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### Viewing cable 09MADRID1121, SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09MADRID1121 | 2009-11-23 10:10 | 2010-12-17 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHMD #1121/01 3271031
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 231031Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1467
    INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
    RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0294

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 001121

    SIPDIS

    FOR JARAHN HILLSMAN, WHA/CCA
    USEU FOR BARBARA THOMAS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2019
    TAGS: CU ETRD ETTC PREL SP
    SUBJECT: SPAIN/CUBA: TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT

    REF: A. STATE 115416
    ¶B. MADRID 483
    ¶C. MADRID 920
    ¶D. MADRID 983
    ¶E. HAVANA 683
    ¶F. HAVANA 639

    Classified By: Acting DCM William H. Duncan, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
    .

    ¶1. (C) Per request in reftel A, Post provides the following
    for use in assessing whether to recommend that the President
    continue to suspend Title III of the Cuban Liberty and
    Solidarity (Libertad) Act. The information in this message
    is keyed to questions posed in reftel A, paragraph 4 and
    updates information reported in reftel B regarding the
    relationship between the Cuban government and the Government
    of Spain.

    ¶2. (SBU) Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos was the
    highest-ranking Spanish official to visit Cuba during the
    period covered by this report. The visit (refs E, F), the
    subsequent "release" of two political prisoners, and the
    ongoing debate about Spain's efforts to replace the EU's
    Common Position are the key factors in evaluating Spanish
    contributions to democratic change in Cuba during this
    period. Speculation that was rife during the first half of
    2009 over a possible visit to Cuba by Spanish President
    Zapatero had all but dissipated at the end of the summer, in
    the wake of Cuba's expulsion in May of a team of Spanish
    intelligence agents and as the GOS anticipated changes in
    United States policy toward Cuba and toward its own EU
    presidency in 2010. Asked about an anticipated trip by
    President Zapatero to Cuba, Moratinos said October 18 that
    given the exigencies of the EU Presidency, a Zapatero visit
    was not anticipated in the near future.

    ¶3. (C) Has the host country, in Post's opinion, worked to
    promote the advancement of democracy and human rights in Cuba?

    The Spanish Government supports democratic objectives
    in Cuba. Nonetheless, its focus on building relationships
    and its fear of both provoking a backlash against human
    rights activists and jeopardizing Spanish economic interests
    limit Spain's willingness to take tough stands against the
    regime. With the European Union, Spain continues to seek
    political and economic engagement with Cuba and to play a
    leadership role in the EU's political and human rights
    dialogue with Cuba. During the period covered by this
    report, Spanish officials alluded to Spain's hopes for even
    greater EU-Cuba engagement during Spain's EU presidency in
    the first half of 2010. FM Moratinos has spoken increasingly
    of the possibility of replacing the EU's 1990 Common Position
    toward Cuba during the Spanish EU presidency. Spain is
    expected to encourage the EU27 to start negotiating an
    alternative cooperation agreement with Cuba, to include a
    "democratic clause" and requirements with regard to Human
    Rights and Rule of Law, as a precursor to eliminating the
    Common Position. (NOTE: A bi-partisan, non-binding roadmap
    for the Spanish presidency agreed to November 18 makes no
    mention of Cuba, however.)

    ¶4. (C) MFA officials claim the Zapatero Administration
    remains committed to the spirit of the Common Position but
    Spain seeks to initiate an EU process to find a new way to
    relate to Cuba that includes a political dialogue conditioned
    on results. Though the European Commission would decide
    among various forms of accords, the GOS says a new country
    strategy paper with a democratic clause that puts everything
    on the table would be stricter than the existing Common
    Position. FM Moratinos testified in the Senate on November
    17 that not a single EU country had spoken against his
    intention to replace the Common Position on Cuba during
    Spain's EU Presidency. According to Moratinos, some other
    European countries might try to make adjustments, but the
    Spanish proposal -- to negotiate a bilateral EU-Cuba
    agreement that would lead to greater Cuban compliance with
    human rights and engagement on reform activities -- was not
    encountering any opposition.

