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### Viewing cable 07MADRID1021, SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE'S JUNE 1 VISIT TO

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07MADRID1021 | 2007-05-25 11:11 | 2011-02-02 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid

`

    VZCZCXRO6681
    PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
    DE RUEHMD #1021/01 1451127
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 251127Z MAY 07
    FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2628
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MADRID 001021

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    TO THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR EDUARDO AGUIRRE; ALSO FOR
    EUR DAN FRIED, E-ES, KEN MERTEN, EUR/WE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2016
    TAGS: OTRA PREL SP
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE'S JUNE 1 VISIT TO
    MADRID

    Classified By: Ambassador Eduardo Aguirre for reasons 1.4 b & d.

    Summary

    ¶1. (C) Dear Secretary Rice: I welcome you to Spain on behalf
    of our 367 American and Spanish colleagues serving the United
    States at Mission Spain. Your visit is a milestone in our
    work, together with you, to overcome the differences over
    Iraq with the Spanish government and convince them that
    further strengthening cooperation coincides with Spain,s
    national interest. At the same time, your visit can serve as
    a catalyst to encourage Spain to become an even more active
    )- but responsible -- member of a Transatlantic partnership,
    marked by cooperative efforts on our shared values, including
    counter-terrorism and promoting democracy, freedom and human
    rights throughout the world. This means that you will need
    to speak frankly to the Spanish government about Cuba,
    despite their desire to avoid the issue. The issue need not
    be the central one in a rich agenda on a wide variety of
    fronts in which we work closely with Spain; however, Cuba
    must be an element of your discussions on democracy, and
    Spain,s own special responsibility as a democracy leader
    that has successfully undergone the transition from
    dictatorship to thriving democracy. Your discussions will
    also include Kosovo, Afghanistan, Spain,s OSCE Chairmanship,
    Russia, Iran, Iraq, Latin America and the Middle East.
    Moratinos will raise a thorny child-custody case involving a
    Spanish woman currently jailed for contempt of court in New
    Jersey. Your interview with the Spanish press will provide
    an opportunity to reach out to the Spanish people and
    underscore the significant value of our alliance and convey
    our views on issues on which we differ. We see this visit as
    a great opportunity to advance our relations with Spain, and
    the Spanish government shares this view. END SUMMARY

    ¶2. (C) The Spanish government has long awaited your first
    visit as Secretary of State and views it as a sign of the
    importance of strong U.S.-Spain relations. They will use your
    visit to counter criticism that the Zapatero government has
    shattered the transatlantic relationship. Per the Spain
    strategy you approved two years ago, we have sought to move
    this government away from visceral and reflexive anti-U.S.
    policies and sentiments, carving out areas in which
    Zapatero,s government can offer support for the President,s
    broad global agenda. We have made clear to the Zapatero
    government that the price of our willingness to publicly
    promote good bilateral relations is real contributions on
    world issues. While we have made some positive headway, the
    Zapatero government has not hesitated on occasion to pursue
    an agenda counter to our own when deemed in the Socialist
    party,s domestic political interest. Your visit should
    encourage Spain to be an even more active member of a
    transatlantic partnership that works cooperatively in pursuit
    of shared values on freedom, democracy, human rights and
    development.

    What is Working

    ¶3. (C) On the positive side over the past two years, Spain
    contributed $22 million to the Basrah Children,s Hospital
    and offered a further $28 million in new money at the recent
    Iraq Compact meeting. The Zapatero government established a
    robust presence in Afghanistan that includes allowing the
    Spanish military to lead a PRT and co-lead a Forward Support
    Base in Western Afghanistan. Spain has contributed some 150
    million Euros in Afghan reconstruction funds. Spain also has
    1100 troops deployed along the Lebanon-Syria-Israel border as
    part of UNIFIL. The government allowed a sale of military
    aircraft to Venezuela to die. They support Turkey,s
    membership in the EU and have said that they will not pose
    problems on Missile Defense. We have superb two-way
    cooperation on counter-terrorism, counternarcotics,
    non-proliferation and military issues. This includes the use
    of two vital bases in southern Spain near the Straits of
    Gibraltar, where we maintain over 2000 personnel that serve
    as major logistical hubs for the flow of troops and materiel
    into the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters. The GOS also very
    much appreciates US coordination with Spain on Western
    Sahara, since Spain sees near-by North Africa as vital to its
    national security interests.

