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### Viewing cable 09ISTANBUL83, US-IRAN RELATIONS: WHY IRAN REFUSED THE US

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09ISTANBUL83 | 2009-03-03 06:06 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | SECRET | Consulate Istanbul

`

    VZCZCXRO7492
    PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHIT #0083/01 0620654
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 030654Z MAR 09
    FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8801
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000083

    SIPDIS

    LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY;
    ASHGABAT FOR TANBORN; BAGHDAD FOR BUZBEE AND FLINCHBAUGH;
    DUBAI FOR IRPO

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS KDEM IR
    SUBJECT: US-IRAN RELATIONS:  WHY IRAN REFUSED THE US
    BADMINTON TEAM

    REF: IRPO DUBAI 95

    Classified By: Deputy Principal Officer Sandra Oudkirk; Reason 1.5 (d)

    ¶1.  (S) Summary: A trusted contact claims he was told by a
    close advisor to Iranian President Ahmadinejad that Iran
    denied visas for the planned February 4, 2009 visit of the US
    women's badminton because of the USG's "bad faith" in
    announcing the visit earlier than Iran had requested.
    According to the contact, Supreme Leader Khamenei only agreed
    to the visit after Ahmadinejad urged him to do so, and only
    on the understanding that no public announcements would be
    made until after the team's arrival in Iran.  Instead, the
    USG announced the visit on February 2, as the team was
    awaiting Iranian visas in Dubai.  The regime wanted to
    maintain full control of media coverage of the event, to
    avoid a replay of the 1998 US wrestling team visit, when
    Iranian crowds were filmed waving American flags and cheering
    the US team.  The regime believed the USG issued the early
    announcement to create a similar dynamic, and now Khamenei
    and Ahmadinejad feel "burned."  Comment: If accurate, this
    scenario underscores the challenges to building trust with a
    regime that feels an obsessive fear of losing control over
    both the process and substance of possible engagement with
    the USG.  End Summary.

    ¶2.  (S) "A first test":  A trusted contact of ConGen
    Istanbul's Iran Watcher who recently returned from a visit to
    Tehran recounted a detailed explanation he said he received
    from a close advisor to President Ahmadinejad over why Iran
    refused to issue visas in early February to the US women's
    badminton team.  In comments that track with IRPO Dubai's
    reftel reporting, our contact says he was told that Supreme
    Leader Khamenei was initially opposed to allowing the visit,
    but President Ahmadinejad urged him to accept it.  Even
    though planning for this cultural exchange began before the
    Obama administration took office, the regime including
    Ahmadinejad believed this represented an important early
    gesture by the new administration to build confidence and
    show respect, and therefore a "first test" whether Iran could
    work effectively with the Obama administration.

    ¶3.  (S) Maximum GOI control: According to the presidential
    advisor, the Iranian side insisted on a "carefully
    calibrated" sequence of timing as a key requirement for
    allowing the visit to proceed.  Iran believes it had a clear
    understanding with the USG (working through the US and
    Iranian badminton federations, which in Iran's case took
    instructions directly from the President's office) that
    announcement of the badminton team's travel to Iran and
    participation in the Fajr Tournament would be embargoed until
    the tournament's opening ceremony on February 5.  Iran
    demanded this condition because Iran's leaders still remember
    with discomfort the 1998 US wrestling team's visit to Iran,
    when -- because of what Iran now sees as a failure on its
    part to insist on airtight control over media coverage of the
    event -- Iranian and international press broadcast scenes of
    Iranian crowds cheering wildly as the US team entered the
    arena carrying an American flag and continued to cheer the US
    team during its matches, sometimes even waving American flags
    in support.  Khamenei demanded that there be no possible
    repeat of such a scene within Iran.  Given that the badminton
    tournament was a women's sporting event and women's sports
    are not televised in Iran, the regime felt confident it could
    maintain full control over the event itself, allowing press
    coverage only of the opening and closing ceremonies.  To
    maximize its control, the regime insisted on an embargo over
    any announcement or media coverage of the US team's
    participation until the team's arrival, i.e., after the team
    had been issued visas in Dubai and flown to Tehran.  This
    important detail was explicitly agreed between the sports
    federations, representing (in Iran's view) an understanding
    between the highest levels of the USG and GOI, the
    Ahmadinejad advisor insisted to our contact.

    ¶4.  (S) "We were burned":  Thus, when surprised regime
    leaders saw the February 2 State Department announcement of
    the badminton team's participation in the Fajr Tournament,
    according to our contact, they immediately assumed "bad
    faith" on the part of the USG, concluding that this was an
    deliberate effort by the administration to gain advantage
    over the GOI and undercut the regime's control of media
    coverage of the event.  The regime's immediate response,
    ordered by Khamenei, was to refuse to issue the visas.  As
    the Ahmadinejad advisor explained to our contact:  "Battles
    of this nature, when foreign visitors come to Iran to
    participate in sensitive or symbolic events, must be on our
    terms and under our full control.  We had an understanding

    ISTANBUL 00000083  002 OF 002

    with the U.S. over how this would proceed, and we were
    burned."  He added that Ahmadinejad, having personally
    persuaded a reluctant Khamenei to allow the visit, felt
    particularly aggrieved, and speculated to his close advisors
    afterwards that this was evidence of "anti-Iranian influence"
    among recently appointed foreign policy officials in the USG.
     In typical Iranian fashion, GOI spokesmen blamed the
    cancellation on other factors, including (from the MFA) the
    "time consuming process" of visa issuance and (from Keyhan
    and other conservative mouthpieces) the USG's failure to
    condemn Israel over Gaza.  But according to our contact,
    Tehran assumes Washington "fully understands the real reason"
    for the cancellation.

    ¶5.  (S) Comment:  Although it may seem far-fetched that such
    a non-political exchange visit would be cancelled over a
    seemingly mundane detail like the timing of the press
    announcement of the visit, in Iran's case this scenario is
    entirely plausible.  If accurate, this scenario highlights
    the challenges to building confidence with a regime that
    feels an obsessive fear of losing control over either the
    substance or process of possible engagement with the USG.
    Indeed, this underscores that to Iran the process of
    negotiations may often be as critical to demonstrating
    "goodwill" and to ensuring eventual success as the substance
    of the negotiations.  This scenario also illustrates the
    regime's rigid expectation that, with regard to early
    confidence-building measures from the USG (especially
    involving CBMs likely to generate press coverage), the GOI
    must feel fully in control over how such measures play out,
    and that at the first sign of any deviation from what it
    believes is an agreed process, its first instinct --
    reflective of its acute fixation on self-preservation -- will
    be to shut the process down and blame the other side.  End
    comment.

    WIENER

`