Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 3955 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone
Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AS AF AM AR AG AMGT ASEC AE AORC AJ AFIN AU APER ABUD ATRN AEMR ACOA AEC AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC AL ASIG ABLD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AGMT
BK BR BRUSSELS BL BM BX BU BO BE BH BTIO BEXP BIDEN BY BA BG BF BB BC BBSR BILAT
CH CU CO CBW CLINTON CASC CE CJAN CVIS CMGT CI CIA CG CF CN CS CAN COUNTER CIS CA CM CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CD CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CDG CJUS CARSON COUNTERTERRORISM CACM CDB CV
DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DJ DISENGAGEMENT DS DOD DEAX
EUN EFIN ECON EAID ENRG EPET ER EIND EAGR ETRD ETTC EU ECIN EAIR ELAB EG EINV ECPS EFIS EI EINT EZ EMIN ET EC ENVR ES ECA EWWT ELTN EN EXTERNAL EINVETC ENIV EINN ENGR EUR ESA ENERG EK ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FJ FMLN
GG GM GH GE GV GT GR GTIP GOI GCC GAZA GZ GA GTMO
HILLARY HA HR HUMAN HO HYMPSK HU HURI HK
IR IS IZ IPR IT INRB IAEA IRAJ IN INRA INRO IO IC ID IIP ITPHUM IV IWC IQ ICTY ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC ICAO IMO IF ILC IEFIN INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF ITALY ITALIAN INTERPOL
JO JA JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JUS JAMES
KTFN KOLY KDEM KCRM KWBG KPAL KISL KPAO KUNR KCOR KJUS KGHG KIPR KDRG KMDR KAWK KSCA KS KN KIRF KIRC KU KBIO KE KNNP KZ KHLS KG KACT KGIC KRAD KCOM KMCA KV KHDP KTIP KVPR KDEV KWMN KSPR KTIA KHIV KPRP KAWC KCIP KCFE KOCI KPKO KTDB KMRS KFRD KLIG KBCT KICC KGIT KSTC KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KOMC KO KTER KSUM KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KMPI KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFIN KTBT KCRS KRVC KR KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KGCC KPIN KNUC KPLS
LE LY LU LG LH LI LO LOG LT
MOPS MASS MAPP MCAP MNUC MARR MU MO MY MTCRE MA MG MASC MX MCC MZ ML MEPP MK MTRE MP MIL MDC MTCR MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MR MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MPOS MOPPS
NU NL NATO NIPP NO NG NI NPT NE NS NAR NZ NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NGO NP NATIONAL
OVIP OEXC OPRC ODIP OFDP OIIP OPDC OREP OTRA OSCE OAS OPIC OECD OPCW OSCI OTR OVP OFFICIALS OSAC
PARM PREL PGOV PINR PHUM PTER PK PL PREF PE PBTS PKFK PO PINS PHSA PGOF PROP PARMS PA PM PMIL PTERE POL PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PNAT PROV PEL PGOVE POLINT POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PSOE PU POLITICAL PARTIES PBIO PECON POGOV PINL
QA
RS RU RW RP RO RIGHTS RICE ROBERT RF RFE REGION
SOCI SP SR SA SCUL SNAR SENV SY SO SU SW SF SG SMIG SL SN SHUM SZ SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI STEINBERG
TU TX TC TS TRGY TI TIP TBIO TR TSPA TH TT TW TERRORISM TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TPHY TK TNGD
UK UNSC UNGA USEU UG USUN UY US UZ UP UNO UNMIK UN UE UNESCO UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS UNAUS UV
VT VE VZ VM VTPREL VN
WA WI WMO WTRO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WTO
XF XA XT XM XY XG XC XH XL XZ XW XR XD XS XK
YM YI YE
ZI ZP ZK ZF ZB ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU ZA

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 08MADRID348, SPANISH ELECTION WRAP UP: ZAPATERO SET TO FORM

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MADRID348.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08MADRID348 | 2008-03-19 16:04 | 2010-12-03 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid

`

    VZCZCXRO9439
    PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
    DE RUEHMD #0348/01 0791620
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 191620Z MAR 08
    FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4523
    INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
    RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 3370

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000348

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR EUR AA/S VOLKER AND EUR/WE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018
    TAGS: PGOV PREL SP
    SUBJECT: SPANISH ELECTION WRAP UP: ZAPATERO SET TO FORM
    SPAIN'S NEXT GOVERNMENT AS PARTIDO POPULAR REVAMPS FOR THE
    FUTURE