    ¶5. (C) Following Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos's
    October 17-19 trip to Havana, reportedly as a concession to
    the GOS, Cuba announced October 20 the release of two
    individuals and eased travel restrictions for two prominent
    dissidents seeking medical attention. Moratinos claimed
    publicly that the releases were proof that Spain,s policy of
    engagement achieved positive results. Cuba commuted the
    sentence (already half completed) of Nelson Aguiar, aged 64,
    one of the Group of 75 condemned in 2003. Spanish

    businessman Pedro Hermosilla, detained several weeks earlier
    in Havana on bribery charges, was released on bail the night
    of October 19, reportedly at the request of Moratinos.
    Lazaro Angulo, another of the Group of 75, had been granted
    provisional release in 2006 for health reasons but was
    prevented from leaving Cuba. As of October 20, Angulo was
    "free without conditions" (presumably to seek medical care in
    Costa Rica or the Untied States). A fourth individual, Elsa
    Morejon, the wife of imprisoned activist Dr. Oscar Biscet,
    who already had a GOC-issued health exit permit, was allowed
    by her handlers to travel in search of medical treatment.
    (She has been under a doctor's care in Oviedo since November
    3.) Post's dissident contacts called the Moratinos trip and
    subsequent news of the releases "absurd" and "stingy"
    (cochinilla) and dismissed the lessening of restrictions on
    Angulo's and Morejon's movement, saying the Cuban government
    had no right to prevent free people from pursuing medical
    care. Asked whether the MFA felt it could take credit for
    the "releases" and whether Spain was satisfied, Director
    General for IberoAmerican Affairs Juan Carlos Sanchez Alonso
    conceded they were insufficient but "better than nothing."
    Cuba wanted to send a message and the GOS, though it wants
    all the prisoners to be released, encouraged the Cuban
    government to allow the sickest of the prisoners to leave.

    ¶6. (C) Has the host country made public statements or
    undertaken other governmental actions, such as resolutions in
    national assemblies condemning human rights abuses in Cuba;
    or actions in support of civil society in Cuba through the
    host country's diplomatic missions or other fora?

    President Zapatero publicly supported U.S. overtures
    toward Cuba on May 24, saying it was up to Raul Castro to
    make the next move. GOS officials have been generally
    supportive of U.S. policy initiatives, sometimes suggesting
    the United States is becoming more like Spain in its approach
    to Cuba. Referencing the June 3 resolution to lift the
    47-year-old suspension of Cuba in the OAS, MFA State
    Secretary for Latin America Juan Pablo de Laiglesia commented
    June 4, "We think it is an important step for the
    strengthening of the inter-American system, and to overcome
    situations that took place under circumstances that are not
    the current ones." Before the Senate Commission for Latin
    American Affairs on June 9, FM Moratinos opined that the U.S.
    decision to "accept Cuba" (at the OAS) was in line with what
    Spain had always proposed: continued dialogue with Cuban
    authorities amid mutual respect. Moratinos commented, "We do
    not follow Washington. When the U.S. has the same policy as
    the GOS, we congratulate ourselves, we support it, and we go
    with it. But we don't subordinate ourselves, as the previous
    (PP) government did on an issue as important to Spain as
    Cuba." Moratinos outlined GOS policy on Cuba, claiming Spain
    pressed Cuba to release 12 political prisoners, engage with
    the international community, and open a dialogue with the
    U.S. on immigration and humanitarian aid issues.

    ¶7. (SBU) Secretary of State for IberoAmerican Affairs de
    Laiglesia testified June 23 before the congressional
    Commission of Foreign Affairs that Spain believed the rest of
    the EU, Latin American governments, and the Obama
    Administration supported GOS policy of "critical dialogue"
    with Cuba. De Laiglesia stated the GOS preferred not to
    judge the decisions made by Latin American countries and
    favored a policy of respect over a judgmental "policy of
    declarations." De Laiglesia told the commission there were
    noticeable reforms under Raul Castro, including a reduction
    in the number of political prisoners and the absence of new
    harassment measures against the Cuban opposition, directly
    attributable to the GOS decision to re-open communications
    with Cuba in 2004.

