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### Viewing cable 09KABUL3890, KANDAHAR POLITICS COMPLICATE U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09KABUL3890 | 2009-12-06 09:09 | 2010-12-02 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kabul

`

    VZCZCXRO8779
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
    DE RUEHBUL #3890/01 3400953
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 060953Z DEC 09
    FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3740
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

` `

    CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 of 03 KABUL 003890

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE SCA/FO, SCA/A
    STATE PASS USAID ASIA/SCAA
    USFOR-A FOR POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019
    TAGS: KDEM PGOV PTER AF
    SUBJECT: KANDAHAR POLITICS COMPLICATE U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN

    REF: A. KABUL 3748
    ¶B. KABUL 3595

    Classified By: Coordinator Director for Development and Economic Affair
    s E. Anthony Wayne, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary: As we step up engagement with GIRoA
    leadership in Kandahar, it is important to understand the
    dynamics of political power and how fundamental Kandahar is
    to the fortunes of the Karzai regime. It is from Kandahar
    that President Karzai's claim to national legitimacy
    originates and from the province that the Karzai family's
    position as a semi-modern aristocracy stems. As the kingpin
    of Kandahar, the President's younger half-brother Ahmed Wali
    Karzai (AWK) dominates access to economic resources,
    patronage, and protection. Much of the real business of
    running Kandahar takes place out of public sight, where AWK
    operates, parallel to formal government structures, through a
    network of political clans that use state institutions to
    protect and enable licit and illicit enterprises. A dramatic
    example is the Arghandab river valley, an agriculturally rich
    and heavily-populated district strategically located at the
    northern gate to Kandahar City, where the President's direct
    intervention in the Alikozai tribal succession increased
    Karzai political dominance over two of the most valuable
    resources in Kandahar -- fertile land and water. The tribal
    power structure in Kandahar seriously complicates our efforts
    to bring formal justice and modern governance to the region.
    In the absence of GIRoA initiatives to bring key individuals
    closely linked to the Karzai regime to justice, RC South is
    pursuing a bottom-up approach to the Arghandab shura. End
    Summary.

    ¶2. (C) As we step up engagement with GIRoA leadership in
    Kandahar in pursuit of U.S. security, stabilization,
    development and anti-corruption goals, it is important to
    understand the dynamics of political power and how
    fundamental Kandahar is to the fortunes of the Karzai regime
    (Ref A). It is from Kandahar, not Kabul, that President
    Karzai's claim to national legitimacy originates, and where,
    through leadership of the royal Durrani Popalzai tribe, he
    has a true political base. In Kandahar, political clans
    consisting of personal, tribal, marriage and economic
    alliances engage in balance of power competition and
    cooperation. At the pinnacle of Kandahar's political clans,
    the Karzai clan functions as a semi-modern aristocracy, with
    the President ultimately presiding over the nation.

    ¶3. (C) As the kingpin of Kandahar, the President's younger
    half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, rules over political deal
    and decision-making at the provincial level and thereby
    dominates access to economic resources, patronage and
    protection. The overriding purpose that unifies his
    political roles as Chairman of the Kandahar Provincial
    Council and as the President's personal representative to the
    South is the enrichment, extension and perpetuation of the
    Karzai clan, and along with it their branch of the Popalzai
    tribe. This applies equally to his entrepreneurial and his
    alleged criminal activities. AWK derives authority and
    legitimacy from his relationship to President Karzai, from
    the relative discipline and elite position of the Popalzai
    tribe and from his access to resources. In Kandahar's
    political realm, he is an unrivaled strongman. For example,
    the Kandahar Provincial Council, which is made up largely of
    individuals who are personally beholden to him, wields
    serious influence, despite its lack of statutory powers. It
    is currently going about its business unhindered despite the
    fraud charges that have prevented the IEC from certifying the
    recent Provincial Council election results (Ref B). xxxxxxxxxxxx

    ¶4. (C) Much of the real business of running Kandahar takes
    place out of public sight, where AWK operates parallel to
    formal government structures through a network of political
    clans that use state institutions to protect and enable licit
    and illicit enterprises. At its core, this clan network has
    a caste-like division of labor. The Popalzai occupy the
    leadership pinnacle. The Barakzai, with Gul Agha
    Sherzai as their leader, compete for power and business,
    which includes, for example, contracting at Kandahar Air
    Field and transport on Highway 4 from the Pakistan border at
    Spin Boldak. The Noorzai occupy key positions in the ANSF
    and are the traditional racketeers (with ties to narcotics
    trafficking). The Achekzais along the border are the
    traditional smugglers, and the Alikozai are the traditional

    Kabul 00003890 002 of 003

    warriors.

