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### Viewing cable 09BERLIN1108, GERMANY: POLITICAL FALL-OUT OVER KUNDUZ AIR

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BERLIN1108 | 2009-09-10 06:06 | 2010-12-02 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Berlin
Appears in these articles: http://www.spiegel.de

`

    VZCZCXRO2166
    OO RUEHSL
    DE RUEHRL #1108/01 2530651
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 100651Z SEP 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5136
    INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0531
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0657
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 001108

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019
    TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO PGOV AF GM
    SUBJECT: GERMANY: POLITICAL FALL-OUT OVER KUNDUZ AIR
    STRIKES CONTAINED -- FOR NOW

    REF: A. BERLIN 970
    ¶B. BERLIN 837

    Classified By: DCM GREG DELAWIE. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Chancellery is confident that Chancellor
    Merkel's policy statement to the Bundestag on September 8 has
    succeeded -- at least for now -- in settling the domestic
    political controversy surrounding the September 4 air strikes
    against two hijacked fuel tankers in Kunduz. Ironically, the
    Greens called for the special parliamentary session in a
    clear attempt to embarrass the government and to make a
    campaign issue out of the controversy, but Merkel used it to
    her advantage to elicit support for the German deployment in
    Afghanistan by all the major parties, save for the Left
    Party, which has always opposed the mission. While it had
    been expected that internal critics would seize on the
    bombing to score political points against the Chancellor and
    Defense Minister Jung, the Chancellery, MFA and MOD all
    expressed dismay that their closest Allies -- especially the
    French -- had made a rush to judgment. Officials at both the
    MFA and MOD also expressed disappointment that despite
    Germany's excellent track record in avoiding civilian
    casualties, COMISAF GEN McChrystal, in their view, quickly
    assumed the worst about German actions in this case. The MOD
    emphasized that while everything was calm now, this issue
    would need to be carefully managed in the coming weeks to
    prevent it from becoming a source of anti-Americanism. Both
    MFA and Chancellery officials emphasized that the joint
    German-UK-France proposal for an international conference on
    Afghanistan was not made in reaction to the Kunduz event and
    is not a cover for trying to secure a date certain for
    withdrawal. END SUMMARY.

    Chancellor's statement

    ¶2. (C) In her policy statement to the Bundestag on September
    8, Chancellor Merkel appealed to ISAF allies as well as
    critics at home to reserve judgment regarding the September 4
    decision by the German PRT commander in Kunduz to call in air
    strikes against two fuel tankers that had been hijacked by
    insurgents. At the same time, she promised a full inquiry
    into the matter and gave assurances that Germany took the
    issue of collateral damage very seriously. "Even the death
    of one innocent person is one too many," she stressed. In
    retreating from the initial stand taken by Defense Minister
    Jung -- who had insisted that only insurgents had been killed
    in the nighttime attack -- she succeeded in deflating some of
    the early indignation over the incident, since Jung's
    statements seemed to defy clear evidence to the contrary.
    All the major parties, with the exception of the Left Party,
    which opposes all Bundeswehr deployments, used the special
    Bundestag session to reaffirm their support for the
    Afghanistan mission and to reject calls for withdrawal.

    Chancellery: "astonished" at allies' reaction

    ¶3. xxxxxxxxxxxx

    Mod: jung's initial approach was wrong

    ¶4. xxxxxxxxxxxx

    ¶5. xxxxxxxxxxxx

    ¶6. xxxxxxxxxxxx

    ¶7. xxxxxxxxxxxx

    Comment

    ¶8. (C) With only three weeks before German national
    elections, it goes without saying that the Kunduz incident
    comes at a very politically sensitive time. Fortunately, the
    Chancellor, in her policy statement to the Bundestag, has
    been able to limit the damage to the delicate political

    Berlin 00001108 003 of 003

    consensus here in favor of the Afghanistan deployment. She
    has successfully rallied all the main political parties in
    rejecting calls for withdrawal. The hope is that the Allies
    and others will refrain from any further premature judgments
    or speculation about what happened in Kunduz, which could be
    exploited by the Left Party and other Afghanistan opponents
    for electoral advantage.

    ¶9. (C) The Kunduz incident ironically also comes at a time
    when the views of the United States and Germany regarding the
    approach to Afghanistan have never been closer. All of our
    interlocutors warmly welcome COMISAF's new counterinsurgency
    guidance, which emphasizes protecting the Afghan population
    over chasing down and killing insurgents. They view the new
    U.S. emphasis on avoiding civilian casualties as moving
    toward a position they have long advocated. At the same
    time, they now acknowledge that their own forces, in view of
    the deteriorating security situation in the north, have to be
    more active in providing security and being willing to use
    force as appropriate. Their new rules of engagement (ref A)
    have gone a long way in this regard. Along similar lines,
    the old debate between the U.S. and Germany on the best way
    to train Afghan police -- i.e., the U.S. supposedly stressing
    speed and quantity versus the Germans stressing quality -- is
    over. The Germans have completely signed up to the U.S.
    focused district development (FDD) police training program
    and are moving toward to taking responsibility for FDD
    throughout the north (ref B).

    ¶10. (C) It is this convergence of views, and their belief
    that they are one of our most reliable Allies in Afghanistan,
    that makes the Germans so sensitive to any perceived U.S.
    criticism of their actions. They feel that their careful and
    dependable management of the north -- while acknowledging the
    growing problems with the insurgency there -- have earned
    them the benefit of the doubt when incidents like the fuel
    tanker bombing in Kunduz occur. As we go forward with our
    plans to deploy some 300 U.S. Special Forces in Mazar-e
    Sharif to assist the Germans in meeting the growing
    insurgency threat, we will want to be careful not to give the
    impression that we do not have faith in the Germans to do
    what is necessary to continue to secure the north as they
    have been for almost six years. While the Germans have been
    consistently reluctant about deploying combat troops outside
    the north, they have been equally consistent in ensuring that
    all the troop and equipment needs in the north -- including
    OMLTs for the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) --
    are fulfilled. It is our interest for the Germans to
    continue to feel "ownership" of this part of the country.
    Murphy

`