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### Viewing cable 09HAVANA462, OBSERVATIONS OF THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09HAVANA462 | 2009-07-28 14:02 | 2010-12-16 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | US Interests Section Havana

`

    VZCZCXYZ0008
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHUB #0462/01 2091401
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 281401Z JUL 09 ZDK
    FM USINT HAVANA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4621
    INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
    RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU
    RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
    RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000462

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR WHA/CCA

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2029
    TAGS: PHUM PREL ECON CU
    SUBJECT: OBSERVATIONS OF THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
    CIVIL SOCIETY IN CUBA

    REF: HAVANA 443

    Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (SBU) This front channel cable was originally sent as
    Official/Informal in reftel. The following is a collection
    of observations by outgoing human rights officer on the state
    of human rights and civil society in Cuba.

    ¶2. (C) CONTINUITY: Repeat visitors to Cuba, whether they
    have been gone for a matter of months or years, always are
    struck by the impression that everything seems exactly the
    way it was when they left. Whether it is the absence of
    Fidel Castro from the scene or the abrupt discharge of the
    two government officials most known to foreigners, the
    Government of Cuba (GOC) seems endlessly capable of returning
    to a condition of stasis. In the fall of 2008 three
    hurricanes severely battered the island's economy prompting
    many to speculate that the system could not recover from the
    devastation. However, nearly all observers have been amazed
    at the steady progress the GOC has made in restoring the
    miserable but adequate quality of living in place before the
    disasters. The GOC faces serious challenges but its ability
    to muddle through cannot be underestimated. The Cuban people
    under the numbing effects of decades of repression, have long
    been accustomed to adapting, often with remarkable ingenuity,
    to whatever new deprivation comes their way. There is no
    reason to think that a new round of ration reductions or
    rolling power outages will change this fact. Noted
    opposition leader Oswaldo Paya has stated quite candidly that
    a situation of a growing opposition, in which the Cuban
    people become increasingly willing to demonstrate and demand
    their rights until the present regime is forced to yield to
    popular pressure, is a fantasy that exists only in the minds
    of those living off the island. Paya believes that a rapid,
    near overnight collapse of the system into total chaos is a
    far more likely scenario.

    ¶3. (C) THE INEFFECTUAL OPPOSITION: The Cuban opposition is
    small and divided into dozens of tiny groups, often with
    seemingly similar goals, but unable to coordinate their
    activities in any significant way. Although several
    opposition leaders, such as XXXXXXXXXXXX, have a great deal of personal courage, they remain largely isolated from the community as a whole. Genuine opposition groups are heavily infiltrated by state
    security. Several others are state security fronts. Others
    exist only on paper and their only activities consist of
    taking photographs of six to ten people in a room holding up
    CAMBIO stickers and generating membership lists for the
    purpose of filing refugee cases. For the past two years the
    GOC has very effectively used the tactic of short term
    detentions to prevent any attempts to hold meetings or
    demonstrations. People are typically detained on the way to
    an opposition activity and then released some hours later
    without charges. As a result, the GOC has silenced
    dissenting voices without getting the type of international
    condemnation that earlier tactics of political trials and
    lengthy jail sentences of dissidents engendered. Over the
    past several months there has been a concerted campaign to
    provoke discord within the opposition that has had a
    devastating effect on major dissident organizations. Unity
    projects have crumbled, accusations are levied back and forth
    that prominent opposition figures are working for state
    security, bitter disputes have arisen over tactics, and
    organizations have split over rival leadership claims. Many
    opposition leaders have been approved for refugee status
    recently, and state security is able to dangle the "tarjeta
    blanca", an essential document for legal departure from the
    country, in front of many people to pressure them into
    informing on or sowing dissent among their colleagues within
    the opposition. Even though opposition members recognize
    these regime efforts at provocation, they still readily fall
    into mutual recriminations and bitter personal quarrels.

    ¶4. (C) In addition, and much like the regime, the
    opposition is aging and few younger people are joining its
    ranks. Even youthful opposition groups that seemed promising
    four or five years ago have been decimated by emigration and
    their leaders, now well in their 30's, have not been able to

    renew their membership base. Many of the prominent figures
    that are critical of the government, such as the independent
    bloggers, state that they cannot relate to the traditional
    opposition. Frequently they see themselves as part of a
    cultural community that has no relation with the political
    opposition. XXXXXXXXXXXX told poloff that when someone does something challenging artistically, the artist receives no support from the political opposition, and therefore feels no inclination to support dissident activities.

