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### Viewing cable 08BRASILIA159, REGIONAL STABILITY, GLOBAL ASPIRATIONS BEHIND NEW

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08BRASILIA159 | 2008-01-31 13:01 | 2011-01-20 00:12 | SECRET | Embassy Brasilia

`

    VZCZCXRO6146
    RR RUEHRG
    DE RUEHBR #0159/01 0311324
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 311324Z JAN 08
    FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0947
    INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6550
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4433
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5274
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3950
    RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 1396
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 5918
    RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3676
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7203
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0351
    RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 1434
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0351
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 2379
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0131
    RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 7648
    RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 5742
    RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 1533
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000159

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, T, WHA, AND PM

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018
    TAGS: MARR MCAP PREL
    SUBJECT: REGIONAL STABILITY, GLOBAL ASPIRATIONS BEHIND NEW
    DEFENSE POSTURE

    REF: A. BRASILIA 0066
    ¶B. BRASILIA 0129
    ¶C. IIR 6 809 0092 08
    ¶D. IIR 6 809 0097 08
    ¶E. 2007 BRASILIA 1568
    ¶F. 2007 BRASILIA 2132
    ¶G. 2007 BRASILIA 2151
    ¶H. BRASILIA 0006
    ¶I. SAO PAULO 0019
    ¶J. 2007 BRASILIA 1836
    ¶K. BRASILIA 0093

    Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD M. SOBEL, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

    SUBJECT: Global Aspirations, Regional Stability, and Brazil's
    Defense Posture

    ¶1. (S) Summary. Discussions between Ambassador Sobel and
    Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, along with Brazilian
    defense-related activities with France and Russia and in
    South America suggest the key elements shaping Brazil's new
    defense posture. The military's traditional role in
    maintaining internal stability and its potential roles as
    domestic crime-fighter and international peacekeeper will be
    important elements in shaping Brazil's new national defense
    strategy (septel). However, it is becoming clear that
    regional stability, particularly with regard to Venezuela,
    traditional sovereignty and border concerns, and Brazil's
    "rightful" place on the regional and world stage will remain
    central, and perhaps overriding motivations for the GOB. As
    we prepare for Jobim,s March visit to Washington,
    understanding of these basic Brazilian motivations regarding
    security will be important in defining our approach to this
    new opportunity for security engagement. End summary.

    Jobim's Focus Becoming Clearer
    ------------------------------

    ¶2. (S) Over the course of several discussions with the
    Ambassador (refs A and B), the most recent on the eve of his
    departure on January 25 for France and Russia, Jobim revealed
    in increasing detail his goals for these visits and his
    activities in the hemisphere. The key elements that emerged
    are 1) pursuit of a nuclear submarine, using French
    assistance on propulsion as well as other systems; 2) a
    general desire to increase Brazil's domestic manufacturing
    capability for weapons via technology transfer; 3) more
    specifically, an interest in becoming a service hub in South
    America for Russian equipment, driven by a desire to have
    greater leverage over Hugo Chavez's Venezuela; 4) a focus on
    rebuilding Brazil's military capacity, including fighter
    aircraft; and 5) a new, more structured organization of South
    American defense ministers.

    What Does It Mean?
    ------------------

    ¶3. (S) Jobim's visits to France and Russia (refs C and D) are
    the GOB's first significant move to actively pursue these
    priorities with countries that he believes will be willing to
    provide the necessary technology transfer as well as
    equipment. Moreover, Jobim was joined, exceptionally, by
    presidential foreign policy advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia, MRE
    Secretary General (Vice Minister) Samuel Guimaraes' chief of

    SIPDIS
    staff Marcos Pinta Gama, and Long Term Planning Minister
    Roberto Mangabeira Unger. The presence of the first two
    individuals, in particular, make clear that, for the first
    time in decades, Brazil is beginning to consider security
    issues as an important element of foreign policy.

