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### Viewing cable 07MADRID2265, POLITICAL STRATEGIES DEVELOP FOR MARCH GENERAL

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07MADRID2265 | 2007-12-18 13:01 | 2010-12-03 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid

`

    VZCZCXRO4850
    PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
    DE RUEHMD #2265/01 3521316
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 181316Z DEC 07
    FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3972
    INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 002265

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2017
    TAGS: PREL SP
    SUBJECT: POLITICAL STRATEGIES DEVELOP FOR MARCH GENERAL
    ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

    Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b)
    and (d).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: As we head into the holidays, the polls
    continue to suggest a close race in the March general
    election, with President Zapatero and the Partido Socialista
    Obrero Espanol (PSOE) perhaps enjoying a slight lead over
    Mariano Rajoy and the Partido Popular (PP). Recent
    conversations with key figures in the leading parties suggest
    that when the campaign kicks into high gear in January, both
    parties will be emphasizing the economy (with sharply
    different views on how it fares). The PSOE will trumpet
    itself as the party of social tolerance and environmental
    protection. The PP will argue that Zapatero has given too
    much ground to regional interests at the expense of Spanish
    national unity, has been weak in dealing with ETA, and has
    not adequately addressed the immigration issue. We do not
    expect foreign policy to be a key issue, although the PSOE
    will remind socialist voters that a return of the PP could
    mean a return to the pro-U.S. foreign policy of former PP
    President Aznar. Both parties think turnout levels will be
    the determining factor, since PP voters are widely believed
    to be more disciplined and hence could be over-represented if
    relatively few people vote on election day. END SUMMARY.

    PSOE SECRETARY GENERAL CONFIDENT BUT HOLDING HIS CARDS CLOSE
    --------------------------------------------- ---------------

    ¶2. (C) Pepe Blanco, Secretary General of the PSOE, acts as
    the de-facto party chairman and as the senior political
    advisor to Zapatero. Talking to the Ambassador, he compared
    this election to a heavy-weight title bout, and claimed the
    PP was not really in the fight. Blanco said he had assembled
    the finest polling team ever to work in Spanish politics.
    Boasting of his team's technical expertise, Blanco said they
    had conducted extensive focus group sessions all over Spain
    and would develop specific policy positions to reflect the
    interests of the voting public. Blanco confidentially
    expressed his certainty that the PSOE had the clear advantage
    in the campaign, citing weekly polls consistently in favor of
    Zapatero, and estimated a winning margin of 6-7 points over
    Rajoy based on current data. Blanco also said the polls were
    trending upwards over the last several weeks.

    ¶3. (C) Acknowledging that PSOE-inclined voters tend to be
    more complacent than PP voters, Blanco said he would never
    make public any data showing Zapatero held a comfortable
    lead. Blanco's strategy and tactics hinge on convincing the
    PSOE voters that their vote is critical to prevent the PP
    from regaining the Presidency. The message will be, as
    Blanco framed it bluntly, "vote for the PSOE or live under
    the rule of reactionary Neanderthals." He also admitted
    Zapatero is already seen as too moderate by some PSOE
    "left-leaners" and they might be disinclined to cast a vote
    in his favor. Only by keeping the PSOE voters feeling
    threatened with the possibility of a PP victory could the
    strategists ensure that people will turn up at the polls on
    voting day.

    ¶4. (C) Blanco noted that if PSOE does win the election, it
    will bring a major turnover in the PP structure as Rajoy will
    be forced to turn over the reins to another political figure.
    Blanco and other officials like Elena Valenciano, PSOE
    Secretary for Foreign Affairs, are counting on Zapatero's

    SIPDIS
    voter appeal and what they describe as Rajoy's "wooden"
    campaign style.

    PP FOCUS ON ECONOMY, FAMILY
    ------------------------------

    ¶5. (C) In a December 4 meeting with Ana Pastor, a close
    advisor to Rajoy, the Ambassador learned that the PP campaign
    team was reassessing its strategy and implementing
    recommendations from U.S. political consultants. In a moment
    of candor, Pastor said that the PP assumed previously that
    Spanish voters recognized implicitly Rajoy's intellect and
    capacity, saying, "Rajoy would be a better President than he
    is a candidate." PP consultants advised that voters
    perceived Rajoy as distant and unsympathetic. The PP team
    intends to create opportunities for Rajoy to show more
    empathy and human connection with voters. They will
    emphasize the importance of the family with linkages to
    health, education, financial independence and security. The
    PP will also continue to focus on pocketbook issues such as
    rising interest rates (home ownership -- vice renting -- and
    variable rate mortgages are the norm here) and inflation.
    Pastor will work with Rajoy to put in place a credible
    finance team that can compete with the success of current
    Minister of Economy Pedro Solbes and articulate a strong

    MADRID 00002265 002 OF 003

    financial stability message to the electorate.

