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### Viewing cable 07KABUL2004, PRT URUZGAN - THE FIGHT FOR CHORA

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07KABUL2004 | 2007-06-21 15:03 | 2011-01-25 18:06 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Kabul

`

    VZCZCXRO2111
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
    DE RUEHBUL #2004/01 1721511
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 211511Z JUN 07
    FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8746
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 002004

    SIPDIS

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A
    STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
    NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
    OSD FOR SHIVERS
    CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-82 POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DE...

    112974
    2007-06-21
    07KABUL2004
    Embassy Kabul
    SECRET//NOFORN
    07KABUL1971|07THEHAGUE1196
    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 002004

    SIPDIS

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A
    STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
    NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
    OSD FOR SHIVERS
    CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-82 POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2017
    TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SOCI AF
    SUBJECT: PRT URUZGAN - THE FIGHT FOR CHORA

    REF: A. KABUL 1971
    ¶B. THE HAGUE 1196

    Classified By: Ambassador William Wood for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (C/REL NATO and AUS) Summary: Chora district
    center came under Taliban attack Friday, June 15, the
    focal point of a province-wide surge in insurgent
    activity. When it looked as if Chora might fall, the
    Dutch took the politically difficult decision to go on
    the offensive. They mounted successful operations
    re-establishing GoA control over Chora and killing key
    Taliban commanders. Unfortunately, the fighting also
    took a toll on the civilian population. The Taliban
    executed residents and their families in retaliation
    for their support of the Afghan government.
    Preliminary investigations indicate that press reports
    of civilian casualties were exaggerated. The PRT is
    on the ground to address humanitarian needs arising
    from the fighting and to resume reconstruction. No
    doubt critics of the Dutch mission in Afghanistan will
    attempt to use the fight for Chora as ammunition in
    this summer's debate over extension of the Dutch
    mission in Uruzgan beyond July 2008; but advocates of
    extension are likely to find that the results better
    support their cause. End Summary.

    ¶2. (SBU) Ref A reported a significant surge in
    insurgent activity in Uruzgan. While this pattern was
    observed throughout the province, the fight for the
    Chora district center was the center of the storm.

    ----------
    The Threat
    ----------

    ¶3. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) As of Sunday, June 17, the
    situation in Chora looked bleak. Insurgents had
    overrun three checkpoints to the east of the Chora.
    ISAF and Afghan forces were hunkered down in the
    district center itself, seemingly surrounded. To
    the west, local tribal commanders defending Sarab
    village lost a checkpoint on the high ground and had
    fallen back into the village. Worse, insurgents held
    the ground between the two points, preventing one
    force from aiding the other. Task Force-Uruzgan (TF-
    U) Commander Col. Hans van Griensven commented that it
    looked like Chora might fall despite the vigorous
    defense the Dutch were mounting. Specifically, they
    were firing live rounds from their Panzer Howitzer and
    had authorized aircraft providing close air support to
    fire on selected targets, techniques usually eschewed
    by the Dutch because of the possibility of civilian
    casualties.

    --------------------------------------------- ----
    A Moment of Choice: The Dutch Go on the Offensive
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶4. (S/NF) In the face of this dire situation, TF-U
    staff considered two alternatives. They could
    withdraw Dutch and Afghan forces from Chora and stay
    faithful to a strict interpretation of their
    reconstruction mandate in the province. Or they could
    commit themselves indefinitely to the fight for Chora,
    and for the first time commit their battle group to an
    offensive operation without the requirement that the
    enemy fire first. The TF-U commander chose to go on
    the offensive, recognizing that this might result,
    despite their best efforts, in some collateral damage.
    General Berlijn, commander of the Dutch armed forces,
    authorized this decision.

    -----------------------
    Fighting the Good Fight

    KABUL 00002004 002 OF 004

    -----------------------

    ¶5. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) On Sunday evening, Dutch
    Special Forces attacked Taliban positions at the
    southern entrance to the Baluchi Valley, a traditional
    Taliban sanctuary that lies between Chora and the
    provincial capital Tarin Kowt. Their objective was
    to force insurgents in Chora to divert forces to
    defend this strategic position. On Sunday night, the
    Dutch bombed a location where Taliban commanders were
    meeting, resulting in the deaths of the commander in
    charge of the operation, Mullah Mutalib, and three
    colleagues, Mullahs Ismael, Sadiq, and Ghafour.

    ¶6. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) On Monday morning, June 18,
    Dutch troops, joined by 90 soldiers of the Afghan
    National Army (ANA), attacked insurgents on the west
    side of Chora, re-taking checkpoints they had lost
    earlier that weekend. Simultaneously, tribal militias
    pushed out of Sarab attacked insurgents and re-took
    the Sarab Hill checkpoint. Militias led by Khas
    Uruzgan District Chief Jar Mohammed and former
    provincial Chief of Police Rozie Khan Sarab joined
    checkpoint commanders Toor Abdullah and Adul Malek and
    their men in this battle. By early afternoon, the
    insurgents disengaged and fled. ISAF had once again
    re-established control of the Chora district center.
    One Dutch soldier was killed and three wounded on
    Monday during the fighting. The Dutch have not
    reported any casualties among the ANSF.

