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### Viewing cable 06PARIS3721, USNATO AMBASSADOR NULAND'S MEETING WITH SOCIALIST

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06PARIS3721 | 2006-06-05 10:10 | 2010-12-01 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris

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    VZCZCXRO7599
    PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
    DE RUEHFR #3721/01 1561015
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 051015Z JUN 06
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8051
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003721

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
    TAGS: PREL FR NATO EUN
    SUBJECT: USNATO AMBASSADOR NULAND'S MEETING WITH SOCIALIST
    PARTY INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SECRETARY PIERRE MOSCOVICI

    Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Bruce Turner for reasons 1.4
    (B & D).

    ¶1. (C) Summary and comment: Pierre Moscovici, the Socialist
    Party's National Secretary for International Relations, met
    May 29 with visiting Ambassador to NATO Nuland to discuss
    transatlantic relations in the context of France's 2007
    presidential elections. Moscovici insisted that a PS
    Administration -- under a candidate yet to be selected --
    would be more U.S.-friendly than Chirac, notwithstanding the
    greater emphasis the PS would place on "Europeanizing" French
    foreign policy. France and the U.S. should strive for
    agreement whenever possible, he asserted, even if France can
    never be like the UK -- what he described as "neither Chirac
    nor Blair" -- and should continue talking even when they
    don't agree. He welcomed the warming in transatlantic
    relations since President Bush's visit to Brussels in 2005
    but insisted that divisions between the U.S. and Europe would
    remain, given continuing French concerns about U.S.
    "unilateralist tendencies." The meeting sent a useful signal
    that the U.S. is eager to engage both sides of the political
    aisle on NATO issues, even if Moscovici tended to see the
    transatlantic relationship in terms of the U.S. and the EU.
    End summary and comment.

    ¶2. (C) In a May 29 meeting with visiting Ambassador to NATO
    Victoria Nuland, Socialist Party (PS) National Secretary for
    International Affairs Pierre Moscovici discussed the likely
    positions of a PS administration on transatlantic relations
    if the Socialist candidate wins the 2007 presidential
    elections, while making clear that he could not speak
    authoritatively for the eventual PS presidential candidate.
    Acknowledging at the outset that he was personally close to
    former Finance Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Moscovici
    described the candidate selection in November -- to be
    determined through a vote among the party's rank and file --
    as a contest between a popular front-runner (Segolene Royal),
    an outsider (former prime minister Lionel Jospin) and two
    insiders (in particular Strauss-Kahn and former Prime
    Minister Laurent Fabius). Moscovici judged that the PS had a
    50-50 chance of winning the elections.

    ¶3. (C) Moscovici noted the first anniversary of France's
    rejection of the EU constitutional treaty. While he rejected
    the notion that the French "no" was the cause of the current
    crisis in Europe, it had nonetheless deepened an already
    existing crisis. He did not expect a renegotiation of the
    treaty until after the 2007 elections, explaining that
    President Chirac's lame-duck status and damaged credibility
    precluded meaningful initiatives in the interim. Moscovici
    attributed French unease with EU enlargement as perhaps the
    major factor in the treaty's rejection, saying that
    enlargement had proceeded too quickly and without sufficient
    debate. Even if one argued that enlargement was "good," it
    could not substitute for the absence of a tangible "project."
    As a vice-president in the European Parliament, he felt he
    could nonetheless state with relative certainty that Romania
    and Bulgaria would join the EU in 2007, although this would
    not occur without some difficult debate.

    ¶4. (C) Turning to U.S.-EU relations, Moscovici regretted
    what he called a wrong U.S. decision to invade Iraq, but he
    welcomed the U.S. stress on renewed partnership since 2005.
    That said, he believed that "unilateral" strains in U.S.
    thinking, combined with divisiveness among the Europeans,
    meant that some frictions in the transatlantic relationship
    would continue. The EU was more regionally focused, he
    judged, as compared with the more global vision of the U.S.
    All that said, it was important for all to understand that
    the U.S. and Europe had no better allies than each other, so
    it was important to make the best of the relationship. There
    was no other real choice.

