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### Viewing cable 06BUENOSAIRES1462, ARGENTINA: THE K-STYLE OF POLITICS

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BUENOSAIRES1462 | 2006-06-29 15:03 | 2010-11-30 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Buenos Aires

`

    VZCZCXRO4935
    PP RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHQU RUEHTM RUEHVC
    DE RUEHBU #1462/01 1801546
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 291546Z JUN 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5073
    INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHNA/DEA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUCNMRC/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BUENOS AIRES 001462

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR WHA TOM SHANNON, JOHN MAISTO, AND CHARLES SHAPIRO
    NSC FOR DAN FISK
    TREASURY FOR DAS NANCY LEE
    USCINCSO FOR POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2016
    TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AR
    SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: THE K-STYLE OF POLITICS

    REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 01090
    ¶B. BUENOS AIRES 01403
    ¶C. BUENOS AIRES 02974
    ¶D. 05 BUENOS AIRES 00141
    ¶E. 05 BUENOS AIRES 02835
    ¶F. 05 BUENOS AIRES 00115

    Classified By: Ambassador Lino Gutierrez for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

    ------------------------
    SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
    ------------------------

    ¶1. (C) This cable is designed to examine President Nestor
    Kirchner's unique operating and decision-making style that
    has become known as the "K-Style." Given Kirchner's control
    over all aspects of GOA policymaking, knowledge of Kirchner's
    motivations and methods in arriving at decisions is essential
    to understanding GOA actions.

    ¶2. (C) President Nestor Kirchner's personalistic, often
    erratic operating and decision-making style defines current
    Argentine policymaking and is characterized by an overarching
    focus on the short-term and politically expedient
    accumulation and maintenance of domestic political power.
    Kirchner's domestic political style leaves no room for
    dissent and utilizes divide-and-conquer tactics to weaken the
    political opposition. While utilizing leftist, populist
    rhetoric at times, in practice Kirchner has demonstrated that
    his ideological leanings are always less important than the
    practicalities of domestic politics. Studies show that
    Kirchner's psychological profile includes a need to always be
    in control, quick and decisive decision making, a constant
    struggle against perceived enemies, and a tendency to respond
    to challenges by lashing out, rather than negotiation.
    Foreign policy in the Kirchner government is always
    subservient to domestic political considerations. President
    Kirchner is not skilled at international diplomacy and often
    ignores basic protocol. Kirchner relies on an ever-shrinking
    group of long-time advisors to make key decisions, many of
    whom lack international, business and economic expertise.
    END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.

    --------------------------------
    THE K-STYLE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS
    --------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) President Nestor Kirchner's personalistic, often
    erratic operating and decision-making style defines current
    Argentine policymaking and is characterized by an overarching
    focus on the short-term and politically expedient
    accumulation and maintenance of domestic political power.
    Close Kirchner insiders have described Kirchner's
    decision-making process to Emboffs as one in which Kirchner
    consults with a small number of trusted advisors, generally
    one-on-one, and then makes all of the final decisions
    himself. The Argentine political system places a great deal
    of authority into the hands of the President, and President
    Kirchner is a strong president even in the Argentine
    historical context. As a result, the "K-Style" defines the
    GOA policymaking process and gives the policy process a
    short-term focus. As Legal and Technical Secretary Carlos
    Zannini, a close Kirchner advisor, told the DCM, "The
    President and I get up every morning, look at the morning
    papers, and try to figure out how to survive the day."
    Another long-time Kirchner associate, former Santa Cruz
    Governor Sergio Acevedo told us that Kirchner focuses very
    much on day-to-day issues, but always with the long-term
    strategic goal of retaining political power. (COMMENT:
    Kirchner's focus on retaining political power leads us to
    discount speculation that Kirchner will step aside in 2007
    and make his wife Cristina the presidential candidate. For
    2011, assuming Kirchner's health holds, we would expect him
    to either modify the Constitution to allow him to run for a
    third term, or to pass the mantel on to his wife. END
    COMMENT.)

