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### Viewing cable 09ISLAMABAD2523, TERRORISTS INCREASE ACTIVITY IN ADVANCE OF

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09ISLAMABAD2523 | 2009-10-16 14:02 | 2010-11-30 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Islamabad

`

    INFO  LOG-00   EEB-00   AF-00    AID-00   A-00     ACQ-00   CCO-00
          INL-00   DOTE-00  PERC-00  PDI-00   DS-00    DHSE-00  EUR-00
          FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VCI-00   TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00
          CAC-00   MOFM-00  MOF-00   M-00     VCIE-00  DCP-00   NSAE-00
          ISN-00   OCS-00   NIMA-00  PM-00    GIWI-00  P-00     ISNE-00
          DOHS-00  FMPC-00  SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    USSS-00
          NCTC-00  ASDS-00  CBP-00   BBG-00   R-00     IIP-00   SCRS-00
          PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   SCA-00   NFAT-00  SAS-00   FA-00
          SRAP-00  PESU-00  SANA-00    /000W

    O 161452Z OCT 09
    FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5421
    INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
    AMEMBASSY KABUL
    AMEMBASSY LONDON
    AMCONSUL LAHORE
    AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
    AMCONSUL KARACHI
    SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
    NSC WASHINGTON DC
    CIA WASHINGTON DC
    CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
    JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

` `

    S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 002523

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2034
    TAGS: PTER MOPS PK
    SUBJECT: TERRORISTS INCREASE ACTIVITY IN ADVANCE OF
    WAZIRISTAN OPERATION

    Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson. Reasons 1.4 b and d.

    ¶1. (S) Summary: With the Pakistan military preparing to
    launch an operation against major terrorist safe havens in
    South Waziristan, Pakistan's terrorist/extremist groups have
    dramatically increased their militant and propaganda
    operations in an effort to undermine public support. On the
    operational side, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) now
    headed by an individual calling himself Hakeemullah Mehsud
    appears to be cooperating both with elements of al-Qaeda and
    with the Punjabi terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
    (LJ). While this is not the first time that we have seen
    cross-cooperation among these terrorist/extremist
    organizations, the intensity of attacks -- five in a single
    day on October 15 -- indicate that TTP has both increased its
    cooperative outreach and its finances (as LJ does not work
    for free).

    ¶2. (S) In addition, the recent attacks demonstrate that TTP
    and its allies have the capacity to evolve and vary the style
    of their attacks to exploit weaknesses in the Pakistani
    security apparatus. The recent attacks involved both
    vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) in the
    North West Frontier Province and smaller attacks against high
    profile installations by armed individuals in security forces
    uniforms that can more easily penetrate Pakistan security
    cordons in other parts of the country. There is information
    to suggest that women/men clad in burqas are now part of the
    mix of attackers. TTP has been clear in its propaganda that
    these attacks are both in direct retaliation for Pakistan
    government support for American initiatives in countering
    violent extremism and because of the military's upcoming
    Waziristan operation. TTP has gone so far as to promise an
    end to the attacks and its fighters participation in jihad
    against India, if the Pakistani government changes its
    foreign policy and establishes an "Islamic" state. Despite
    these threats, the Pakistan military continues its
    preparations for an offensive in South Waziristan against the
    TTP and their tribal allies to be launched in the next few
    weeks. End Summary.

    ¶3. (S) Beginning with the attack against the Askari Bank in
    Peshawar on September 26, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
    has resumed its terrorist attacks in Pakistan's settled areas
    that had largely ceased following the death of Baitullah
    Mehsud. TTP's new campaign coincides with Pakistan military
    preparations for an operation in South Waziristan, including
    increased air strikes in Mehsud territory and with the
    consolidation of leadership power within TTP in the hands of
    an individual referring to himself as Hakeemullah Mehsud.

    ¶4. (S) TTP and its al-Qaeda allies, who have been providing
    advice and logistical assistance to the organization in
    exchange for shelter with the Mehsud tribe in South
    Waziristan, appear to have timed their renewed spate of
    attacks and the accompanying propaganda blitz to undermine
    public confidence in Pakistan security forces just as
    preparations for the South Waziristan operation were
    increasing. The terrorists appear to have read in on modern
    theories of asymmetrical warfare, including the tenet that
    public support will help determine the outcome of the
    struggle between government and anti-government actors.
    General Kayani told us repeatedly that strong public support
    was a key issue in his decision to move into Swat.

    ¶5. (S) TTP is not, however, acting alone in carrying out the
    recent attacks. Al-Qaeda advice, support, and possibly
    financing have long been a critical element in TTP's ability
    to carry-out spectacular attacks in Pakistan's settled areas.
    In addition, TTP has allied on and off with various other
    Taliban-inspired terrorist and criminal groups in Pakistan's
    North West Frontier Province, including Mengal Bagh and the
    Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM).

    ¶6. (S) In the recent attacks in the Pakistani Punjab, TTP
    appears to have, as they did in 2008, hired the services of
    Punjab-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ). LJ,
    which began as a violent off-shot of Deobandi sectarian
    extremist group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) in the 1990s,
    has steadily increased its target set from strictly Shias, a
    minority in Pakistan, to any group which does not share its
    strict, militant interpretation of Islam, including the
    Pakistan government and western interests. Since 2001, LJ
    has become essentially a "guns for hire" terrorist
    organization, prepared to carry out attacks on any
    non-Deobandi group in exchange for sizable cash payments.
    The latest attacks are also tied directly to Ilyas Kashmiri,
    who is affiliated with the anti-India terrorist group
    Harakat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HUJI). HUJI, along with other
    anti-India groups including Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) and
    Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), have increasingly shifted their focus
    to include Pakistan government and western targets in
    Pakistan and India. They are also actively collaborating
    with Taliban groups, including TTP, sectarian extremist
    groups such as LJ, and al-Qaeda.

