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### Viewing cable 09TBILISI1123, IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITH

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09TBILISI1123 | 2009-06-18 12:12 | 2010-12-01 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tbilisi

`

    VZCZCXRO2123
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
    DE RUEHSI #1123/01 1691201
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 181201Z JUN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1755
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0246
    RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4866

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TBILISI 001123

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR P, EUR
    WHSR PLEASE PASS TO OVP

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS PBTS RS GG
    SUBJECT: IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITH
    GEORGIA

    REF: MOSCOW 1591

    Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary. The June 22 kickoff of the U.S.-Georgia
    Charter Commission will raise the question of the future of
    our military cooperation. Embassy Moscow's recent cable
    (reftel) has highlighted Russian views and the potential
    impact on our attempt to reset our relations with Moscow.
    There are, however, strong arguments in favor of providing
    Georgia a modest, transparent defensive capability. We
    provide our views in this cable. In our assessment, the
    Russians are effectively using propaganda based in falsehoods
    regarding the current state of the Georgian military to
    ratchet up tensions, while simultaneously impressing upon the
    U.S. that any efforts to provide military assistance to
    Georgia will pose potential roadblocks to improving the
    U.S.-Russia relationship. Accepting Russian objections,
    however, contradicts stated U.S. policies such as rejecting
    the notion of spheres of influence; refusing a third party
    veto over NATO membership; and maintaining equal commitment
    to relations with both Russia and Georgia. It gives Russian
    disinformation an undeserved voice in U.S. policy formation.

    ¶2. (C) Summary, continued: Embassy Tbilisi believes that
    increased transparent military cooperation could help
    stabilize the situation in Georgia, as Georgia seeks to
    develop its defensive capacity -- and even decrease the size
    of its standing army. Retreating from our commitments would
    send a profoundly mixed signal to our partners in the region
    and in western Europe, especially to those who are
    considering opening up their society, increasing
    transparency, and seeking increased partnership with the
    west. Russia will undoubtedly object to increased military
    cooperation, but the answer is not to validate their concern,
    but to set the record straight in an organized, aggressive
    private and public diplomacy campaign with both Russia and
    our broader partners. To do otherwise would be to reward
    Russia's aggression in Georgia, as well as its violation of
    international law and commitments; encourage a similar stance
    in Ukraine; and deal a body blow to our credibility in
    Georgia, other Eurasian states, our western partners -- and
    ultimately Russia itself. End summary.

    THE GEORGIAN ARMY HAS NOT RE-ARMED

    ¶3. (C) Russian claims that Georgia has more military
    capability now than in August 2008,or that it has been
    steadily re-arming its forces, are false. During the August
    2008 conflict, Georgia lost extensive capabilities, including
    30 percent of its armored vehicles, 40 percent of
    U.S.-produced AR-15 rifles, and at least 60 percent of its
    air defense capability. These have not been replaced. We
    are aware of only two deliveries of lethal military equipment
    since the war: Ejder armored personnel carriers from a
    Turkish firm, based on a pre-war contract; and 16 armored
    HMMWVs for the Special Forces Brigade under a program begun
    in 2007. The latter were purchased using Coalition Support
    Funds, the case was processed before the August war, and the
    vehicles would be used in such coalition operations as those
    in Afghanistan. The U.S. and other NATO partners have moved
    cautiously since the war. Bilateral military-to-military
    events between NATO partners and Georgia have been reduced,
    Qevents between NATO partners and Georgia have been reduced,
    suspended, even terminated. The U.S. in particular has yet
    to renew a capacity-building program begun months ago, and we
    have not executed a single kinetic event since August,
    despite Georgian desires for more tactical training. The
    NATO PfP Lancer/Longbow exercises, publicly used by Russia
    against the Alliance and Georgia, were planned more than a
    year in advance with full Russian knowledge and possibility
    for participation.

