Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 4039 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone
Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AJ ASEC AF AR AMGT ACOA AEC AO AE AU AFIN AX AMED ADCO AG AODE APER AFFAIRS AC AS AM AL ASIG ABLD ABUD AA AEMR AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AVERY AGMT ATRN
BR BL BO BH BTIO BEXP BU BIDEN BM BK BY BA BG BE BF BB BC BBSR BRUSSELS BILAT BX
CDG CI CO CH CU CVIS CIS CA CBW CF CLINTON CM CASC CMGT CN CE CJAN CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CG CS CD CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM COUNTER CJUS CARSON COUNTERTERRORISM CIA CACM CDB CV CAN
DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DJ DISENGAGEMENT DS DOD DEAX
EAIR ECON EINV EAID EFIN ETRD ENRG EWWT EPET ECPS EUN ER EINT EIND EAGR EMIN ETTC ELTN ELAB EU EFIS EG EI EN ES EC EXTERNAL ECIN EINVETC ENVR ENIV EZ EINN ENGR EUR ECA ET ESA ELN ENERG EK ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FJ FMLN FINR
GG GM GH GE GR GTIP GV GT GOI GCC GAZA GZ GA GTMO
HUMAN HILLARY HO HA HYMPSK HR HU HURI HK
IC IAEA IZ IT ITPHUM IR IV IPR IWC IS IQ IN IO ID ICTY ISRAELI IRAQI IIP ICRC ICAO IMO IF ILC IEFIN INRB INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF ITALY ITALIAN INTERPOL IRAJ INRA INRO
JOSEPH JA JO JP JOHNNIE JUS JAMES
KIPR KNNP KHLS KGHG KSCA KIRF KGIC KRAD KDEM KCRM KJUS KCOR KE KWMN KSPR KG KZ KN KTFN KISL KTIA KPAL KHIV KWBG KS KACT KPRP KU KAWC KOLY KCIP KCFE KOCI KV KMDR KPKO KPAO KTDB KMRS KFRD KTIP KLIG KBCT KICC KMCA KGIT KSTC KUNR KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KVPR KOMC KAWK KO KTER KSUM KHUM KRFD KBIO KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KDRG KPRV KMPI KHDP KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFIN KTBT KCRS KRVC KR KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KGCC KPIN KNUC KPLS KIRC KCOM KDEV
LY LG LE LH LI LU LO LOG LT
MARR MK MNUC MTRE MOPS MX MASS MU MTCRE MCAP ML MO MP MA MY MIL MDC MTCR MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MR MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MASC MASSMNUC MPOS MZ MEPP MOPPS MAPP MG MCC
NE NS NPT NAR NATO NL NO NI NIPP NZ NU NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NG NGO NP NSF NATIONAL
OTRA OSCE OPRC OVIP OAS OFDP OREP OIIP OPIC OPDC OEXC OECD ODIP OPCW OSCI OIE OTR OVP OFFICIALS OSAC
PARM PGOV PREL PTER PINS PBTS PHUM PINR PK PREF PHSA PROP PE PO PA PM PMIL PL PTERE POL PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PNAT PARMS PROV PEL PGOVE POLINT PRAM POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PSOE PU POLITICAL PARTIES PBIO PECON POGOV PINL PKFK PGOF
QA
RO RU RS RIGHTS RW RICE ROBERT RF RFE REGION RP
SP SW SOCI SHUM SR SENV SO SNAR SCUL SY SA SMIG SF SZ SU SL SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI STEINBERG SN SG
TH TU TO TBIO TW TX TFIN TD TRGY TSPL TSPA TZ TIP TPHY TS TK TNGD TERRORISM TI TC TR TT
UNSC UK UNGA UZ UN UY UP UE UNESCO UAE UNO UNEP UG US USTR UNHCR UNMIK UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS UNAUS USUN USEU UV
VE VT VM VZ VTPREL VN
WMO WI WTRO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WTO WA
XM XA XL XF XZ XW XR XH XG XT XC XY XD XS XK
YI YM YE
ZI ZP ZK ZF ZB ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU ZA

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09RIYADH670, SPECIAL ADVISOR HOLBROOKE'S MEETING WITH SAUDI

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09RIYADH670.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09RIYADH670 | 2009-05-17 16:04 | 2010-12-01 23:11 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Riyadh

`

    VZCZCXYZ0003
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHRH #0670/01 1371606
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 171606Z MAY 09
    FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0798
    INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 2489
    RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 4741
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0254
    RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 0465
    RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 1648

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 000670

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2019
    TAGS: PREL PTER AF PK SA YM
    SUBJECT: SPECIAL ADVISOR HOLBROOKE'S MEETING WITH SAUDI
    ASSISTANT INTERIOR MINISTER PRINCE MOHAMMED BIN NAYEF

    Classified By: CDA DAVID RUNDELL, 1.4(b),(d)

    ¶1. KEY POINTS:

    -- (C) Ambassador Richard Holbrooke met in Riyadh May 16 with
    HRH Prince Mohammed bin Nayef (MbN), Saudi Assistant Minister
    of the Interior.

