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### Viewing cable 08TRIPOLI430, DIE HARD IN DERNA

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08TRIPOLI430 | 2008-06-02 16:04 | 2011-02-01 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
Appears in these articles: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/libya-wikileaks/

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    VZCZCXRO9119
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
    DE RUEHTRO #0430/01 1541659
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O P 021659Z JUN 08
    FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3484
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0484
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0806
    RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0022
    RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3989

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    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000430

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, S/CT

    E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/27/2018
    TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL PTER PHUM LY IZ
    SUBJECT: DIE HARD IN DERNA

    REF: TRIPOLI 120

    TRIPOLI 00000430  001.2 OF 004   CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary:  Frustration at the inability of eastern Libyans to effectively challenge Qadhafi's regime, together with a concerted ideological campaign by returned Libyan fighters from earlier conflicts, have played important roles in Derna's development as a wellspring of Libyan foreign fighters in Iraq. Other factors include a dearth of social outlets for young people, local pride in Derna's history as a locus of fierce opposition to occupation, economic disenfranchisement among the town's young men.  Depictions on satellite television of events in Iraq and Palestine fuel the widespread view that resistance to coalition forces is justified and necessary.  One Libyan interlocutor likened young men in Derna to Bruce Willis' character in the action picture "Die Hard", who stubbornly refused to die quietly.  For them, resistance against coalition forces in Iraq is an important act of 'jihad' and a last act of defiance against the Qadhafi regime.  End summary.  2. (C) P/E Chief paid an unofficial visit to the eastern Libyan town of Derna in early May in conjunction with a trip to Benghazi and the ancient Graeco-Roman ruins of Cyrene.  P/E Chief traveled from Benghazi in a rented car with a driver/guide.  (Note: An apparent lapse in coordination between security officials in Tripoli and Benghazi led to what appeared to be a rare gap in surveillance by security organizations.  End note.)  Located along Libya's eastern littoral in an area bracketed with rocky hills, Derna's beautiful, if bleak, setting and Soviet-style poured concrete buildings evoke Tyre and Sidon in South Lebanon.  While asking directions to the city's old fort, P/E Chief met local resident xxxxxxxxxxxx(strictly protect), who happened to hail from the same tribe as P/E Chief's driver/guide.  In typical fashion, xxxxxxxxxxxx promptly dropped what he was doing and spent the next several hours accompanying us around Derna, a town of some 50,000 people. Asked about his livelihood, xxxxxxxxxxxx described himself as "a free businessman", usually indicating someone who does not hold a full-time job, but instead gets by on a mix of odd jobs and commercial activities.  BAAB AL-SHIHA: WELLSPRING OF LIBYAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS  3. (C) P/E Chief visited the Baab al-Shiha neighborhood, site of the town's old fort (now all but gone) and the district from which a large number of the Libyan foreign fighters identified in documents captured during September's Objective Massey operation in Iraq had hailed.  The lower-middle class neighborhood, comprising poured concrete homes crowded along largely unpaved streets, sits on a hill overlooking the town. Unbidden, xxxxxxxxxxxx pointed out a number of small, discrete mosques tucked away in side alleys, noting that the profusion of "popular mosques" complicated effective monitoring by security forces. (Note: As reported reftel, another contact indicated previously that while mosques in town centers are closely monitored, it has been more difficult for secruity organizations to effectively monitor smaller, more remote mosques in exurbs and towns in eastern Libya.  End note.)  4. (C) A number of residents were on the streets; however, they were visibly more wary and less friendly than in other Libyan towns. xxxxxxxxxxxx later noted that some residents were closely questioned by security officials after speaking with a visiting Newsweek reporter in April.  Told P/E Chief was an American, xxxxxxxxxxxx jokingly swore and said "there goes my evening". Clarifying, he said he had plans that night, but would likely be detained and questioned by security officials about his interactions with an Emboff.  While P/E Chief had not obviously been followed, word would doubtless reach security officials' ears that foreigners had visited and inquiries would be made. He dismissed the idea of parting company to avoid creating problems for him, saying it was important that he, as a son of Derna, not bow down to the central government's authority. "They may have their boot on our throat, but it's important that they know that we are still breathing and kicking", he said.  PERCEIVED U.S. SUPPORT FOR QADHAFI FUELS DESIRE TO FIGHT IN IRAQ  5. (C) Over lunch at a popular restaurant just off the waterfront, xxxxxxxxxxxx and his business partner (who declined to give his name)discussed at length the local political-economic, cultural and religious scene, noting that it was "well-known" that a large number of suicide bombers (invariably described as "martyrs") and foreign fighters in Iraq hailed from Derna, a fact in which the town "takes great pride".  