    ¶8. (C) Coupled with Moratinos's subsequent meeting in Madrid
    with Adriana Perez and Olga Salanueva, spouses of Gerardo
    Hernandez and Rene Gonzalez, two of five Cuban citizens
    sentenced in 2001 in the United States for serving as
    unregistered agents of the Cuban government, Moratinos's
    refusal to engage with civil society while in Havana drew
    harsh criticism from human rights activists. A group of 37
    Cuban political prisoners released a statement October 26
    criticizing Spain's policy toward Cuba, stating that FM
    Moratinos showed "disrespect" to the peaceful opposition by
    ignoring the group's request for a meeting during his recent
    visit. The group thanked the GOS for its efforts resulting
    in the release of political prisoner Nelson Aguiar, but
    warned that the gesture should not be taken as a "general
    willingness for change in general by the Cuban government,
    and should not merit changes in the Spanish and EU policy
    toward Cuba." By way of response, Moratinos pointed out that
    other prisoners have thanked the Spanish Ambassador to Cuba
    for GOS efforts and that the GOS is working for improvement
    on the island. Asked October 18 why he did not meet with
    Cuban dissidents, Moratinos responded that he did not come to
    meet with any one sector of society in particular but to
    strengthen bilateral relations, and he said that no one is
    his delegation would be meeting with the opposition or
    dissidents. MFA DG for IberoAmerican Affairs Sanchez Alonso
    told POLOFF October 29 that Moratinos knew of Cuban plans to
    liberate prisoners and did not want to risk their release
    over contentious discussions with the Cubans about where he
    could go and who he could see. The GOS did not make a formal
    offer to meet with dissidents, but Sanchez Alonso asserted
    they had unlimited access to the Spanish mission in Havana.
    He said Spain's political counselor talked to them (see also
    ref E), saying perhaps that was not the level of interaction
    the dissidents (none of whom had been elected and who did not
    represent all of Cuban society) would have preferred.

    ¶9. (C) Have there been any high-level diplomatic visits
    between Cuba and the host country in the past six months?

    --Representatives of Spanish autonomous community and local
    governments visit Cuba often and maintain contacts and
    collaborative relationships. The Cuban government encourages
    and facilitates relations with the autonomous communities,
    especially with the Basque Country and to a lesser extent
    with Andalucia, Galicia, Castilla-La Mancha, and the Canary
    Islands. Catalonian Vice President Josep Lluis Carod-Rovira,
    of the independence-minded Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC)
    party, visited Havana July 5-7 on a cultural trip entitled
    "The Catalan Footprint in the Caribbean," part of a longer
    trip in which Carod-Rovira visited Catalan communities in the
    Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. Carod made public
    comments to Cubans of Catalonian decent, visited the Cuban
    Parliament and met the President of the Parliament, Ricardo
    Alarcon.

    -- Elena Valenciano, PSOE International Relations Secretary,
    announced in August she would lead a delegation to Cuba in
    October to assess the situation, and reach out to new
    interlocutors in the Cuban government and the Cuban Communist
    Party. Valenciano made no promises to meet with dissidents.
    Secretary of State de Laiglesia stressed to the Charge in
    September that Valenciano would be traveling in a political
    capacity and representing the Socialist Party, not/not the
    GOS (ref C). NOTE: The trip never took place, however.