    ¶7. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) The Dutch appeared to have
    regained the upper hand, at least for the moment.
    Meanwhile, the insurgents were said to be in disarray
    and demoralized. They were short on ammunition and
    weapons. With their top commanders dead, they lacked
    leadership and seemed to be at a loss as to how to re-
    group and carry on with the fight. Many fled to safe
    areas or hid among the population.

    ------------------
    The Threat Remains
    ------------------

    ¶8. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) While diminished for the time
    being, the insurgent threat remains and attacks could
    soon start again. A group of insurgents remains in
    position between Chora District Center and Sarab.
    Another is sitting to the northwest of Chora in the
    vicinity of the Niazy checkpoint. There were reports
    that 100 reinforcements under the command of Mullahs
    Hamdullah and Qahir left Mirabad on Tuesday, June 19,
    bound for Chora. Reinforcements could also come from
    safe havens in Gizab district and the Baluchi Valley.

    ¶9. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) Intelligence indicates the
    Taliban in Uruzgan have already established a new
    command structure. Mullah Aktar Mohammed has been
    tapped as commander for the Chora district. Mullah
    Aminullah now commands forces in Cahar Cineh district.
    And Qahir Faiz Mohammed is said to now lead the
    Taliban in the vicinity of Tarin Kowt, including
    Mirabad to the east and Darefshan to the north.

    ¶10. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) Some Dutch platoons and ANA
    returned from Chora Thursday, June 21, to rest and
    refit. Three Dutch platoons, a number of PRT
    personnel and about 50 ANA will remain in Chora. The
    Dutch will maintain their forces in Chora for the
    foreseeable future. They are there to perform a
    number of functions: to act as a deterrent to future
    attack; to work with ANSF to defend the area; to
    provide relief to civilians affected by the fighting;
    and to resume reconstruction work. The ANA are likely
    to be pulled out as soon as police -- either local
    police from Uruzgan or 80 of the ASP who are already
    in Uruzgan -- arrive to man and reinforce checkpoints in and
    around Chora.

    KABUL 00002004 003 OF 004

    -------------------
    Impact on Civilians
    -------------------

    ¶11. (U) Daily life in Chora is slowly returning to
    normal. The bazaar is open. Children are going to
    school. Families that fled the fighting are returning
    home. Local men can be seen again on the street.

    ¶12. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) But the
    fighting took a toll on the local population. There
    are multiple reports of civilian casualties in the
    press, many of them exaggerated. According to TF-U,
    30 plus civilians were killed during the fight (from
    June 15 on) and 62 were wounded. These numbers are
    still preliminary and do not distinguish between
    casualties that resulted from enemy action and those
    resulting from ISAF action. The PRT has dispatched
    its medical and legal specialists to Chora to work
    with local authorities to investigate this issue.

    ¶13. (S/REL TO NATO/AUS) The Taliban executed an as
    yet undetermined number of civilians. These acts were
    directed at those supporting the GoA and their
    families. The Dutch have confirmed the executions of
    checkpoint commander Abdul Malek's two brothers.
    There are multiple reports that checkpoint commander
    Toor Jan's family was executed, women and children
    included.

    ¶14. (S/NF) The PRT has maintained a steady presence
    throughout the build-up in tensions and the recent
    fighting. Now it is in the process of reinforcing its
    team in Chora with additional civil affairs personnel,
    police mentors, and subject matter experts. The Dutch
    government has put 1.2 million Afghani (approximately
    USD 24,000) at the PRT's disposal for emergency relief
    (food, blankets, shelter, and clothing). The PRT is
    working to access ISAF funds to assist families
    repairing and replacing property damaged by the
    fighting. However, the Dutch are not prepared to
    immediately promise to compensate all those civilians
    who claim to have suffered losses. They first want to
    compile information on where and when they fired into
    the area, so that they might limit payment to those
    legitimate claims for which ISAF is responsible. They
    also do not appear to have identified a source of
    funds for compensation/reconstruction of lives and
    personnel property. Possibly because of
    their policy to avoid collateral damage at all cost,
    they did not have a pre-existing plan/procedure to
    deal with this eventuality. Rather, they began
    Monday, June 18, to work from scratch to devise a
    response to the humanitarian costs of this fight in
    Chora.

    -------
    Comment
    -------

    ¶15. (S/NF) The Dutch here acquitted
    themselves well in Chora. They
    accurately assessed the threat and overcame policy
    obstacles to the kind of forward-leaning, offensive
    operations demanded by the situation. They dealt the
    Taliban a resounding blow, even at the cost of one of
    their own. They are carefully but quickly replying to
    criticism about civilian collateral damage with facts
    and concrete plans to address civilian need, which
    prevents the Taliban from getting ahead on this front.
    The Dutch government has publicly stated its intent to
    continue the mission in the face of the dangers (ref
    B). There will be those who use what happened in
    Chora to try to argue against the extension of the
    Dutch mission in Uruzgan beyond 2008. Strong
    arguments for extension can also be extrapolated from
    the events of the last week.

    ¶16. (S/NF) In a private meeting which included the

    KABUL 00002004 004 OF 004

    Dutch Ambassador on June 21, President Karzai
    expressed concern about use of artillery and the
    danger of civilian casualties. Both the Dutch
    and ISAF Commander McNeill explained the situation.
    We believe/believe the President was reassured.

    WOOD

`