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### Viewing cable 04THEHAGUE1793, EU/US COOPERATION IN THE UNGA AND ON...

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
04THEHAGUE1793 | 2004-07-16 12:12 | 2011-01-25 19:07 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001793

    SIPDIS

    IO FOR LAGON; DRL FOR KOZAK; GENEVA FOR DELAURENTIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2014
    TAGS: PREL ECON PHUM KDEM AORC NL CH UN
    SUBJECT: EU/US COOPERATION IN THE UNGA AND ON...

    18800

    2004-07-16

    04THEHAGUE1793

    Embassy The Hague

    CONFIDENTIAL

    04STATE153876

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001793

    SIPDIS

    IO FOR LAGON; DRL FOR KOZAK; GENEVA FOR DELAURENTIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2014
    TAGS: PREL ECON PHUM KDEM AORC NL CH UN
    SUBJECT: EU/US COOPERATION IN THE UNGA AND ON HUMAN RIGHTS

    REF: A. STATE 153876

    ¶B. THE HAGUE 1737

    Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ANDREW SCHOFER, POLCOUNS, FOR REASONS 1.4
    AND D

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Dutch are deeply committed to the Transatlantic
    Dialogue, a successful EU Presidency, and leadership during the UN Gene
    Assembly that values USG input if not always agreeing with it. In
    discussions with DRL PDAS Kozak and IO DAS Lagon on July12 - 13, Dutch
    interlocutors acknowledged Chinese backsliding on human rights in the l
    six months but did not expect this to influence EU thinking on lifting
    China Arms Embargo. Dutch MFA and NGO officials remain terribly
    troubled by Abu Ghraib and welcomed USG clarification regarding the
    status of Guantanamo prisoners. The Dutch agreed to collaborate on a
    US-EU package of agreed language to settle references to contentious
    issues in Third Committee resolutions. USDel signaled new flexibility
    UN Commission on Human Rights elections, prompting the Dutch to agree t
    restart WEOG negotiations. Sudan, Chechnya, Iran, Burma, Turkmenistan,
    and Zimbabwe seem likely subjects for Third Committee resolutions, whil
    Belarus and Uzbekistan are not. End summary.

    ¶2. (U) China, Guantanamo, human rights and a range of United Nations
    issues were the agenda in The Hague, June 12 - 13, for DRL PDAS Michael
    Kozak's and IO DAS Mark Lagon's meetings with Dutch MFA officials. MFA
    interlocutors included Special Ambassador for Human Rights Piet de Kler
    Deputy Political Director Hermann Schaper, Human Rights Director Adanna
    Adema, and Director of the UN Department Karel van Kesteren. The DCM
    hosted an NGO reception and Lagon briefed a large group of university
    students on U.S. Human Rights concerns and multilateral issues generall

    CHINA ARMS EMBARGO AND BACKSLIDING ON HUMAN RIGHTS

    ¶3. (C) Amb. de Klerk will travel to China soon to review the human rig
    situation. Schaper reminded USDel that the EU's embargo was a specific
    response keyed to Tiananmen Square. It was not intended as retaliation
    for human rights issues generally and was not imposed for military
    considerations, although both concerns now prompt the USG push for
    maintaining the ban. He admitted Chinese backsliding over the last six
    months caused concern but stressed that this in itself was not a
    sufficient argument for maintaining the embargo.

    ¶4. (C) The Dutch said that the next senior EU discussion of China in
    September would focus on the last couple of years of Chinese actions.
    EU will examine whether their China dialogue has made a difference on t
    ground. The Dutch shared elements from the EU decision matrix:

    a. The EU does not want the embargo to stand in the way of overall bett
    relations.

    b. Human rights is but one issue here; the question is more than is t
    glass half full or half empty. There are more glasses on the table.
    There has been recent backsliding, but overall the situation has improv
    over the last 15 years. The embargo was a response to Tiananmen Square

    c. The EU does not expect to export its best weapons to China should t
    ban be lifted, and it does not want European weapons to be used or
    deployed against U.S. forces.

    d. What effect would lifting have on the US presidential elections; an
    would it lead to Euro-bashing that would embarrass the Dutch EU
    Presidency, for example.

