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### Viewing cable 10RABAT8, GUINEA: THE WAY FORWARD

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10RABAT8 | 2010-01-08 11:11 | 2010-12-09 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Rabat

`

    VZCZCXRO3317
    OO RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHRB #0008/01 0081117
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 081117Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1026
    INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 0018
    RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0001
    RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 0657
    RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 0595
    RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0989
    RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY 0001
    RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0103
    RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 0200
    RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0139
    RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL PRIORITY 0107
    RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 0061
    RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0520
    RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY 0040
    RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME PRIORITY 0568
    RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1183
    RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0459
    RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 0057

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RABAT 000008

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR AF, AF/W, NEA, NEA/MAG AND INR/AA
    KINSHASA PLS PASS BRAZZAVILLE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2020
    TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL PINR GV MO
    SUBJECT: GUINEA: THE WAY FORWARD

    REF: A. 09 RABAT 1018
    ¶B. 09 RABAT 1009

    RABAT 00000008 001.2 OF 004

    Classified By: Ambassador Samuel L. Kaplan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (S) Summary: Following a series of discussions in Rabat
    on January 5, Assistant Secretary of State for African
    Affairs Johnnie Carson signaled explicit USG support to
    Guinean Defense Minister Sekouba Konate in his bid to lead
    the country's transition to civilian rule. A/S Carson, along
    with French Presidential Advisor for African Affairs Andre
    Parant and Moroccan Foreign Minster Taieb Fassi Fihri, signed
    a declaration indicating their commitment to the transition
    process based on the plan proposed by ECOWAS facilitator
    Blaise Compaore, President of Burkina Faso. Under the
    declaration, wounded junta leader Captain Moussa Dadis
    Camara, who remains hospitalized in Rabat, would be
    prohibited from returning to Conakry as the signatories
    pursue his resettlement to a third country. Konate departed
    Rabat after meeting with A/S Carson and was expected to make
    a public pronouncement in the near future in Guinea
    announcing his intention to lead the transition to civilian
    rule (Ref A).

    ¶2. (S) On January 7, King Mohammed VI called Gabonese
    President Ali Bongo to request that Gabon host Dadis Camara;
    according to the Moroccan MFA, Bongo declined. French
    Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner planned to ask Congolese
    President Denis Sassou-Nguesso if the Republic of the Congo
    would host Dadis, and the GOM requested that we reinforce
    that message. Finally, the GOM indicated that it would be
    willing to participate in an international contact group
    meeting on Guinea in Addis Ababa on January 26 and would
    mobilize Arab support -- if an organization other than the
    African Union (AU) convened the meeting. End Summary.

    -----------------------
    Moroccans Set the Stage
    -----------------------

    ¶3. (C) Prior to meeting with Konate, A/S Carson met on
    January 5 with Moroccan Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri and
    Moroccan Director General for Studies and Documentation
    (external intelligence service chief) Mohamed Yassine
    Mansouri, the de facto national security advisor. Also in
    attendance were Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director
    General for Multilateral Affairs and Chief of Staff
    Ambassador Nasser Bourita, Ambassador, DCM, and D/PolCouns.
    French Presidential Advisor for African Affairs Andre Parant
    had met with the Moroccans and with Konate on January 4, and
    A/S Carson subsequently briefed French Ambassador Bruno
    Joubert.

    ¶4. (S) Emphasizing Morocco,s goal of finding a way to
    stabilize the situation in Conakry, Fassi Fihri reported that
    in the past few days Konate had asserted his readiness to
    begin the political transition in Guinea. Konate had told
    the Moroccans that he would not name a Prime Minister but
    would ask Guinean civil society, including the political
    parties and the labor unions, to identify a leader until
    elections could be held. Fassi Fihri added that Konate
    recognized the inseparability of military and political
    affairs and the need to disarm the militias and restructure
    Guinean armed forces. Konate needed, however, the commitment
    of support from Washington, Paris, and Rabat, evidenced by
    signature of the declaration, to move forward, Fassi Fihri
    said.

    ¶5. (S) Fassi Fihri went on to explain that Konate saw the
    restructuring of the military as a three-to-five year process

    RABAT 00000008 002.2 OF 004

    before the country could claim to have a professional army.
    Konate wished that violence and bloodshed such as seen in
    Guinea and elsewhere on the continent would "never happen
    again," and he recognized the need for those responsible,
    from Dadis to the lowest ranking accomplice, to be brought to
    justice either through Guinean courts or, if not credible,  through an international tribunal, Fassi Fihri reported. As  for the document expressing French, U.S. and Moroccan support  for Konate, French Presidential Advisor for African Affairs  Andre Parant had already signed it. Fassi Fihri said Konate  would "keep it in his pocket" but needed the written  assurance of support.

    -------------
    The U.S. Role
    -------------

    ¶6. (S) A/S Carson and the Ambassador expressed appreciation
    for the GOM's leadership on the issue and in the region,
    noting the urgent need to set Guinea on the path to stability
    and civilian rule. While recognizing the importance of
    military restructuring, A/S Carson stressed the need to
    address Guinea's economic situation as well by working to
    develop a strategy for the country's economic revitalization.
    Specifically, A/S Carson suggested that the United States
    could seek the establishment of an international contact
    group that would encourage economic assistance to Guinea,
    engaging the World Bank and the IMF as well. He noted too
    that U.S. Africa Command could visit Guinea to assess the
    security sector and make recommendations on security sector
    reform.