    -- (C) Holbrooke emphasized that Afghanistan and Pakistan
    should be treated as a closely inter-related problem. He
    stressed U.S. desire for stronger cooperation and a common
    U.S./Saudi approach to Pakistan based on economic assistance,
    encouraging cooperation between Pakistani political factions,
    and transforming the Pakistani army to fight a
    counterinsurgency war.

    -- (C) MbN noted the Saudis viewed the Pakistan army as the
    strongest element for stability in the country. In reply
    Holbrooke emphasized U.S. support for Pakistan's democracy
    and said the U.S. opposed a military coup. MbN said he
    agreed.

    -- (C) MbN described Yemen as a dangerous failed state and a
    growing threat to Saudi Arabia because it attracts Al-Qaeda
    (AQ), said Yemeni President Saleh is losing control, and
    outlined a Saudi strategy of co-opting Yemeni tribes with
    assistance projects.

    -- (C) MbN strongly supported President Obama's decision to
    oppose release of photographs of U.S. detainee
    interrogations, saying release would provide a boon to AQ,
    and would be "the favor of their life."

    PAKISTAN MUST NOT FAIL

    ¶2. (C) Holbrooke thanked the Prince for Saudi Arabia's $700
    million pledge at the April 17 Pakistan donors'
    conference in Japan. He said he had not come to make demands
    or requests but simply to begin a consultative process. The
    fact that three U.S. special envoys (Senator Mitchell, Dennis
    Ross, and now Holbrooke) have visited Saudi Arabia
    demonstrates the importance President Obama places on
    U.S./Saudi relations and the Saudi role in the region.
    Afghanistan and Pakistan were a major problem the new U.S.
    administration had inherited.

    ¶3. (C) Success in Afghanistan was essential for U.S.
    security as well as security in Europe and the Middle East,
    Holbrooke continued. The U.S. might be able to live with
    some degree of instability in Afghanistan, but not with an
    unstable Pakistan, because of Pakistan's nuclear arms,
    fragile politics, and relationship with India. He asked if
    Saudi Arabia shared this conclusion. MbN said "Absolutely,"
    a comment echoed precisely in Holbrooke's subsequent meetings
    with King Abdullah and Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal
    (septels). It's clear that Saudi Arabia has a "unique"
    relationship with Pakistan, Holbrooke said. He noted that
    over 800,000 Pakistanis live and work in Saudi Arabia. Saudi
    Arabia was especially important to Nawaz Sharif, the most
    popular politician in Pakistan. These were reasons why what
    happened in Pakistan was of direct concern to both the U.S.
    and Saudi Arabia.

    ¶4. (C) Holbrooke said the U.S. and Saudi Arabia shared a
    common purpose on Pakistan but not yet a "common
    collaboration." The purpose of his visit was thus to begin a
    dialogue on Pakistan and seek a common policy. Neither the
    U.S. nor Saudi Arabia could afford to let Pakistan fall
    apart. There were three important issues to address:

    -- Pakistan desperately needs economic assistance;
    -- Even though the Saudis preferred Nawaz Sharif, Sharif and
    Zardari need to be persuaded to work together;
    -- The Pakistan army needs to restructure itself to fight
    today's war against the Taliban rather than yesterday's war
    against India.

    If Pakistan fell apart, Holbrooke said, the consequences for
    Saudi Arabia would be "unimaginable,"
    especially if Pakistan's nuclear weapons fell into unfriendly
    hands. ("God forbid!" interjected the Prince.)
    "Under your leadership," Holbrooke told the Prince "Saudi
    Arabia has defeated terror, but if Pakistan falls apart, the
    result would be catastrophe."

    ¶5. (C) Holbrooke said the U.S. wanted to expand the
    U.S./Saudi relationship concerning Pakistan. Saudi Arabia
    could do a lot for Pakistan, he added, noting that economic

    and social conditions in Pakistan created fertile ground for
    extremism. Zardari had many faults but he was democratically
    elected, so the U.S. tries to get him and Sharif to work
    together. Meanwhile, Holbrooke said, money for the Taliban
    flows in from the region.

