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### Viewing cable 09STATE83014, COMBATTING VENEZUELAN DIVERSION OF ARMS TO THE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09STATE83014 | 2009-08-10 21:09 | 2010-12-08 21:09 | SECRET | Secretary of State

`

    VZCZCXYZ0015
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHC #3014 2222149
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 102132Z AUG 09
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0000
    RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0000
    INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0000
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 0000

` `

    S E C R E T STATE 083014

    NOFORN
    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2019
    TAGS: PARM PREL XT XM RS CO VE SW SP
    SUBJECT: COMBATTING VENEZUELAN DIVERSION OF ARMS TO THE
    FARC

    REF: A. BOGOTA 2409 B. STATE 81957: REPORT OF U.S.-
    RUSSIA MANPADS EXPERTS MEETING

    Classified By: EUR/PRA ACTING DIRECTOR KATHELEEN
    MORENSKI FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

    ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassies Madrid and
    Stockholm see para 6.

    ¶2. (S/NF) Summary: In an August 3 telcon with the
    Secretary, Colombian President Uribe expressed concerns over
    evidence that three Swedish-origin anti-tank missiles sold to
    Venezuela were found in the possession of the Revolutionary
    Armed Force of Colombia (FARC). The Swedish Embassy in
    Bogota (Ref A) confirmed that the weapons were manufactured
    by Sweden and sold to the Government of Venezuela (GOV) in
    ¶1988. This incident has been widely reported in the press,
    and underscores growing ties between the GOV and the FARC.
    The matter is of concern to the Government of Colombia (GOC)
    and to us because the weapons were diverted from Venezuelan
    military stocks and because of other separate, compelling
    evidence of the GOV's support for the FARC. The GOC has
    taken an aggressive, fact-based approach in addressing the
    GOV's support for the FARC, and has requested USG help in
    urging all nations that have completed or are contemplating
    arms sales to Venezuela to take GOV support for the FARC into
    account, including reconsidering such sales. As current and
    upcoming EU Presidents respectively, Sweden and Spain are
    well positioned to raise awareness of this incident and to
    urge other EU members, as well as Russia, to strengthen
    transparency and accountability in arms exports to Venezuela.
    End Summary.

    ¶3. (S/NF) Background: According to Ref A, the GOC has
    seized three M-136 AT4 anti-tank missiles from the batch
    Sweden sold to Venezuela. The Swedish confirmed that these
    weapons were manufactured by Saab Bofors Dynamics of Sweden
    and sold to Venezuela in 1988. Since media reports about
    this incident broke out in July, the Swedish government has
    been actively working with Colombia to investigate how the
    diversion occurred. The Swedish Ambassador in Bogota failed
    to get a response from the Venezuelan Defense and Foreign
    Ministries to investigate how the Swedish-origin weapons
    ended up in the hands of FARC guerillas. On July 29,
    Colombian President Uribe issued a statement highlighting
    that Sweden had asked Venezuela to investigate, but the GOV
    had not yet responded. After initially claiming that the
    story was a Colombian fabrication, on August 5 Venezuelan
    President Chavez claimed that the missiles were stolen from a
    Venezuelan naval base fourteen years ago; he said Sweden had
    "fallen into (Colombian
    government's) play" and asserted his government would not be
    providing Sweden any further explanation.

    ¶4. (S/NF) Background continued: As highlighted in Uribe's
    July 29 statement, the Colombian government is also concerned
    about FARC interest in acquiring man-portable air defense
    systems (MANPADS). Given that Russia has begun delivery of
    sophisticated Igla-S MANPADS to Venezuela, over the last
    several months we have engaged at high levels with Russia to
    express our concerns over the possibility of the FARC
    acquiring them. In early March, Secretary Clinton raised the
    sale with Russian FM Sergey Lavrov, who promised that
    "surprise inspections" were in place to prevent unauthorized
    re-transfer of these systems. During a U.S.-Russian experts
    meeting on MANPADS held in Washington July 9-10 (Ref B), the
    Russian side promised a written response to our request for
    clarification of Lavrov's remark. We have also raised with
    Russia evidence of Russian-produced assault rifle ammunition
    sold to Venezuela and found in FARC caches, and have sought
    an investigation. WHA A/S Shannon presented this evidence,
    including
    photographs, to Russian Ambassador Kislyak May 28 and
    requested that Russia look into the matter. On August 6, WHA
    PDAS Kelly raised the issue again with Russian DCM Darchiyev,
    seeking an update on the Russian inquiry; Darchiyev said that
    the Russian government continued to investigate and would
    provide an update shortly.