    REF: MADRID 288 AND PREVIOUS

    MADRID 00000348 001.2 OF 003

    Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (U) The absentee votes are in, and recounts have taken
    place in the most contested districts of Spain. The final
    electoral numbers for Spain's 350-seat Congress are as
    follows. The ruling Socialist party of President Jose Luis
    Rodriguez Zapatero (PSOE) - 169, the main opposition Partido
    Popular (PP) - 154, the Catalan centrist party Convergence
    and Union (CiU) - 10, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) - 6,
    the Catalan Republican Left (ERC) - 3, the United Left (IU) -
    2, the Canaries Coalition (CC) - 2, the Galician Nationalist
    Bloc (BNG) - 2, the Navarran/Basque party (Na-Bai) - 1, and
    the new party Union, Progress and Democracy (UPD) - 1.

    //TIMELINE TO FORM THE NEW GOVERNMENT//

    ¶2. (U) The new Congress will meet for the first time on April
    1 and President Zapatero will be given the opportunity to
    form a government. As his party fell seven seats short of an
    absolute majority, Zapatero will look to enter into a pact
    with one or more of the smaller parties to put him over the
    top. Depending on the demands of each of the smaller
    parties, there remains the chance that Zapatero may feel he
    has enough of a plurality to preclude having to forge a
    formal pact, choosing instead to form pacts "a la carte" as
    each new piece of legislation comes up for a vote. Zapatero
    has consistently stated his preference to lead a stable
    government, making an "a la carte" situation less likely.
    The investiture debate is due to occur on April 7-8, and if
    all goes as planned and the King swears in Zapatero on April
    9, the new cabinet of ministers would then be sworn in on
    April 10, and the first meeting of the new Council of
    Ministers would be held on April 11.

    ¶3. (C) No one doubts that Zapatero will end up being Spain's
    next president, but he may have trouble gaining the necessary
    176 votes during the first round of investiture voting. This
    could change in the coming days, pending the results of PSOE
    negotiations with the smaller parties. At this time, the
    most likely scenario appears to be a pact with the PNV and
    their six seats, with the final vote to gain a majority in
    Parliament coming from any one or several of the numerous
    smaller parties that make up what is known as the "Mixed
    Group" (CC, BNG, IU, Na-Bai, ERC). As the leftist parties IU
    and ERC lost much of their power and influence with respect
    to the previous legislature, they probably would be willing
    to join Zapatero for a very small price. Reports surfaced in
    the press in the days following the March 9 election
    suggesting that the PSOE's natural partners in this new
    legislature were the Basque nationalists. PNV leaders
    visited the Embassy on March 12 and told us that they would
    be favorably disposed to an alliance with the PSOE. Contrary
    to post-election statements in the press, the PNV leaders
    told us there was some flexibility in their demands for a
    controversial referendum on the political status of the
    Basque people. The officials said that the PNV realizes that
    it suffered a severe electoral setback on March 9, and is in
    no position to make unrealistic demands if it wants to repeat
    its participation in a Zapatero government. These sentiments
    appeared to be confirmed by PNV President Inigo Urkullu on
    March 17, when he said publicly that his party would be
    willing to cooperate with the Socialists over the coming
    months and would consider standing down on its plans for a
    referendum in October of this year, provided that President
    Zapatero make sincere efforts to discuss the status of Basque
    autonomy.

    ¶4. (U) Although CiU could put the PSOE over the top without
    having to turn to the PNV and the Mixed Group, the PSOE's
    allies in Catalonia handily defeated CiU in almost every
    Catalan province, and there would be some pushback from these
    allies were Zapatero to consider forming a pact. In
    addition, CiU's demands for senior leadership roles in both
    the Congress and Senate (Spain's upper house) may be a deal
    breaker. Finally, Zapatero could gain a majority by forming
    a broad alliance exclusively with the remaining smaller
    parties (most are nationalist and/or leftist), but most
    analysts have ruled this out as a repeat of the weak and
    unwieldy coalition the president formed during the last
    legislature.