    ¶4. (C) Kirchner's domestic political style leaves no room
    for dissent and utilizes divide-and-conquer tactics to weaken

    BUENOS AIR 00001462 002 OF 005

    the political opposition. Kirchner is quick to silence any
    opposition to his policies from within his movement, as when
    he recently expelled congresswoman Maria del Carmen Alarcon
    from the presidency of the Lower House Agricultural Committee
    and from Kirchner's Victory Front (FPV) after Alarcon
    criticized the GOA beef policy (See Reftel A). Kirchner has
    also proven adept at co-opting members of the opposition and
    exploiting divisions within opposition parties. Through the
    skillful use of his fiscal powers, Kirchner has been able to
    draw in the majority of the Radical Civic Union (UCR)
    governors, and many UCR mayors (See Septel on deteriorating
    provincial finances and Kirchner's use of fiscal power for
    political aims). He has also been able to co-opt the
    political leadership from the now defunct center-left Frepaso
    and most of the Peronists formerly aligned in opposition to
    Kirchner with former President Eduardo Duhalde. Kirchner has
    exploited divisions within the UCR by heavily courting
    Mendoza Governor Julio Cobos, long-time rival of UCR
    President Roberto Iglesias, even encouraging rumors that
    Cobos may be Kirchner's running mate in 2007. Kirchner also
    does not accept criticism from those outside of the political
    arena, attacking the press, the Catholic Church and business
    leaders that have been publicly critical of the GOA.

    ¶5. (C) While utilizing leftist, populist rhetoric at times,
    in practice Kirchner has demonstrated that his ideological
    leanings are always less important than the practicalities of
    domestic politics. As Acevedo recently told us, President
    Kirchner has no true ideology. For example, the issue of
    human rights and his political affiliations in the 1970s were
    non-issues in the 20 years of Kirchner's political life as
    Mayor of Rio Gallegos and Governor of Santa Cruz province.
    Acevedo said Kirchner's recent support for the Mothers of the
    Plaza de Mayo and a renewed focus on human rights crimes
    committed under the last dictatorship was driven by his need
    to develop a core base of support within the left wing of the
    Peronist movement. Kirchner was also a big proponent of the
    1990s privatizations at the time they occurred, but has since
    vehemently attacked them. This does not mean that Kirchner
    does not have left-wing sympathies, but rather that these are
    completely subordinate to his personal political interests
    and ambition (See Reftel B). Kirchner's left-wing sympathies
    have not stopped him from forming alliances of convenience
    with center-right Peronist leaders, such as Luis Barrionuevo
    of Catamarca, Cordoba Governor Jose Manuel de la Sota, or the
    largely conservative Peronist political machine in Buenos
    Aires province.

    ¶6. (C) Kirchner's style of policymaking has become more
    pronounced after the October 2005 elections and November 2005
    cabinet changes left Kirchner firmly in charge of all aspects
    of GOA decision making (See Reftel C). Prior to the October
    elections, Kirchner had to consider former President
    Duhalde's opinion in making major decisions. Kirchner's
    resounding victory in Buenos Aires province in the elections
    left him in control of the Peronist Party (PJ) and banished
    Duhalde from the center stage of the political scene. Before
    Kirchner's November cabinet changes, Kirchner also had to
    contend with his independent-minded Minister of the Economy,
    Roberto Lavagna, in making economic policy decisions, and
    with then-Foreign Minister Rafael Bielsa, who occasionally
    exhibited an independent streak. Their replacements, Felisa
    Miceli and Jorge Taiana are loyal soldiers who follow
    presidential orders. For example, recently Miceli was give a
    copy of a communique that had been issued to a news agency by
    the Casa Rosada with Miceli's comments criticizing a recent
    speech by Lavagna before Miceli had actually spoken. As
    leading pollster Roberto Bacman told Poloff, "Never since the
    return to democracy (1983) has Argentina had a President that
    was also the Minister of the Economy."

    ---------------------------------------------
    KIRCHNER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE SETS K-STYLE
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) According to recent studies, Kirchner's psychological
    profile includes a need to always be in control, quick and
    decisive decision making, and a constant struggle against
    perceived enemies. Kirchner does not delegate policymaking,

