Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 3891 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone
Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF ASEC AE AR AG AJ AFIN AU AM APER ABUD ATRN AORC AEMR AMGT ACOA AEC AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC AS AL ASIG ABLD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AGMT
BU BR BL BO BM BE BH BTIO BEXP BIDEN BK BY BA BG BF BB BC BBSR BRUSSELS BILAT BX
CJAN CH CU CASC CVIS CMGT CO CI CLINTON CIA CG CF CN CS CAN COUNTER CIS CA CBW CM CE CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CD CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CDG CJUS CARSON COUNTERTERRORISM CACM CDB CV
DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DJ DISENGAGEMENT DS DOD DEAX
EU EFIN EG ETTC EINV ENRG EI ECPS EINT ECON EIND ETRD EPET EUN EZ EMIN ELAB EAID EAGR ET EC EAIR ENVR ES ECA EWWT ER ELTN EFIS EN EXTERNAL ECIN EINVETC ENIV EINN ENGR EUR ESA ENERG ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FJ FMLN
GM GG GH GE GV GT GR GTIP GOI GCC GAZA GZ GA GTMO
HA HILLARY HR HUMAN HO HYMPSK HU HURI HK
IR IZ IS IT INRB IRAJ IN INRA INRO IO IC ID IIP IAEA ITPHUM IV IPR IWC IQ ICTY ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC ICAO IMO IF ILC IEFIN INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF ITALY ITALIAN INTERPOL
JO JA JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JUS JAMES
KE KTFN KDEM KJUS KNNP KGHG KZ KIPR KWBG KIRF KPAO KDRG KHLS KCRM KSCA KPAL KISL KG KACT KN KS KGIC KRAD KU KCOM KBIO KMCA KCOR KV KHDP KTIP KVPR KDEV KWMN KSPR KTIA KHIV KPRP KAWC KOLY KCIP KCFE KOCI KMDR KPKO KTDB KMRS KFRD KLIG KBCT KICC KGIT KSTC KUNR KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KOMC KAWK KO KTER KSUM KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KMPI KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFIN KTBT KCRS KRVC KR KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KGCC KPIN KNUC KPLS KIRC
LE LY LU LG LH LI LO LOG LT
MARR MOPS MU MASS MY MNUC MCAP MA MO MTCRE MG MASC MX MCC MZ ML MK MTRE MP MIL MDC MTCR MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MR MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MPOS MEPP MOPPS MAPP
NATO NIPP NL NO NG NI NPT NE NS NAR NZ NU NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NGO NATIONAL
OFDP OVIP OPRC OREP OIIP ODIP OTRA OSCE OAS OPIC OPDC OEXC OECD OPCW OSCI OTR OVP OFFICIALS OSAC
PGOV PREL PINR PO PINS PTER PK PHUM PARM PL PE PREF PHSA PBTS PGOF PROP PARMS PA PM PMIL PTERE POL PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PNAT PROV PEL POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PSOE PU POLITICAL PARTIES PBIO PECON POGOV PINL PKFK
QA
RS RU RW RP RIGHTS RICE RO ROBERT RF RFE REGION
SU SA SY SP SNAR SENV SCUL SW SOCI SF SO SR SG SMIG SL SN SHUM SZ SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI STEINBERG
TI TIP TBIO TR TX TU TSPA TS TRGY TH TT TW TERRORISM TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TPHY TK TNGD TC
UK UNSC UG US UZ UP UNO UNMIK UY UN UNGA UE UNESCO UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS UNAUS USUN USEU UV
VZ VE VT VM VTPREL VN
WA WI WMO WTRO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WTO
XA XT XM XY XG XC XH XL XF XZ XW XR XD XS XK
YM YI YE
ZI ZP ZK ZF ZB ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU ZA

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 05MADRID1585, SPANISH DEFENSE MINISTRY: "TRUST US ON VENEZUELA

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05MADRID1585.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05MADRID1585 | 2005-04-22 17:05 | 2010-12-08 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001585

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR EUR/WE AND WHA/AND
    DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISP (P. GRAFF)

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2015
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SP
    SUBJECT: SPANISH DEFENSE MINISTRY: "TRUST US ON VENEZUELA
    SALE"

    Classified By: Charge d'Affaires J. Robert Manzanares,
    reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Secretary of State for Defense (deputy
    minister equivalent) Francisco Pardo called a meeting with
    Charge April 20 to discuss Spain's plan to sell ships and
    planes to Venezuela. Pardo said the Zapatero government
    wanted to be as transparent as possible on the sale but was
    frustrated that "third parties" were using the sale to drive
    the U.S. and Spain apart. Spain is not selling corvette
    class vessels to Venezuela and none of the ships Spain sells
    will have offensive capabilities, declared Pardo. Although
    admitting the ships' configuration has not yet been
    determined, Pardo said the Spanish government deserves the
    United States' trust that Spain "will do the right thing."
    Pardo hoped the Venezuela issue would not be the focus of
    Defense Mininster Bono's May 3 meeting with Secretary
    Rumsfeld, and would not overshadow areas of strong U.S.-Spain
    cooperation, such as Afghanistan. End summary.

    ¶2. (C) Pardo told Charge (who was joined by defense attache
    and pol-miloff) he called the meeting "in the interest of
    transparency" and to avoid "manipulations" of information
    about the Venezuela sale by third parties. The Zapatero
    government and the defense ministry wanted to be "as clear as
    possible" with the U.S. on what the Venezuela sale involved
    and did not involve, because others, such as the opposition
    Popular Party, were using the Venezuela sale to "drive a
    wedge" between the Zapatero government and the U.S.
    government. Pardo said he was "very bothered" that third
    parties have created a problem where there shouldn't be one."

