Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 3895 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone
Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF ASEC AE AR AG AJ AFIN AU AM APER ABUD ATRN AORC AEMR AMGT ACOA AEC AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC AS AL ASIG ABLD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AGMT
BU BR BL BO BM BE BH BTIO BEXP BIDEN BK BY BA BG BF BB BC BBSR BRUSSELS BILAT BX
CJAN CH CU CASC CVIS CMGT CO CI CLINTON CIA CG CF CN CS CAN COUNTER CIS CA CBW CM CE CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CD CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CDG CJUS CARSON COUNTERTERRORISM CACM CDB CV
DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DJ DISENGAGEMENT DS DOD DEAX
EU EFIN EG ETTC EINV ENRG EI ECPS EINT ECON EIND ETRD EPET EUN EZ EMIN ELAB EAID EAGR ET EC EAIR ENVR ES ECA EWWT ER ELTN EFIS EN EXTERNAL ECIN EINVETC ENIV EINN ENGR EUR ESA ENERG ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FJ FMLN
GM GG GH GE GV GT GR GTIP GOI GCC GAZA GZ GA GTMO
HA HILLARY HR HUMAN HO HYMPSK HU HURI HK
IR IZ IS IT INRB IRAJ IN INRA INRO IO IC ID IIP IAEA ITPHUM IV IPR IWC IQ ICTY ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC ICAO IMO IF ILC IEFIN INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF ITALY ITALIAN INTERPOL
JO JA JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JUS JAMES
KE KTFN KDEM KJUS KNNP KGHG KZ KIPR KWBG KIRF KPAO KDRG KHLS KCRM KSCA KPAL KISL KG KACT KN KS KGIC KRAD KU KCOM KBIO KMCA KCOR KV KHDP KTIP KVPR KDEV KWMN KSPR KTIA KHIV KPRP KAWC KOLY KCIP KCFE KOCI KMDR KPKO KTDB KMRS KFRD KLIG KBCT KICC KGIT KSTC KUNR KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KOMC KAWK KO KTER KSUM KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KMPI KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFIN KTBT KCRS KRVC KR KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KGCC KPIN KNUC KPLS KIRC
LE LY LU LG LH LI LO LOG LT
MARR MOPS MU MASS MY MNUC MCAP MA MO MTCRE MG MASC MX MCC MZ ML MK MTRE MP MIL MDC MTCR MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MR MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MPOS MEPP MOPPS MAPP
NATO NIPP NL NO NG NI NPT NE NS NAR NZ NU NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NGO NATIONAL
OFDP OVIP OPRC OREP OIIP ODIP OTRA OSCE OAS OPIC OPDC OEXC OECD OPCW OSCI OTR OVP OFFICIALS OSAC
PGOV PREL PINR PO PINS PTER PK PHUM PARM PL PE PREF PHSA PBTS PGOF PROP PARMS PA PM PMIL PTERE POL PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PNAT PROV PEL POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PSOE PU POLITICAL PARTIES PBIO PECON POGOV PINL PKFK
QA
RS RU RW RP RIGHTS RICE RO ROBERT RF RFE REGION
SU SA SY SP SNAR SENV SCUL SW SOCI SF SO SR SG SMIG SL SN SHUM SZ SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI STEINBERG
TI TIP TBIO TR TX TU TSPA TS TRGY TH TT TW TERRORISM TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TPHY TK TNGD TC
UK UNSC UG US UZ UP UNO UNMIK UY UN UNGA UE UNESCO UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS UNAUS USUN USEU UV
VZ VE VT VM VTPREL VN
WA WI WMO WTRO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WTO
XA XT XM XY XG XC XH XL XF XZ XW XR XD XS XK
YM YI YE
ZI ZP ZK ZF ZB ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU ZA

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09MEXICO193, THE BATTLE JOINED: NARCO VIOLENCE TRENDS IN 2008

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MEXICO193.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09MEXICO193 | 2009-01-23 23:11 | 2010-12-02 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Mexico

`

    R 232312Z JAN 09 ZDS
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4721
    INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
    NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    HQ USNORTHCOM
    CIA WASHINGTON DC
    CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
    NSC WASHINGTON DC

` `

    S E C R E T MEXICO 000193

    NOFORN
    E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 01/22/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINR SNAR KCRM MX
    SUBJECT: THE BATTLE JOINED: NARCO VIOLENCE TRENDS IN 2008

