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### Viewing cable 09UNVIEVIENNA9, IAEA; WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION WITH DIRECTOR

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09UNVIEVIENNA9 | 2009-01-13 07:07 | 2011-02-09 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | UNVIE

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHUNV #0009/01 0130735
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 130735Z JAN 09
    FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8889
    INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000009

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2019
    TAGS: AORC PARM MNUC KNPP IR SY TRGY
    SUBJECT: IAEA; WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION WITH DIRECTOR
    GENERAL ELBARADEI UPON ENTRY-INTO-FORCE OF U.S. ADDITIONAL
    PROTOCOL  REF: A. A: SECSTATE 246      B. B: UNVIE 005  Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4b and d  ------- Summary -------

    ¶1.  (C)  Ambassador Schulte presented IAEA Director General ElBaradei with the U.S. instrument of ratification for the Additional Protocol on January 6, 2009.  Ambassador used the occasion to query the DG on priorities for the remainder of ElBaradei's tenure (November 30, 2009), in particular how he might deal with the inspection processes in Iran and Syria which remain blocked by those states' non-cooperation. ElBaradei repeated his view that, while the IAEA will "do its job" and "go through the motions" in Iran and Syria, he did not believe either issue would progress except as part of a wider political package.  On broader IAEA priorities for the coming year, the DG identified nuclear fuel assurances, universality of the Additional Protocol, promoting "the right way" to develop nuclear power, and nuclear safety, security, and terrorism as priorities.  The DG repeatedly returned his argument that to achieve shared U.S.-IAEA objectives, the U.S. should reach out to "show respect and show you care" to the G-77.  To reinforce this argument, the DG said he thought the dynamic in the IAEA Board of Governors between G-77/NAM states on the one hand, and the U.S. and developed states on the other, is the worst he has seen during his time in Vienna.  In this regard, he said "Gaza will make everything harder," in particular on Middle East-related issues at the IAEA.  Comment:  The DG seems poised to continue to place the onus on the U.S. and others to "solve" the Iran and Syria issues.  As he sails into the sunset of his tenure, he also seems increasingly less willing to constrain his empathy for a NAM-like perspective on key IAEA issues, including nuclear fuel assurances.  End comment.  ---------------------------- U.S. Additional Protocol EIF ----------------------------

    ¶2.  (U)  On January 6, 2009, Ambassador Schulte met with IAEA DG ElBaradei to present a diplomatic note and instrument of ratification to bring into force the U.S. Additional Protocol, per Ref A instructions.  The DG gratefully accepted and welcomed the U.S. ratification, noting that all nuclear weapons states now have the AP in force, and that this would help support efforts toward AP universalization.  (Note:  The IAEA subsequently gave Mission a note verbale confirming receipt of the U.S. documents and confirming that the U.S. AP was in force as of January 6, 2009.  Note has been forwarded to Department (Michelle Cannon, L/T).)  --------------------------- Gaza Makes Everything Worse ---------------------------

    ¶3.  (C)  Following presentation of the AP instrument, Ambassador Schulte engaged the DG in a wide-ranging discussion of IAEA issues for the coming year and for the remainder of the DG's tenure, which expires November 30.  At the outset, the DG made reference to the events in Gaza and returned to the issue at several points in the conversation. He said he believes the Gaza events are a manifestation of Israel's "bunker mentality" and-holding an Egyptian newspaper showing civilian casualties--he said anger at Israel in the region is high and that he suspects "the Israelis don't know what they've gotten into."  In later discussion of Middle East issues at the IAEA and the political environment within the IAEA Board, he opined that "Gaza makes everything worse."   --------------------------------------------- ---- Syria and Iran:  Looking for a "Package" Solution --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶4.  (C)  Turning to priorities at the IAEA, Ambassador began by noting that both Syria and Iran are blocking the safeguards investigations in their respective countries. While clearly the onus is on them to cooperate, the Secretariat and member states could not sit idly by and wait for that to happen, he said.  Noting a recent conversation with Senator Specter shortly after his visit to Syria, ElBaradei said both Iran and Syria have decided to "play it by the book," but accepting only those safeguards activities for which they are explicitly obligated under their respective safeguards agreements.  The DG said "of course we" in the Secretariat "will continue to do our jobs" and "go   through the motions" to try to take forward the investigations.  He said "our people are hard on them, " but he doubted Tehran or Damascus would move without a political package deal that addresses broader issues of security and "face-saving" as well.  On Syria, the DG said he believes such a package would have to address Syrian security concerns and offer 'incentives," and at the same time assure Syria that coming clean on its nuclear activities would not be used by others as a premise for punitive sanctions.  The Ambassador noted the imperative for the IAEA, regardless of any political package, to verify whether Syria has any continuing or reconstituted covert nuclear activities.  The DG responded by saying he "didn't think they had the capability."  (Comment:  He did not offer any basis for this judgment.)  When Ambassador Schulte noted that the EU has some leverage via the pending EU-Syria Association Agreement, the DG agreed, but noted it would only be effective as part of a broader package.

