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### Viewing cable 06CARACAS2367, CASTRO'S ILLNESS; IMPACT ON THE BRV, ON BRV-GOC

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06CARACAS2367 | 2006-08-10 02:02 | 2010-12-15 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Caracas

`

    VZCZCXRO6327
    OO RUEHAG
    DE RUEHCV #2367/01 2220226
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 100226Z AUG 06
    FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
    TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5787
    INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 6884
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 5695
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 1390
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 2255
    RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 0500
    RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 1399
    RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 3945
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2340
    RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR PRIORITY 0966
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 3695
    RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO PRIORITY 0943
    RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 0582
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0430
    RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
    RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0912

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 002367

    SIPDIS

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
    DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016
    TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM VE CU
    SUBJECT: CASTRO'S ILLNESS; IMPACT ON THE BRV, ON BRV-GOC
    RELATIONS

    CARACAS 00002367 001.2 OF 004

    Classified By: Classified by CDA Kevin Whitaker for reason 1.4(d.)

    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (S/NF) BRV reaction to the announcement of Castro's
    illness and recovery directly mirrored that of the Cuban
    regime. There is no reason to believe that the fundamentals
    of the Cuba-Venezuela relationship -- with Venezuela
    providing huge resource flows, and the Cubans providing tens
    of thousands of "advisors" -- will change through the medium
    term. Castro's absence from the scene will deprive Chavez of
    an avuncular presence and a proven crisis manager, which may
    increase Chavez' vulnerability. In the event of Castro's
    permanent departure from the scene, the mercurial Chavez may
    become even more unpredictable. Chavez may believe his
    regime's survival is tied to that of a Castroite successor
    government, and under a conceivable set of circumstances
    might even be willing to deploy Venezuelan military assets in
    support of a successor regime. Embassy believes this would
    be an apt moment to warn the BRV against intervening in Cuba
    during its transition. End summary.

    Initial BRV Reactions to Castro Announcement
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶2. (U) Initial Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (BRV)
    reaction to the news of Castro's illness and temporary
    hand-over of power has been limited to parroting the Cuban
    line. Speaking on August 1 in Vietnam, Chavez seemed a bit
    taken by surprise and uninformed, but said he had talked to
    Cuban officials who assured him that Castro "would return to
    his job in some weeks." The same day, the Venezuelan Foreign
    Ministry announced that they "had received, with
    satisfaction, news from Cuban authorities" that Castro was
    recuperating. Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel similarly
    said that he spoke with his Cuban counterpart Carlos Lage and
    Cuban Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque, who assured him
    that the Cuban leader was recovering normally.

    ¶3. (S/NF) Chavez returned to Caracas on August 3,
    apparently without stopping in Havana. SIMO reports indicate
    that he had wanted to do so, but the Cubans waved him off,
    fearing that his presence would undercut their efforts to
    convey a sense of normality. Chavez got the point; during
    his August 6 "Alo Presidente," Chavez said he had learned out
    that Castro was up and talking, and expressed his confidence
    that the Cuban leader would be back in action soon.
    Interestingly, Chavez did not suggest he'd spoken personally
    to Castro. Too, he engaged in a lengthy digression about his
    appreciation for being able to meet and work with a hero from
    his youth. Certainly it was not his intention, but this part
    of Chavez' comments took on the tone of an elegy.

    Speculation on Raul-Chavez Relations
    ------------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) Regardless of whether Fidel is alive or not, it
    would appear that Raul will continue to play a larger role
    than in the past. Public and other sources have included
    speculation about the lack of chemistry between Chavez and
    Raul Castro. While we question the reliability of such
    judgments, because it's unclear to us the basis for reaching
    them, they are worth being aware of. Americo Martin, a
    former Venezuelan Communist close to the Castros in the
    1970s, told El Universal that the younger Castro views Chavez
    with distrust and caution. Former Venezuelan Ambassador and
    ubiquitous international relations analyst Julio Cesar Pineda
    told poloff August 8 that he has heard that Chavez is close
    to FM Perez Roque, and VP Lage, who it would appear are going

    CARACAS 00002367 002.2 OF 004

    to continue to play important roles in Cuba. Exiled Cuban
    intellectual Carlos Alberto Montaner probably made the most
    relevant observation in noting that Raul and Chavez lack the
    emotional ties that bind Fidel and Chavez.

    What Does it Mean for Venezuela?
    --------------------------------

    ¶5. (C) While there are a number of unknowns in the
    equation, there is no reason to believe much will change in
    the bilateral relationship in the short to medium term. Both
    countries derive benefits from the relationship. Cuba
    benefits from the millions in oil and transfer payments for
    services rendered; Venezuela benefits from the advice of
    Castro and tens of thousands of "trainers" and doctors.
    Apparent Cuban influence in Venezuela has grown dramatically,
    to the point that opposition Venezuelans sardonically refer
    to "Venecuba" or "Cubazuela" (both forms are acceptable).
    Chavez relies heavily on Cuban advisors to implement programs
    that are one of the keys to his political success. We assess
    there could be as many as 40,000 Cubans currently in
    Venezuela, managing, guiding, and implementing Chavez' social
    missions (e.g., Barrio Adentro medical program, Mision
    Robinson literacy program, Mercal state-owned grocery chain,
    etc.) Rumors swirl about Cubans taking central roles in
    sensitive government functions, including in Chavez' personal
    security, the military, the National Electoral Council, the
    national identification Office, even land titling offices.
    None of that is going to change soon. The Bolivarian regime
    is deriving political and organizational benefit from it, and
    the Cubans are getting paid hard currency for it.