    ¶6. (C) MbN said a vacuum in Islamabad would be dangerous.
    He described Pakistan army Chief of Staff General Kayani as a
    "decent man" who wanted to restore dignity to the army, and
    sought consensus support of all the civilian factions. The
    army was the Saudis' "winning horse," MbN said, but it needed
    to prepare to fight the current war against terror.
    Pakistani soldiers needed to be proud of their service, and
    not hide their identity as soldiers when they were off duty,
    MbN said. He had told Kayani that Pakistani troops needed to
    feel they were fighting for Pakistan and not the U.S. The
    Pakistani army had a "golden opportunity" because now
    Pakistan faced an external enemy. MbN emphasized that the
    army was Pakistan's "best bet" for stability. There were
    800,000 Pakistanis and over one million Indians living in
    Saudi Arabia, MbN said, and millions more visited the
    Kingdom to make the Hajj pilgrimage, so anything that
    happened in Pakistan, or between Pakistan and India, was a
    threat to stability in Saudi Arabia.

    ¶7. (C) Holbrooke said he knew Kayani, with the Director of
    Pakistan's intelligence service (ISI), and
    General Pasha, and also Musharraf. He recalled the U.S. and
    Saudi Arabia had decided to support Musharraf in
    the aftermath of 9/11. This had been the right decision at
    the time but Musharraf had been a disappointment. The U.S.
    supported democracy in Pakistan, not any individual leader.
    Holbrooke repeated that the U.S. supported Zardari because he
    was elected, and emphasized that the U.S. was "100 percent
    opposed" to a military coup in Pakistan. MbN assured that
    Saudi Arabia would not support a coup either.

    ¶8. (C) He noted the U.S. agreed that corruption in Pakistan
    was an issue, but the U.S. had decided it was more
    important to help Pakistan. Attaching onerous conditions to
    assistance was a mistake, Holbrooke said. Since the U.S. and
    Saudi Arabia agreed on Pakistan's importance, the question
    was how to start working together. MbN answered that
    U.S./Saudi security cooperation should stay as it is, since
    it had "never been better" despite past tensions. Each side
    knew its own business best, and the focus should be on
    obtaining results. MbN characterized Saudi cooperation with
    U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies as "one team."

    ¶9. (C) Holbrooke reiterated that terrorists in Pakistan were
    not under enough pressure and pressed the point that
    U.S./Saudi cooperation on Pakistan needed to rise to a higher
    level. MbN replied that he had asked King Abdullah
    for permission to maintain a "security channel" with the U.S.
    to remain open at all times to facilitate information
    exchange regardless of other issues in bilateral relations.
    The Prince added that the King despised the corruption he saw
    in Pakistan and this colored his views toward that country.

    "WE HAVE A PROBLEM CALLED YEMEN"

    ¶10. (C) Moving to a new subject, the Prince said "We have a
    problem called Yemen." AQ has found fertile ground
    there, he said. The geography was similar to Afghanistan,
    and many Yemenis were more sympathetic to AQ's goals than
    were the Afghans. Yemen is also closer to AQ targets and
    recruiting grounds in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had detected
    a pattern of individuals coming to the Kingdom for Hajj or
    Umrah and then traveling south to Yemen ("it's only 400
    miles," he noted) for training before returning to their home
    countries. Saudi forces have arrested Egyptians and
    Algerians, among others, who were attempting to do this.

    ¶11. (C) MbN described Yemen as a failed state that is "very,
    very, extremely dangerous," and required focus. The Huthi
    tribes were Takfiri and Shi'a "like Hizballah South," he
    said. This was a threat forming around Saudi Arabia that
    required action now. The Saudis would like Saleh to be a
    strong leader, MbN said, but "his vision of Yemen has shrunk
    to Sana'a," and he was losing control over the rest of the
    country. Saleh's old advisors were gone and now he relied on
    his son and other younger men who did not have good
    connections with the Yemeni tribes. In contrast, Saudi
    Arabia had good connections with the tribes, MbN said.

    ¶12. (C) MbN said the Saudis had established a bilateral
    council with Yemen that met twice a year to consider
    assistance projects. The Saudi representatives were the

    Crown prince and the oil minister (Note: Crown Prince
    Sultan has been incapacitated by illness for at least he past
    year; it is not clear whether the bilateral council
    has continued to meet in his absence.) Saudi assistance to
    Yemen was not in the form of cash payments, MbN said, since
    cash tended to end up in Swiss banks. Instead the Saudis
    backed projects in the tribal areas of Yemen where AQ was
    hiding. The idea was that when Yemenis saw the concrete
    benefits of these projects they would push their leaders to
    eject the extremists. Saudi Arabia was counting on this
    strategy, MbN said, to persuade Yemenis to see extremists as
    criminals rather than heroes. Holbrooke replied that the
    U.S. understood Saudi concerns about Yemen, and would work
    with the Saudis to address the problem there.

