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### Viewing cable 08MOSCOW2545, TFGG01: PARLIAMENT UNANIMOUSLY ENDORSES ABKHAZ,

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08MOSCOW2545 | 2008-08-25 15:03 | 2010-12-01 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow

`

    VZCZCXYZ0005
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHMO #2545/01 2381519
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 251519Z AUG 08
    FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9682
    INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002545

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2018
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINR RS
    SUBJECT: TFGG01: PARLIAMENT UNANIMOUSLY ENDORSES ABKHAZ,
    SOUTH OSSETIAN INDEPENDENCE

    REF: A. A) MOSCOW 2535
    ¶B. B) MOSCOW 2491

    Classified By: Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Alice G. Wells;
    reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a solid show of support, both the
    Federation Council and the Duma voted unanimously to urge
    that President Medvedev recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia
    as independent states. Parliamentarians blasted Georgia for
    having launched a military campaign against South Ossetia,
    and pointed the finger at the U.S. as having planted the
    seeds for the aggression by arming and training the Georgian
    military. Having ratcheted up expectations of imminent
    Russian action, some observers now believe Medvedev and Putin
    will wait to see if the international community meets
    Russia's demands: UN confirmation of Russia's peacekeeping
    role and condemnation of Saakashvili. Medvedev can be
    expected to proceed cautiously, taking advantage of a
    situation that, at the moment, he perceives to be in Russia's
    favor. END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (SBU) The Federation Council, meeting August 25,
    unanimously approved an appeal to President Medvedev that he
    immediately recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South
    Ossetia. In a remarkably organized and disciplined one-hour
    session, Council leaders and 45 members quickly delivered
    statements pillorying Georgia for having attacked Tskhinvali
    August 7. Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaders Bagapsh and
    Kokoity also addressed the session, proclaiming the support
    of residents of those territories for independence from
    Georgia. The Abkhaz leader also confirmed his readiness to
    sign a agreement on military cooperation with Russia.

    ¶3. (SBU) Following smartly on the heels of that session, the
    Duma convened to consider a similar appeal to Medvedev. In
    that larger body, popularly elected legislators took their
    time to score rhetorical points. The resolution calling for
    recognition was introduced by CIS Committee Chairman
    Ostrovskiy. International relations Committee Chairman
    Kosachev introduced a companion appeal to the UN and to
    parliaments of UN member states urging them also to recognize
    the two entities. Once again, Bagapsh and Kokoity led off
    discussion of the appeal, charging that steps by "western
    states" to arm Georgia emboldened leaders in Tbilisi to
    launch its attack against South Ossetia.

    ¶4. (SBU) Speeches by Duma party faction leaders took on a
    very anti-Georgian and anti-American tone. Communist leader
    Zyuganov and LDPR leader Zhirinovskiy specifically accused
    the U.S. of having precipitated the attack on South Ossetia
    by arming and training Georgian military forces, and that
    U.S. motives included destabilizing Russia and controlling
    energy transit routes from the Caucasus and the Caspian
    regions. Vice President Cheney was accused of coordinating
    the anti-Russian, pro-Georgian campaign. Zhirinovskiy
    alleged that Israel had intended to attack Iran just prior to
    the U.S. elections, and that the Georgian military strike now
    disrupted that plan. In the end, the lower house also
    adopted the appeals to Medvedev (for Russian recognition) and
    to the UN and UN member states unanimously.

    Not So Fast
    -----------

    ¶5. (C) In the days just prior to the special session of
    Parliament, experts and academicians filled newspapers and
    airwaves with concern for the political consequences of
    recognition. While conceding that public sentiment has been
    affected by the events in South Ossetia, esteemed figures
    including former Ambassadors Adamishin and Lukin urged
    Medvedev to hold off on recognition. They argued that
    Moscow's diplomatic hand has been strengthened as a result of
    "Georgian aggression" and Russia's decisive victory in the
    war, and that now was not the time to consign the two
    entities to the same fate as Northern Cyprus, i.e. to being
    recognized by only one other country.

    Now What?
    ---------

    ¶6. (C) There was little doubt that the legislative moves were
    coordinated by the Kremlin. The question remains, though,
    for what purpose? XXXXXXXXXXXX that the same Duma
    that had said nothing during the war, and had also not been
    called back earlier from its August recess, was now being
    used by the Kremlin to further muddy international waters and
    to give the Kremlin another card to play with European
    mediators. The Federation Council and Duma were already on

    record (as of March, 2008) as supporting independence for
    Abkhazia and South Ossetia. By orchestrating a solid show of
    support for independence from the parliament, she contended,
    the Kremlin can take a tougher line with respect to drawing
    back Russian forces to pre-August 7 lines of demarcation.
    Expecting that disputes over interpretation and
    implementation of Point 6 of the Medvedev-Sarkozy cease-fire
    agreement will continue with Europe and the U.S., the Kremlin
    can now either move to recognize, declaring that it cannot
    stand in the way of strong public sentiment, or it can argue
    for acceptance of its interpretation of Point 6. In either
    case, Medvedev will be able to demonstrate to the world and
    to the Russian public that, having weathered the storm of
    world criticism, he took quick action before opportunities
    created by military action faded away.  XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that
    factors that might restrain Medvedev from immediately
    recognizing included positive signals from Europe, and a
    desire to await the outcome of U.S. presidential elections.
    Even if he chooses to wait, the parliamentary show will still
    give Russian diplomats enough cover to take tough positions
    on the future of Abkhazia and South Ossetia at the OSCE and
    the UN for months to come.

    ¶7. (C)  XXXXXXXXXXXX did not anticipate Medvedev approving recognition in the immediate term. Acknowledging that supporting independence
    was not in Russia's objective interests, XXXXXXXXXXXX said
    Medvedev's decision would be driven by other factors.
    Medvedev, he argued, would use the vote to build pressure for
    an international mechanism that met Russia's bottom line. In
    particular, he argued that Russia sought a UNSCR confirming
    its status as peacekeeper in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and
    expected the international community to halt its unqualified
    support for President Saakashvili. Otherwise, he intimated,
    recognition of the two entities might be expedited. He cited
    an interview given by Saakashvili in recent days in which the
    Georgian leader reportedly declared that he would strive not
    to convince South Ossetians to "come back to Georgia," but
    that "Georgia would come to them (e.g., militarily)."  XXXXXXXXXXXX
    charged that this only further confirmed Saakashvili's future
    military intentions against South Ossetia and the need to
    ensure that the Georgian military never launches a military
    attack against the region again.

    ¶8. (C) Comment: The Duma and Federation Council's actions
    will be used by the Kremlin and the MFA in dealings with
    foreign intermediaries to demonstrate strong broad support
    for even tougher measures regarding the two regions, and to
    further ratchet up pressure against the Saakashvili
    government. Despite the unanimous votes, Medvedev and Putin
    can play the recognition game out further, increasing
    pressure on European allies to compromise on a
    Russian-preferred UNSC draft resolution while avoiding a step
    that -  XXXXXXXXXXXX's bravado aside - could have unpredictable
    consequences in Russian domestic terms.
    BEYRLE

`