    ¶6. (S/NF) We judge that Chavez will also want to continue
    Venezuela's generous petroleum support to Cuba, which we
    currently estimate at 98,000 barrels per day, worth at least
    $7 million a day, or $2.5 billion a year. SIMO reporting
    indicates that Chavez directed that his staff find ways of
    increasing resource flows to Cuba. We can think of two
    motivations Chavez might have in increasing cash flow to
    Cuba: first, to help a friend in need; the one thing he has
    is cash, and he can give more of it. Second, it may also be
    true that Chavez is looking to bump up transfer payments in
    order to increase his influence in Cuba at this critical
    moment. The economic assistance could become a problem,
    however, if the egoistic, increasingly intrusive Chavez used
    it to promote his own candidate in any ensuing power
    struggle, prolonging the infighting and delaying a democratic
    transition.

    How Does Chavez Act if Castro is Debilitated or Dead?
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶7. (S/NF) Castro's prolonged convalescence or even death is
    likely to cause headaches for the region and roil bilateral
    relations. Some argue that Castro has had a moderating
    influence on Chavez, and so he'll really let go if Castro is
    gone. The predicate seems wrong to us. It's hard to see
    much moderation in Chavez' recent behavior: open
    interventionism and tendency to pick fights with leaders
    throughout the hemisphere, his embrace of pariah states
    (including especially the vote for Iran at the IAEA and the
    apparent endorsement of the DPRK's July 4 missile launches),
    and his government's relentless assault on basic freedoms
    within Venezuela. It may be closer to the mark to observe
    that Castro is one of the few people who could contradict
    Chavez or give him news he didn't want to hear. We've
    received numerous reports that Chavez is left surrounded by
    yes-men, because he simply won't accept bad news or
    criticism. The absence of Castro -- to Chavez, respected and
    avuncular -- could make the mercurial Chavez even more

    CARACAS 00002367 003 OF 004

    unpredictable and radical.

    ¶8. (S/NF) Over time, Chavez will probably move toward
    assuming the mantle as (in Castro's words) "my successor to
    advance social revolution." Chavez will need to work this
    issue slowly, as he does not wish to suggest prematurely that
    Castro is dead and inadvertently cause problems for -- or
    with -- any successor Castroite regime. That said, Chavez
    has neither the intellectual candlepower nor the
    international environment to replicate Castro's rise to
    international prominence. That doesn't mean he won't try,
    and he'll play his best card -- oil wealth -- whenever he
    needs to. And whatever the force of his arguments, his
    checkbook is going to speak loudly.

    ¶9. (S/NF) We should be particularly mindful that Chavez
    will be a committed advocate of the continuation of a
    repressive regime in Cuba. Chavez has been on a losing
    streak, with the electoral results in Peru and (it seems) in
    Mexico; were Cuba now to turn toward democracy, Chavez would
    be increasingly isolated as the sole radical leftist in the
    hemisphere. Chavez may believe that the survival of his
    regime is tied to that of the Castro regime.

    ¶10. (S/NF) There are some even more troubling scenarios
    that one can play out in this regard. Chavez has said as
    recently as this April that he'd be willing to spill
    Venezuelan blood to save the Cuban regime (although he was
    speaking about a U.S. invasion). Were there to be an
    internal civil conflict in Cuba, we believe it possible that
    Chavez would consider intervening militarily on the side of
    pro-regime elements. It is not clear to us that such an
    intervention would be militarily effective, but the presence,
    or even threat, of a Venezuelan force in Cuba would have
    important implications for Cuba and for us. Perhaps the most
    likely scenario would have the Venezuelans providing lift
    capability to loyalist troops; the Venezuelan Armed Force
    (FAV) does retain some fixed-wing and rotary lift capability.
    That said, a Venezuelan navy troopship regularly plies
    between Venezuela and Cuba, and could conceivably be used to
    move FAV troops to the island.

    (11. (C) Comment: As noted in previous email traffic,
    Embassy suggests that this may be an apt time to warn the BRV
    against intervening in Cuba.)

    An Achilles' Heel?
    ------------------

    ¶12. (S/NF) These are some fairly gloomy scenarios. We can
    conceive how Castro's absence might actually make Chavez more
    vulnerable. Hugo Chavez is a master tactician, regularly
    assessing the domestic political situation better and faster
    than the opposition, and making moves to box in his
    democratic opponents. What Chavez is less good at is crisis
    management. To take a recent example, Chavez' first instinct
    to go to Castro's sickbed was wrong, because it would have
    undercut the regime's "all is well" line. There are
    historical examples, of Chavez cracking under pressure. In
    both the 1992 and the 2002 failed coups, evidence suggests
    that Chavez lost his nerve at key moments. His military
    colleagues were willing to fight on in 1992 when he was holed
    up in the Military Museum, but he surrendered them all. In
    2002, a weepy Chavez was reportedly ready to sign the letter
    of resignation and flee to Cuba. Castro has proved his worth
    to Chavez as a proxy crisis manager. It was Castro who told
    Chavez to fight on in 2002, and it was Castro who worked the
    phones to reassemble a pro-Chavez consensus in the armed
    forces. In 2004, as the recall referendum approached, it was
    Castro who conceived and executed the "misiones" plan to buck

    CARACAS 00002367 004.2 OF 004

    up Chavez' popularity. In Cuba, from the Cuban Missile
    Crisis to Mariel to the Maleconazo to the Special Period,
    Fidel Castro has proven himself to be a superb crisis
    manager. Should Chavez confront a thorny crisis, especially
    a domestic crisis, he may suffer significantly from the loss
    of Castro's steady hand at his back. This, in turn, could be
    an advantage for us in our efforts to urge a return to full
    democracy in Venezuela.

`