    BUENOS AIR 00001462 003 OF 005

    making all of the important decisions himself. Kirchner only
    consults with a narrow group of long-time advisors, who are
    part of Kirchner's inner circle primarily because of their
    loyalty, not their technical abilities (See Reftel D). He
    often does not even consult or give warning to top GOA
    officials before making major policy statements in their
    respective areas of responsibility. According to Central
    Bank officials, for example, Central Bank President Martin
    Redrado found out that the GOA was going to use nearly 10 USD
    billion in Central Bank reserves to pay off the IMF when
    Kirchner publicly announced it. Casa Rosada insiders have
    described Kirchner as prone to making quick, sometimes even
    rash decisions. For example, Kirchner reportedly made a snap
    decision to institute a six-month ban on beef exports after
    learning that the price of beef had risen a significant
    amount the previous day in the country's most important beef
    market. Kirchner has lashed out at has perceived enemies,
    both domestic and foreign, throughout his presidency.
    Kirchner's targets have included the IMF, the U.S., the
    media, the Catholic Church, the Argentine military, the
    foreign and domestic business community, supermarkets,
    foreign gas stations, anything that happened in the 1990s,
    former Presidents Carlos Menem, Fernando de la Rua and
    Eduardo Duhalde. Kirchner often targets unpopular groups or
    individuals as a means to increase his own public approval
    ratings.

    ¶8. (C) When confronted with a problem, Kirchner's first
    instinct is to go on the offensive, rather than negotiate,
    upping the ante if his initial efforts fail to win the
    desired result. When Kirchner faced resistance from the
    business and agricultural sector on his efforts to control
    inflation earlier in the year, Kirchner instituted a ban on
    the export of beef and appointed the unorthodox Peronist
    economist Guillermo Moreno to run the GOA's anti-inflation
    efforts through bullying and threatening individual producers
    to lower their prices. When Uruguayan President Tabare
    Vazquez did not respond well to Kirchner's insistence that
    Uruguay halt the construction of two paper plants on the
    Argentine border to conduct additional environmental studies,
    Kirchner's rhetoric encouraged the residents of the affected
    province to step up their blockade of the bridges connecting
    the two countries, resulting in millions of dollars of lost
    trade and tourism income for Uruguay. Faced with rising gas
    prices in early 2005, Kirchner called for a national boycott
    of Shell Oil and sent thousands of piqueteros to blockade
    Shell Oil gas stations until they agreed to lower their
    prices.

    ¶9. (C) Kirchner has a reputation for taking slights or any
    perceived lack of respect from others personally, but is also
    known for quick changes in temperament. Acevedo told the DCM
    that once then-Governor Kirchner became enraged with his
    Deputy Energy Minister for making a statement regarding Santa
    Cruz energy policy he did not personally approve. Kirchner
    called the Deputy Minister into his office and proceeded to
    scream at him at the top of his lungs, ultimately effectively
    throwing him out of his office physically. Everyone in the
    provincial government leadership expected the Deputy Minister
    to be fired. Kirchner did not speak to him for two weeks,
    until he unexpectedly called him asking for some trout for a
    dinner that Kirchner was hosting. Acevedo said this
    individual had a reputation for knowing where to get the best
    trout in Rio Gallegos. The Deputy Minister complied with the
    request, and two days later Kirchner invited him for coffee.
    Kirchner greeted him warmly, thanked him for the trout, and
    proceeded to chat with him for a long period, as if the
    previous incident had never happened, to the shock of
    everyone else present, including the Deputy Minister. In the
    end, the Deputy Minister was not fired, and Kirchner did not
    raise the issue again.

    ¶10. (C) Kirchner's health condition exacerbates, and perhaps
    helps define, Kirchner's emotions and psychology. President
    Kirchner has reportedly suffered from irritable bowel
    syndrome for many years. According to the American Medical
    Association, the psychological effects of this condition
    leads those who suffer from it to be "often rigid, methodical
    persons who are conscientious, with obsessive-compulsive

    BUENOS AIR 00001462 004 OF 005

    tendencies." Kirchner also reportedly works himself to
    exhaustion and needs to take frequent vacations to recover.
    The AMA further states "Psychologic and social stresses are
    often present in patients with irritable bowel syndrome, and
    may be related in a temporal sense to the exacerbation of
    symptoms." This may account for Kirchner's lack of attention
    to protocol that involves long ceremonies or tight schedules,
    where Kirchner would not have quick access to a bathroom.

