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### Viewing cable 90BAGHDAD4237, SADDAM'S MESSAGE OF FRIENDSHIP TO PRESIDENT BUSH

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
90BAGHDAD4237 | 1990-07-25 12:12 | 2011-01-01 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Baghdad

`

    O 251246Z JUL 90
    FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4627
    INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
    AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
    AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
    AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE
    ARABLEAGUE COLLECTIVE

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 04237

    E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
    TAGS: MOPS PREL US KU IZ
    SUBJECT: SADDAM'S MESSAGE OF FRIENDSHIP TO PRESIDENT BUSH

    ¶1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

    ¶2. SUMMARY: SADDAM TOLD THE AMBASSADOR JULY 25
    THAT MUBARAK HAS ARRANGED FOR KUWAITI AND IRAQI
    DELEGATIONS TO MEET IN RIYADH, AND THEN ON
    JULY 28, 29 OR 30, THE KUWAITI CROWN PRINCE WILL
    COME TO BAGHDAD FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. "NOTHING
    WILL HAPPEN" BEFORE THEN, SADDAM HAD PROMISED
    MUBARAK.

    --SADDAM WISHED TO CONVEY AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO
    PRESIDENT BUSH: IRAQ WANTS FRIENDSHIP, BUT DOES
    THE USG? IRAQ SUFFERED 100,000'S OF CASUALTIES
    AND IS NOW SO POOR THAT WAR ORPHAN PENSIONS WILL
    SOON BE CUT; YET RICH KUWAIT WILL NOT EVEN ACCEPT
    OPEC DISCIPLINE. IRAQ IS SICK OF WAR, BUT KUWAIT
    HAS IGNORED DIPLOMACY. USG MANEUVERS WITH THE UAE
    WILL ENCOURAGE THE UAE AND KUWAIT TO IGNORE
    CONVENTIONAL DIPLOMACY. IF IRAQ IS PUBLICLY
    HUMILIATED BY THE USG, IT WILL HAVE NO CHOICE
    BUT TO "RESPOND," HOWEVER ILLOGICAL AND SELF
    DESTRUCTIVE THAT WOULD PROVE.

    --ALTHOUGH NOT QUITE EXPLICIT, SADDAM'S MESSAGE
    TO US SEEMED TO BE THAT HE WILL MAKE A MAJOR PUSH
    TO COOPERATE WITH MUBARAK'S DIPLOMACY, BUT WE MUST
    TRY TO UNDERSTAND KUWAITI/UAE "SELFISHNESS" IS
    UNBEARABLE. AMBASSADOR MADE CLEAR THAT WE CAN
    NEVER EXCUSE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BY OTHER THAN
    PEACEFUL MEANS. END SUMMARY.

    ¶3. AMBASSADOR WAS SUMMONED BY PRESIDENT
    SADDAM HUSAYN AT NOON JULY 25. ALSO PRESENT
    WERE FONMIN AZIZ, THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
    DIRECTOR, TWO NOTETAKERS, AND THE IRAQI
    INTERPRETER.

    ¶4. SADDAM, WHOSE MANNER WAS CORDIAL,
    REASONABLE AND EVEN WARM THROUGHOUT THE ENSUING
    TWO HOURS, SAID HE WISHED THE AMBASSADOR TO
    CONVEY A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BUSH. SADDAM
    THEN RECALLED IN DETAIL THE HISTORY OF IRAQ'S
    DECISION TO REESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
    AND ITS POSTPONING IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT
    DECISION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR, RATHER THAN BE
    THOUGHT WEAK AND NEEDY. HE THEN SPOKE ABOUT THE
    MANY "BLOWS" OUR RELATIONS HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO
    SINCE 1984, CHIEF AMONG THEM IRANGATE. IT WAS
    AFTER THE FAW VICTORY, SADDAM SAID, THAT IRAQI
    MISAPPREHENSIONS ABOUT USG PURPOSES BEGAN TO
    SURFACE AGAIN, I.E., SUSPICIONS THAT THE U.S. WAS
    NOT HAPPY TO SEE THE WAR END.