    ¶4. (C) In addition, our economic relationship with Spain is
    strong and mutually beneficial. The Spanish economy has
    boomed in the last decade as a result of structural reforms,
    EU aid, and membership in the Euro zone. The commercial
    relationship is dominated by a very strong U.S. direct
    investment presence, although two-way trade remains a
    relatively minor percentage of each country,s exports and
    imports. Many of the U.S. Fortune 100 firms are present and

    MADRID 00001021 002 OF 005

    doing well. The American Chamber of Commerce estimates that
    about five percent of Spain,s annual GDP comes from U.S.
    investment. In recent years, U.S. portfolio investors have
    bought significant shares in major Spanish firms. Spanish
    firms have rediscovered America and are now investing in the
    United States, especially in the banking and renewable energy
    sectors, and Spanish construction companies have also won
    important contracts in the U.S.

    ¶5. (C) Spain cooperates closely with the United States in the
    fight against terrorism finance, co-chairing the Financial
    Action Task Force with us. Following intensive intervention
    by the USG and private industry, the Spanish government is
    giving increased attention to intellectual property rights
    issues. Other areas where we work closely with the Spanish
    include NASA,s Deep Space Network, and close partnerships in
    port security programs such as Megaports and the Container
    Security Initiative.

    What Still Needs Work

    ¶6. (C) However, our challenge has been to channel the efforts
    of a unpredictable Spanish Foreign Minister who portrays
    himself as a self-styled &bridge8 between the U.S. and
    difficult world players--such as Syria, Cuba, Iran and some
    Palestinian elements. Additionally, President Zapatero plays
    to a largely leftist, pacifist support base, and uses foreign
    policy to win domestic political points rather than giving
    attention to core foreign policy priorities or embracing
    broader strategic goals.

    ¶7. (C) This has lent an erratic &zig-zag8 quality to the
    bilateral relationship. Moratinos, recent visit to Cuba
    highlighted the difficulty of maintaining a smooth and stable
    pattern as did his earlier outreach to Syria and Iran.
    Zapatero,s reversal of his Defense Minister,s commitment to
    deploy 150 troops to staff the ISAF XI headquarters reflects
    PSOE,s increasing sensitivity to Spanish public concerns
    about growing dangers in Afghanistan during this highly
    charged political season here ) with local/regional
    elections May 27 and national elections by March 2008.
    Kosovo independence is a sensitive issue for the GOS, which
    maintains troops in KFOR, because of concern about the impact
    of such an evolution on Spain,s own complex federal vs.
    regional struggle. For this reason, a UNSC Resolution
    explicitly authorizing independence will be essential for
    Spain to maintain its troops there.

    Proposed policy agenda

    ¶8. (C) We want to challenge the Zapatero government to do
    better in the U.S.-Spain relationship as a result of your
    visit. In your meetings with King Juan Carlos, Zapatero and
    Moratinos, we suggest you frame our goals with Spain over the
    following months along several interrelated themes that make
    clear the need to act responsibly in NATO, Latin America and
    the Middle East in order to be seen as a reliable partner.
    We suggest the following themes:

    --Spain should work more closely in coordination with us in
    Europe and around the world on the freedom or democracy
    agenda. Spain has achieved a remarkable transformation since
    the end of dictatorship 30 years ago. It is one of the
    leading democracies in Europe and has the 8th largest economy
    in the world. Spain is now an active player in Europe, Latin
    America and the Middle East, including Iran. But Spain needs
    to act in concert with the EU, NATO and the U.S. on key
    issues. There is too much at stake for Spanish freelancing,
    as in the Middle East, Cuba and Russia. The transatlantic
    community needs Spain,s support on Kosovo, Missile Defense,
    NATO transformation, and Iran. The price of leadership and
    respect, which Spain seems to desire, is the willingness to
    devote the resources, assume responsibility, share burdens
    and act jointly with other powers. We welcome Spain,s
    commitment to stay the course in the pivotal struggle in
    Afghanistan. We know it is a delicate political issue in
    this electoral season but it is the right thing to do and a
    responsible policy. Spain,s OSCE chairmanship is important
    on all of these issues and we want to ensure close
    consultations so that Russian attempts to weaken key OSCE
    functions are curtailed.