    ¶5. (C) DISILLUSIONED YOUTH: The most dramatic failure of
    the Cuban Revolution has been the creation of the "new man",
    as Che Guevara termed him, who would work for the benefit of
    society without regard to self interest. Cuban youth are
    overwhelmingly bitter and disillusioned and see no future
    except the possibility of leaving Cuba. This bitterness is
    acute among the professional classes who, after years of
    training, cannot pursue employment in their fields at low
    salaries, and instead find themselves hustling after jobs in
    the tourist sector. After years of indoctrination, young
    people are often completely turned off by politics, and do
    not relate at all to the traditional opposition. However,
    they are hungry for opportunity and dialogue, as long as it
    is not done in a heavy-handed way or with anything that
    smacks of propaganda and recruitment. When USINT offered
    scholarship programs for community college and a summer
    institute, more than 600 applicants applied and most had had
    no previous contact with USINT. The applicants were
    surprisingly technologically savvy considering that in Cuba
    only 2% of the population reportedly has access to some form
    of the internet.

    ¶6. (C) THE RACIAL DIVIDE: In spite of official statistics
    to the contrary, African descendent Cubans probably
    constitute a majority of the population. However, they
    occupy few leading positions in government, state owned
    industries and academia. They live in the poorest and most
    marginal neighborhoods. They rarely occupy jobs with access
    to hard currency in the tourist industry. Refugee applicants
    are disproportionately white. African descendants have far
    fewer relatives in other countries and so by and large do not
    have relatives who can either send remittances or pay for
    them to be smuggled into other countries. African
    descendants rarely take to the seas in rustic vessels, partly
    because for years they have been told that racism in the
    United States is as brutal as it was 60 years ago. Accounts
    from inmates indicate that as much as 80% of the prison
    population are of African descent. Due to emigration, Cuban
    society is becoming increasingly black resulting in much more
    overt racism than was seen in the past. Nevertheless, there
    is complete silence from the GOC on the topic of racial
    prejudice, the official line being that racism was a problem
    solved by the Revolution. There are many people of good will
    who fear for the future of their nation, and who are
    initiating dialogue aimed at restoring integration and racial
    harmony. After all the GOC told African descendants about
    life in the United States, they view the election of Barack
    Obama as a miraculous event. There is a great desire to
    discover what can be learned from the U.S. experience with
    race relations.

    ¶7. (C) THE BATTLE FOR PRIVATE SPACE: Besides the parts of
    the cultural community who challenge the status quo, and
    those who are working towards racial integration, there are
    other not officially sanctioned groups trying to address
    social issues. They don't view their work as related to the
    political opposition. These include advocates for homosexual
    rights and those trying to work on women's issues. The
    homosexual advocates, while welcoming statements against
    prejudice by Mariela Castro, the daughter of Raul Castro who
    heads the Center for Sexual Education, are upset that she
    says nothing about employment discrimination and police
    harassment. There are local people in Cuba trying to
    intervene at the community level in cases of domestic
    violence. It is doubtful whether the GOC would allow a much
    more organized private effort to confront these and other
    insufficiently addressed problem areas.

    ¶8. (C) RELIGION: The group that has been most successful

    at creating space beyond the government's control has been
    the religious community. This has been a very slow process
    and the leading religious organizations have always known not
    to test the limits too far. Considering that only a few
    decades ago the GOC sought an eradication of religion, it is
    notable how the faith of many Cuban people remains strong.
    Even though the GOC is now seeking an accommodation with
    religious groups that still allows government control,
    religious groups have gradually regained ownership of their
    buildings and expanded their facilities. They increasingly
    issue their own publications, and conduct adult education and
    community service projects. Even though religious
    organization avoid confrontation, and look towards achieving
    very small goals, such as permission for one additional
    procession or a few more minutes of radio time, they are the
    only groups within Cuban civil society with absolute
    confidence that they will outlast the regime. Religious
    organizations should not be overlooked as agents of
    transformational change.
    FARRAR

`