    REF: A. CIUDAD JUAREZ 22
    ¶B. MEXICO 3586
    ¶C. MEXICO 2371
    ¶D. MEXICO 3498
    ¶E. MEXICO 3779
    ¶F. MEXICO 1766

    Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay.
    Reason: 1.4 (b), (d)

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (C) 2008 set a new record for organized crime-related
    homicides with more than 6000 killings. Violence in Mexico
    suddenly provided fodder for U.S. and international media
    with commentators suggesting worse to come. While the death
    toll is already at disturbing levels, and there are no signs
    violence will taper off anytime soon, we will continue to
    evaluate information or evidence that would suggest the
    cartels have decided to up the ante significantly by
    undertaking mass-casualty attacks on civilians,
    systematically attacking GOM officials or institutions or
    targeting USG personnel. Internecine struggles among the
    cartels and GOM counter narcotic successes have increased the
    costs of doing business and account for most of the up-tick
    last year. Frustrated traffickers, seeking to diversify
    profit-making activities through kidnappings and extortion,
    account for more. End Summary.

    ----------------------------------
    Drug-Related Homicides on the Rise
    ----------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Few killings in Mexico are thoroughly investigated,
    and determining which are truly related to organized crime
    remains an inexact science, but Mexico's Attorney General's
    office's year-end estimate stands at 6262. Other GOM
    authorities put the toll from organized crime slightly
    higher. SEDENA reports that drug-related killings
    represented roughly 17% of all homicides last year, while the
    National System of Public Security (SNSP -- part of the
    Public Security Secretariat (SSP)) estimates a total of
    approximately 10,700 intentional homicides.

    (S/NF) Table I: Organized Crime-Related Killings, By Year*
    --------------------------------------------- ----------
    2005 1855
    2006 2489
    2007 3038
    2008 6380
    ----------------------------------------
    *Source: SEDENA

    (S/NF) Table II: 2008 OC-Related Killings, By Month*
    --------------------------------------------- -----
    Jan 282
    Feb 283
    Mar 417
    Apr 320
    May 496
    Jun 531
    Jul 540
    Aug 587
    Sep 526
    Oct 847
    Nov 843
    Dec 708
    --------------------------------------------- ------
    *Source: SEDENA

    --------------------------------------------
    Spike in Violence Concentrated at the Border
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) Violence continued to be concentrated in a few key
    states, and in 2008 there was a spike in drug-related
    killings in the northern border territories. An estimated 41
    percent of these homicides took place in Chihuahua and Baja
    California states and largely in two urban areas, Ciudad
    Juarez and Tijuana. (see MEXICO 3586). Sinaloa continued to
    rank among the most violent states with approximately 1048
    (or 18%) of these killings. The surge in violence along the
    border stems largely from the intensified struggle among
    cartels over a few lucrative land crossings to the U.S. In
    particular, the January 2008 arrest of cartel leader Alfredo
    Beltran Leyva sparked a serious rift among the Gulf, Juarez
    and Sinaloa (Pacific) cartels, which is being played out
    viciously in Ciudad Juarez. (See MEXICO 1766) In Tijuana,
    rival factions of the weakened Arellano Felix Organization,
    one of which is backed by the Sinaloa cartel, are battling
    for control.

    --------------------------
    Changes In Cartel Behavior
    --------------------------

    ¶4. (SBU) Beyond its broadened scope, the nature of cartel
    violence changed in 2008: organized violence was
    characterized by significantly increased brutality, a callous
    disregard for the potential for collateral damage and more
    frequent targeting of soldiers and police. Mexico's drug
    trafficking organizations (DTOs) have also more frequently
    orchestrated violence to send intimidating messages to
    security forces, the Mexican public and the body politic.

    ¶5. (SBU) Incidents, such as the August beheadings of 12 in
    Yucatan, the execution style killing of 24 on the outskirts
    of Mexico City in September, late fall killings of soldiers
    in Monterrey and Guerrero in late December contributed to
    growing public unease here and garnered media attention
    abroad. Several first-time-ever incidents involving grenades
    and improvised explosive devices (such as the notorious
    Independence Day grenade attack in Morelia, the shooting and
    undetonated grenade attack on the US Consulate in Monterrey,
    the use of improvised explosive devices in downtown Mexico
    City and Sinaloa, and a grenade attack on police cadets in
    Jalisco) demonstrate that not only have the cartels
    successfully expanded their arsenals, but at least some
    elements have developed a tolerance for inflicting civilian
    casualties.