    JOINING THE AFGHANISTAN COALITION

    ¶4. (C) Secretary Gates' approach on security cooperation of
    "brains before brawn" (B3) focuses on the intellectual
    development of the Georgian armed forces and is non-kinetic
    in nature. The U.S. has now told Georgia we accepted their
    offer to deploy a battalion for two years in RC-South, one of
    the most dangerous areas of Afghanistan. While it is not yet
    known how much training and equipping will be needed to bring
    Georgia effectively into the coalition, it is in both U.S.
    and Russian interests to widen the coalition in Afghanistan.
    Some lethal training will undoubtedly be involved, and we
    should not allow Russia to twist any such cooperation in

    TBILISI 00001123 002 OF 004

    Afghanistan, one of the Administration's top priorities, into
    a phantom threat.

    MINIMAL DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES NEEDED FOR SURVIVAL

    ¶5. (C) Georgia also wants to rebuild its native defensive
    capacity, which is currently insufficient to control its own
    airspace or hinder an invasion from any of its neighbors.
    Current Georgian operational thinking is that if they can
    defend Tbilisi from occupation for 72 hours, then
    international pressure will force the advance to pause. To
    achieve this extremely limited goal, Georgia needs sufficient
    anti-armor and air defense capability to stall a ground
    advance, which it currently lacks. The development of this
    capacity is not solely equipment-based, but it will require
    the acquisition of new lethal defensive systems. If Georgia
    does not procure the equipment from the U.S., it will almost
    surely seek to procure it elsewhere, as it has done in the
    past. U.S. involvement would help ensure the transparency of
    the procurement process itself, as well as increase our
    control over the amount, type and location of the equipment.

    ¶6. (C) In addition, Minister Sikharulidze recently approved
    an intermediate force structure change that would reduce the
    Georgian Armed Forces total personnel strength by 6,000
    service members from the current 36,000. (Current actual
    personnel is approximately 31,000.) Without prejudging the
    ongoing Strategic Assessment process, the Minister has
    confided to us that the final Georgian force structure will
    be below 30,000. The Georgians have not publicized this
    proposed downsizing because they fear that a smaller Georgian
    Army could encourage Russian armed incursions. Furthermore,
    a recently proposed further 7 percent reduction in the
    defense budget will drop Georgia's total defense spending to
    less than half of 2008 levels.

    ¶7. (C) Georgia's military plan is defensive in nature. As
    EUR Assistant Secretary Gordon recently noted to Georgian
    Defense Minister Sikharulidze, every country has the right to
    defend itself - as described in Article 51 of the UN Charter.
    Russia may argue no weapon is only defensive in nature;
    anti-tank and air defense systems, however, would not give
    Georgia the capacity to launch an offensive attack. Russia
    may argue that Georgia is acquiring other, more offensive
    systems clandestinely at the same time. There is no evidence
    to support this assertion, and we would have a much greater
    degree of influence -- and be in a position to keep Russia
    well informed -- if we were involved in defensive system
    procurement. Finally, Russia will likely level allegations
    of increased Georgian offensive capacity regardless of facts,
    just as they have done in the Geneva process. Georgia,
    however, provides far more transparency on its military
    forces than virtually any country in the world, signing MOUs
    between the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) and its Ministries
    of Defense and Internal Affairs that give the observers
    unprecedented access to Georgian military and law enforcement
    installations. The EUMM, along with the OSCE, has repeatedly
    affirmed that Georgia has respected the limits established in
    those MOUs and has no offensive capability near Abkhazia and
    South Ossetia. Russia essentially ignores these statements
    and continues to level the same allegations, but that bluster
    Qand continues to level the same allegations, but that bluster
    does not change the fact of Georgia's continued restraint.
    As we seek to help Georgia develop its defensive capacity, we
    could pursue smilar public and/or written commitments from
    the Georgians on the exclusively defensive nature of the
    program.

