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### Viewing cable 05PARIS7682, THE FRENCH INTEGRATION MODEL: GOING UP IN SMOKE?

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05PARIS7682 | 2005-11-09 18:06 | 2010-12-01 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007682

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015
    TAGS: PHUM PGOV KISL SOCI ELAB FR
    SUBJECT: THE FRENCH INTEGRATION MODEL: GOING UP IN SMOKE?

    REF: A. PARIS 7599
    ¶B. PARIS 7525
    ¶C. EMBASSY PARIS SIPRNET DAILY REPORT FOR NOV 9 AND
    PREVIOUS
    (WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/EUR/PARIS/INDEX.CFM)

    Classified By: POL/MC Josiah Rosenblatt, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: Continuing violent unrest in
    France -- only now diminishing after thirteen intense days --
    has very publicly brought to light the ugly reality of
    France's persistent failure to integrate its immigrant
    population. Importantly, the violence has not taken on
    religious overtones, nor have mainstream (or, as far as we
    can detect, underground extremist) Muslim groups sought to
    manipulate the situation to their own advantage. Indeed, the
    Muslim establishment has been actively trying to calm the
    unrest. The government response -- to reestablish order
    while exercising restraint and to promise to address the
    underlying issues of unemployment, education, and family
    breakdown -- seems to be working for the moment. But any
    longer-term solutions will depend on successfully tackling
    the underlying issue of social exclusion -- in particular,
    employment discrimination. This is likely to prove a
    difficult challenge for any government given France's slow
    economic growth and chronic unemployment problems. Changing
    deep-seated attitudes will also be a daunting challenge.
    Failure could push a largely unpoliticized minority
    underclass to embrace the Islamic political extremism the
    French fear most. End Summary and Comment.

    Where We Are Now
    ----------------
    ¶2. (SBU) Images of rampaging youth hurling Molotov cocktails
    and defying French authorities have gripped France for the
    past thirteen days. Although France is accustomed to a
    certain level of violence (prior to the unrest, the country
    averaged 80 car burnings daily), the numbers to date are
    staggering: some 300 towns affected since the onset of
    unrest, more than 6,600 cars burned, nearly 1,800 individuals
    taken in for questioning, 11,500 police and gendarmes
    deployed, and over 100 security agents injured. In response
    to the violence, the GoF has invoked emergency measures used
    only twice since their enactment fifty years ago, during the
    war in Algeria. On the first night of the law's application,
    curfews were implemented in parts of 25 different departments
    and appear to have had some success. There were 617 cars
    reported burned, 280 arrests, and violence reported in 196
    towns overnight, as opposed to the 1,173 vehicles attacked,
    330 people taken in for questioning, and 226 communities
    reporting unrest the night before. Press reports indicate
    that the suburbs ringing Paris were notably quieter November
    8 in comparison with past nights.

    What the Violence is Not
    ------------------------
    ¶3. (C) The destruction of both public and private property
    has been enormous and often self-defeating, as the youths
    have targeted their own schools and gyms or their neighbors'
    vehicles. But it has fallen short of full-scale riots. The
    perpetrators have generally not sought out open
    confrontations with state security agents, with the notable
    exception of a birdshot attack November 6 that wounded 10
    police and hospitalized two. Similarly, casualties have been
    relatively limited. One youth lost a hand in a confrontation
    with police. One bystander was killed after being punched by
    a youth, and there have been a few instances of other
    injuries, primarily during attacks on vehicles.

    ¶4. (C) Nor has the unrest taken on the tone of an intifada,
    despite the fact that a large portion of those responsible
    for the violence are of Muslim background. In fact, Muslim
    groups have played positive roles in trying to quell the
    violence. During the first weekend of unrest, a tear gas
    canister landed in a mosque, sending some 700 worshipers
    fleeing. While some of the perpetrators used the incident to
    justify their actions, the leadership of the mosque and many
    of the worshippers there have downplayed the event in French
    and international media and actively circulated among the
    youth to act as mediators. The fundamentalist Union for
    Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF) issued a fatwa
    November 6 condemning the violence as un-Islamic.

    ¶5. (C) For the moment, the unrest is not viewed as
    specifically Muslim. The French media, and French commentary
    generally -- and perhaps deliberately -- identify those
    involved as "minority" youth, sometimes specified as Arab
    (North African) or Black (Sub-Saharan). Rarely are they
    classed as "Muslim." The issue is seen as a problem of
    disaffected ethnic minorities, not a local playing out of a
    clash of civilizations between Muslims and the West. That
    said, the GoF has alluded to the potential that radical
    elements may yet seek to use the unrest to try to further
    nefarious aims. Some commentators see the mediating role
    being played by Islamic organizations itself as a possible
    cause for concern.

