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### Viewing cable 08PARIS1703, ELYSEE READOUT OF SARKOZY'S SEPTEMBER 3-4 VISIT TO

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08PARIS1703 | 2008-09-09 18:06 | 2010-12-07 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Paris

`

    VZCZCXRO9266
    OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
    DE RUEHFR #1703/01 2531813
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 091813Z SEP 08
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4275
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1606

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001703

    SIPDIS

    NEA/FO FOR DAS HALE AND PDAS FELTMAN
    NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/09/2023
    TAGS: FR LE UNSC PREL
    SUBJECT: ELYSEE READOUT OF SARKOZY'S SEPTEMBER 3-4 VISIT TO
    DAMASCUS

    REF: POUNDS-HALE E-MAIL OF 9/5

    Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen H. Allegrone, reas
    ons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (S) Summary: During his September 3-4 visit to Damascus,President Sarkozy told Syrian President Bashar al-Asad that in order to establish a relationship of trust with France, Syria would need to honor its commitments and respect certain principles (e.g., Lebanon's sovereignty and the International Tribunal), according to Elysee Middle East Counselor Boris Boillon. Al-Asad reaffirmed his commitment to exchange ambassadors with Lebanon before the end of the year, and to make progress on reviewing bilateral agreements and demarcating the Lebanese-Syrian border. The French plan to assess Syria's progress against these benchmarks at year's end and adjust their policy accordingly, although Boillon candidly admitted that they have not yet given much thought as to what the next steps in their relationship with Damascus might be if Syria were to demonstrate progress. Boillon stressed that Sarkozy remains "pragmatic" about Damascus: if the Syrians do not perform, then "too bad for them." Boillon reported that al-Asad intervened with Hamas Political Bureau
    leader Khalid Mishal to encourage the latter to deliver a
    letter to captured Franco-Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit
    (although al-Asad declined to convey the letter to Mishal
    himself). Boillon distanced Sarkozy from ideas the MFA
    attempted to table at the Sept. 6 Gymnich regarding how the
    EU could play a more active role on the Israeli-Palestinian
    peace process. On a sobering note, Boillon said he met last
    week with a personal envoy from Saudi King Abdallah, who
    detailed a Saudi plan to spend up to $1 billion dollars to
    support Sunni groups in Lebanon in the upcoming parliamentary
    elections and "against Hizballah." End summary.

    Sarkozy Spells it Out for Bashar al-Asad
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) President Sarkozy, during his September 3-4 visit to
    Damascus, delivered a frank message to his Syrian counterpart
    Bashar al-Asad, according to Boris Boillon (the Middle East
    Counselor at the Elysee). Per Boillon, Sarkozy told al-Asad
    that in order to build a relationship of trust with France,
    Syria would need to respect its commitments (e.g.,
    normalizing relations with Lebanon) and respect certain
    non-negotiable principles (e.g., Lebanon's sovereignty and
    the inviolability of the International Tribunal on the Hariri
    assassination). Moreover, Sarkozy noted that France would be
    watching closely to see whether Syria attained certain
    benchmarks by the end of the year, namely: the exchange of
    ambassadors with Lebanon (the most critical benchmark in
    Boillon's opinion); the modification of the Syria-Lebanon
    High Council; and the restoration of three defunct
    commissions to discuss refugees, borders, and to review
    existing treaties. Al-Asad reaffirmed his previous
    commitment to Sarkozy to exchange ambassadors with Lebanon
    before the end of the year, and to make progress on the other
    issues. Boillon stressed that Sarkozy remained "pragmatic"
    about Damascus and would make a dispassionate decision at
    year's end on whether the Syrians had attained the benchmarks
    and, consequently, where to take the relationship. He would
    not be swayed by pecuniary concerns in dealing with what
    France sees as an unimportant trading partner. ("They are
    nothing for us," scoffed Boillon, who observed that Syria
    froze trading opportunities in 2007 and France was now 61 in
    the ranks of Syrian trading partners. He acknowledged that
    several business leaders, including the CEO of Total and a
    wealthy Syrian-origin entrepreneur, had been on the trip. He
    also confirmed exploratory talks on the sale of 14 Airbus
    aircraft to Syria and said that U.S. components would pose
    problems for such a sale, but added it was a commercial deal
    that the GOF was not actively pushing). Sarkozy's view
    remains that if the Syrians do not perform, then "tant pis"
    (too bad for them) said Boillon, who conceded that the Elysee
    has not yet given much thought as to where it would like to
    take the relationship if the Syrians pass muster. Boillon
    noted that FM Kouchner will likely see FM Muallim in November
    at a follow-on meeting for the Mediterranean Union, which
    will give the French an opportunity to signal to the Syrians
    whether they are on track for a passing grade in December,
    which might result in a second, longer visit by Sarkozy to
    Damascus.

