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### Viewing cable 09BEIJING2731, FOURTH PLENUM: XI NOT APPOINTED TO CMC; NO

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BEIJING2731 | 2009-09-23 11:11 | 2010-12-28 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing

`

    VZCZCXRO2243
    OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
    DE RUEHBJ #2731/01 2661108
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 231108Z SEP 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6194
    INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 002731

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2034
    TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MARR KDEM CH
    SUBJECT: FOURTH PLENUM: XI NOT APPOINTED TO CMC; NO
    SIGNIFICANT REFORMS

    REF: BEIJING 2533

    Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
    Reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Although contacts expressed surprise that
    Vice President Xi Jinping was not appointed Central Military
    Commission Vice Chairman at the four-day Fourth Plenum of the
    Seventeenth CCP Central Committee that concluded September
    18, most cautioned against reading too much into the decision
    and all stressed that it did not imply significant discord
    within the Party. Several contacts noted that Party
    leadership dynamics and China's political situation have
    changed since 1999 when Hu Jintao was appointed to the CMC
    and it is not possible to extrapolate Xi's political
    trajectory from past practice. All contacts agreed that,
    despite not being appointed to the CMC at the Fourth Plenum,
    Xi Jinping is still the clear frontrunner to succeed Hu
    Jintao. Some attributed the deferral of Xi's appointment to
    leadership uncertainty that Xi's appointment was the right
    move at the right time. There was consensus among our
    contacts that, despite a communique touting "intra-Party
    democracy" and anti-corruption initiatives, the Plenum was
    essentially devoid of substantive reforms and will not result
    in any significant policy initiatives. Although the Plenum
    made no decisions on the future of Xinjiang Party Secretary
    Wang Lequan, contacts unanimously predicted his political
    career is "finished." End Summary

    Plenum Communique
    -----------------

    ¶2. (C) The Fourth Plenum of the Seventeenth Chinese Communist
    Party (CCP) Central Committee concluded September 18. In
    keeping with past practice, an official Xinhua news agency
    statement announced the release of a CCP communique outlining
    the conclusions of the Plenum. The Xinhua summary of the
    communique noted that the Plenum had approved a "Decision"
    calling for increased "intra-party democracy," party building
    and anti-corruption initiatives in the face of urgent
    domestic and international challenges. The communique
    included a reference to the importance of addressing ethnic
    policy, termed "nationalities work" (minzu gonzuo), and
    promoting "ethnic unity." The text of the Decision itself
    was not publicly released. The communique noted that
    President Hu Jintao had delivered an important speech to the
    Plenum outlining the challenges confronting the party. It
    highlighted the role of Xi Jinping, who delivered an
    "explanation" of the Decision to party members. Unlike the
    Fourth Plenum of the Sixteenth Central Committee in 1999,
    there was no mention of personnel decisions in the communique
    following this plenum. The widely anticipated appointment of
    Xi Jinping as Vice Chairman of the Central Military
    Commission (CMC) was not included in the document. Following
    the Plenum, the fourth plenary session of the CCP Central
    Commission for Discipline and Inspection (CCDI) took place on
    September 19 and also took up the discussion of
    anti-corruption initiatives, specifically personal financial
    declarations for Party members.

    Lack of CMC Appointment Surprising but Not Significant
    --------------------------------------------- ---------

    ¶3. (C) Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Professor of
    Public Policy Dong Lisheng on September 21 told PolOff that
    he had been very surprised by the decision not to appoint Xi
    to the CMC. Dong noted that the Plenum was the sole venue
    for such personnel decisions and the outcome of this year's
    Plenum meant that Xi would not receive the CMC appointment in
    the near term. He discounted speculation, particularly among
    the Hong Kong press, that Xi's appointment would only be
    deferred until after the October 1 National Day celebrations
    noting that the Party would not use such unorthodox means to
    effect such an important personnel decision. Separately, on
    September 21 Guangming Ribao Senior Editor Dong Yuyu agreed
    that the issue of Xi's CMC appointment, if it had ever been a
    subject at the Plenum, had been deferred for the near term
    and would not be revived until 2011 at the earliest.