    ¶5. (C) Moscovici asserted that the PS leadership was
    favorably disposed toward the U.S. and described the PS as
    ultimately less anti-American than Chirac. While it was
    likely to be tougher on questions of principle, he judged
    that the PS would be more flexible in practice. He described
    Chirac as a dogmatist who had pandered too much to domestic
    opinion, and accused Chirac of actively working against the
    U.S. in the run-up to the Iraq war and threatening a veto
    "too early," before the UN had had an opportunity to explore
    all possible avenues. Although the PS was also opposed to
    the Iraq war, he contended that, unlike Chirac, it also would
    not have broken off dialogue with the U.S. Moscovici claimed
    that, historically, French-U.S. relations had been strongest
    when the left was in power, primarily because the PS did not
    hold certain negative attitudes toward the U.S. The PS, he
    said, would base its relations with the U.S. on cool-headed
    analysis rather than emotion, taking into account the bedrock
    values the Europe and America share.

    PARIS 00003721 002 OF 002

    ¶6. (C) Moscovici asserted that France under a PS
    administration would be "neither Blair nor Chirac." France
    viewed itself as fully European, and, unlike the UK, not as a
    bridge between the U.S. and Europe. But it was incumbent on
    the U.S. and France despite certain differences to maintain
    at all times a constructive dialogue. They should strive to
    find agreement whenever possible, he continued, citing
    specifically Darfur, Iran, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, as well
    as France's membership in NATO. Of course, France would
    sometimes oppose U.S. policy, such as on Iraq. Even then,
    however, it would be important to keep talking, without lies
    and dissimulation. The U.S. should also understand that a PS
    administration would want more than the center-right to
    "Europeanize" France's foreign policy. While proud of
    France's status as a UNSC permanent member, the PS understood
    that it could not act on its own and therefore needed ESDP.
    In that regard, speaking personally, Moscovici said he hoped
    France would not only maintain, but increase current defense
    expenditure levels. Ambassador Nuland welcomed French
    leadership in that regard, adding that Europe also needed
    French leadership. She urged Moscovici to view NATO not as a
    U.S.-owned vehicle, but one in which France was also a large
    stakeholder.

    ¶7. (C) Asked about the weight of security policy issues in
    the upcoming elections, Moscovici said that French voters
    were more motivated by domestic concerns. He noted that that
    U.S. emphasis on anti-terrorism was not shared by the French
    public, which did not view itself as a target. Moreover,
    there was currently great skepticism toward the EU as well as
    the U.S., whereby PS voters were generally much more negative
    than the party leadership and would need to be led toward
    more positive attitudes toward the EU and the U.S. Moscovici
    assured Ambassador Nuland that all the main Socialist
    candidates -- Jospin, Strauss-Kahn, and even former Culture
    Minister Jack Lang -- were reasonable and realistic on this
    count. He indicated, however, that he could not speak for
    Segolene Royal, given that her positions on the issues were
    still largely unknown. (Comment: Moscovici is not a
    Segolene Royal supporter. End comment.)

    ¶8. (C) Ambassador Nuland concluded the meeting by extending
    an invitation to the PS presidential candidate's foreign
    policy advisor to visit Brussels and become more personally
    familiar with NATO. Moscovici pledged to remain in touch,
    cautioning that an election team probably would not be formed
    until the end of the year, after the selection of the party's
    candidate.

    ¶9. (C) Comment: In discussing transatlantic relations,
    Moscovici tended to speak in terms of the U.S. and the
    Europe. The meeting nonetheless served a useful purpose in
    sensitizing PS officials to NATO issues and, through
    Ambassador Nuland's active pursuit of a meeting with party
    officials on both sides of the aisle, demonstrated U.S.
    willingness to engage them on NATO in the run-up to the
    presidential elections and beyond. End comment.

    ¶10. (U) This message was cleared by Ambassador Nuland.

    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

    STAPLETON

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