    ¶3. (C) Pardo then complained that Minister of Defense Bono
    had no sooner ended his appearance in Congress the day before
    when the Popular Party started spreading claims in the press
    that some of the ships Spain would be selling Venezuela would
    have offensive capabilities. "This would be difficult for
    the Popular Party to know," quipped Pardo, "since the
    configuration of the ships hasn't even been determined yet."
    In Pardo's view this illustrated how the Popular Party was
    using the Venezuela sale and Spain-U.S. relations for its own
    political purposes. Pardo said he had instructed the
    Navantia shipyard not do include anything in the ships'
    configuration that would go against the memorandum of
    agreement between Spain and Venezuela, including anything
    that could constitute offensive capability.

    ¶4. (C) Pardo then showed Charge a copy of the memorandum of
    agreement signed between Spain and Venezuela, pointed to the
    portion describing the types of ships that would be sold, and
    emphasized that nowhere did it mention "corvettes" as some in
    the Popular Party and press had claimed Spain planned to sell
    Venezuela. "I do not have to show you this classified
    document," said Pardo, "but I want us both to be absolutely
    clear on what we are and are not selling here." Pardo said
    he wanted to be clear: Spain is only contemplating selling
    Venezuela coastal patrol ships and oceanic patrol ships, the
    latter needed to patrol Venezuela's free economic zone.
    Spain will not be selling Venezuela corvettes.

    ¶5. (C) When asked what tonnage the ships would have, Pardo
    said those specifications had also not yet been determined,
    but the displacement would likely be between 1,200 and 1,700
    tons. Defense attache noted that ships in that displacement
    range could be outfitted to carry missiles, regardless of
    whether they're called corvettes or patrol boats. Noticeably
    bothered, Pardo replied emphatically, "The ships will not
    carry missiles -- that's what I'm trying to explain. Please
    trust us." Pardo insisted that the Zapatero government and
    the defense ministry are "responsible" and will not permit
    the ships to carry offensive weapons. "We believe we deserve
    your trust," said Pardo, adding "you should listen to what we
    at the ministry tell you before you believe what a Spanish
    congressman says (referring to Popular Party critics)."

    ¶6. (C) Pardo then pointed out that "something the opposition
    and the press are missing" is that the industrial portion of
    the deal, including transport planes and ships to carry
    petroleum and asphalt, is worth much more than the military
    portion. When asked how much the military and industrial
    portions of the sale would be worth, Pardo demurred, saying
    he could not give us numbers because the have not been worked
    out yet, but he assured us the non-military portion was more
    significant than the military.
    ¶7. (C) Pardo restated his concern that third parties were
    succeeding in making this a bigger issue than it should be,
    and said he was "very frustrated" by that. Pardo claimed
    that many other European countries "with good relations with
    the U.S." were selling equipment with much more offensive
    capability to the Chavez government than Spain. He then
    said he hoped the issue would not come up in Minister Bono's
    May 3 meeting with SecDef Rumsfeld because "we (Spain and the
    U.S.) have already gotten beyond it."

    ¶8. (C) Charge explained to Pardo that the U.S. is concerned
    about the Venezuela sale not because "third parties" such as
    the Popular Party had made an issue of it, but because the
    U.S. believes the sale could add to Venezuela's ability to
    cause destabilization in the region. In addition, Spain's
    engagement with Venezuela, including by virtue of the sale,
    could also lend Chavez political visibility and legitimacy he
    otherwise would not have. Charge made clear the U.S. is very
    concerned about Chavez's non-democratic moves in his own
    country and his destabilizing activities in other countries
    of Latin America. The last thing anyone needs to do right
    now, explained Charge, is do something to give Chavez more
    political and military muscle, which seems to us exactly what
    Spain is doing. Charge also told Pardo it was not realistic
    to think the Venezuela sale would not come up in the
    Bono-Rumsfeld meeting. It was bound to be raised because it
    remains an important issue for the U.S.

    ¶9. (C) Pardo replied that although he understood the topic
    would come up in the meeting, he hoped it would not be main
    subject discussed and "the only thing the newspapers talk
    about afterward." The Zapatero government, he said, has made
    numerous gestures to show the U.S. Spain wants to improve
    relations, and will continue to do so, and does not feel the
    focus should always be on the negative aspects of the
    relationship, such as the Venezuela sale. "Our decisions to
    increase our troop presence in Afghanistan last fall, and to
    lead a PRT this year in western Afghanistan, were taken
    because we are a loyal ally of the U.S.," said Pardo. The
    Spanish government believes it should get some degree of
    recognition for such moves and hopes that the focus of the
    Bono-Rumsfeld meeting can be areas in which Spain and the
    U.S. cooperate, such as Afghanistan, and not only on problem
    areas like Venezuela. Pardo then said the Ministry of
    Defense is probably the most supportive ministry in the
    Spanish government of positive U.S.-Spain relations.

    ¶10. (C) Comment: Pardo made every effort to show that he
    was very irritated that the Venezuela sale had become such a
    big issue in the Spanish press, in internal Spanish politics,
    and in U.S.-Spain relations. The purpose of the meeting
    appeared to be to demonstrate this irritation and to press
    Charge to do what he could to exclude the Venezuela sale from
    the Bono-Rumsfeld agenda. Charge made clear the U.S. was
    troubled by the matter exclusive of the interests of any
    third parties, the issue would very likely come up during
    Bono's meeting with Rumsfeld, and the U.S. remained concerned
    about the sale's ability to bolster Chavez politically and
    militarily.

    MANZANARES

`