    //PARTIDO POPULAR LOOKS TO PICK UP THE PIECES AND MOVE ON//

    ¶5. (SBU) Despite external speculation and pressure for his
    resignation after a second straight national election loss,
    Mariano Rajoy announced on March 11 during a meeting of the

    MADRID 00000348 002.2 OF 003

    PP's executive council that he would not resign as president
    of the Partido Popular. Rajoy said he would again present
    his candidacy for this position during the PP's National
    Congress in June, and the party's executive committee
    immediately expressed their support for the decision.
    Although Rajoy appears set to lead the party for the
    foreseeable future, he probably will look to reshuffle his
    team in efforts to improve the party's image. On March 13,
    PP Congressional spokesman Eduardo Zaplana announced that he
    would not remain in the post for a second term, in a move
    pundits and political leaders immediately signaled as the
    first casualty of the electoral defeat. Speculation has
    since arisen that the Secretary General of the party, Angel
    Acebes, may be on his way out as well. Zaplana and Acebes
    are considered right-wing members of the PP old guard,
    closely linked both to the Aznar administration and the
    controversial handling of the aftermath and investigation of
    the 2004 Madrid train bombings.

    ¶6. (C) In a separate announcement on March 13, centrist
    Madrid Mayor Alberto Ruiz-Gallardon said he had no plans to
    leave his position and would work for the good of the party
    in the coming years. After the Mayor had a public dispute
    with party leaders in January over his possible candidacy as
    Rajoy's number two, he said he would wait until after the
    elections to make a decision about his political future.
    Ruiz-Gallardon is seen as a more moderate member of the PP
    and has often had public disagreements with the party's more
    conservative members. The Mayor previewed this announcement
    in a private meeting with the Ambassador on March 12.
    Ruiz-Gallardon confirmed that he would be staying in office,
    and said that he would be taking steps to mend his
    relationship with Rajoy and hopefully return to the party's
    good graces. The Mayor and Rajoy were due to have lunch this
    week. The Mayor confirmed for the Ambassador that Rajoy was
    the PP's leader, as there were simply no other credible
    options. He said that someone like he or Madrid regional
    President Esperanza Aguirre could try and take over the
    party, but at the risk of splitting it right down the middle.
    He said that Rajoy staying put was the best way to minimize
    damage to the PP.

    ¶7. (C) Ruiz-Gallardon said that Rajoy would now take
    concerted steps to mold the party more in his image and
    decouple it from the strong influence of Aznar. As an
    example, the Mayor said that Rajoy had asked Anzar not to
    participate in the March 11 executive council meeting. The
    departure of Zaplana and potentially Acebes may be further
    signs of Rajoy trying to distance himself from the PP's
    controversial past. Ruiz-Gallardon also told the Ambassador
    that Rajoy would take steps over the coming months to appear
    more "statesmanlike," and would temporarily cease his
    constant criticism of every Zapatero policy initiative. The
    Mayor also mentioned that Rajoy is considering a strategy
    whereby he would tell Zapatero that the PP will support him
    for 12 months, voting for his budget proposal and any other
    policy issue that does not cross PP "redlines," so that
    Zapatero would not need the support of the other parties. At
    some point the pact would dissolve and Rajoy would be free to
    make a public announcement saying that his party had
    supported the president in good faith, but that his policies
    were leading Spain over a cliff and they could not in good
    conscience continue their support.

    //COMMENT//

    ¶8. (C) Both main candidates departed for separate vacations
    on March 14 and will return after Easter to prepare for the
    new legislature. We will work closely with the new
    government (we expect several holdovers and a few new faces)
    to build on the progress we have made over the past three
    years. President Bush's phone call to President Zapatero and
    reported plans for the two to chat at the NATO summit in
    Bucharest are receiving positive play among our Spanish
    counterparts and the local press, and will serve as a
    positive base to our relations with the new government. We
    also will maintain good relations with our friends in the PP,
    while reminding them that it is in both U.S. and Spanish
    interests that we work well with the government in power. It
    will be interesting to see whether Rajoy actually pledges his
    support to the government as the Mayor suggested, but we
    doubt that Zapatero would accept this proposition with
    anything but the utmost caution. Rajoy may find himself
    walking a fine line between acting statesmanlike and changing
    the tone of political discourse in Madrid, while also
    remaining faithful to his traditional PP supporters, over 55
    percent of whom want him to lead an even harder opposition to
    Zapatero in the new government, according to a recent poll

    MADRID 00000348 003.2 OF 003

    from Sigma Dos.
    AGUIRRE

`