    ¶4. (C) Communist Party member, Renmin University Sociology
    Professor and Vice Dean for Undergraduate Education Hong
    Dayong on September 21 cautioned against overemphasizing the
    1999 precedent and reading too much into the decision not to
    elevate Xi. The political dynamics of the Party had changed
    greatly, and past models of political transition were of
    little utility in the current environment. Guangming Ribao

    BEIJING 00002731 002 OF 004

    editor Dong Yuyu emphasized that there was no established
    system dictating the content and pace of Plenum personnel
    decisions. Many had incorQctly surmised that because Hu
    Jintao had been appointed to the CMC at the Fourth Plenum of
    the Sixteenth Central Committee, Xi Jinping had to be
    appointed at the same juncture. However, perceptions of the
    importance of this perceived precedent were inaccurate.
    CASS's Dong Lisheng emphasized that a primary factor in
    deferring the appointment was likely Xi's short tenure as a
    member of the Politburo. Dong Lisheng noted that when Hu
    Jintao was appointed to the CMC in 1999 he had already been a
    Politburo member for seven years. In contrast, Xi had only
    been appointed to the Politburo two years earlier.

    Xi Still the Frontrunner
    ------------------------

    ¶5. (C) Guangming Ribao's Dong Yuyu stressed that Xi Jinping
    was still the frontrunner to succeed Hu Jintao in 2012 and,
    in his own opinion, had a "sixty-percent chance" of
    succeeding Hu in the Party Chairmanship, Presidency and CMC
    Chairmanship. He noted that the decision to defer Xi's
    elevation to the CMC was likely made in order to provide him
    more time to develop as a Party leader. The Party was also
    looking to protect itself by affording Xi "less time to make
    mistakes" in that capacity before eventually taking the CMC
    Chairmanship. Fang Jinyu, recently retired Beijing bureau
    chief of the Nanfang Ribao Media Group, told PolOff September
    14 that Xi remained the only feasible candidate by virtue of
    his political pedigree and backing by Jiang Zemin, Zeng
    Qinghong and other retired cadres and that Li Keqiang was not
    a realistic competitor.

    No Discord within the Politburo
    -------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) CASS's Dong Lisheng said that, in his view, the
    decision was the result of the Party leadership's
    determination to "keep its options open" but did not imply
    intra-Party discord. Guangming's Dong Yuyu stressed that the
    failure to elevate Xi did not suggest power struggles within
    Party leadership. On the contrary, the leadership was united
    as never before around the principles of protecting its power
    and the individual vested interests of Party leaders.
    Deferring the appointment of Xi to the CMC was a function of
    the Party's more cautious attitude in general rather than any
    significant disagreements within the Politburo.

    CCP-PLA Issues
    --------------

    ¶7. (C) Renmin University's Hong Dayong noted that the CCP
    leadership had to be "cautious in how it manages the
    military" and Xi Jinping still lacked the requisite
    experience at the highest levels of the Party leadership for
    this role. Huang Shan, Deputy International Editor of
    Caijing Magazine, on September 17 (during the Plenum)
    emphasized that the Party was conscious of its "lack of
    authority over the military," particularly in the wake of the
    much publicized confrontation between Premier Wen Jiabao and
    the PLA during reconstruction efforts after the Sichuan
    earthquake and that this issue would inform the outcome of
    the Plenum. Chen Jieren, News Director at Youth.cn, a news
    website operated by the Communist Youth League and the nephew
    of Politburo Standing Committee Member He Guoqiang, on
    September 9 told PolOff that conservative members of the PLA
    were among the leading critics of the response to the
    Xinjiang riots and of the policies of President Hu and
    Premier Wen; this was causing much introspection within the
    Party. Guangming's Dong Yuyu noted that this theme had been
    presaged in a speech by Hu Jintao during a July 24 Politburo
    study session at which he called for the development of
    "military-civilian integration" (junmin rongheshi fazhan).
    Dong speculated that this initiative could suggest that the
    Party was considering new options for the composition of the
    CMC, including a formulation whereby both Xi Jinping and Li
    Keqiang could be jointly named as Vice Chairmen in the future.