    -----------------------------------
    FOREIGN POLICY NOT KIRCHNER'S FOCUS
    -----------------------------------

    ¶11. (C) Foreign policy in the Kirchner government is always
    subservient to domestic political considerations. Kirchner,
    at least initially, took a hard line on the paper mills
    dispute with Uruguay -- despite the damage to Mercosur and
    regional relations -- because of the strong Argentine public
    concern about the paper mills, particularly in
    ruling-party-run Entre Rios province that is on the opposite
    side of the river from the plants. Kirchner's explicit and
    harsh criticism of the U.S. during his speech during the
    Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata can only be
    understood in the context of dismal public perceptions of the
    U.S. and Kirchner's desire to appeal to his leftist political
    base (See Reftel E). Kirchner's hardball tactics during
    negotiations over Argentina's private sector debt and his
    criticism of foreign companies that run major enterprises
    that were privatized in the 1990s do not earn him any support
    from foreign investors, but are popular with the Argentine
    public. Likewise, Kirchner cut Argentine gas exports to
    Chile in 2005 to cover shortages in the internal market
    despite the existence of valid contracts between Chile and
    local gas suppliers.

    ¶12. (C) President Kirchner is not skilled at international
    diplomacy and often ignores basic protocol. Kirchner's
    gaffes with foreign dignitaries are legendary. In June 2004,
    Kirchner left Russian leader Vladimir Putin waiting at the
    Moscow airport for a meeting that never happened, reportedly
    because Cristina Kirchner wanted to spend more time shopping
    at their previous stop in Prague. The GOA claimed that "bad
    weather" had delayed their takeoff when weather reports
    showed sunny conditions in Prague. Later that year,
    President Kirchner failed to attend a state dinner he was
    supposed to host for visiting Vietnamese President Tran Duc
    Luong. In like fashion, Kirchner failed to attend a
    reception in honor of the State visit of Queen Beatriz of
    Holland in March of 2006. Kirchner also never receives new
    Ambassadors, as state protocol would dictate, relegating this
    responsibility to Vice President Daniel Scioli.

    ¶13. (C) Kirchner relies on an ever-shrinking group of
    long-time advisors to make key decisions, many of whom lack
    international, business and economic expertise (See Reftel
    D). No one from the Foreign Ministry is part of Kirchner's
    inner circle of advisors, and very few of Kirchner's close
    associates had overseas experience before Kirchner became
    President (See Reftel F). As a result, Kirchner often
    receives poor advice on international issues, such as when
    Legal and Technical Secretary Carlos Zannini reportedly
    convinced Kirchner that taking a tough line publicly on
    counter terrorism would, in the eyes of the USG, compensate
    for being critical of the U.S. in other areas and opposing
    the FTAA at the Summit of the Americas (See Reftel E).

    ------------------------------------
    COMMENT -- IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.
    ------------------------------------

    ¶14. (C) Kirchner's peculiar operating and decision-making
    style defines Argentine policymaking, and in the coming year,
    may lead to more challenges in the U.S.-Argentine
    relationship, as Kirchner focuses on shoring up his
    center-left political base for the 2007 elections. Given
    poll numbers that show Argentines have the least positive
    view of the U.S. out of all nations in the region, the U.S.
    will be a convenient target for Kirchner. As during the 2003
    presidential campaign, Kirchner will likely portray himself

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    as the lone true defender of Argentina in the world
    community. The Casa Rosada has reportedly already begun an
    effort to link Roberto Lavagna to the U.S., for example by
    encouraging press articles that the U.S. approved and is
    sponsoring a potential Lavagna campaign for President.

    ¶15. (C) Kirchner has a history of using international
    disputes, like the paper mill conflict with Uruguay, to gain
    domestic popular support. We have been told by our British
    colleagues that relations between the U.K. and Argentina are
    at their lowest point in 15 years because Kirchner has chosen
    a confrontational attitude with the U.K. on the Falkland
    Islands dispute, thereby making political use of an issue
    that is at the core of Argentine national identity. As
    leading political analyst Rosendo Fraga told Poloff, "This
    year, Kirchner will use the U.K. and Uruguay as targets, and
    next year, it will be the U.S." Kirchner has been described
    to us by his close associates as someone who constantly
    focuses on the costs and benefits of his political decisions.
    During a recent trip to Spain, Kirchner criticized the
    U.S.'s "absence" and lack of significant assistance to the
    region. Former Minister Lavagna told the Ambassador that
    Kirchner did this in order to counter the image that he had
    been too forthcoming with Spanish multinationals during the
    trip. As the 2007 presidential campaign approaches, we
    cannot rule out occasional anti-U.S. diatribes by Kirchner in
    order to placate his leftist supporters.

    GUTIERREZ

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