    The French "Way" Questioned
    ---------------------------
    ¶6. (C) The recent upheaval has raised many questions within
    France about its "unitary" (as opposed to multicultural)
    integration model, as well as the social inequalities and
    racism that exist in French society. Although many --
    particularly on the left -- have been quick to blame the
    current government, it is clear that the unrest playing out
    throughout France today is the result of decades of neglect
    by governments of both the left and right. The role that
    France's generous social welfare system may have played in
    fueling the discontent has also come under scrutiny. In many
    of the areas most affected by the violence, there exist
    scores of state-subsidized, long-term unemployed (Villepin
    cited 57,000 in a nationally televised interview November 7)
    who are provided enough money to survive, but no real
    incentive to seek gainful employment.

    ¶7. (C) Many of the youth are products of homes where the
    primary breadwinner is among the long-term unemployed. For
    other young men, there has been a breakdown in the family
    structure. But the real problem is the failure of white and
    Christian France to view their darker, Muslim compatriots as
    real citizens. The cumulative effect has been the creation
    of a generation of young males lacking parental control and
    unequipped to secure and hold a job, even if they could break
    through the formidable barriers of prejudice faced by young
    Arabs and young blacks in particular.

    Possible Political Ramifications
    --------------------------------
    ¶8. (C) Nor did the French government do a good job of
    managing the situation. With an eye to the 2007 presidential
    elections, Prime Minister de Villepin and Interior Minister
    Sarkozy initially tried to manipulate the unrest to
    individual political advantage. President Chirac was
    conspicuous by his unusual silence. Only belatedly did
    Villepin and Sarkozy put their differences aside and present
    a common front. Villepin's decision to invoke curfew powers
    has been criticized by some in the opposition as an
    overreaction, but an initial poll indicates that 73 percent
    of those polled agree with the hard line.

    ¶9. (C) It is impossible at this time to predict with any
    precision the long-term political repercussions of the
    violence, including with regard to the 2007 presidential
    elections. It is also too early to know what effect, if any,
    the events will have on the political activism of the
    disaffected immigrant population or what steps the government
    is prepared to take to give minority groups more of a
    political voice. At present, the immigrant community is
    vastly underrepresented in all parties and barely represented
    at all in official positions, from the mayoral through
    parliamentary and ministerial ranks in the French political
    spectrum.

    Comment
    -------
    ¶10. (C) The dimensions and persistence of the unrest -- and
    the depth of the frustration reflected by it -- largely
    blindsided France's political class, which is generally
    regarded as being far-removed from the lives and experiences
    of ordinary people. That said, the government response -- to
    focus on re-establishing order while scrupulously avoiding
    excessive police violence, and to promise effective
    engagement to better social conditions -- appears initially
    to be working. The nightly violence is decreasing, both as
    police enforce newly authorized curfews in selected areas and
    as local government and citizens mobilize to defend their
    communities.

    ¶11. (C) While this approach may prove successful in quelling
    the current wave of unrest, sporadic incidents of car
    burnings and clashes with police are likely to persist. The
    youths perpetrating the violence and vandalism -- and the
    criminal groups that in some cases are manipulating them --
    are present in every poor suburb, and no amount of policing
    will preventively keep them completely in check. While
    responsible leaders across the political spectrum agree that
    France must do more to integrate its more recent immigrants,
    agreeing is not the same as doing. The recent wave of unrest
    has publicly and embarrassingly exposed France's deep social
    inequalities, reminding the broader public of the persistence
    of France's large, probably growing underclass (estimated at
    4.7 million by Social Affairs Minister Borloo).

    ¶12. (C) Once calm returns, the GoF will be expected to
    follow through on promised reforms to address the underlying
    issues that have fueled the unrest. But unless there is some
    measurable amelioration of the structural unemployment,
    societal discrimination, and widening gulf between mainstream
    French society and the people of the suburban projects, the
    nightly violence will continue to simmer just below the
    surface and will recurrently boil over. The challenge is
    enormous for the government, given France's slow economic
    growth and chronic unemployment. Any job creation program is
    likely to focus on inefficient public-sector programs that do
    nothing to empower the private sector and provide incentives
    to the unemployed. It will also be a challenge to change
    deeply ingrained negative attitudes towards non-white
    immigrants. However, not to make the effort would squander a
    crucial opportunity to significantly enhance the well-being
    and prospects of a disaffected Muslim underclass before it
    becomes politically radicalized. End Comment.

    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
    Stapleton

`