. (S/NF) One of Ortega's first efforts in 2007 was an
    attempt to bring the military under his direct control.
    After the National Assembly forced him to abandon two
    separate candidates for Defense Minister, he chose to leave
    the top two seats at Defense vacant and bestow the "rank of
    minister" on a weak, but personally loyal Secretary General
    with no relevant experience. The Ministry has since been
    purged of all professional-level technocrats, with all key
    positions now staffed by FSLN ideologues. The
    marginalization of the Defense Ministry has allowed the
    uniformed military to largely retain its professional and
    apolitical stance, but has left no civilian buffer between
    Ortega and Chief of Defense General Omar Halleslevens. Thus
    far, the popularity and sheer personality of Halleslevens, as
    well as the personal relationship between the General and the
    President, have prevented Ortega from asserting direct
    control. However, beginning last July, Ortega has used his
    speeches at all military events and venues as a platform to
    attack the U.S. and our "interventionist policies." On

    MANAGUA 00000573 004 OF 008

    multiple occasions Ortega has singled out U.S. military
    personnel in attendance to receive his verbal lashings.
    Halleslevens has been careful to avoid public disputes with
    Ortega, but has also repeatedly and firmly asserted the
    military's apolitical stance and its obligation to defend the
    Constitution, not a particular political party. We have not
    observed the political interference in military promotions
    and assignments that we have witnessed with the National
    Police. In fact, most military observers believe that
    Halleslevens will complete his full term through 2010, though
    they predict Ortega will move to install a more malleable
    figure to replace him. This appears to be borne out by
    recent sensitive reporting.

    (S) Ortega Foreign Policy: Petulant Teen or Axis of Evil
    Wannabe?
    - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶7. (S/NF) As expected, Ortega's foreign policy shifted
    substantially to the left after January 2007 (REF L).
    Despite Ortega's early and reassuring move to name moderate
    Sandinista Samuel Santos as foreign minister, over the last
    fifteen months Ortega's infatuation with Venezuela and Iran,
    and the promotion of the ardent U.S.-hater Miguel d'Escoto
    for UNGA president (REF B), would indicate that Ortega's
    guiding principle in foreign relations seems to be, "Will
    this annoy the U.S.?" Over time, Santos and the ministry
    have played an increasingly ceremonial role. Routine tasks
    normally be handled at the working-level require
    Ambassadorial advocacy and, despite Santos's assurances to
    the contrary, almost never seem to gain traction. Recently,
    we were advised that Ortega sought a meeting with Embassy TDY
    visitors. We found the Ministry had no knowledge of the
    meeting nor the means to obtain any details. We were only
    able to confirm the details after sending an email directly
    to First Lady Rosario Murillo. We agree with our diplomatic
    circuit colleagues that the Ministry has virtually ceased to
    function.

    ¶8. (S/NF) Chavez "Mini-Me": With respect to Venezuela,
    Ortega is a willing follower of Chavez who has replaced
    Castro as Ortega's mentor. Initially the relationship seemed
    largely a mutual admiration society with Chavez slow to send
    assistance; however, the ALBA alliance has finally begun to
    produce monetary benefit for Ortega and the FSLN. We have
    first-hand reports that GON officials receive suitcases full
    of cash from Venezuelan officials during official trips to
    Caracas. We also believe that Ortega's retreat last year
    from his demand that the Citizens Power Councils (CPCs) be
    publicly funded was due in part to the fact that the
    Venezuelan cash pipeline had come on-line. Multiple contacts
    have told us that Ortega uses Venezuelan oil cash to fund the
    CPCs and FSLN municipal election campaigns. Several
    unconfirmed reports indicate that Ortega will have as much as
    500 million dollars at his disposal over the course of 2008.

    ¶9. (S/NF) Unrequited Love for Iran: Regarding Iran, Ortega
    had earnestly hoped to improve relations with Iran, which he
    views as Nicaragua's revolutionary soul mate, both having
    toppled authoritarian regimes in the same year, 1979. But
    Ortega's early flurry of activity that re-established formal
    relations and saw reciprocal state visits appears to be a
    case of unrequited love. Iran has sent multiple "private
    investment delegations" (REF E), but to date, Tehran has
    signed no investment deals nor responded to Ortega's request
    to forgive Nicaraguan sovereign debt held by Iran. In fact,
    Taiwan has been more forthcoming with direct assistance than
    Iran.