    ¶8. (C) We believe that providing Georgia with enhanced
    defensive capabilities will stabilize the situation. While
    Russia, as well as the de facto regimes in Abkhazia and South
    Ossetia, may argue otherwise, it is Russia and its proxy
    regimes that have dramatically increased the militarization
    of Georgia over the past year. Russia has introduced at
    least 3,700 troops into sovereign Georgian territory, as well
    as heavy military equipment, such as tanks, artillery and
    anti-aircraft systems, into the area immediately adjacent to
    the administrative boundaries -- in direct violation of the
    commitments President Medvedev made in the cease-fire
    agreement. It is Georgia that has lost 14 police officers
    since the war; kidnappings, cattle thefts, and detentions
    continue along the boundary, mostly on the Abkhaz and South
    Ossetian sides. Russian helicopters make regular flights
    along the boundaries, sometimes crossing them, and Russian
    forces move large numbers of troops and heavy equipment along
    the boundaries at will. Meanwhile, the EUMM, OSCE and UNOMIG

    TBILISI 00001123 003 OF 004

    continue to confirm Georgia's cooperative and constructive
    approach. There is little to deter Russia from taking
    additional military action, except a legitimate defensive
    force opposing it. At the same time, such a force would not
    pose an offensive threat to the regions.

    ¶9. (C) Retreating from military cooperation would be a step
    back from commitments we have made to Georgia and other
    international partners. Not only will Georgia be
    disappointed in our diminished support, and hesitant to trust
    us again, but other partners will draw the same conclusions.
    The Russia-Georgia war has already led some countries, such
    as Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states, to question the
    extent of our commitment, even though we never committed to
    the direct military defense of Georgia. A step back from
    commitments we have made would remove any doubt in our
    unreliability and convince countries from Belarus to
    Kyrgyzstan, even as they try to recalibrate their own
    relationship with Russia, that the risks of continuing
    partnership with Russia are less than those of moving toward
    cooperation with the United States. One of our specific
    commitments has been to NATO membership for Georgia,
    politically at the Bucharest Summit, and at the operational
    level, with the Georgia-NATO Commission and the Annual
    National Plan. A key component of that process is the
    development of Georgia's homeland defense capacity. Since
    last August we have engaged with Georgia on elements of their
    preparation for Euro-Atlantic integration, but the military
    component cannot be deferred indefinitely. The longer we
    defer action, the clearer the message will be to Georgia and
    others that our commitment to membership has diminished.

    ¶10. (C) Beyond our specific commitment to Georgia, we have
    made broader commitments not to allow Russia to impose its
    flawed zero-sum vision on our own strategic view of the
    world. The Secretary explicitly rejected Russia's notion of
    spheres of influence during her May 7 meeting with Foreign
    Minister Lavrov. The Vice President rejected the same notion
    at the February Munich Security Conference. The President
    himself told President Medvedev the same thing in London.
    All three have likewise expressed unequivocal support for
    Georgia's NATO aspirations and territorial integrity. Any
    perceived or real retreat from these unambiguous statements
    -- and our special relationship with Georgia makes it a test
    case -- will raise questions about our leadership.

    LOOKING AHEAD

    ¶11. (C) A difficult, but crucial, element of our strategy for
    continuing engagement with Georgia while maintaining a good
    relationship with Russia will be an aggressive private, as
    well as public diplomacy campaign that is well coordinated
    with our western partners. Russia will try to spin any
    military cooperation as negatively as possible, but we must
    not allow Russian disinformation to go unchallenged. As
    noted above, we have already taken the first step in our
    engagement with the Georgian military: agreeing together on
    the B3 approach. We are currently exploring the best fit for
    a Georgian contribution to the effort in Afghanistan.
    Neither of these areas could be considered threatening. A
    further step, toward helping Georgia improve its defensive
    capacity, would not be inherently threatening, and could help
    Qcapacity, would not be inherently threatening, and could help
    stabilize the situation. We must resist efforts to cast it
    any other way. Russia will likely continue to portray NATO
    engagement as threatening.