    ¶6. (C) Pastor, like other PP interlocutors, criticized the
    PSOE for diminishing Spain's international prestige during
    the last three years. According to Pastor, Zapatero
    abandoned the transatlantic relationship and reduced Spain's
    international influence. The PP would seek to expand Spain's
    prestige and reaffirm key alliances. Citing missed
    opportunities and mishandling of important portfolios such as
    the Middle East, North Africa, Venezuela and Cuba, Pastor
    admitted that foreign policy might not be a decisive issue in
    the March elections. Nevertheless, she argued that increased
    drug trafficking from Latin America (e.g., Venezuela) and
    rising consumption in Spain could give the PP a way to tie
    the PSOE's foreign policy blunders to the concerns of
    ordinary voters.

    ¶7. (C) Acknowledging that all politics are local and that the
    election would be won or lost on "hometown issues," Pastor
    said that the "human connection" strategy would play a big
    part in regional politics. Andalucia is a primary target for
    getting out the vote, and the PP will play up the need for
    more education and training opportunities (local press noted
    Andalucia was ranked lower than Turkey in a recent education
    survey). In Catalonia, the PP hopes a series of
    well-publicized debacles involving public infrastructure
    (commuter train interruptions and electricity blackouts) will
    lead Catalan voters (who are unlikely to vote for the PP in
    any circumstance) to stay home on election day.

    PP SEEKS TO UP THE LEVEL OF CHARISMA
    ------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) During a lunch hosted by the DCM with five members of
    the PP electoral committee, the guests recognized Rajoy was
    behind in the polls but claimed to take comfort from the fact
    that the polls failed to predict their strong showing in
    Spain's May 2005 municipal elections. The advisors theorized
    the campaign would be fought hardest in about 20 cities where
    congressional seats are won or lost by a handful of votes.
    Each party will put its most charismatic candidates on the
    ballots in these key areas (e.g., Valencia). The PP team
    said their campaign would focus on a softening economy,
    Zapatero's alleged weakness in the face of Basque and Catalan
    demands for more autonomy and fiscal privileges, and rising
    concerns over immigration.

    ¶9. (C) If PP did win the election, Ignacio Astarloa, PP
    Executive Secretary for Security and Justice, has been
    mentioned to us as the potential Minister of Interior (among
    others by Astarloa himself) and Angel Acebes, PP General
    Secretary has been mentioned as Vice President and senior

    SIPDIS
    policy advisor. There has been hedging about who might be
    Minister of Foreign Affairs, with a hint that that PP
    insiders such as Jorge Moragas or Gustavo Aristegui might be
    passed over in favor of a senior career diplomat.

    ¶10. (C) Astarloa told us he expects the March election to be
    close (within two to three percent). He declined to
    speculate as to which party was ahead at this point, but he
    admitted what many observers have noted: the PP might have
    overplayed its hand during the last eighteen months with its
    harsh criticism of the PSOE for being soft on terrorism.
    Nevertheless, he believed Rajoy had much more credibility
    than Zapatero on security issues, and that, combined with
    effective messages on the economy and immigration, could win
    the day. Like Pastor, he emphasized framing issues in a way
    that connected with voters and cited immigration as one such
    issue. He noted the rising number of immigrants was
    beginning to affect ordinary Spaniards as they sought access
    to social services such as health and education. He also
    believed immigration could be linked to law and order
    concerns such as gang violence.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶11. (C) While the general sense seems to be that the PSOE is
    slightly ahead, it is too early to make predictions. Rajoy
    has so far failed to land any body blows on Zapatero.
    Instead, the PSOE has had some success (thanks in part to PP
    missteps) in depicting the PP as mean-spirited and needlessly
    divisive. Nevertheless, Spanish voters will not get serious
    about this campaign until January or even February. Rajoy
    still has time to get his message across (it appears there
    will be two televised debates). There is also the very real
    possibility that the softening economy, especially if
    unemployment jumps, will spook the voters. Finally, a boring
    or negative campaign could suppress turnout, which everyone
    seems to believe could hand the PP a victory.

    MADRID 00002265 003 OF 003

    ¶12. (C) A lurking issue for the PP is that even if it beats
    the PSOE, it may not win enough seats to govern without
    forming alliances with other parties. There are 350 seats in
    Congress, and 176 are required to govern. In 2004, the PSOE
    won 164, the PP 148, CiU (the main Catalan party) ten, ERC
    (another Catalan party) eight, the PNV (the main Basque
    party) seven, the IU (far left) five, and smaller parties a
    total of eight. The PSOE combined with ERC and IU to add 13
    to their total of 164. The PP electoral committee has
    acknowledged to us they might have to seek alliances with the
    Catalan or Basque parties to govern, but it is far from
    certain that parties from the same regions the PP criticizes
    for demanding too much autonomy from the central government
    will ally themselves with the PP if the time comes.
    Certainly they would try to exact a heavy price.

    ¶13. (C) Finally, there is the unexpected. The terrorist
    attacks three days before the 2004 election probably cost the
    PP the presidency (certainly that is what the PP believes).
    With the polls so close, no one can rule out some unforeseen
    event that would turn the campaigns upside down. Whatever
    the case, we will be watching closely.
    AGUIRRE

`