    ------------
    Enter Konate
    ------------

    ¶7. (S) After more than one hour, Guinean Minister of
    National Defense Sekouba Konate, who had been waiting nearby,
    joined the meeting. A/S Carson thanked him for sharing
    concerns about the future of Guinea and applauded his efforts
    to resolve the situation in the country. He stated that
    Guinea is at a crossroads and that Konate's leadership was of
    crucial importance and could help ensure the country moved
    along the road to stability and progress. A/S Carson
    stressed that it was important for the transition to begin
    and to lead in the shortest possible time to new elections,
    adding that it was similarly important that Dadis not return
    and participate in elections. Likewise, it would be
    beneficial for Konate to facilitate the presence in Guinea of
    a small ECOWAS monitoring group consisting of 30 to 40
    diplomats and unarmed military personnel, which would lend
    credibility to the transition process. A/S Carson noted
    there was much international goodwill toward Guinea, and if
    the country chose the path toward stability, economic
    development, and civilian government, there would be help
    along the way.

    ¶8. (S) Konate expressed his appreciation for A/S Carson's
    message and repeated the importance of having the signed
    document verifying support for his efforts. He repeatedly
    expressed concern for his own security and for the security
    of his country, but stated his readiness to return to Conakry
    and put the Ouagadougou Accords in place. It was important
    to begin, he said, adding that the violent events of
    September 28 could be repeated if efforts were not made to
    prevent violence. Konate stated explicitly that he would
    engage the Forces Vives and others in support of the
    transition and that he would not be a candidate in any future
    elections.

    RABAT 00000008 003.2 OF 004

    ¶9. (S) Konate also stated that he supported a civilian
    government of national unity and suggested that opposition
    leader Jean Marie Dore serve as Prime Minister until
    elections were held but asserted in this regard that he would
    accept the decision of the opposition. Konate said the
    military would agree to his role in leading the transition,
    and he agreed it would be important to show that the army was
    not engaged in politics. Claude Pivi (Dadis's half-brother)
    and others closely affiliated with Dadis Camara and the junta
    would similarly be excluded from participating in the
    transition. Pivi was involved in the September 28 massacre,
    Konate said, and should go to court (Ref A).

    --------------
    Whither Dadis?
    --------------

    ¶10. (S) Carson did not meet with Dadis Camara, but discussed
    his health with the Moroccans outside of Konate,s presence.
    Fassi Fihri told A/S Carson that he has visited Dadis four
    times since he was allowed into the country for medical care
    (Ref B). According to the FM, Dadis has regained "80
    percent" of his faculties, but has difficulty putting more
    than five words together without 30-second pauses before the
    next phrase or sentence. Fassi Fihri,s conversations with
    Dadis had focused mainly on health issues, the FM said, with
    Fassi Fihri urging him to fully recover before thinking about
    politics and his future. Dadis has, however, expressed the
    desire to leave, Fassi Fihri said, and has begun to wonder
    why he has not been discharged from the hospital.

    ¶11. (S) Fassi Fihri and Mansouri suggested that once Konate
    made his public pronouncement, Dadis would know he was
    finished politically and it would be difficult for him to
    return to Guinea. Concerted engagement by Konate with
    political forces inside Guinea, and by the U.S. and France
    with external forces such as ECOWAS and President Blaise
    Compaore, to enlist support for Konate and his leadership
    though a transitional period and their positive reaction to a
    pronouncement would convince Dadis to go to a third country,
    Fassi Fihri said. Konate was explicit that Dadis not be
    allowed to return to Guinea and participate in the transition.

    ¶12. (S) A/S Carson outlined U.S. efforts to identify a
    country to house Dadis Camara for the long term, noting that
    Gabon, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Libya have been considered.
    Fassi Fihri suggested that The Gambia or the Republic of the
    Congo (Brazzaville) might be other options.

    --------------
    The Road Ahead
    --------------

    ¶13. (S) After A/S Carson relayed to ECOWAS facilitator
    Blaise Compaore the contents of the meetings, Compaore
    expressed his gratitude for the efforts and noted that this
    could help break the impasse in Guinea. However, he noted
    that Pivi seemed to be running the show in Guinea and asked
    rhetorically if Konate would be able to bring the factions
    together or whether a Konate pronouncement would bring
    greater instability. The real issue for Compaore was whether
    Konate would be able to command the support of the military.
    Konate's stated intention was to move the country along the
    path to economic progress and civilian rule. Konate departed
    Rabat for Conakry on January 5.

    ¶14. (S) On January 7, King Mohammed VI called Gabonese
    President Ali Bongo to request that Gabon host Dadis Camara;
    according to Bourita, Bongo declined. French Foreign
    Minister Bernard Kouchner planned to ask Congolese President

    RABAT 00000008 004.2 OF 004

    Denis Sassou-Nguesso if the Republic of the Congo would host
    Dadis, and the GOM requested that we reinforce that message.
    Bourita told DCM that Morocco it would be willing to
    participate in an international contact group meeting on
    Guinea in Addis Ababa on January 26 and would mobilize Arab
    support -- if an organization other than the African Union
    (AU) convened the meeting. Having the AU convene is
    unacceptable to Morocco because Morocco is not a member.

    -------
    Comment
    -------

    ¶15. (C) Ambassador Carson,s trip was very productive and
    clearly led to forward movement. Konate, who spoke very
    softly, repeated several times that he was concerned about
    his personal security. For its part, the GOM is anxious to
    1) get Dadis Camara out of Morocco and 2) continue to support
    the transition and reconstruction processes in Guinea. End
    Comment.

    ¶16. (U) A/S Carson cleared paragraphs 1 and 3 through 13.

    ¶17. (U) Conakry and Tripoli minimize considered.

    *****************************************
    Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
    http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
    *****************************************
    KAPLAN

`