    ¶4. (S) Although Jobim himself has not commented extensively

    BRASILIA 00000159 002 OF 003

    on the GOB's motivations for focusing on these items, they
    dovetail with Brazil's traditional focus on regional
    stability, the new regional threat posed by Venezuela, and
    the need to defend its national sovereignty and borders.
    Brazil's military and foreign policy elite make consistently
    clear that regional stability is their overriding concern
    within South America. Venezuela has now become the central
    focus of Brazil's regional stability concerns. Brazilian
    observers regularly and publicly express general concerns
    about Chavez's destabilizing influence on Bolivia and
    Ecuador, as well as his troubled relationship with Colombia,
    even though Ministry of External Relations (MRE) contacts
    refuse to admit to us even in private that they are worried
    about Venezuelan interference in other countries. More
    importantly, the Ambassador has now been told by three
    respected members of the foreign policy elite--Senate Foreign
    Affairs and National Defense Committee head Heraclito Fortes
    (refs E and F), sitting senator and former president Jose
    Sarney (refs G and H), and Former Finance Minister Antonio
    Delfim Netto (ref I)--that they believe Venezuela under
    Chavez could well make a military effort to reclaim the half
    of Guyana (west of the Essequibo River) that it considers
    lost territory, principally as a way to deflect public
    attention from domestic woes.

    ¶5. (S) The general policy approach of Lula and his foreign
    policy team in seeking to maintain stability in the region
    does not differ enormously from that of his predecessors;
    historically, Brazilian governments have avoided taking sides
    in Latin America and followed a policy of trying to maintain
    good relations with all of their neighbors. Uncertainty
    about Venezuela has added a new element, however, leading to
    a more concerted effort to contain Chavez. Brazil is the
    leading advocate of Venezuelan admission to Mercosul, a move
    that, if approved by the Brazilian and Paraguayan congresses,
    will further complicate both the stated economic integration
    and political objectives of the organization. From Lula,s
    point of view, bringing Chavez into a political organization
    in which Brazil has strong influence makes sense.

    ¶6. (S) Similarly, Lula's proposal to create a new
    organization of South American regional defense ministers,
    which Jobim is actively pursuing, may achieve little in the
    way of defense coordination, but would serve a political
    objective of bringing Venezuela and other regional
    troublemakers into a common organization that Brazil could
    use to exercise a measure of control. Finally, while the
    proposal to serve as a hub for servicing Russian equipment in
    the region will do little to develop Brazil's defense
    manufacturing capacity or to serve Brazil's own defense
    needs, it does make sense if Brazil believes that performing
    such a function could help control the spread of Russian
    weapons in the region. This objective might also explain the
    interest in allowing a Russian military jeep manufacturer to
    set up shop in Porto Alegre (ref A), a capability Brazil does
    not need but which might serve to entice Russian interest in
    allowing Brazil to serve as an equipment hub.

    ¶7. (S) Border security and sovereignty concerns also continue
    to be a driving factor for Brazil's desire to re-build its
    military, develop a domestic manufacturing capacity for
    military equipment, and beef up its air defenses, in
    particular. Brazilians continue to perceive their long
    border with ten neighboring countries as vulnerable,
    justifying maintenance of a strong defense posture. The most
    likely scenarios with direct military implications for Brazil
    involve non-state actors such as the FARC and international
    criminal organizations operating across borders.
    Nonetheless, although it seems highly unlikely that the GOB's
    first reaction would be to send in the troops, Brazilians see
    a military incursion by Chavez into a neighboring country as

    BRASILIA 00000159 003 OF 003

    plausible, in light of Chavez's unpredictability, and see
    having a strong military as a deterrent. Moreover, they
    continue to hold suspicions regarding the intentions of the
    international community--including the United States (ref
    J)--with regard to the Amazon. Brazil sees a strong military
    as an important element in backing up these assertions of
    sovereignty over the Amazon.

    ¶8. (S) Beyond concerns about Chavez and regional and border
    security more generally, Jobim's priorities suggest that
    Brazilian interests are also motivated by Brazil's growing
    desire to take its "rightful" place among the world's powers
    and to be seen as a worthy of a permanent UN Security Council
    seat. It is this objective, which senior GOB policy makers
    place above all other foreign policy goals, that is driving
    Brazil's interest in a nuclear submarine (ref K).

    What does it mean for us?
    -------------------------

    ¶9. (S) Brazilian leaders believe that now is their time to
    play a more important global role. This, combined with
    Brazil's continuing concerns regarding regional stability,
    the threat posed by Venezuela, and border security, will form
    the backdrop to the discussions and to Brazilian positions.
    While we may not agree with Brazilian views of Brazil,s
    security situation, they will nonetheless form a framework
    within which we must approach our discussions with Minister
    Jobim and other GOB officials. While we should seek to focus
    on more realistic areas for bilateral defense cooperation,
    such as peacekeeping, we cannot afford to dismiss these core
    Brazilian concerns, which will be important considerations as
    we seek to exploit the opportunities presented by Jobim's
    visit to Washington in March and Pol-Mil talks in April.

    SOBEL
    SOBEL

`