    -- FM Moratinos earned the Wall Street Journal title of
    "Castro,s Man in Europe" upon visiting the island October
    17-19. The trip had as stated objectives to reinforce
    political dialogue, promote bilateral dialogue, to inform
    Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez and other officials
    about Spain,s EU Presidency objectives, and to reciprocate
    the October 2008 visit to Madrid of former Cuban Foreign
    Minister Perez Roque. Moratinos saw his Cuban counterpart,
    Bruno Rodriguez, for lunch October 19. Following a
    three-hour meeting with Raul Castro on October 19 Half of
    which was devoted to human rights, according to MFA staff),
    Moratinos told the press that Spanish-Cuban bilateral
    relations were "normalized" and that as of one Spain's
    priorities during its EU Presidency, Madrid would seek the
    elimination of the EU's Common Position and its replacement
    with a mechanism that seeks to condition the normalization of
    relations between Member States and Cuba on the latter's
    democratization efforts and respect for human rights, in
    particular civil and political rights. Moratinos declared
    that the international community should not seek a political
    gesture from Havana and added it should be the Cubans who
    decide how to carry out their political affairs. According
    to press reports subsequent to both Moratinos's visit and
    Zapatero's October 13 meeting at the White House, President
    Obama asked Spain to transmit a message to the Cuban
    government: "Tell Raul that if he does not take any steps, I
    will not be able to either." Spanish diplomatic sources told
    leading daily El Pais that Obama said Moratinos should "tell
    the Cuban authorities we understand that change can't happen
    overnight, but down the road, when we look back at this time,
    it should be clear that now is when those changes began."

    ¶10. (C) What is the nature of investments (and names, if
    known) that host country businesses have in Cuba?

    Spain is believed to be the largest foreign investor in
    Cuba, though Spanish companies avoid publishing precise data
    out of concern that such information will be used to further
    U.S. enforcement actions under the Libertad Act. Spain's
    Ministry of Industry, Tourism, and Trade (MITYC) reported
    that there was no significant investment in Cuba in 2008 even
    though Spain continues to be among the foreign countries with
    the largest economic presence in Cuba.

    Tourism is one of the main industries in Cuba and Spain
    has a dominant position in the sector. Most of the 54 4-and
    5-star hotels managed by foreign firms are owned by Spanish
    companies. Tobacco is another leading Spanish investment in
    Cuba. Imperial Tobacco, which acquired Altadis (formerly
    Tabacalera, S.A.) in January 2008, has a 50 percent interest
    in Corporacion Habanos, the exclusive worldwide distributor
    of premium Cuban cigar brands such as Bohiba and Montecristo.
    Cuba is also among Spain's largest markets Latin America,
    with Spanish exports of 312.7 million euros in the first
    eight months of 2009. During his October visit, Foreign
    Minister Moratinos tried to secure payment of USD 300 million
    owed by Cuba to 280 Spanish businesses but blocked in Cuban
    banks.

    Spanish telecommunications giant Telefonica --
    currently operating in several Latin American countries
    including Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela --
    expressed interest in entering the Cuban market at a
    telecommunications conference in Santander on September 2.
    President for Latin America Affairs Jose Maria Alvarez
    Pallete said Telefonica would like to buy Telecom Italia's 27
    per cent stake in state-owned Cuban operator Etesca. Alvarez
    saw good prospects in Cuba, due to the low market penetration
    in a population of 11 million.

    ¶11. (C) Are there any bilateral trade agreements or other
    cooperative agreements between host country and Cuba?

    There is a bilateral "Commission on Economic-Industrial
    Cooperation" between Spain and Cuba that is intended to
    promote bilateral trade and investment. The work of the
    Commission has been suspended for several years due to
    disputes over Cuba's non-payment of debt to Spanish entities.
    Spain and Cuba have bilateral cooperative agreements on air
    transportation, mutual customs assistance, promotion and
    protection of investment, double taxation and tax evasion,
    tourism, and scientific and technical cooperation. Spain
    offered to restructure Cuba's debt of more than 1,500 euros
    and provide more than 100 million euros in short-term credit
    after the recent hurricanes.

    ¶12. (C) Are there any exchange programs between host country
    and Cuba, including but not limited to: scholarships for host
    country nationals to study in Cuba; Cuban-paid medical travel
    for host country nationals; and Cuban doctors working in the
    host country?

    Post is not aware of any such programs between Spain
    and Cuba. However, Spanish regional governments have
    substantial assistance programs in Cuba. Such assistance is
    channeled primarily through the Cuban government, and to a
    lesser degree through multilateral aid organizations.
    CHACON

`