    ¶5. PICKING HIS WORDS WITH CARE, SADDAM SAID
    THAT THERE ARE "SOME CIRCLES" IN THE USG,
    INCLUDING IN CIA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT,
    BUT EMPHATICALLY EXCLUDING THE PRESIDENT AND
    SECRETARY BAKER, WHO ARE NOT FRIENDLY TOWARD
    IRAQ-U.S. RELATIONS. HE THEN LISTED WHAT HE
    SEEMED TO REGARD AS FACTS TO SUPPORT THIS
    CONCLUSION: "SOME CIRCLES ARE GATHERING
    INFORMATION ON WHO MIGHT BE SADDAM HUSAYN'S
    SUCCESSOR;" THEY KEPT UP CONTACTS IN THE GULF
    WARNING AGAINST IRAQ; THEY WORKED TO ENSURE
    NO HELP WOULD GO TO IRAQ (READ EXIM AND CCC).

    ¶6. IRAQ, THE PRESIDENT STRESSED, IS IN SERIOUS
    FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES, WITH 40 BILLION USD DEBTS.
    IRAQ, WHOSE VICTORY IN THE WAR AGAINST IRAN
    MADE AN HISTORIC DIFFERENCE TO THE ARAB WORLD
    AND THE WEST, NEEDS A MARSHALL PLAN. BUT "YOU
    WANT THE OIL PRICE DOWN," SADDAM CHARGED.

    ¶7. RESUMING HIS LIST OF GRIEVANCES WHICH HE
    BELIEVED WERE ALL INSPIRED BY
    "SOME CIRCLES" IN THE USG, HE RECALLED THE
    "USIA CAMPAIGN" AGAINST HIMSELF, AND THE
    GENERAL MEDIA ASSAULT ON IRAQ AND ITS PRESIDENT.

    ¶8. DESPITE ALL THESE BLOWS, SADDAM SAID, AND
    ALTHOUGH "WE WERE SOMEWHAT ANNOYED," WE STILL
    HOPED THAT WE COULD DEVELOP A GOOD RELATIONSHIP.
    BUT THOSE WHO FORCE OIL PRICES DOWN ARE ENGAGING
    IN ECONOMIC WARFARE AND IRAQ CANNOT ACCEPT SUCH
    A TRESPASS ON ITS DIGNITY AND PROSPERITY.

    ¶9. THE SPEARHEADS (FOR THE USG) HAVE BEEN KUWAIT
    AND THE UAE, SADDAM SAID. SADDAM SAID CAREFULLY
    THAT JUST AS IRAQ WILL NOT THREATEN OTHERS, IT
    WILL ACCEPT NO THREAT AGAINST ITSELF. "WE HOPE
    THE USG WILL NOT MISUNDERSTAND:" IRAQ ACCEPTS,
    AS THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID, THAT ANY
    COUNTRY MAY CHOOSE ITS FRIENDS. BUT THE USG KNOWS
    THAT IT WAS IRAQ, NOT THE USG, WHICH DECISIVELY
    PROTECTED THOSE USG FRIENDS DURING THE WAR--AND THAT
    IS UNDERSTANDABLE SINCE PUBLIC OPINION IN THE USG,
    TO SAY NOTHING OF GEOGRAPHY, WOULD HAVE MADE IT
    IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE AMERICANS TO ACCEPT 10,000 DEAD
    IN A SINGLE BATTLE, AS IRAQ DID.

    ¶10. SADDAM ASKED WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR THE USG
    TO ANNOUNCE IT IS COMMITTED TO THE DEFENSE OF
    ITS FRIENDS, INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY.
    ANSWERING HIS OWN QUESTION, HE SAID THAT TO IRAQ
    IT MEANS FLAGRANT BIAS AGAINST THE GOI.