    ¶5.  (C)  The DG had virtually the same analysis of the Iran case and argued for a broad political settlement.  He suggested re-visiting the idea of allowing Iran an enrichment program in return for Iran agreeing to send all of its LEU elsewhere to be fabricated into reactor fuel and returned only in that form.  He said he hopes Ahmadinejad will be out of office after June.  He said "my advice to you is to see the big picture" in the Middle East.  Citing Gaza again, he said the situation is terrible, Arab governments (e.g. Egypt and the Gulf States) lack credibility, and there is a growing gap between rich and poor.  Asad feels isolated, so he embraces Iran.  The U.S. needs to have a "unified" policy to address all of this.  One factor is to "strengthen moderates" in the Arab world, specifically Saudi King Abdullah, whom the DG appraised as being "one of the best."  They need to work on "internal reform, not just foreign policy."  (Comment:  It was not clear how exactly the DG saw this as linked back to the nuclear issue.)  ----------------------------------------- Other IAEA Priorities for the Coming Year -----------------------------------------

    ¶6.  (C)  In response to Ambassador's query on broader IAEA priorities for the remainder of ElBaradei's term, the DG cited nuclear fuel assurances, universality of the Additional Protocol, promoting "the right way" to develop nuclear power, as well as nuclear safety, security, and countering nuclear terrorism; see Ref B for DG's discussion of nuclear fuel assurances as his top priority for the coming year.  The DG said he believes we are in general agreement on these priorities, but added that success would be contingent on outreach to the G-77 and "building trust."  ElBaradei said it should be "easy" for the U.S. and others to demonstrate a new approach, noting that the EU, and specifically the Czech Presidency, "would work with you" to "build bridges to G-77."  The DG suggested, for example, that we could give an extra USD 10 million to technical cooperation.  He said the money is "peanuts" for us and it would reap benefits in terms of goodwill across the Board room.  Ambassador noted that TC is not particularly transparent and was too often seen as an "entitlement" rather than as a way to enable development. The DG retorted that that was due to the lack of trust to which he referred.  He added that Russia had recently given USD 10 million for the Agency to use toward safety in Armenia (which has an old Soviet-type VVER reactor).  ------- Comment -------

    ¶7.  (C)  ElBaradei's comments on Iran and Syria are familiar fare and reflect how important it will be to stay closely engaged with key safeguards staff to help encourage internal upwards pressure on the DG not to accept the status quo "stalemate."  Our diplomacy should remain geared to ensuring others remain similarly engaged and that Board members make clear to the DG that he must do more than "go through the motions."  On both files -- Syria in particular - we need to keep pounding the theme that the the IAEA's institutional credibility is at stake.  ElBaradei's comments on the political environment in the Board, however, resonate with Mission's own analysis of the current Board dynamic. Unfortunately, ElBaradei is likely to remain part of the problem, rather than solution, if he becomes increasingly unwilling toward the end of his term to hold in check his proclivity to take a NAM-like view on key issues like the Middle East and fuel assurances.  SCHULTE

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