xxxxxxxxxxxx stressed  TRIPOLI 00000430  002.2 OF 004   the importance of the link between the domestic political situation in Libya and the flow of foreign fighters in Iraq. Residents of eastern Libya in general, and Derna in particular, view the al-Qadhafa clan as uneducated, uncouth interlopers from an inconsequential part of the country who have "stolen" the right to rule in Libya. (Note: Qadhafi's hometown, Sirte, is a remote spot located on the coast midway between the leading cities of Tripoli and Benghazi.  End note.)  Easterners had tried and failed to bring down Qadhafi's regime via the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group's (LIFG) insurgency in the 1990s.  6. (C) There was a strong perception, he said, that the U.S. had decided in the wake of Qadhafi's decision to abandon WMD aspirations and renounce terrorism to support the regime to secure counter-terrorism cooperation and ensure continued oil and natural gas production.  Many easterners feared the U.S. would not allow Qadhafi's regime to fall and therefore viewed direct confrontation with the GOL in the near-term as a fool's errand.  At the same time, sending young Libyans to fight in Iraq was "an embarrassment" to Qadhafi.  Fighting against U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq represented a way for frustrated young radicals to strike a blow against both Qadhafi and against his perceived American backers.  Dismissing P/E Chief's argument that we have privately pressed the GOL to adopt further political and economic reforms, xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi (who hails from Benghazi), remained in detention.  The U.S. surely had the wherewithal to secure el-Jahmi's release if it really cared about human rights; the fact that el-Jahmi remained in detention was viewed as one sign that the U.S. tacitly supported Qadhafi, regardless of his actions. (Note: We heard a similar line of reasoning from Libyan contacts in Benghazi.  End note.)  TARGETED IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN LIBYA  7. (C) Rejecting the idea that Derna was uniformly extremist, xxxxxxxxxxxx and his business partner described the town as being divided between religiously conservative and secular residents. A "large number" of Derna's citizens were not happy about the increasingly conservative religious atmosphere that had prevailed since the 1980's, he claimed.  Elaborating, al-Mansuri attributed adherence to more extreme iterations of Islam to "unnatural foreign influences" on religious practices in Derna. A number of Libyans who had fought and in some cases undergone "religious and ideological training" in Afghanistan, Lebanon and the West Bank in the late 1970's and early 1980's had returned to eastern Libya, including Derna, in the mid to late 1980's. Claiming their return was "not coincidental", he described a deliberate, coordinated campaign to propagate more conservative iterations of Islam, in part to prepare the ground for the eventual overthrow by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) of Muammar Qadhafi's regime, which is "hated" by conservative Islamists. (Note: After taking pains to curry favor with the 'ulema' in Libya in the years immediately after the 1969 revolution, Qadhafi broke with them in the late 1970's, criticizing aspects of Islam as "un-revolutionary".  Although he renewed efforts to cultivate Muslim leaders in the 1990's, deep suspicions remain.  The LIFG waged a successful low-level guerrilla insurgency in the early to mid-1990's, specializing in robbery and raids on remote military garrisons to sustain itself.  End note.)  8. (C) According to xxxxxxxxxxxx, these returned former fighters deliberately targeted towns and areas known to be less heavily surveilled and controlled by government security officials. Many of those were located in eastern Libya, where authorities have since Ottoman times experienced difficulty extending the writ of the central government.  xxxxxxxxxxxx mentioned a small group of Libyans who had reportedly fought in Afghanistan, subsequently undergone religious training in northern Syria and Lebanon, and then returned to Derna in the late 1980's as having been particularly instrumental in steering the community in a more conservative direction.  Stressing their conservatism, he said they had spearheaded campaigns against many aspects of daily life, such as smoking cigarettes, which they deemed "un-Islamic".  He pointed out the large number of religiously-themed audio cassettes and DVDs on offer in Derna's markets.  Many featured sermons and speeches by conservative imams in Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and Egypt.  LIMITED SOCIAL OUTLETS CREATE FERTILE ENVIRONMENT; SATELLITE TV FOSTERS "HARD VIEW"   TRIPOLI 00000430  003.2 OF 004   9. (C) A dearth of social outlets for young people in Derna "created space" for the message of returned fighters and conservative imams, who deliberately sought to eliminate the few social activities on offer for young people to monopolize the social and cultural environment.  While Derna's social life had never been robust, there had been public cinemas, sports leagues and some youth activities organized outside the auspices of mosques.  Virtually all of those had petered out in the late 1980's and 1990's, in part because of a campaign to label such activities as "un-Islamic".  He cited a popular youth theater group that had staged up to half a dozen productions a year, including western plays.  Clerics criticized "un-Islamic" themes and the fact that boys and girls were cast together in some productions; the resulting social stigmatization of families whose children had participated led to the group's demise in the late 1980's.  10. (C) The fact that Derna's educational system was weak had also enabled conservative clerics.  xxxxxxxxxxxx described a situation in which mosques and imams effectively offered the only alternative to schools, sports leagues and after-school activities.  A heavy influx of Arabic-language satellite television - a phenomenon that dated to the late-1990's - also fostered a "hard view" of the world, xxxxxxxxxxxx said.  Most young men watched a mix of al-Jazeera news, religious sermons and western action films on English language satellite channels broadcast from the Gulf.  The result was a heady mixture of violence, religious conservatism and hatred of U.S. policy in Iraq and Palestine.  