    ¶12. (C) More fundamentally, Russia continues to characterize
    our differing agendas in the post-Soviet space as a zero-sum,
    new "Great Game". Unlike in the 19th century, when two
    empires vied to establish control over the intervening
    territory in the exclusive pursuit of their own narrow
    interests, U.S. policy seeks to enable independent countries
    to make their own choices. However real the perception may
    be among Russians that the United States is out to get them,
    we must resist all efforts to confuse that perception with
    our true intentions. Georgia is seeking to choose its own
    partners, defend its own country, establish a market-based
    economy free of corruption, and further develop its young
    democracy -- and we are helping it do so. Georgia poses no
    threat to Russia; it wants the political space to pursue its
    own path. To step back from our mission because Russia
    mitrusts our motives is to cede to Russia the terms of
    development in Eurasia for the foreseeable future.

    ¶13. (C) There are two practical steps that we might consider

    TBILISI 00001123 004 OF 004

    pursuing to help both address the real danger of instability
    and blunt Russia's momentum in the public diplomacy sphere.
    First, we could encourage Georgia to make public and/or
    written commitments about the exclusively defensive nature of
    its new military programs. Second, we could encourage
    Georgia to offer to sign a non-use of force agreement with
    Russia. Russia has been pushing hard for such an agreement
    between Georgia and its own regions, which Georgia has
    understandably been unwilling to consider. If Georgia were
    to call Russia's bluff and offer to sign such an agreement
    with Russia itself, however, the burden would shift to Russia
    to demonstrate the sincerity of its commitment to stability.
    It is unlikely that Russia, which still maintains the fiction
    that it is not a party to the conflict, would accept
    Georgia's offer, but it would be left on the defensive.
    Meanwhile Georgia could pursue its defensive development with
    a ready answer to any Russian claims of belligerence or
    provocation. (Note: Embassy Tbilisi has not explored either
    of these steps with Georgia, so they are only ideas at this
    point, but experience suggests Georgia would at least be
    willing to consider them. The steps Georgia has already
    taken to provide transparency on its military and law
    enforcement activities suggest they would be willing to take
    similar steps. In the months after the war, senior Georgian
    officials expressed their willingness to pursue a non-use of
    force agreement if Russia made certain concessions. End
    note.)

    COMMENT: BALANCING RISKS

    ¶14. (C) Embassy Tbilisi does not question the importance or
    difficulty of managing our relationship with Russia,
    especially if we proceed with further military cooperation
    with Georgia. No matter how loudly we insist on the true
    state of affairs, most Russians at this point will either not
    believe us or ignore us, as Embassy Moscow pointed out.
    There is indeed a risk that taking the next step with Georgia
    will jeopardize the improvement of our relationship with
    Russia. There is also a risk, however, that not taking that
    step will both foster further instability in Georgia and
    jeopardize our credibility in a much broader space.
    Furthermore, as past experience has shown, there is yet
    another risk: that improvements in relations with Russia,
    even if bought with compromises on other U.S. interests, will
    not pay off with any real dividends. Embassy Tbilisi would
    argue that sacrificing a relationship with a dedicated
    partner like Georgia is the greater risk, because it will
    only embolden Russia in the future, both to push for more
    concessions on our part and to reassert its perceived sphere
    of influence further. Up to this point, Russia has paid no
    concrete penalty whatsoever for invading and occupying a
    neighboring country; unilaterally recognizing two of its
    regions as independent states; violating CFE and cease-fire
    commitments by vastly increasing its military presence in
    those regions and not allowing humanitarian access;
    corrupting the original concept of the Geneva process into a
    forum to lend legitimacy to the regions; blocking a
    status-neutral effort by the international community, through
    the OSCE, to promote stability; and killing the UN Observer
    Mission in Georgia. Allowing Russia to dictate the pace of
    QMission in Georgia. Allowing Russia to dictate the pace of
    military engagement with Georgia will be seen as rewarding
    Russia for its behavior. It could only be a matter of time
    before it takes similar actions in Ukraine or elsewhere.
    TEFFT

`