    ¶5. (C) PDAS Kozak disputed the Dutch assertions regarding China's
    improved human rights record and shared recent examples of China's
    unfulfilled commitments. A dialogue without results was pointless, he
    stressed. Regarding Tiananmen, Chinese restraint from running people o
    with tanks in recent years could not justify lifting. He suggested the
    should take a closer look at the status of those who were punished for
    Tiananmen, if resolution of that issue is the threshold for lifting.

    ¶6. (SBU) USDel and NGO reps, meeting later at the DCM's residence,
    brainstormed ideas for trying to use public opinion to deflect what loo
    like a pending EU decision to lift the ban. One idea that resonated wa
    to hold a European NGO forum on the Chinese human rights situation earl
    in the fall.

    GUANTANAMO AND OTHER DETAINEES IN THE WAR ON TERROR

    ¶7. (C) Dutch MFA officials and NGO reps remained terribly troubled b
    what happened at Abu Ghraib and were clearly hungry for the latest
    information on the status of all detainees (ref b). Discussions of the
    new Cuba resolution in ECOSOC (ref b) led to thinking about how to a
    discussion of how improve Dutch and EU public opinion, including
    development of new public affairs products or informal visits to
    Guantanamo by an EU or EU Presidency rep. USDel did not commit to thes
    proposals but promised to study options.

    THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

    ¶8. (U) UN Priorities for 59 UNGA
    The USG's UNGA priorities paper has inspired the EU to devise a concise
    working paper of their own, the Dutch told us. They promised to study
    UNGA priorities (septel) and offered to review the EU list with us late
    in the week as well (septel).

    ¶9. (C) Working together at the UNGA - Third Committee

    USDel committed to sending the EU a draft package of agreed language to
    settle references in resolutions to contentious issues in the Third
    Committee, including how to refer to the International Criminal Court,
    death penalty, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, among
    others. The Dutch agreed to vet our draft at the EU's September COHUM
    (working group on human rights) and to arrange a bilateral meeting, if
    needed, to work out problems. This might be in Brussels on or about
    October 1, or in Warsaw around the same time.

    ¶10. (C) Country specific issues included:

    - Sudan: We agreed to wait to see what the Security Council would do
    before considering Third Committee action to follow on the UNCHR
    resolution. (Sudan is discussed in more detail below).

    - Burma: We agreed there is a need to have Third Committee action.

    - Turkmenistan: The EU wondered if it made sense to table another
    resolution this year. Not doing so might send the wrong signal. On th
    other hand, we are trying to streamline the UN agenda. The EU suggeste
    we could run one last resolution and announce that henceforth we would
    focus on action in the UNCHR.

    - Zimbabwe: USDel offered to support any British action in New York if
    they want to have a resolution there.

    - Belarus and Uzbekistan: We agreed that there is no need for Third
    Committee action since rapporteurs have been already been assigned.

    UN REFORM

    ¶11. (C) Reformed and better UN

    Geopolitical reality and strategic practicality inspire the Netherlands
    devotion to the multilateral system with an active, constructive, and
    reformed UN at the center, Schaper said. The upcoming review of the
    Millennium Development Goals is a natural deadline for UN reforms. DAS
    Lagon assured him that the US is as committed to building up the UN as
    have been to reforming it, however we cannot single-handedly reach the
    goal of a UN living up to its original purposes.

    ¶12. (C) The Dutch do not want UN reform to stall over Security Council
    enlargement. They favor, eventually, one EU seat. The MFA working lev
    however, opposes Germany's SC seat bid, but publicly the MFA has had to
    along for now. On voting, the Dutch have proposed to SYG Annan a votin
    weight system as follows: 1/3 based on being a member of the UN; 1/3
    based on population; and 1/3 based on the total amount of assessed and
    voluntary contributions to the UN.

    ¶13. (U) Community of Democracies/Democracy Caucus

    In courting the wary Dutch to become involved, we reassured them that t
    Democracy Caucus (DC) would augment, not compete, with traditional,
    long-standing groups. Admitting the idea has theoretical merit, the Du
    remained curious about how the Caucus would admit borderline members.
    noted that UN PermRep Danforth cited the DC in his confirmation hearing
    and thought it a useful tool not limited to use in human rights but als
    good for development issues, UN reform, and so on.

    UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACTION FOR COUNTRY SPECIFIC CONCERNS

    ¶14. (C) UNCHR Elections

    We signaled U.S. readiness to restart negotiations over an agreed WEOG
    slate for UNCHR elections, with new flexibility on forgoing membership
    two years, rather than one, out of 21. Van Kesteren, co-chair (with th
    Canadians) of earlier negotiations on this issue, agreed to explore
    restarting negotiations based on this welcome information. He added th
    the U.S. might end up having to relinquish three years to get a deal.
    added that, after the Security Council, membership on the UNCHR was a
    valuable prize for many states. DAS Lagon reported the French seemed
    prepared to work it out so WEOG could focus on substance and discourage
    the current practice of vote trading with undesirable countries from ot
    regions. Finally, van Kesteren fingered Austria as a problem country t
    insisted on maintaining their position based on the established pattern
    Commission membership.

    ¶15. (C) Sudan

    The Dutch felt the time was ripe for a SC resolution on Sudan. There w
    serious problems with both sides and sanctions might be appropriate. I
    reviewing the earlier, troublesome Geneva negotiations on the Sudan
    resolution and what to do in the Third Committee, the Dutch predicted N
    York discussions would again be a triangle between the U.S., EU and
    African Union (AU). USDel urged the EU to avoid surprises like the dea
    it cut with the AU behind our backs on the last day of talks in Geneva.
    We agreed it would be useful to try to split the AU members by peeling
    South Africa and other AU members chafing under the AU's lowest common
    denominator protection of Sudan. There was consensus not to let
    discussion of the genocide question delay or thwart more immediate
    action.

    ¶16. (SBU) NGOs suggested that finding a political solution should be m
    higher on the agenda. The rep from Doctors Without Borders complained
    that the NGOs are under new threats because both government and rebels
    object to their perceived sharing of information from the field with th
    outside world. PDAS Kozak regretted that information sharing caused
    problems, and said it is important for the GOS to know we are collectin
    facts so as to hold them accountable.

    ¶17. (SBU) Chechnya

    NGOs believed the international community has increasingly abandoned
    Chechnya and that the situation has become more criminalized in the las
    four years. Dutch MFA officials had earlier admitted that the EU has a
    bloody nose on this intractable issue. PDAS Kozak reassured NGOs tha
    we raise Chechnya with the Russians all the time and have not let
    terrorism get in the way of promoting human rights.

    ¶18. (C) Iran

    The Dutch reported a meeting the EU had in Teheran three weeks ago wher
    academics and officials discussed police, prisons, and the legal system
    Discussions were much more uni sono than half a year ago since
    opposition parliamentarians were absent. There are serious questions n
    whether to continue the dialogue and there will be a decision by early
    October, they told us. The Dutch reminded USDel that they see the
    non-proliferation issue as part of a broader relationship with Iran tha
    includes expanding business opportunities.

    MEETING WITH UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

    ¶19. (U) DAS Lagon had a cordial dialogue with 25 student leaders from
    Dutch universities who asked about the U.S.'s lack of participation wit
    the ICC, its support of Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its
    perceived unilateral approach to the war in Iraq, and its treatment of
    human rights in the broader war on terrorism. Praising the EU's cultur
    of dialogue as a model for other nations, Lagon cautioned that American
    realpolitik is a reaction to a belief that the rest of the world has a
    less mature approach to international relations. Lagon warned that tha
    an extended process of seeking consensus often delayed urgent action.
    Rejecting allegations of U.S. unilateralism, Lagon described America's
    involvement in many multilateral efforts. Public diplomacy could rever
    impressions of American unilateralism and build greater consensus for U
    actions. He suggested exchange programs, greater awareness by American
    politicians of their global audiences, and discussions such as the one
    was currently having were important elements in such a strategy.

    COMMENT

    ¶20. (C) Commitment to the Transatlantic Dialogue underlies much of the
    Dutch UN agenda during their EU Presidency. Their exchanges with the
    USDel were productive, showed flexibility and receptiveness to US ideas
    and a drive to find consensus while doing their duty for national and E
    positions. Their promise to work more closely on the Sudan human right
    resolutions in New York was welcome and signaled good intentions on the
    wider range of issues. On the other hand, their narrowing of the China
    arms embargo debate to Tiananmen Square left us little room to argue th
    larger human rights and military points of the issue. Immediately on
    Guantanamo and longer term in general, the Dutch public remains recepti
    to fresh public diplomacy efforts providing information they can use to
    justify alignment with U.S. positions.
    RUSSEL

`