    ¶7. (S) The recent attacks demonstrate that TTP and its allied
    groups are capable of adjusting their tactics and practices
    to counter Pakistan government security measures. TTP has
    continued to use vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices
    (VBIED) against police and government installations in NWFP
    -- where counter-measures are comparatively weaker. In
    Rawalpindi, Islamabad, and Lahore, TTP has started deploying
    single suicide bombers or small teams of suicide bombers and
    armed gunmen to target high-profile installations. These
    individual suicide bombers or small teams have begun wearing
    the uniforms of Pakistani security personnel, which are
    easily available for purchase in any market and allow them to
    bypass security screening checkpoints unchallenged. There is
    information that women/men in burqas have also been part of
    the mix of attackers. While casualty tolls in these attacks
    are lower than in the VBIED explosions, their ability to
    bypass security and penetrate into the General Headquarters
    of the Pakistan Army, international organizations, and the
    headquarters of the Federal Investigation Agency could have a
    devastating impact on public and security force morale.

    ¶8. (S) It is also possible, however, that the terrorists have
    not accurately assessed all quarters of Pakistani public
    opinion. Most Punjabis were remarkably nonchalant about
    violence in the tribal areas prior to the March attack on the
    Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore. Consulate Lahore contacts
    have fallen into two camps in reaction to the October 15 (and
    earlier but also recent) attacks in the Punjab. One camp
    does, indeed, bemoan the government's incapacity and speaks
    pessimistically about the GOP's capacity to rally. Another
    camp speaks passionately of the importance of the GOP's
    civilian and military components joining to defeat the
    terrorists, and restore normalcy to Pakistan, with some pride
    in the GOP's accomplishments to date. The attacks seem to
    have further invigorated this camp. Both camps insist that
    the violent extremists represent neither Islam nor Pakistan.
    Terrorist "messaging" is not having the desired impact in
    Lahore. Even the anti-U.S., nationalist daily "The Nation"
    spoke highly of the "martyred" security forces who lost their
    lives in the October 15 attacks.

    ¶9. (S) In addition to the increase in attacks, TTP has
    equally launched a propaganda effort to break public support
    for the impending operation in South Waziristan. The thrust
    of this propaganda effort has been that the attacks are in
    retaliation for the Pakistan Army/government's policy of
    supporting America's "war against Islam" in Pakistan and
    Afghanistan. TTP has stressed that any action in Waziristan
    is being carried out on instructions from the United States.

    ¶10. (S) TTP spokespeople have promised that the campaign of
    attacks will end, if the Pakistan government abandons its
    support of the United States policy. In one recent
    statement, TTP even offered to send its jihadi forces to
    Pakistan's eastern border with India if the Pakistan
    government turned Pakistan into "an Islamic state." Such
    propaganda messages are clearly designed to damage the army
    and government's image in the general public and decrease
    public and political support for what may be a prolonged
    military operation in South Waziristan.

    ¶11. (S) Despite these attacks, we continue to receive solid
    evidence that the Pakistan military is preparing to move
    forward with some kind of operation in South Waziristan. For
    the last several days, we have witnessed renewed air strikes
    in the region designed to prepare the ground to facilitate
    offensive maneuver. In addition, we have seen continued
    movements of troops and supplies to tactical assembly areas
    in South Waziristan and the positioning of Special Services
    Group (SSG) personnel for reconnaissance activities, which
    appear imminent. On October 16, Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq
    Pervaiz Kayani made an unscheduled call to ISAF Commander
    Gen. McChrystal to advise that operations in South Waziristan
    were imminent and to request that ISAF forces in Afghanistan
    coordinate with the Pakistani military to prevent the escape
    of militants across the border. Mission believes that the
    start of major ground combat operations may still be several
    days or more away as SSG reconnaissance and additional air
    strikes are likely prior to the commencement of decisive
    operations.

    ¶12. (S) Despite the positive indications that the Pakistan
    Army intends to move into South Waziristan, post remains
    uncertain as to the intended extent of the operation. There
    is no question that the Pakistan Army intends to "punish" the
    Mehsud tribe for its protection of TTP and to dismantle as
    much TTP infrastructure in South Waziristan as possible. It
    is also likely that the Pakistan Army will move against
    al-Qaeda elements that are inter-mingled with the Mehsud
    tribe and supporting TTP. It remains to be seen, however,
    that given the short time frame before a harsh winter sets
    into the Waziristans that the Pakistan Army is contemplating
    a full-scale clearance operation. There is no indication
    that the military intends to go after Commander Nazir,
    Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Haqqani network, or their allied
    tribes -- all located in North Waziristan -- as part of this
    operation. These elements that focus almost exclusively on
    cross-border attacks into Afghanistan are not a high priority
    for the Pakistan military, and, in the case of the Haqqanis,
    it is not clear the Pakistani military could achieve a
    decisive victory even if it wanted to do so.

    PATTERSON

`