    ¶11. COMING TO ONE OF HIS MAIN POINTS, SADDAM
    ARGUED THAT USG MANEUVERS WITH THE UAE AND KUWAIT (SIC)
    ENCOURAGED THEM IN THEIR UNGENEROUS POLICIES. THE
    IRAQI RIGHTS, SADDAM EMPHASIZED, WILL BE RESTORED
    ONE BY ONE, THOUGH IT MAY TAKE A MONTH OR MUCH
    MORE THAN A YEAR. IRAQ HOPES THE USG WILL BE
    IN HARMONY WITH ALL THE PARTIES TO THIS DISPUTE.

    ¶12. SADDAM SAID HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE USG IS
    DETERMINED TO KEEP THE OIL FLOWING AND TO
    MAINTAIN ITS FRIENDSHIPS IN THE GULF. WHAT HE
    CANNOT UNDERSTAND IS WHY WE ENCOURAGE THOSE WHO
    ARE DAMAGING IRAQ, WHICH IS WHAT OUR GULF MANEUVERS
    WILL DO.

    ¶13. SADDAM SAID HE FULLY BELIEVES THE USG WANTS
    PEACE, AND THAT IS GOOD. BUT DO NOT, HE ASKED,
    USE METHODS WHICH YOU SAY YOU DO NOT LIKE,
    METHODS LIKE ARM-TWISTING-

    ¶14. AT THIS POINT SADDAM SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT
    PRIDE OF IRAQIS, WHO BELIEVE IN "LIBERTY OR DEATH."
    IRAQ WILL HAVE TO RESPOND IF THE U.S. USES THESE
    METHODS. IRAQ KNOWS THE USG CAN SEND PLANES AND
    ROCKETS AND HURT IRAQ DEEPLY. SADDAM ASKS THAT
    THE USG NOT FORCE IRAQ TO THE POINT OF HUMILIATION
    AT WHICH LOGIC MUST BE DISREGARDED. IRAQ DOES NOT
    CONSIDER THE U.S. AN ENEMY AND HAS TRIED TO BE
    FRIENDS.

    ¶15. AS FOR THE INTRA-ARAB DISPUTES, SADDAM SAID
    HE IS NOT ASKING THE USG TO TAKE UP ANY PARTICULAR
    ROLE SINCE THE SOLUTIONS MUST COME THROUGH ARAB
    AND BILATERAL DIPLOMACY.

    ¶16. RETURNING TO HIS THEME THAT IRAQ WANTS
    DIGNITY AND FREEDOM AS WELL AS FRIENDSHIP WITH THE
    U.S., HE CHARGED THAT IN THE LAST YEAR THERE WERE
    MANY OFFICIAL STATEMENTS WHICH MADE IT SEEM THAT
    THE U.S. DOES NOT WANT TO RECIPROCATE. HOW, FOR
    EXAMPLE, SADDAM ASKED,CAN WE INTERPRET THE
    INVITATION FOR ARENS TO VISIT AT A TIME OF CRISIS
    IN THE GULF? WHY DID THE U.S- DEFENSE MINISTER
    MAKE "INFLAMMATORY" STATEMENTS?

    ¶17. SADDAM SAID THAT THE IRAQIS KNOW WHAT
    WAR IS, WANT NO MORE OF IT--"DO NOT PUSH US TO IT;
    DO NOT MAKE IT THE ONLY OPTION LEFT WITH WHICH WE
    CAN PROTECT OUR DIGNITY."

    ¶18. PRESIDENT BUSH, SADDAM SAID, HAS MADE NO MISTAKE
    IN HIS PRESIDENCY VIS-A-VIS THE ARABS. THE DECISION
    ON THE PLO DIALOGUE WAS "MISTAKEN," BUT IT WAS
    TAKEN UNDER "ZIONIST PRESSURE" AND, SADDAM SAID, IS
    PERHAPS A CLEVER TACTIC TO ABSORB THAT PRESSURE.