    Plenum without Substance
    ------------------------

    ¶8. (C) Guangming Ribao's Dong Yuyu noted that in other
    aspects the Plenum had developed exactly how he had expected,
    with no meaningful changes to the Party's fundamental
    approach to reform and ideology. Echoing references by other
    contacts (reftel) to Hu Jintao's statement that the Party

    BEIJING 00002731 003 OF 004

    would "avoid distractions" (bu zheteng), Dong noted that the
    process of drafting the Plenum conclusions had been ongoing
    for the past year and the decision not to deviate from
    existing policies had been reached long before the Plenum
    convened. The one significant exception was the inclusion of
    the reference to "nationalities work" in the communique, Dong
    Yuyu said, which had been included recently in response to
    the unrest in Xinjiang. However, like the other purported
    reform initiatives, this would not translate into any
    substantive adjustments to ethnic policy. A loosening of
    policies in Xinjiang and Tibet would create a backlash
    against the Party by the Han majority and was therefore
    politically untenable.

    Party Leaders Lack Mandate for Reform
    -------------------------------------

    ¶9. (C) Speaking to PolOff September 17 (during the Plenum),
    Caijing editor Huang Shan predicted that the significant
    dilution of the political authority of individual Chinese
    leaders would inform Plenum outcomes. The lack of a clear
    political mandate meant there could be no substantive
    political reforms at the Plenum or in the near term. The
    Party had adopted a "wait and see" approach to reform in
    general and was "absolutely unwilling" to consider any
    meaningful changes to party ideology or policy. Although the
    Party was aware that social unrest was a potential challenge
    to its legitimacy, it would address the issue exclusively
    through economic policy rather than political reform.

    ¶10. (C) CASS scholar Dong Lisheng echoed Huang Shan's
    comments, noting that that the need for consensus informed
    all major Party decisions and was the reason for the lack of
    any substantive policy initiatives during the Plenum. He
    noted, however, that the tenor of the Plenum reflected
    significant dichotomy within the Party's outlook. On the one
    hand, the Party remained confident that its policies had
    successfully guided China through the global financial crisis
    and had maintained economic growth and general political
    stability. Guangming's Dong Yuyu echoed these comments,
    stating that the Party had a confident (zihao) outlook and
    was touting international praise for the "Beijing model" of
    economic development as legitimizing its mandate. Both Dong
    Lisheng and Dong Yuyu individually noted, however that on the
    other hand the Party was obsessively preoccupied with
    perceived threats to its hold on power. In this context, the
    Party's overarching near-term goal was the preservation of
    the status quo, and it would therefore avoid any policy or
    reform initiatives that could potentially have "unforeseen
    consequences."

    ¶11. (C) CASS's Dong Lisheng discounted the communique's
    references to "intra-party democracy" as restatements of the
    general principles outlined during the Seventeenth Party
    Congress. He predicted that the anti-corruption measures
    discussed during the Plenum would also not result in any
    substantive measures to bring rampant graft under control.
    Dong Lisheng noted that, despite the renewed discussion of
    personal financial disclosure statements during the CCDI
    plenary session, disclosure regulations for high-level cadres
    had been on the books since 1995 but had not been enforced.
    Guangming's Dong Yuyu noted that the reason that financial
    disclosure statements had been discussed at the CCDI session
    instead of the full Plenum was because they were impossible
    to implement.

    Wang Lequan Finished
    --------------------

    ¶12. (C) All contacts agreed that Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
    Region (XUAR) Party Secretary Wang Lequan would be replaced
    in the near term. CASS scholar Dong Lisheng noted that the
    unprecedented spectacle of ethnic Han Urumqi residents taking
    to the streets to demand Wang's resignation shortly after a
    visit to the XUAR by Hu Jintao could not go unanswered.
    Caijing Magazine's Huang Shan suggested that Wang would be
    reassigned to a semi-retirement position as a National
    People's Congress Committee Chairman around the beginning of
    the 2010. Politburo member nephew Chen Jieren noted that the
    frontrunners to replace Wang included Hunan Party Secretary
    Zhang Chunxian, Tibet Party Secretary Zhang Qingli, and
    Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu. Chen noted that the
    Party's decision on Wang's replacement would be an important
    indicator of how it planned to proceed in Xinjiang. The
    appointment of Zhang Qingli or Meng would suggest a more
    hardline, security-focused approach.

    BEIJING 00002731 004 OF 004

    HUNTSMAN

`