    --Spain needs to help in countering anti-Americanism by
    publicly emphasizing cooperation. The U.S. and Spain
    cooperate on a myriad of issues that matter to the Spanish
    people, including the fight against terrorism and
    international organized crime, Middle East, North Africa,
    human rights and support for democracy. We urge the Spanish
    government to work with us to allay anti-American sentiments

    MADRID 00001021 003 OF 005

    in Spain, not just cooperate with us behind the scenes.
    Spain,s changing population and proximity to North Africa
    make it a prime target of Islamic extremism regardless of its
    relationship with the U.S. It is essential that we emphasize
    our shared values of democracy, human rights, freedom and
    opportunity for immigrants. Furthermore, during this
    difficult election period, we do not want our bilateral
    relations to become a casualty of the political crossfire. We
    understand electoral politics, but not at our expense.

    --Spain should capitalize on its role as a democratic leader.
    The U.S. welcomes Spain,s contributions on Afghanistan and
    Iraq, defense ties and counter-terrorism; these form the
    basis of our good bilateral relations. Spain,s success in
    the transition from dictatorship to thriving democracy makes
    it a worldwide leader in the areas of democracy-building and
    institution-building. Spain should deploy that expertise
    more actively in concert with our shared goals. Our respect
    for Spain,s exemplary democratic transition makes it all the
    more perplexing and disconcerting that Spain has embarked
    upon a policy of outreach to the Raul Castro regime,
    validating his succession with no clear message about the
    need for democratic transition. Nevertheless, we want to
    continue working with Spain in support of human rights and
    market-based economic policies in Latin America, including
    Cuba, and we urge Spain,s leadership to act in more positive
    ways and to demonstrate publicly Spain,s own values.

    ¶9. (C) We believe that folding our concerns about recent
    Spanish foreign policy moves into a broader, positive agenda
    can help advance our goals as we navigate the waters of a
    very difficult and volatile political season in Spain.

    The Political Environment

    ¶10. (C) You arrive just after the May 27 regional and local
    elections. Current polls show that the results will likely
    provide momentum for both Zapatero,s Socialist Party and
    Mariano Rajoy,s Popular Party going into national elections
    by March 2008. In the regional elections, the Socialists
    could gain seats and join in coalition governments in three
    current PP regions. With Socialist victories in several
    regions last year, Zapatero could have a strong base of
    support going into the national elections. However, the PP
    is expected to strengthen its support in its traditional
    regional strongholds. On the national level, while support
    for Zapatero has diminished since its peak after the March
    2004 elections, Rajoy has not been able to capitalize and his
    ratings remain low and are falling.

    Assessment of Zapatero

    ¶11. (C) Though polls show Zapatero,s support down from the
    high just following the March 2004 elections and considerable
    concern about his ETA policies, he stands a good chance of
    surviving national elections in early 2008, albeit with some
    of his support drifting to smaller, leftist parties in the
    Parliament.

    ¶12. (C) Zapatero focuses almost exclusively on domestic
    policy; his foreign policy instincts are governed by the
    exigencies of their domestic political impact. With a largely
    left of center, pacifist public which is strongly opposed to
    the Iraq war, the Aznar government and Bush Administration
    policies, Zapatero loses nothing by taking the U.S. to task
    on key issues. However, Zapatero now recognizes that the
    Spanish public believes that Spain,s leaders must maintain
    good relations with the U.S. After his first volatile year
    in office, he has sought to improve the tenor and substance
    of U.S.-Spain relations while still maintaining the
    politically acceptable policy of offering criticism of U.S.
    policies as part of the role of what he calls a &loyal
    ally.8 We suggest you encourage Zapatero to continue to view
    a positive agenda with the U.S. as a necessary element of his
    political strategy and emphasize that the U.S. will not keep
    silent when his government pursues policies that run counter
    to our shared values and interests.

