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### Viewing cable 04MADRID960, DEALING WITH ZAPATERO: AN INEXPERIENCED BUT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
04MADRID960 | 2004-03-18 18:06 | 2010-12-07 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000960

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2014
    TAGS: PGOV PREL SP PSOE
    SUBJECT: DEALING WITH ZAPATERO: AN INEXPERIENCED BUT
    PROBABLY MANAGEABLE PARTNER

    Classified By: Ambassador George Argyros for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: This message provides initial embassy
    thinking on how to deal with President-Elect Zapatero in the
    lead up to his government's formation and the early stages of
    his administration. Zapatero has no experience in
    administration or foreign affairs. He is likely to be a
    difficult but manageable interlocutor and carries with him
    the Spanish Left's skepticism of U.S. motives. Opposition to
    the war in Iraq is central to Zapatero,s appeal to voters.
    Nonetheless a UNSCR that gave the UN a leading role in the
    Iraq mission could allow Zapatero to save face and agree to
    maintain Spanish forces in Iraq. End summary.

    ¶2. (C) Some things to bear in mind

    --It is important to recall that Zapatero, who is 43, has no
    experience whatsoever in government administration. He has
    served as a member of the Parliament since he was 26.

    --The Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) was shocked that
    they won the elections and Zapatero and his people are
    scrambling to figure out what to do. He also made a number
    of campaign statements that might have come out differently
    had he thought he had a real chance of becoming president of
    the government of Spain.

    --As leader of Spain, Zapatero will be able to draw on some
    experienced PSOE party operatives and experienced diplomats
    and economists such as Miguel Angel Moratinos and Miguel
    Sebastian. But he will also have to make certain he does not
    provoke the image that he is replaying the corrupt government
    of Felipe Gonzalez, the PSOE President of Spain from
    1982-1996. So his team likely will include a mix of
    experienced people and newer and less experienced hands. The
    learning curve will be steep. Zapatero and his team will
    have a certain settling in period once the reality of
    government sets in.

    --We have already seen some 'wiggle room' in public
    statements on certain issues, including possibly on the pull
    out of Spanish troops from Iraq. Zapatero,s possible
    foreign minister, Miguel Angel Moratinos indicated in the
    March 18 Wall Street Journal that a UN resolution prior to
    June 30 could provide the context in which Spanish troops
    could remain. If by May we are beginning to negotiate a
    resolution and if France and Germany are on board, Zapatero
    might agree to leave the troops in Iraq.

    --Zapatero will have to work to dispel the image that he won
    because he will appease terrorists (or that he was elected by
    Al-Qaeda). He will almost certainly hear from his European
    colleagues on this issue. He will have to calibrate his
    decisions to avoid the impression that terrorists can
    influence his foreign policy moves.

    --Though terrorism and foreign policy are now front and
    center for Zapatero, many Spaniards believe his main
    challenge will be handling the increasingly vocal nationalist
    tendencies in Catalonia and the Basque region, which could
    threaten the Spanish constitutional order. Zapatero does not
    have the gravitas nor the credibility to deal with these
    issues effectively, many fear. It is not in the U.S.
    interest to see instability in the Spanish national system.

    --Under Zapatero, Spain will continue to face a terrorist
    threat, both from Al-Qaeda and from ETA. This is our most
    significant common challenge, on which we should seek to
    build a firm relationship.

    --On macro-economic issues, we can expect sound policies.
    The PSOE initiated many of the reforms which laid the basis
    for Spain,s current economic success, and Zapatero himself
    has credited the success of Aznar,s economic policies in the
    past. Zapatero has already endorsed PP Minister of Economy
    Rato to head the IMF. There are continued grounds for
    cooperation in this area.

    --The USG has worked well with previous socialist
    governments. Under Felipe Gonzalez, Spain reaffirmed its
    membership in NATO, despite the Socialists, previous
    opposition to NATO membership. We negotiated a renewal of
    our bilateral defense agreements. There is a positive
    history with PSOE on which to build.

    --We will have to accept that there are some issues on which
    we will disagree with the Zapatero government. Zapatero,s
    political philosophy, and that of his closest associates, is
    grounded in the European Left,s reflexive skepticism about
    U.S. motives at best, and anti-Americanism at worst.

    --We have long-term interests in Spain that transcend
    governments in power. Spain is a NATO ally, a strong and
    growing economic force in the EU with shared common
    historical and linguistic links with the Americas. Knowledge
    of and ties with the U.S., however, remain quite thin.
    Zapatero has little understanding of the U.S.

    --Spanish democracy is still rather immature - less than 30
    years old. The high voter turnout last week was a victory
    for democracy in Spain. We should avoid castigating Spanish
    voters and allow them to come to their own conclusions about
    the government that they have elected, albeit under
    extraordinary circumstances.

    ¶3. (C) Our overall approach

    --We believe it is in U.S. interest, both for relations with
    Spain and more broadly in Europe and in the Iraq Coalition
    that we allow Zapatero some time before we come to
    conclusions about steps he will take, including on Iraq.