    ¶6. (SBU) Cartels have also expanded their use of violence to
    intimidate. Beheadings and the prominent placement of
    dismembered bodies in public places, relatively rare two
    years ago are now common throughout the country. The late
    night grenade/shooting attack on our consulate in Monterrey
    was obviously designed to send a message, although no
    individual or group has ever claimed responsibility. More
    explicit was the January assault on the Monterrey offices of
    Televisa, accompanied by a message telling the broadcaster to
    do a better job reporting on corrupt public officials.
    Attacks such as these remain sporadic so far, and we have
    insufficient indications whether they mark a new trend or
    not.

    ¶7. (SBU) Despite these sporadic attacks, Mexico's drug war
    continues to primarily impact security forces and those
    linked directly or indirectly to the drug trade. The
    civilian population in some urban areas along the border
    remains bunkered down with some of those who have the money
    either sending their children to school in the U.S. or
    relocating entirely to minimize risk. In much of the rest of
    the country, though, the civilian population not involved in
    the drug trade remains essentially insulated from the
    violence, though not from its effects.

    --------------------------------------------- --------
    Police Killings Increase Along With Overall Death Toll
    --------------------------------------------- --------
    ¶8. (SBU) SEDENA estimates that at least 522 civilian law
    enforcement and military personnel were murdered last year,
    compared to 315 in 2007.

    (S/NF) Table III: Drug-Related Military/Police Homicides:
    2007* 2008**
    (% of total)

    AFI 22 (6.9) 5 (1.0)
    PFP 12 (3.8) 37 (19.7)
    State
    Police 62 (19.8) 110 (21.1)
    Ministerial
    Police 63 (20.0) 14 (2.7)
    Municipal
    Police 120 (38.0) 305 (58.4)
    Military 27 (8.6) 51 (9.8)
    Other 9 (2.9) Unavailable
    --------------------------------------------- -------------
    Total 315 522
    CENAPI (Mexico's Center for Information, Analysis and
    Planning) statistics
    **SEDENA statistics

    ¶9. (C) Increased confrontations between security forces and
    criminals is one explanation for the increasing killing of
    security forces personnel. GOM authorities argue that
    killings are no longer just score-settling among bad cops,
    but increasingly the consequence of the government's
    aggressive fight against the cartels. Some analysts we have
    spoken to agree. However, they also note that with few
    exceptions the majority of deaths are not the result of
    direct confrontations. They argue that the crackdown on
    police corruption has put compromised police officials in the
    position of either being prosecuted or breaking their
    established agreements/arrangements with the cartels. Hence,
    some of those who presumably choose the latter course are
    being punished brutally. (See MEXICO 2371, 3498)

    ¶10. (SBU) It is worth noting that police victims (at all
    levels of government) represented eight percent of all 2008
    killings believed to be drug-related, a figure slightly lower
    than the percentage in 2007. The vast majority of victims
    continue to be state and municipal law enforcement officers.
    Senior level, federal police killings were still rare
    occurrences in 2008. The most high-profile death remains the
    May killing of Edgar Millan Gomez, the country's
    highest-ranking federal police officer.

    --------------------------------------
    Targeting of Soldiers An Ominous Sign
    --------------------------------------
    ¶11. (S/NF) There have been notable incidents of horrific
    violence against soldiers, including a string of slayings of
    enlisted men in Monterrey in October and the systematic
    decapitation of seven troops in Guerrero (see MEXICO 3779).
    The theory that those killed in Guerrero were rogue soldiers
    involved in drug trafficking has been discounted, suggesting
    the cartels have begun to target soldiers to exact revenge
    for successes registered by the military and attempt to
    undermine the institution's resolve. The Monterrey and
    Guerrero killings immediately followed successful military
    operations in the respective regions resulting in seizures
    and arrests. Whether such tactics will have a chilling
    effect remains to be seen. Sources tell us that while some
    soldiers are more fearful, many others are keen to strike
    back at the cartels with greater resolve. SEDENA and SEMAR
    have instructed regional commanders to implement force
    protection counter-measures to reduce the risk of future
    incidents.