    ¶19. AFTER A SHORT DIVERSION ON THE NEED FOR THE
    U.S. TO CONSIDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF 200,000
    ARABS WITH THE SAME VIGOR AND INTEREST AS THE HUMAN
    RIGHTS OF THE ISRAELIS, SADDAM CONCLUDED BY
    RESTATING THAT IRAQ WANTS AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP
    "ALTHOUGH WE WILL NOT PANT FOR IT, WE WILL DO OUR
    PART AS FRIENDS."

    ¶20. SADDAM THEN OFFERED AN ANECDOTE TO ILLUSTRATE
    HIS POINT. HE HAD TOLD THE IRAQI KURDISH LEADER
    IN 1974 THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE UP HALF OF
    THE SHATT AL-ARAB TO IRAN TO OBTAIN ALL OF A
    PROSPEROUS IRAQ. THE KURD HAD BET THAT SADDAM WOULD
    NOT GIVE HALF THE SHATT--THE KURD WAS WRONG. EVEN
    NOW, THE ONLY REAL ISSUE WITH IRAN IS THE SHATT, AND
    IF GIVING AWAY HALF OF THE WATERWAY IS THE ONLY
    THING STANDING BETWEEN THE CURRENT SITUATION AND
    IRAQI PROSPERITY, SADDAM SAID HE WOULD BE GUIDED
    BY WHAT HE DID IN 1974.

    ¶21. THE AMBASSADOR THANKED SADDAM FOR THE
    OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS DIRECTLY WITH HIM SOME OF
    HIS AND OUR CONCERNS. PRESIDENT BUSH, TOO, WANTS
    FRIENDSHIP, AS HE HAD WRITTEN AT THE 'ID AND ON
    THE OCCASION OF IRAQ'S NATIONAL DAY. SADDAM
    INTERRUPTED TO SAY HE HAD BEEN TOUCHED BY THOSE

    ¶22. AMBASSADOR RESUMED HER THEME, RECALLING THAT
    THE PRESIDENT HAD INSTRUCTED HER TO BROADEN AND
    DEEPEN OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. SADDAM HAD REFERRED
    TO "SOME CIRCLES" ANTIPATHETIC TO THAT AIM. SUCH
    CIRCLES CERTAINLY EXISTED, BUT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION
    IS INSTRUCTED BY THE PRESIDENT. ON THE OTHER HAND,
    THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT CONTROL THE AMERICAN PRESS;
    IF HE DID, CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT
    EXIST. SADDAM AGAIN INTERRUPTED TO SAY HE UNDERSTOOD
    THAT. THE AMBASSADOR SAID SHE HAD SEEN THE DIANE
    SAWYER SHOW AND THOUGHT THAT IT WAS CHEP AND UNFAIR.
    BUT THE AMERICAN PRESS TREATS ALL POLITICIANS
    WITHOUT KID GLOVES--THAT IS OUR WAY.

    ¶23. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS
    VERY RECENTLY REAFFIRMED HIS DESIRE FOR A BETTER
    RELATIONSHIP AND HAS PROVEN THAT BY, FOR EXAMPLE,
    OPPOSING SANCTIONS BILLS. HERE SADDAM INTERRUPTED
    AGAIN. LAUGHING, HE SAID THERE IS NOTHING LEFT
    FOR IRAQ TO BUY IN THE U.S. EVERYTHING IS
    PROHIBITED EXCEPT FOR WHEAT, AND NO DOUBT THAT WILL
    SOON BE DECLARED A DUAL-USE ITEM- SADDAM SAID, HOWEVER,
    HE HAD DECIDED NOT TO RAISE THIS ISSUE, BUT RATHER
    CONCENTRATE ON THE FAR MORE IMPORTANT ISSUES AT HAND.