    MANAGUA 00000573 005 OF 008

    ¶10. (S/NF) "What the FARC?" Perhaps the most disturbing
    recent development in Ortega's foreign policy relates to his
    increasingly public support for the FARC. Ortega and the
    FSLN have a long-standing, clandestine relationship with
    Manuel Mirulanda and the FARC, but which publicly had seemed
    dormant until five months ago when Ortega initiated
    saber-rattling against Colombia over the San Andres
    archipelago during an ALBA meeting in Caracas. Tensions
    reached a peak in March when Ortega, at the behest of Chavez,
    broke diplomatic relations with Colombia, following its
    strike into Ecuador against FARC leader Raul Reyes, only to
    restore them a day later after a tempestuous Rio Group
    meeting. Since that point, Ortega has come perilously close
    to declaring open support for the FARC. In late April,
    Ortega appeared at the airport to greet Lucia Morett, a
    Mexican student and alleged FARC supporter who survived the
    March attack. Media reports persist that Ortega offered
    asylum and citizenship to Morett. The Foreign Ministry's
    reply to our direct questions on the topic was "nothing was
    requested, nothing was offered," insisting that media usage
    of the terms "asylum" and "refugee" are incorrect. Sensitive
    reporting indicates that recently the Government of Ecuador
    rebuffed Ortega's request, through intermediaries, that Quito
    send two additional Colombian survivors to Managua.

    (C) The Opposition and Municipal Elections: Quixotic Errand?
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶11. (C) The most important event on Nicaragua's political
    horizon is the November municipal election. Given Ortega's
    unpopularity, the current economic decline, and several
    political factors, one would expect Ortega opponents to hold
    excellent odds at the ballot box. Even so, opposition
    parties have fumbled about without setting a clear direction.
    Confusion reigns in the Liberal camp. The Supreme Electoral
    Council (CSE) decision in February to remove Eduardo
    Montealegre as leader of the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance
    (ALN) party -- forcing him to re-activate his Vamos Con
    Eduardo (VCE) political movement -- followed quickly by
    Eduardo's decision to run for mayor under a PLC-VCE alliance
    banner, left many in the Liberal rank-and-file feeling angry,
    betrayed and confused. Polling shows that many Liberals
    still believe a vote for the ALN is a vote for Eduardo. The
    shortened electoral calendar forced parties to set up party
    machinery and identify candidates more rapidly than in past
    years. As a result, candidate selection was rushed, with
    many choices made based more on personal connections than on
    electoral viability. The presence of "the Pacto," the
    de-facto power-sharing alliance between Ortega and former
    President Aleman, was felt as well, perhaps most strongly in
    Matagalpa. In February nine opposition parties, including
    the ALN, MRS and a PLC that had rejected Aleman, banded
    together to select consensus candidates. A unity slate was
    announced, but only days later cast aside when Aleman
    insisted on picking the mayoral candidate for Matagalpa under
    the new PLC-VCE alliance. The nine-party unity evaporated
    with each party now putting forward its own individual slate.

    ¶12. (C) The Liberal unity of the PLC-VCE alliance is
    tenuous. We see parallel, rather than complementary
    structures for policy formulation, strategy, voter outreach,
    fundraising, etc. Guidance and funding from National-level
    leadership is almost non-existent, with many candidates
    unclear how to proceed. We often come away bemused from
    meetings with rural mayoral candidates who appear oblivious
    of the need to develop platforms and campaigns. Many such
    candidates, several of whom could be described as

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    "charisma-challenged," seem to believe that simply being
    non-FSLN will be enough to get them elected. The perennial
    problem of funding persists. Several times a week we are
    approached by local candidates for campaign financing, voter
    registration support and the like. Even with the
    environmental advantages enjoyed by opposition candidates and
    parties, training and clear direction by opposition parties
    will be essential to seriously challenge Ortega's
    well-organized, highly-disciplined, and apparently
    Venezuelan-financed FSLN/CPC election machine.

    What About the Atlantic Coast?
    - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶13. (C) On April 4 the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) voted
    to delay elections in three communities on the Atlantic Coast
    for six months. The CSE, whose magistrates owe their loyalty
    to President Daniel Ortega and Aleman, ignored widespread
    support from hurricane-affected communities in the RAAN to
    proceed with elections as scheduled. In the weeks leading up
    to ) and since ) the CSE decision, tensions between pro-
    and anti-election supporters have run high, causing violence
    and bloodshed on at least one occasion. Liberal leaders in
    surrounding municipalities are convinced the government will
    use the delay to manipulate voter registries by moving
    pro-FSLN voters from the affected coastal municipalities to
    Liberal-dominated interior municipalities thus tipping the
    vote towards FSLN candidates.

    ¶14. (C) On April 24, the National Assembly -- on its second
    try -- issued a non-binding resolution overturning the CSE's
    decision. On April 25, the Assembly's Justice Commission
    voted out two decrees, one formalizing the Assembly's
    decision of the day before, and the second calling for an
    authentic interpretation of electoral law to prevent the CSE
    from exercising such authority in the future. Both decrees
    will face serious challenges as the FSLN will use its control
    of the Supreme Court and CSE to nullify these measures. As
    the legal struggle plays out in the legislative, judicial,
    and electoral branches of government, pro- and anti-vote
    supporters in the RAAN are preparing for a possible struggle
    of their own, including the use of violence, even armed
    tactics.