    Rajoy as PP leader

    ¶13. (C) Your meeting with PP leader Mariano Rajoy will be
    interpreted in Spain as a symbol of continued U.S. ties with
    a partner that supports U.S. foreign policy goals. However,
    we need to make clear to Rajoy that the U.S. will continue to
    work with the current government as long as it is in power
    because of our major long-term interests in Spain, including
    in the war on terrorism and in Afghanistan. The Spanish
    media will scrutinize the length of your meeting with Rajoy
    in comparison with your session with Zapatero for signs of

    MADRID 00001021 004 OF 005

    any political signals we are trying to send.

    ¶14. (C) Recent polls indicate that Rajoy thus far has not
    been able to galvanize support for his candidacy for Spain,s
    Presidency, despite some very meaty issues that could be
    developed to the PP,s advantage. One of the most crucial of
    these controversial issues is Zapatero,s policy toward the
    Basque terrorist group ETA, which the PP viscerally opposes
    and which has driven hundreds of thousands of protesters into
    the streets. The PP points to the December 30 attack at the
    Madrid airport which killed two Ecuadorian citizens as proof
    that ETA will not renounce violence. The PP remains strong in
    its traditional strongholds, however, and the ETA issue has
    become increasingly worrisome to a number of Spaniards.
    However, recent polls show that Rajoy himself has not
    galvanized support for his candidacy for Spain,s Presidency.
    If PP turns out a large number of voters for the regional
    and local elections, Rajoy nonetheless will come to your
    meeting buoyed with the hope of a strong challenge to
    Zapatero in the national elections. Bitterness over the March
    11 terrorist attacks and the Aznar government,s handling of
    the issue, however, remains a liability for Rajoy, and
    Spanish politics at the national level are bitter and
    divided.

    Role of the King

    ¶15. (C) Your meeting with King Juan Carlos will demonstrate
    U.S. respect for the Spanish state and its people. Though
    prohibited from playing a direct role in foreign policy, Juan
    Carlos has helped behind the scenes. For example, he helped
    smooth relations with the U.S. after tensions in the months
    following the 2004 Spanish elections. In November of that
    year, President and Mrs. Bush invited the King and Queen for
    a pre-Thanksgiving lunch at Crawford, which was widely
    interpreted here as a sign of respect for the Spanish state.
    Juan Carlos is well versed on foreign policy issues and will
    welcome your review of the key issues you plan to discuss
    with Zapatero and Moratinos. He should also hear our strong
    concerns on issues like Cuba and Syria. On a personal note,
    you might congratulate the King on the birth of Crown Prince
    Felipe,s second daughter, Sofia, born on April 29, 2007.

    Dealing with Moratinos

    ¶16. (C) We no longer hear last year,s rumors of Moratinos,
    imminent departure from his post as Foreign Minister and he
    seems entrenched in his position. He seeks a role on the
    world stage andtries to capitalize on his old ties in the
    Middle East, as well as Spain,s presence in Lebanon and
    Afghanistan, to play a role on Israel-Palestinian issues,
    Lebanon, Syria and Iran. We have sought to find ways to keep
    Moratinos in contact with senior USG officials on a range of
    issues as a means to help channel his efforts. Spain,s
    chairmanship of the OSCE puts Moratinos in the unusual
    position of having a voice and interest in core transatlantic
    issues related to Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and the
    Caucasus. Moratinos, penchant for trying to &mediate8
    needs to be tamed as Russia issues come to the fore; we have
    already seen evidence of Spain,s willingness to try to
    excuse or mitigate Russia,s recent threats to cut off CFE.
    Moratinos has denied that his comments that he supports
    Missile Defense discussion in the OSCE, but Russian Embassy
    contacts have told us that Moratinos supports the idea.