    ¶3. (C) Noting that Sarkozy also pressed al-Asad on Israel,
    Iran, and human rights, Boillon assessed that Bashar has been
    weakened by the assassination of Mohammed Suleiman and would

    PARIS 00001703 002 OF 003

    himself be "finished" if he were to publicly acknowledge
    Israel's successful attack on Syria's nuclear research
    facility, an attack to which the Syrians made no effective
    riposte. Al-Asad professed to be concerned by the delay in
    the next round of indirect Syrian-Israeli peace talks and, in
    response to a query from Sarkozy, claimed to have no
    objection to indirect peace talks between Lebanon and Israel
    that might proceed in tandem with the Syrian-Israeli track.
    However, al-Asad claimed that the Lebanese themselves were
    not prepared to take such a step. Boillon claimed that
    Sarkozy had made some progress in shaping al-Asad's thinking
    on the Iran nuclear question by asking how the latter could
    be confident that Tehran's nuclear program is for civilian
    use in the absence of international inspection.
    (Unfortunately, Sarkozy did not use this moment of epiphany
    to suggest that al-Asad also re-think Syria's candidacy for a
    seat on the IAEA Board of Governors.)
    Human Rights
    ------------

    ¶4. (C) The Syrians, clearly anticipating Sarkozy's talking
    points on human rights, adroitly deflected the brunt of his
    message by suggesting that France channel future human rights
    demands (e.g., lists of prisoners to be released) through
    Qatar so as "to avoid the optic of Syria caving into Western
    pressure." The French seem to have swallowed this specious
    argument, although Boillon claimed that there was a
    "favorable evolution" in al-Asad's position on the case of
    kidnapped Franco-Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit: Bashar,
    although he declined to deliver a letter from Shalit's father
    to Hamas Political Bureau chief Khalid Mishal, agreed to
    speak to Mishal and encourage him to see that the letter is
    delivered on humanitarian grounds. The French believe that
    al-Asad fulfilled this commitment.

    ¶5. (S) Boillon dismissed the September 4 quad meeting of
    Sarkozy, al-Asad, Turkish PM Erdogan, and Qatari Emir
    al-Thani as a largely academic exchange of views, with little
    meaningful discussion (although he observed that al-Asad and
    Erdogan were each surprisingly well-informed about Darfur).
    He also reported that on the margins of the visit, Syrian FM
    Muallim had told the French delegation that Syria could do
    without an EU association agreement if the alternative was
    the conditionality outlined in the letter he received a few
    weeks ago from his Spanish, German and Italian counterparts.
    The significance of Muallim's statement, in Boillon's view,
    is that the Israelis have yet to realize that the prospect of
    an EU association agreement is not a significant incentive
    for Damascus.

    MEPP/Saudi Initiative for Lebanon
    ---------------------------------

    ¶6. (S) Turning to other regional issues, Boillon distanced
    Sarkozy from a set of ideas that the MFA had hoped to present
    at the September 6 Gymnich working lunch on how the EU could
    play a more active role in supporting the Middle East peace
    process; Boillon acknowledged that they reflect ideas Sarkozy
    has supported, but characterized them as "reflections" that
    did not represent a new initiative on the part of France. On
    Lebanon, Boillon said that notwithstanding the somewhat
    gloomy reporting from the French embassy in Beirut, he
    believed the overall situation in the country was relatively
    good at the moment. He described President Sleiman as "very,
    very cautious -- and that's putting it diplomatically,"
    whereas he saw Michel Aoun as "an enigma who nevertheless
    represents many Lebanese Christians -- we don't have much
    contact with him, perhaps wrongly." Boillon expressed
    concern about funding from the Gulf states for Salafist
    groups in and around Tripoli, noting that a former Lebanese
    Prime Minister had recently walked him through the reason the
    Salafists abrogated an agreement with Hizballah the day after
    signing it (the reason, said Boillon, is that one branch of
    the Salafist clan funded by Kuwaitis had been over-ruled by
    another branch funded by Saudis). On a related note, Boillon
    confided that last week he met with a "personal envoy" (NFI)
    from Saudi King Abdallah, who outlined an initiative to
    provide up to USD $1 billion dollars in support to Lebanese
    Sunni groups for use in the upcoming parliamentary elections
    and for defense "against Hizballah." "If that is the Saudi
    vision for Lebanon, that is truly worrisome," said Boillon,
    who was simultaneously arranging a meeting for visiting Saudi
    Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, who was in France on
    September 9 on an unannounced visit to his Parisian residence.

    Comment

    PARIS 00001703 003 OF 003

    -------

    ¶7. (S) Comment: Boillon is an engaging and enthusiastic
    interlocutor whose personal loyalty to Sarkozy is palpable.
    We believe his readout to be largely accurate, although we
    are somewhat skeptical of Bashar's alleged epiphany on the
    Iranian nuclear program, and somewhat dismayed that the
    Syrians seem to have so easily deflected the French president
    on the question of human rights. As for the benchmarks, we believe the Elysee is sincere in its desire to hold the Syrians to objective performance benchmarks, yet we remain concerned that even if Syria's performance falls short, Sarkozy may find it politically difficult to shelve one of his self-proclaimed foreign policy successes. This suggests
    that rather than trying to derail France's rapprochement with
    Syria -- a train that has already left the station -- our goal should be to maintain a continual, candid dialogue with the Elysee on Syria's behavior with an eye towards informing their year-end policy review. Finally, we defer to our  colleagues at Embassy Riyadh on the question of Saudi financial support for Lebanon's Sunni community; we report Boillon's comments here merely to register the Elysee's concern on that score. STAPLETON

`