    TERRORISTS STOLE OUR FAITH

    ¶13. (C) Turning to another issue, MbN recalled that the day
    following President Obama's inauguration, White House
    counterterrorism advisor Brennan had telephoned to assure him
    the new president was committed to continuing the war on
    terror. "Terrorists stole the most valuable things we have,"
    said the Prince. "They took our faith and our children and
    used them to attack us." It had not been easy to see Saudi
    involvement in 9/11 and other terrorist incidents, he said.
    AQ was smart in wanting to hit both the U.S. and Saudi
    Arabia. AQ's strategic goal was to hurt the U.S. and to take
    control of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina.

    ¶14. (C) MbN claimed that in 2003 radicals were present in
    "90 percent" of Saudi mosques. The current Saudi leadership
    had decided it needed to be on the front lines of the
    struggle against terrorism, that the task could not be left
    to the next generation, since AQ gained momentum every time
    it succeeded. The Saudis realized they could not fight back
    without public support, he said, and developed a strategy of
    working with families of suicide bombers and other extremists
    who had been killed. This approach involved providing
    support to the families and telling them their sons had been
    "victims" and not "criminals." This gave the families "a way
    out" and
    provided a public relations advantage to the government. "If
    you stop five but create fifty" new radicals, "that's dumb."
    MbN said. The Saudis measure their success against extremism
    by looking at levels of terrorist recruitment the number of
    successful operations, and they see a growing rejection of
    extremist violence. The Prince related an anecdote about an
    anti-terrorist operation in which the officer commanding
    Interior Ministry forces had discovered his cousin was the
    leader of the terrorists inside a surrounded building. MbN
    said he had offered to relieve the officer, but the latter
    had refused, and had insisted on leading the attack. The
    officer succeeded in defeating the terrorists while capturing
    his cousin alive.

    ¶15. (C) Saudi Arabia was not yet free of terrorism, MbN
    said. Thus it remained important to defeat the terrorists on
    the ground, in the media, and ideologically. The Saudis
    wanted to do this in cooperation with the U.S., the Prince
    said. Time was the key, and it was "not in our favor," he
    added, so "we need to work fast."

    ¶16. (C) On terrorist financing, MbN said "We are trying to
    do our best." Saudi Arabia has millions of visitors,
    especially during Hajj. The Saudis are making arrests, but
    are not making this public. Instead, the Saudi goal is to
    make the public aware that donations could go to the wrong
    places. MbN said that "if money wants to go" to terrorist
    causes, "it will go," and that terrorist attacks were
    inexpensive, "but let's make it harder." Holbrooke asked
    what the Saudis would do with Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia who
    financed terrorism. The Prince replied the suspects would be
    tried in Shari'a courts with Wahhabi judges so that the
    results of the judicial process could be used to condemn
    extremist ideology.

    A BIG FAVOR TO AL-QAEDA

    ¶17. (C) Holbrooke explained that President Obama had decided
    to oppose release of 2000 photographs of U.S.
    interrogations of terrorist suspects on grounds of national
    security, and asked what the Saudi public reaction would be
    to publication of these photos. MbN responded "You bet!" it
    would be bad for security, and noted that following
    publication of the first Abu Ghraib photos, Saudi authorities
    had arrested 250 individuals trying to leave Saudi Arabia to
    join extremist groups in Afghanistan. Release of more
    pictures would give AQ "the favor of their life," said the

    Prince. Saudi Arabia had fought very hard to defeat AQ on
    the Internet, but he couldn,t see how to fight 2000 new
    photos.

    ¶18. (U) Meeting participants

    U.S.

    XXXXXXXXXXXX
    XXXXXXXXXXXX
    XXXXXXXXXXXX
    XXXXXXXXXXXX
    XXXXXXXXXXXX
    XXXXXXXXXXXX

    Saudi Arabia

    XXXXXXXXXXXX,
    XXXXXXXXXXXX

    XXXXXXXXXXXX,

    XXXXXXXXXXXX,
    XXXXXXXXXXXX,
    XXXXXXXXXXXX

    XXXXXXXXXXXX

    ¶19. (U) Amb. Holbrooke cleared this telegram.
    RUNDELL

`