    --The public line the White House and the Department have
    thus far taken, for example in the White House and Department
    briefings of March 16, is working and we can already see it
    resonating through opinion pieces in Spanish media. This
    will help us avoid an unhelpful U.S.-vs- Zapatero image that
    may be difficult to dispel later on when some rapprochement
    might be possible or needed by us or Spain for other reasons.

    --Rather, we should emphasize our long-term interests in and
    alliance with Spain, our good relations with the previous
    PSOE government, our shared interest combating terrorism, the
    strength of our economic relations and our shared interest in
    repairing strained transatlantic relations (the theme here is
    that Zapatero need not choose between Europe and the United
    States).

    --We should allow other European leaders to express their
    concerns to Zapatero about the appearance of giving in to
    terrorism. The views of France and Germany carry particular
    weight with Zapatero. We should offer our support and advice
    in the effort against terrorism, and should continue to do so
    at the highest levels.

    --We should also emphasize that transatlantic relations and
    close ties with Europe are not either/or propositions. The
    U.S. strongly supports European integration and enlargement.

    ¶4. (C) It will be important that the USG seek to engage
    Zapatero and his new team at senior levels as soon as
    possible, and continue practical areas of U.S. - Spanish
    cooperation that are outside of the difficult issues such as
    Iraq.

    Some suggested practical steps:

    --Secretary Powell connect with probable PSOE Foreign
    Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos as soon as possible.

    --Presidential letter to Zapatero as soon as he is invested
    (probably in late April); second congratulatory phone call as
    soon as he is in office.

    --Offer high-level intelligence briefing to Zapatero on
    counter-terrorism and other key world issues.

    --Suggest that Zapatero would be welcome in Washington as
    soon as he is able to visit.

    --Engage at high levels on counter-terrorism cooperation,
    with a visit by Secretary Ridge to meet with his counterpart
    (under new ministry name of Ministry of Security) once the
    new government is invested, and follow up at other levels
    immediately.

    --Suggest regular high-level and working-level consultations
    with new MFA on key issues - Middle East, Latin America, UN
    Security Council issues, human rights, common threats and
    challenges. Public diplomacy outreach the primacy and
    breadth of the U.S. - EU relationship will also be important.

    --Defense issues: Spain reaffirmed its membership in NATO
    under PSOE government. We should continue our good level of
    defense dialogue, contacts, and cooperation, including in the
    Balkans and Afghanistan; dialogue on Iraq if we get a new UN
    resolution. Continue "business as usual" with
    military-military contacts.

    --Terrorism Finance: The events of March 11 represent an
    opportunity to persuade Spain to take a greater leadership
    role on these issues in the EU and elsewhere, particularly in
    terms of assistance. Spain had proposed hosting a terrorism
    finance conference early this year. We should convey our
    willingness to support such a conference should the
    government wish to do so. We should also continue our
    willingness to consider Spain for standing membership in the
    CTAG.

    --Iraq Contracts: The Spanish private sector continues to
    show interest in and frustration with the contracting
    process. We believe Spanish companies have a lot to offer.
    We recommend going ahead with tentative plans to have the
    CPA,s Program Management Office (PMO) brief on
    subcontracting (sponsored by a private sector entity) in late
    April as currently planned. It will demonstrate the possible
    benefits of cooperation.

    --Trade Issues: We recommend signaling to the new trade team
    a willingness to consult on the Doha Round and progress in
    the FTAA - a likely area of continued interest for the new
    government.

    --Housing: Zapatero has already signaled that housing will
    be a key issue for his government and has already said he
    will create a housing ministry. Based on the U.S.-Spain
    Housing forums which took place under former HUD Secretary
    Martinez, leadership with the Ministry of Public Works
    (where housing currently stands) suggest a dialogue with HUD
    as soon as this ministry is established, building on ties
    already created, many of which at the working level will
    remain.

    --R&D/S&T/Productivity: There is a wide scope for increased
    R&D cooperation given that the PSOE platform included a
    pledge to significantly increase the amount of R&D spending.
    Along the same lines, improving worker productivity is
    another key PSOE pledge. As a leader in this area, U.S. may
    be able to share experiences with the new government.

    ¶5. (C) Possible PSOE response

    --Zapatero likely will prove an inexperienced partner. There
    are a number of issues on which he will clearly differ from
    Aznar, but there are areas on which we can build on long-term
    cooperative efforts.

    What will change

    --From the PSOE side, we can expect some initial reservations
    about our engagement overtures. But as the reality of
    government sets in, Zapatero and his team may welcome a
    matter of fact approach from us focused on practical steps in
    areas on which we can agree.

    --Zapatero,s European focus will be a key element of his
    foreign policy. He has made it clear he intends to follow
    the lines of France and Germany on most issues. He has
    already said that he will drop Aznar,s insistence in the EU
    constitution debate on maintaining the Nice treaty voting
    formulas. Again, though, as Zapatero realizes he is
    governing one of Europe,s fastest growing economies, he will
    quickly find that on some issues Spain will want to have a
    voice that is separate from those of France and Germany. But
    as our relationship with France and Germany evolves, we may
    find areas of opportunity with Spain under PSOE as well.
    ARGYROS

`