    ¶24. AMBASSADOR SAID THERE WERE MANY ISSUES HE
    HAD RAISED SHE WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON, BUT
    SHE WISHED TO USE HER LIMITED TIME WITH THE
    PRESIDENT TO STRESS FIRST PRESIDENT BUSH'S DESIRE
    FOR FRIENDSHIP AND, SECOND, HIS STRONG DESIRE, SHARED
    WE ASSUME BY IRAQ, FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MID
    EAST. IS IT NOT REASONABLE FOR US TO BE CONCERNED
    WHEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER BOTH
    SAY PUBLICLY THAT KUWAITI ACTIONS ARE THE
    EQUIVALENT OF MILITARY AGGRESSION, AND THEN WE
    LEARN THAT MANY UNITS OF THE REPUBLICAN GUARD
    HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE BORDER? IS IT NOT REASONABLE
    FOR US TO ASK, IN THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP, NOT
    CONFRONTATION, THE SIMPLE QUESTION: WHAT ARE YOUR
    INTENTIONS?

    ¶25. SADDAM SAID THAT WAS INDEED A REASONABLE
    QUESTION. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE SHOULD BE
    CONCERNED FOR REGIONAL PEACE, IN FACT IT IS OUR
    DUTY AS A SUPERPOWER. "BUT HOW CAN WE MAKE THEM
    (KUWAIT AND UAE) UNDERSTAND HOW DEEPLY WE ARE
    SUFFERING." THE FINANCIAL SITUATION IS SUCH THAT
    THE PENSIONS FOR WIDOWS AND ORPHANS WILL HAVE
    TO BE CUT. AT THIS POINT, THE INTERPRETER AND
    ONE OF THE NOTETAKERS BROKE DOWN AND WEPT.

    ¶26. AFTER A PAUSE FOR RECUPERATION, SADDAM SAID,
    IN EFFECT, BELIEVE ME I HAVE TRIED EVERYTHING: WE
    SENT ENVOYS, WROTE MESSAGES, ASKED FAHD TO
    ARRANGE QUADRAPARTITE SUMMIT (IRAQ, SAG, UE,
    KUWAIT). FAHD SUGGESTFD OIL MINISTERS INSTEAD AND
    WE AGREED TO THE JEDDAH AGREEMENT ALTHOUGH IT WAS
    WELL BELOW OUR HOPES. THEN, SADDAM CONTINUED,
    TWO DAYS LATER THE KUWAITI OIL MINISTER ANNOUNCED
    HE WOULD WANT TO ANNUL THAT AGREEMENT WITHIN TWO
    MONTHS. AS FOR THE UAE, SADDAM SAID, I BEGGED
    SHAYKH ZAYID TO UNDERSTAND OUR PROBLEMS (WHEN
    SADDAM ENTERTAINED HIM IN MOSUL AFTER THE BAGHDAD
    SUMMIT), AND ZAYID SAID JUST WAIT UNTIL I GET
    BACK TO ABU DHABI. BUT THEN HIS MINISTER OF OIL
    MADE "BAD STATEMENTS."

    ¶27. AT THIS POINT, SADDAM LEFT THE ROOM TO TAKE
    AN URGENT CALL FROM MUBARAK. AFTER HIS RETURN,
    THE AMBASSADOR ASKED IF HE COULD TELL HER IF
    THERE HAS ANY PROGRESS IN FINDING A PEACEFUL WAY
    TO DEFUSE THE DISPUTE. THIS WAS SOMETHING PRESIDENT
    BUSH WOULD BE KEENLY INTERESTED TO KNOW. SADDAM
    SAID THAT HE HAD JUST LEARNED FROM MUBARAK THE
    KUWAITIS HAVE AGREED TO NEGOTIATE. THE KUWAITI
    CROWN PRINCE/PRIME MINISTER WOULD MEET IN RIYADH
    WITH SADDAM'S NUMBER TWO, IZZAT IBRAHIM, AND THEN
    THE KUWAITI WOULD COME TO BAGHDAD ON SATURDAY,
    SUNDAY OR, AT THE LATEST, MONDAY, JULY 30.

