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### Viewing cable 10PRISTINA48, KOSOVO: STRATEGY FOR NORTHERN KOSOVO AN IMPORTANT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10PRISTINA48 | 2010-01-29 12:12 | 2010-12-09 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Pristina

`

    VZCZCXYZ0018
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHPS #0048/01 0291235
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 291235Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY PRISTINA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9662
    INFO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0049
    RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0643
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0459
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
    RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0990
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1339
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1877

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L PRISTINA 000048

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHIL GORDON FROM THE AMBASSADOR

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KV
    SUBJECT: KOSOVO: STRATEGY FOR NORTHERN KOSOVO AN IMPORTANT
    STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION

    Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

    ¶1. (C) Phil - I know that you are seeing Robert Cooper on
    Tuesday, February 2, among other things, to discuss Kosovo
    and the strategy for northern Kosovo. Integrating Kosovo
    Serbs into Kosovo society and preserving the country's
    territorial integrity is central to Kosovo's and the region's
    long-term stability and has been a core U.S. policy objective
    since 1999. In November 2009, we had a breakthrough that
    ended ten years of Belgrade-imposed stalemate when thousands
    of Serbs in southern Kosovo took part in Kosovo municipal
    elections. We want to replicate that success in the north
    and end the stalemate that has left Kosovo's future
    uncertain. That fundamentally is what the so-called northern
    strategy is about. We want to coax the population into
    greater cooperation with Pristina, not to impose outcomes on
    them.

    ¶2. (C) Currently, we have a growing, if still somewhat
    fragile, consensus within the international community in
    Pristina that the time is right to end the years of drift on
    the north and to alter the dynamic of a hardening partition
    between the north and the rest of Kosovo. In part, this is
    sparked by the new willingness among Kosovo Serbs to engage
    with Kosovo institutions. It also stems from Belgrade's
    increasingly aggressive actions in the north (e.g., seizure
    of the Valac electrical substation; unilateral appointment of
    Serb judges to illegal parallel courts) that have underscored
    to representatives of the international community on the
    ground the risks of continuing to do nothing. For ten years,
    we told the Kosovars to trust us -- "let us handle the
    situation, and we will protect you" -- and now the government
    of independent Kosovo is increasingly asking us when we are
    going to make good on that commitment. KFOR is drawing down
    (in six months NATO could take a decision to cut its forces
    in half). We need to take advantage of a unique opportunity
    that has crystallized and act now while we still have a KFOR
    presence capable of handling any contingency.

    ¶3. (C) Belgrade has reacted vehemently to the northern
    strategy. I think this intensity is rooted in the concern
    that any positive momentum in the north will undermine
    Belgrade's likely post-ICJ strategy: push to reopen status
    talks and formalize the emerging de facto partition of
    Kosovo. Furthermore, Belgrade has shrewdly judged that
    raising the specter of confrontation rattles our EU partners
    and is an effective tactic for derailing the strategy
    altogether. Cooper will likely reflect this anxiety with
    you, but I do not sense that this concern is nearly as strong
    within the local Quint (with the exception of Italian
    Ambassador Michael Giffoni, who spent ten years on Javier
    Solana's staff, where the Brussels bureaucrats have long been
    anxious about taking any difficult decision on the north).
    With this in mind, I recommend that you stress three points
    with Cooper. First, the northern strategy is not radical.
    Much of it restates what the international community, in
    general, and the EU, in particular, are already committed to
    doing. Second, it provides a vehicle for constructively
    channeling the GOK's ambitions for the north and takes
    advantage of Prime Minister Hashim Thaci's readiness to offer
    inducements to northern Serbs who engage with Kosovo
    institutions. Third, we now have legitimate Serb partners
    (elected by fellow Serbs) who are ready to help us in the
    north. These are the elements of a soft approach, which is
    the northern strategy's leading edge.

    ¶4. (C) We should expect Belgrade to challenge all elements of
    the strategy and to misportray the strategy as hard and
    confrontational. Serbian Ministry for Kosovo State Secretary
    Oliver Ivanovic has already declared that Pristina is
    promoting conflict. This is not the case. There is no
    interest here in conflict (not among the Quint and the ICO,
    nor within the GOK), but the current situation is untenable
    and deteriorating. The aim is to stop the rot in the north
    and create the positive momentum there that we need to secure
    our long-term policy objectives: a secure and stable Kosovo
    and a Serbia focused on its EU future, not old ambitions and
    grievances. We need to start the process now, and we should
    not allow Belgrade to use threats of confrontation as a veto
    to block progress.

    ¶5. (C) You can tell Cooper that the northern strategy offers
    incremental, but fundamental, steps necessary to getting the

    north right. We know, however, that there will be difficult
    challenges that pose risks. For example, EULEX must get
    serious about rolling up organized crime networks in the
    north that feed the parallel structures and make the current
    situation unsustainable. The northern Serbs are the first
    victims of these thugs, and there is a growing body of
    reports that they would welcome a change if EULEX can deliver
    it. We must, also, deal with the blatant theft of Kosovo
    property that has allowed Serbia to, in effect, seize the
    northern power grid in Kosovo. Dealing with these issues
    will require hard choices and fortitude. Our message to
    Cooper should be that we want to coordinate and consult with
    Brussels every step of the way. This process, after all,
    only works if Brussels makes clear to Belgrade that its EU
    future depends on real cooperation on Kosovo. In recent
    meetings with Boris Tadic, both Angela Merkel and Nicolas
    Sarkozy reportedly emphasized that Serbia's path to Brussels
    runs, in part, through constructive relations with Pristina.
    This is the perfect message. Brussels needs to repeat it --
    regularly. We, of course, are also ready to consult with
    Belgrade, as well, and to offer them the opportunity to
    engage constructively. Where we part company with some
    within the EU, however, is in not being willing to accept
    that we must have Belgrade's agreement before taking any
    steps.

    ¶6. (C) I need to emphasize the importance of this moment.
    Failure to act soon means losing northern Kosovo and will
    re-open the Pandora's Box of ethnic conflict that defined the
    1990s. Fortunately, our European partners increasingly
    recognize this. My British colleague here confirms what Stu
    has also heard -- that there is a greater degree of
    commitment and resolve in member capitals than may be the
    case in the Commission and the Council officialdom in
    Brussels. Even there, though, initial anxieties over the
    strategy appear to be easing as they look more carefully at
    the content and less at the rhetoric.
    DELL

`