The consensus view in Derna is that the U.S. blindly supports Israel and has invaded Iraq to secure oil reserves and position itself to attack Iran, he said.  He dismissed P/E Chief's attempts to clarify U.S. policy, stressing that most people base their judgments on information they receive from satellite television and at the mosque.  PRIDE IN DERNA'S HISTORY AS A TOWN OF FIGHTERS  11. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx attributed the flow of foreign fighters from Derna in part to local pride in the town's reputation as a historical locus of resistance to occupation.  While many of the town's citizens were uncomfortable with the town's increasingly conservative Islamist bent, the fact that young men from Derna traveled to Iraq in disproportionate numbers to fight against coalition forces was viewed through a different lens.  Not everyone liked the "bearded ones" (a reference to conservative imams) or their message, xxxxxxxxxxxx said, but the duty of a Muslim in general - and of a son of Derna in particular - was to resist occupation of Muslim lands through jihad. "It's jihad - it's our duty, and you're talking about people who don't have much else to be proud of."  Derna's residents might take issue with attempts to ban smoking or restrict social activities, but there was consensus on "basic issues" like jihad.  Depictions on al-Jazeera of events in Iraq and Palestine fueled the widely-held view in Derna that resistance to coalition forces was "correct and necessary".  Referring to actor Bruce Willis' character in the action picture "Die Hard", who stubbornly refused to die quietly, he said many young men in Derna viewed resistance against Qadhafi's regime and against coalition forces in Iraq as an important last act of defiance.  12. (C) Claiming "most Libyans" shared that sentiment, xxxxxxxxxxxx proudly said the difference was that Derna's sons actually acted on their beliefs.  Derna had historically resisted "occupations of all kinds - Ottoman, Italian, American (a reference to the 1805 attack on Derna led by William Eaton), and Qadhafi's."  Derna's role in opposing the Italian occupation in the early 20th century helped foster the near-deification of Libyan resistance leader Omar al-Mukhtar, who hailed from eastern Libya.  A visit to the al-Sahab mosque near the town's center was telling.  Large murals on the mosque's exterior (inaccurately) depicted Islamic warriors besting what appeared to be Roman soldiers.  The mosque's imam showed P/E Chief a series of small shrines to medieval holy men and a small cemetery filled with graves of "martyrs" who had resisted Ottoman and Italian occupation.  Many of the markers were garlanded with flowers; xxxxxxxxxxxx said families often come to picnic in the mosque's garden on holidays and pay their respects at the cemetery.  WEAK ECONOMY HURTS MARRIAGE PROSPECTS, FUELS FRUSTRATION  13. (C) As discussed reftel, xxxxxxxxxxxx drew a direct line between the parlous local economy and the willingness of Derna's  TRIPOLI 00000430  004.2 OF 004   sons to travel to Iraq for jihad.  A military base in Derna closed in the early 1990's, taking with it a large number of jobs (cooks, washerwomen, auto mechanics, electricians, etc.) who helped support the base.  Derna has a small fishing and maritime transport industry; other economic activities are largely restricted to services and smuggling.  While a military prison, located along the town's waterfront, remains open, the closure of the base hit the town hard and ushered in a more difficult era of economic austerity.  Unemployment, particularly among young men between the ages of 18 and 40, is high - xxxxxxxxxxxx put the percentage of un- and under-employed men in that demographic at 60 to 70 percent.  Dim employment prospects leave many young men in Derna without the means to marry - a key social anchor in what remains a traditional society - and the average age at which men marry has crept upwards.  Asked about reports that many now marry in their early- to mid-30's (reftel), xxxxxxxxxxxx said most of his friends and acquaintances actually did not marry until their mid-30's to early- 40's.  He half-jokingly noted that the cumulative level of sexual frustration among Derna's young men was "a big problem".  14. (C) In addition, while Benghazi and other parts of eastern Libya had benefited in the last several years from increased government patronage, Derna continued to "suffer from neglect". Citing an indeterminate grudge between Libya's former monarch, King Idriss al-Sanussi, and leading citizens of Derna, xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed that Derna had long been the victim of a deliberate government campaign to keep it poor.  He compared Derna's plight to the fortunes of another conservative eastern Libyan town, Bayda.  While Bayda had been the summer retreat for King Idriss and was initially shunned in the early years of Qadhafi's rule, its fortunes changed after Qadhafi married Sadia Farkhis, daughter of a prominent citizen of the town.  The government subsequently established the Omar al-Mukhtar University in what had been the royal palace and sited a number of government-owned enterprises there.  By contrast, Derna had not benefited from any such measures.  15. (C) Comment: xxxxxxxxxxxx remarks suggest that frustration at the inability of eastern Libyans to effectively challenge Qadhafi's regime, together with a concerted ideological campaign by returned Libyan fighters from earlier conflicts, have played an important role in in Derna's development as a wellspring of Libyan foreign fighters in Iraq.  The GOL's limited ability to extend its writ in eastern Libya -  along with limited social outlets, dim economic prospects and the town's historical role as a center of resistance - have fostered a landscape in which Derna's angry young men view the conflict in Iraq through the lens of dissatisfaction with their government and with the USG's perceived support of it.  Observations of the town, together with information reported reftel, strongly suggest that comments by senior GOL officials to the effect that the east is under control are exaggerated.  End comment. STEVENS

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