    ¶5. (C) Among Karzai family-run businesses are alleged
    control of trucking on Highway 1 (the Ring Road) through
    Kandahar Province and beyond, private security contracting
    and real estate. The last notably includes Ayno Mina, an
    ostentatious Karzai property development for Afghan elites
    east of Kandahar City, built on land obtained from the
    government at rock bottom prices, with financing guaranteed
    by OPIC. In a land of popular strongmen, AWK is widely
    unpopular in Kandahar, because he rules exclusively rather
    than inclusively; he is not perceived as caring about the
    population at large but rather, as a traditional Pashtuns
    Khan using his power to "feed his tribe."

    ¶6. (C) A good example of how the Karzais' power plays out in
    Kandahar can be found in the Arghandab river valley, an
    agriculturally rich and heavily populated district
    strategically located at the northern gate to Kandahar City,
    where the Alikozai tribe makes up 60 percent of the
    population. They received the valley as a reward for
    assisting the founder of Afghanistan, Ahmed Shah Durrani,
    conquer Kandahar in the mid-1700s. As the guardians of
    Kandahar, the Alikozais have prevented all invaders from
    occupying Arghandab. The Soviets fought hard but never took
    it and as a result were never secure in Kandahar City. The
    Taliban's rise to power began in Kandahar, when the powerful
    Alikozai leader Mullah Naquibullah decided to give them the
    keys to the city, and he turned on them to assist their
    overthrow in 2001. When Mullah Naqib died of a heart attack
    in 2007, President Karzai took the unusual step of flying to
    Kandahar, where he anointed Naquib's son Karimullah as the
    new leader of the Alikozai. However, the move had
    significant blowback. Mullah Naqib had never designated his
    young and inexperienced son as his
    successor, and Karzai's intervention generated resentment
    among senior Alikozai elders. The resulting split weakened
    tribal unity, a vulnerability the Taliban quickly exploited,
    and it remains a present source of instability.

    ¶7. (C) The Arghandab story appears on the surface to be a
    case of bungled tribal exploitation. On the contrary, by
    intervening in the Alikozai succession, the Karzais linked
    the most important tribal faction to control over the
    provincial government in a line that runs from AWK to their
    putative leader Karimullah, who in turn holds sway over the
    District Administrator and local shura. The Karzais also
    increased their influence over two of the most valuable
    resources in Kandahar (which is largely desert) -- fertile
    land and water. The Arghandab river valley, contains some of
    the best agricultural land in Afghanistan; it famously
    produces 80 percent of the country's pomegranates.
    Production and land values there will increase greatly as a
    result of Canada's "signature" rehabilitation of the Dahla
    Dam and irrigation works, originally constructed by the U.S.
    in the 1950s. Karzai businesses are also set to
    acquire multiple patronage benefits from Dahla Dam
    construction and security contracts, but the main prize will
    be political control over long-term allocation of water
    flows, including to Popalzai and Barakzai areas that lie well
    downstream, via underground canals to the south.

    ¶8. (C) It is no accident that AWK lobbied the project's
    Canadian sponsors on behalf of the Watan Group, the eventual
    winner of the Dahla Dam security contract, whose CEO is his
    cousin, U.S. national Rashid Popal. More than business is
    involved; most of the project lies in Alikozai majority
    areas, but the Popalzai will control security, and Alikozai
    leader Karimullah was incensed over this treatment by his
    Karzai sponsors when he found out. A follow-on to warlord
    militias, private security companies today also serve
    personal interests as camouflaged vehicles for protection
    rackets in construction, transportation and drug smuggling.
    AWK's determined but so far unsuccessful efforts to acquire
    MOI-sanction to license all contractors and their weapons
    through the Provincial Council has the potential to arm the
    Karzai clan with a non-state entity that can insure against
    whoever should come to power in Afghanistan.

    ¶9. (C) Comment: The traditional tribal power structures in
    Kandahar have many implications for U.S. objectives in the
    region. Initiatives that rely on GIRoA to take the lead in
    bringing to justice major corrupt figures or negative
    influences in Kandahar contain a serious dilemma: they would
    include some of Karzai,s closest relatives and allies and
    require the prosecution of people on whom we often rely for
    assistance and/or support. Second, any efforts to bring
    these individuals to justice could compromise the informal

    Kabul 00003890 003 of 003

    governing networks to which Kandaharis have become
    accustomed, without necessarily replacing them with effective
    GIRoA officials or improving the delivery of services. A
    focus on bottom-up local solutions, such as identifying and
    reaching out to the multiple factions in Arghandab as well as
    the official shura, which RC South is pursuing, could offset
    this problem to some degree. End Comment.

    ¶10. (U) This assessment, derived from multiple sources
    including information provided by over a dozen
    knowledgeable Afghans, presents a perspective that is widely
    perceived among the Afghan public and consistent with
    documentation in open sources and intelligence analyses.
    Mussomeli

`