    ¶28. "I TOLD MUBARAK," SADDAM SAID, THAT "NOTHING
    WILL HAPPEN UNTIL THE MEETING," AND NOTHING WILL
    HAPPEN DURING OR AFTER THE MEETING IF THE KUWAITIS
    WILL AT LAST "GIVE US SOME HOPE."

    ¶29. THE AMBASSADOR SAID SHE WAS DELIGHTED TO HEAR
    THIS GOOD NEWS. SADDAM THEN ASKED HER TO CONVEY
    HIS WARM GREETINGS TO PRESIDENT BUSH AND TO
    CONVEY HIS MESSAGE TO HIM.

    ¶30. NOTE: ON THE BORDER QUESTION, SADDAM REFERRED
    TO THE 1961 AGREEMENT AND A "LINE OF PATROL" IT
    HAD ESTABLISHED. THE KUWAITIS, HE SAID, HAD TOLD
    MUBARAK IRAQ WAS 20 KILOMETERS "IN FRONT" OF THIS
    LINE. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT SHE HAD SERVED IN
    KUWAIT 20 YEARS BEFORE; THEN, AS NOW, WE TOOK NO
    POSITION ON THESE ARAB AFFAIRS.

    ¶31. COMMENT: IN THE MEMORY QF THE CURRENT
    DIPLOMATIC CORPS, SADDAM HAS NEVER SUMMONED AN
    AMBASSADOR. HE IS WORRIED.

    ACCORDING TO HIS OWN POLITICAL THEORIZING
    (U.S. THE SOLE MAJOR POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST),
    HE NEEDS AT A MINIMUM A CORRECT RELATIONSHIP
    WITH US FOR OBVIOUS GEOPOLITICAL REASONS,
    ESPECIALLY AS LONG AS HE PERCEIVES MORTAL
    THREATS FROM ISRAEL AND IRAN. AMBASSADOR
    BELIEVES SADDAM SUSPECTS OUR DECISION SUDDENLY
    TO UNDERTAKE MANEUVERS WITH ABU DHABI IS A
    HARBINGER OF A USG DECISION TO TAKE SIDES.
    FURTHER, SADDAM, HIMSELF BEGINNING TO HAVE AN
    INKLING OF HOW MUCH HE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND ABOUT
    THE U.S., IS APPREHENSIVE THAT WE DO NOT
    UNDERSTAND CERTAIN POLITICAL FACTORS WHICH
    INHIBIT HIM, SUCH AS:

    --HE CANNOT ALLOW HIMSELF TO BE PERCEIVED AS
    CAVING IN TO SUPERPOWER BULLYING (AS U/S HAMDUN
    FRANKLY WARNED US IN LATE 1988);

    --IRAQ, WHICH LOST 100,000'S OF CASUALTIES, IS
    SUFFERING AND KUWAIT IS "MISERLY" AND "SELFISH."

    ¶32. IT WAS PROGRESS TO HAVE SADDAM ADMIT
    THAT THE USG HAS A "RESPONSIBILITY" IN THE
    REGION, AND HAS EVERY RIGHT TO EXPECT AN
    ANSWER WHEN WE ASK IRAQ'S INTENTIONS. HIS
    RESPONSE IN EFFECT THAT HE TRIED VARIOUS
    DIPLOMATIC/CHANNELS BEFORE RESORTING TO
    UNADULTERATED INTIMIDATION HAS AT LEAST THE
    VIRTUE OF FRANKNESS. HIS EMPHASIS THAT HE
    WANTS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS SURELY SINCERE
    (IRAQIS ARE SICK OF WAR), BUT THE TERMS SOUND
    DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. SADDAM SEEMS TO WANT
    PLEDGES NOW ON OIL PRICES AND PRODUCTION TO
    COVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.

    GLASPIE

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