    ¶17. (C) Moratinos' recent trip to Cuba is one of the most
    prominent of Moratinos, miscalculations with the U.S. In
    addition to private protestations, I published an op-ed in
    Spain,s leftist daily newspaper El Pais, laying out U.S.
    goals for democracy in Cuba. He has pushed the Human Rights
    dialogue promised during his visit so that it could take
    place just before your visit to Madrid. Moratinos will argue
    this justifies his Cuba policy. However, your visit should
    make clear to Moratinos the harm his trip has done to this
    effort, an objective he and Zapatero continually claim they
    share with us. Moratinos wants your brief bilateral before
    the working luncheon to be kept to a small group, where he
    wants to corral the issues of Cuba, Kosovo and Afghanistan
    (his proposal for an international neighbors conference).
    These are the three issues he deems most sensitive from the
    Spanish side. In your working luncheon, issues will including
    US-Spain bilateral relations (including excellent
    counter-terrorism, defense, non-proliferation cooperation);
    Transatlantic issues, including Spain,s Chairmanship of the
    OSCE, Russia and Moscow,s proposals for OSCE to discuss
    Missile Defense, to Russia (Missile Defense); and finally,
    Latin America, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and the Middle East peace
    process. Iran will be in the Spanish news during your visit;
    while you are here, Larijani may be meeting with Solana at a

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    location organized by the Spanish. Moratinos will also want
    to discuss the way forward on Western Sahara, and he is
    pleased at our cooperation in security the latest MINURSO
    resolution calling for direct talks between Morocco and the
    Polisario.

    ¶18. (C) Two important bilateral issues fall in the judicial
    area. Moratinos has said he will raise with you the child
    custody involving Spanish citizen Maria Jos Carrascosa who
    is currently jailed for contempt of court in Bergen County,
    New Jersey for failure to return her child to the US as
    required by a New Jersey court decision. During this
    political season in Madrid, the case has become a cause
    celebre, with pictures of Carrascosa ) viewed as a mother
    separated from her child - in handcuffs entering the New
    Jersey prison. The GOS agrees that this is a case for the
    courts and both governments agree that mediation of the
    dispute is the appropriate response. However, Moratinos for
    political reasons has to show the government is doing
    something about the case. On our side, you should note
    continued USG concern about the court case against the three
    US servicemen charged with alleged &war crimes8 in the case
    of the death of Spanish TV camerman Jose Couse in the
    Palestine Hotel in Baghdad in 2003. The GOS has been helpful
    behind the scenes in getting the case appealed by the Spanish
    Prosecutor. The case now moves to the appeals tribunal of
    the National Court, which will rule on the substance of the
    charges. We want continued vigilance and cooperation by the
    GOS until the case is dropped.

    ¶19. (C) Moratinos holds you in very high regard and values
    the contacts that he has had with you. Your efforts and
    those of other senior USG officials, along with mine, to help
    guide Moratinos on key issues such as handling Russia in the
    OSCE and on the full range of Middle East issues, can prove
    effective. The more outreach the better, as we try to play
    to his desire to have a role on major issues while helping to
    direct some of these efforts toward policies that work to
    support US global objectives.

    ¶20. (U) You may want to congratulate Moratinos on the
    upcoming celebration of the 50th anniversary of the
    Commission for Cultural, Educational and Scientific Exchange
    between the United States and Spain (the Fulbright
    Commission) and express how you look forward to hearing more
    about the events planned to take place in Washington to
    commemorate this major milestone. The Spanish Fulbright
    Commission, the second largest in Europe, is a truly
    binational organization with the majority of funding provided
    by the Spanish central government, as well as regional
    autonomous communities and private sector entities.

    ¶21. (C) In all, you will find a rich agenda with Spain, which
    your visit can advance substantially. Again, welcome to
    Madrid. We are looking forward to your visit on June 1.
    AGUIRRE

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