    ----------------------------------------
    U.S. Personnel and Institutions Targets?
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶12. (C) We have observed a significant up-tick in threats,
    as well as incidents of surveillance, against USG personnel
    and properties over the last three months. All threats are
    treated seriously and precautions taken; fortunately, none
    has come to fruition.

    ¶13. (S/NF) On October 12, unknown persons fired gunshots and
    tossed an un-detonated grenade at the U.S. Consulate in
    Monterrey. The attack occurred after hours, no one was
    injured, and little damage occurred. No message was left and
    we have uncovered no useful intelligence regarding the
    authors or their motives. One unsubstantiated report cited a
    source claiming a senior Gulf cartel leader ordered the
    attack. However, with little hard evidence, no attempt to
    claim credit and no follow on incident to date, the
    possibility remains that this was an isolated, possibly even
    impulsive, attack not likely undertaken at the behest of
    senior cartel leaders.

    ¶14. (C) While the cartels have not yet directly targeted USG
    law enforcement or other personnel, they have shown little
    reticence about going after some of our most reliable
    partners in Mexican law enforcement agencies. Ten close DEA
    law enforcement liaison officers have been killed since 2007,
    seven of whom were members of Special Vetted Units.
    Similarly, within the past two years 51 close FBI contacts
    have been murdered. More than sixty of Mexico's best law
    enforcement officers in whom we have placed our trust and
    with whom we have collaborated on sensitive investigations,
    shared intelligence and in many cases trained and vetted have
    been murdered by the cartels. We do know from sources that
    cartel members have at least contemplated the possibility of
    doing harm to both our personnel and institutions, but we
    frankly don't know enough about how DTO members think and
    operate to know what factors might trigger a decision to
    mount such an attack, but the potential threat is very real.

    ¶15. (C) We assess that the threat to U.S. personnel could
    increase if the violence continues to escalate and more
    high-level government officials and political leaders are
    targeted. Also, a reaction may be triggered if traffickers
    perceive their losses are due to U.S. support to the GOM's
    counter-narcotics efforts. We will continue to monitor
    potential threats to U.S. personnel from organized criminal
    gangs and be alert to information that suggests drug
    traffickers increasingly see the U.S. hand as responsible for
    their losses.

    ---------------------
    A Measure of Success?
    ---------------------

    ¶16. (C) While attributing last year's significant spike in
    violence to its own successes marks an effort by the Calderon
    administration to put the best face possible on a grim
    situation, there is also considerable truth to the assertion.
    President Calderon's counter-narcotics team has scored
    significant successes, particularly in the last 12 months.
    Record numbers of weapons and drugs have been seized, key
    members of drug cartels have been arrested and/or extradited,
    cartel sources inside government institutions have been
    arrested ) including a former Deputy Attorney General and
    the head of Interpol in Mexico. The GOM has disrupted cartel
    operations in meaningful ways; in year-end reports SEDENA and
    SEMAR reported that together they have reduced the maritime
    trafficking of illicit drugs by 65 percent and cut direct air
    transit of illegal drugs from Colombia by 90 percent.
    According to collaborative sensitive reporting, the January
    2008 arrest of Alfredo Beltran Leyva split the Pacific
    Cartel, and accentuated antagonism between that DTO and the
    Gulf organization which caused the spike in violence in
    Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Baja California (see also MEXICO
    1766). In addition to these rifts, frustrated traffickers
    have turned to kidnappings and extortion to compensate for
    the loss in drug-trafficking revenue, expanding their reach
    and impacting a greater number of bystanders who have no
    involvement in DTO activities. These kinds of impacts bring
    home to ordinary Mexicans the nature of the struggle here.

    -------
    Outlook
    -------

    ¶17. (C) Mexican authorities and law enforcement analysts
    predict that violence will likely get worse before it gets
    better. Recent truce rumors notwithstanding, there is
    currently no indication that the violence will soon abate;
    CENAPI reports 280 killings for the first 20 days of January.
    The cartels have shown themselves to be remarkably
    innovative, vicious, and resilient when aggressively
    confronted. Given their powerful weaponry and deep
    penetration of the country's security institutions, further
    attacks against security forces and government officials seem
    all but inevitable. However, while violence remains at
    unacceptably high levels here, we have no reason to believe
    at this point that it will escalate either quantitatively or
    qualitatively.
    Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
    Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
    BASSETT

`