    Un-unified Civil Society Concerned By Diminishing Democratic
    Space
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶15. (C) Across the political spectrum Nicaraguan civil
    society actors are concerned about the anti-democratic
    tendencies of the Ortega Administration and see an
    increasingly hostile environment for organizations seeking to
    operate freely and independently. Since Ortega assumed
    office in January 2007, many NGOs, particularly those openly
    critical of the government, have experienced various forms of
    harassment, interference, intimidation, financial pressure,
    and threats both from the government and FSLN loyalists.
    Although some actions appear to be innocuous on their
    surface, e.g. unannounced audits by tax authorities and
    related financial penalties, the overall cumulative effect
    appears to be part of a slow, deliberate effort by the
    government to discourage and undermine the independence,
    credibility, and operations of these groups and their
    advocacy of citizen rights and freedom. NGOs, including the
    traditionally left-leaning Office of the Civil Coordinator,
    often have been targeted based on an arbitrary application of
    the law or trumped up charges. Others, such as the
    center-right Permanent Commission for Human Rights (CPDH),

    MANAGUA 00000573 007 OF 008

    have received death threats against members of their staffs
    and families. Most civil society groups regard the
    establishment of the Citizen Power Councils (CPCs) under the
    central control of the FSLN's executive branch as a direct
    attempt to sideline and ultimately supplant the work of civil
    society.

    ¶16. (C) These organizations, which represent diverse
    elements of Nicaraguan society, share a common conviction
    that civil society is the only viable sector that can keep
    Nicaragua on a democratic path and stop Ortega's
    authoritarian aspirations. Unfortunately, they lack clear
    direction on how to reach their destination and have missed
    many opportunities to really make their mark. Although they
    mounted a successful protest against the CPCs in September,
    they were unable to produce a ripple effect that inspired a
    wider pro-democratic movement. Initially galvanized to come
    together to oppose the government's encroachment on citizen
    rights and freedoms, civil society has not yet demonstrated a
    capacity or commitment to building any sort of unified
    alliance or response to the challenges facing the country.
    Some organizations, led by the Movimiento por Nicaragua
    (MpN), have pledged to unite as a coalition, but to little
    avail. Most NGOs suffer from a shortage of resources and
    lack of a long-term vision to work proactively on concrete,
    sustainable projects. Internal divisions, egos, leadership
    rivalries, and competition for donor resources and
    international cooperation also present impediments to
    building a long-term civic alliance. Despite the weaknesses
    of Nicaraguan civil society organizations, however, they
    remain one of the strongest forces working in defense of the
    country's democratic spaces. Support from the international
    community will be crucial if they are to make an impact,
    given the pressures they face. On our part, we have begun a
    USD 1 million small grants program for our democratic civil
    society friends.

    Shut Them Up: Independent Media Being Squeezed Too
    - - - - - - -

    ¶17. (SBU) In the first few months of 2008, there has been a
    marked decline in press freedom in Nicaragua. Recent threats
    to press include the politicized use of the judicial system
    to convict a prominent local newspaper owner and editor of
    libel, and the mounting of a dubious public radio and TV
    campaign against the same media owner and an opposition
    leader, Montealegre, for alleged public theft. Journalists
    continue to report that only "official Sandinista" media
    outlets, often those owned and operated by children of the
    President and First Lady, have access to government
    information. The Ministry of Health has selectively banned a
    reporter from its premises for reporting that was not in its
    favor. In a space of two weeks in April, four national radio
    stations (3 independent and 1 Sandinista) reported serious
    equipment theft at their transmission towers which knocked
    them off the air for 8-12 hours each. To date, there are no
    convictions for any of these crimes. A few months ago,
    private, apparently partisan security forces surrounding the
    president handcuffed a local reporter when he tried to
    approach the Ambassador to tape public comments at an outdoor
    event.

    Comment
    - - - -

    ¶18. (S/NF) Our bilateral interests and commitment to the
    Nicaraguan people remain unchanged. Our goals are to keep
    Nicaragua on the democratic path; to combat corruption,

    MANAGUA 00000573 008 OF 008

    terrorism and all forms of trafficking; to promote private
    sector-led development and to protect the interests of U.S.
    citizens residing in Nicaragua. Though our interests remain
    unchanged, Ortega has made it increasingly difficult for us
    to work towards these goals, by restricting our access and
    pressuring our partners. He has scrupulously avoided either
    an outright rejection of U.S. assistance or a direct policy
    confrontation with Washington. However, he has worked
    assiduously to undermine any domestic opposition, and thus
    our ability to find partners capable of imposing pressure for
    meaningful change. The Ortega-Aleman political pact remains
    active, and the single greatest, though not the only,
    obstacle to a more open, transparent Nicaragua. Ortega has
    mis-managed the economy and has repeatedly permitted, if not
    instigated, government intervention in the energy and finance
    sectors for clearly political ends. Ortega continues to
    close the space in which independent voices of civil society
    and media can educate and defend the rights of Nicaraguans.
    Though he has not publicly abandoned his post-election
    commitments to keep the country on a democratic path and
    maintain responsible free market policies, there are multiple
    signs that Ortega seeks only one goal ) consolidation of
    power to perpetuate his rule.
    TRIVELLI

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