    ¶5. (S/NF) The recovered Russian-origin ammunition in
    Colombia, the ongoing Russian sale of advanced Igla-S MANPADS
    to Venezuela, and the latest Swedish incident have all
    reinforced growing concerns about the risk of increasing
    proliferation of arms to terrorist and criminal organizations
    in the region. Part of our strategy to counter this, and to
    respond to the GOC request, is to engage directly with
    countries which have or potentially could export arms to
    Venezuela. Russia is the predominant arms supplier to
    Venezuela, totaling over $5 billion last year and growing.
    However, the latest Swedish incident underscores that older
    systems, including those supplied in the past by EU
    countries, can end up in the wrong hands, particularly as
    they are displaced in Venezuelan inventories by newer weapons
    acquired. To this end, the USG seeks to encourage Sweden and
    Spain, in their capacity as the current and upcoming EU
    Presidents respectively, to raise awareness of
    Venezuelan-FARC ties, to strengthen accountability and t
    ransparency within the EU over arms sales to Venezuela given
    these recent reports of diversions, and to take action in
    multilateral export control regimes. As appropriate, we will
    seek to keep the GOC apprised of our efforts. End background.

    ¶6. (SBU) Embassies Stockholm and Madrid are requested to
    convey at the highest appropriate level the following talking
    points. Embassies are also requested to encourage host
    governments to share their views on these points with the
    Government of Colombia:

    Talking Points for Embassy Stockholm:

    --We appreciate your efforts to work with Colombia and to
    press Venezuela for an explanation on how three M-136 AT4
    anti-tank missiles Sweden sold to Venezuela in 1988 ended up
    in FARC stocks.

    --Diversion of conventional weapons, including MANPADS, to
    terrorist and criminal organizations, such as the FARC,
    presents a clear threat to peace and security in Latin
    America.

    --We prefer that EU members not transfer arms to Venezuela.
    If arms are transferred to Venezuela, we ask that EU Member
    States work to strengthen transparency and accountability
    measures for such exports, such as through post-shipment
    verification to ensure that the arms remain in Venezuelan
    hands.

    -- We are aware of and appreciate EU efforts to strengthen
    transparency and accountability via its Code of Conduct.

    --We encourage Sweden, in its capacity as EU President, to
    raise further awareness of this matter within the EU and
    through multilateral export-control mechanisms.

    --To that end, we urge Sweden to present a paper on the
    illegal transfer of Swedish arms from Venezuelan stocks, as
    well as Sweden's view of arms transfers to Venezuela, at the
    Wassenaar General Working Group in October.

    -- We would also urge you to raise these transfers with the
    Russian government. The United States has raised concerns
    with Russia about arms transfers to Venezuela. Sharing your
    experiences with the Russian government may encourage them to
    ensure that their weapons are not diverted.

    If asked about U.S. arms sales to Venezuela:

    --As you may be aware, U.S. persons are barred by statute
    from transferring arms to Venezuela, a consequence of a 2006
    determination that Venezuela was "not fully cooperating" on
    counter-terrorism issues.

    Talking Points for Embassy Madrid:

    --Diversion of conventional weapons, including MANPADS, to
    terrorist and criminal organizations, such as the FARC,
    presents a clear threat to peace and security in Latin
    America.

    --We prefer that EU members not transfer arms to Venezuela.
    If arms are transferred to Venezuela, we ask that EU Member
    States work to strengthen transparency and accountability
    measures for such exports, such as through post-shipment
    verification to ensure that the arms remain in Venezuelan
    hands.

    -- We are aware of and appreciate EU efforts to strengthen
    transparency and accountability via its Code of Conduct.

    --We encourage Spain, in its capacity as EU President in
    2010, to raise further awareness of this matter within the EU
    and through multilateral export-control mechanisms.

    --We would also urge you to raise these transfers with the
    Russian government. The United States has raised concerns
    with Russia about arms transfers to Venezuela. Sharing your
    experiences with the Russian government may encourage them to
    ensure that their weapons are not diverted.

    If asked about U.S. arms sales to Venezuela:

    --As you may be aware, U.S. persons are barred by statute
    from transferring arms to Venezuela, a consequence of a 2006
    determination that Venezuela was "not fully cooperating" on
    counter-terrorism issues.

    ¶7. (SBU) Posts are requested to deliver demarche responses
    as soon as possible. POC for this activity is Nate Young
    (EUR/PRA): 202-647-7278; YoungNH@state.gov. Department
    appreciates posts' assistance.
    CLINTON

`