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### Viewing cable 07BUENOSAIRES376, C) U.S.- ARGENTINE RELATIONS: DR. JEKYL AND MR.

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07BUENOSAIRES376 | 2007-02-27 21:09 | 2010-11-30 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Buenos Aires

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHBU #0376/01 0582141
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 272141Z FEB 07
    FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7388
    INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION IMMEDIATE 5968
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 5820
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 1094
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ FEB 4470
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE 6210
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 0855
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE 0214
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 0062

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000376

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    WHA FOR A/S SHANNON, DAS DUDDY, AND WHA/BSC
    P FOR HEIDE BRONKE
    NSC FOR JUAN ZARATE AND JOSE CARDENAS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017
    TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON VZ AR
    SUBJECT: (C) U.S.- ARGENTINE RELATIONS: DR. JEKYL AND MR.
    KIRCHNER

    REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 360
    ¶B. BUENOS AIRES 311
    ¶C. BUENOS AIRES 305
    ¶D. BUENOS AIRES 302
    ¶E. BUENOS AIRES 301

    Classified By: Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne for reasons 1.4
    (b)and(d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: Argentina's President Nestor
    Kirchner is trying to stake out a position for himself close
    to Chavez yet still working well with the U.S. on issues
    important to Argentina. With domestic political advantage
    and 2007 elections in mind, we expect Kirchner to continue
    the balancing act. Kirchner will lash out with largely
    indirect criticism, he will cozy up to Chavez, and yet he
    will maintain a number of open doors to us. Kirchner
    recognizes the value of maintaining quiet, positive relations
    with the U.S. -- particularly on key strategic issues, e.g.
    non-proliferation and counterterrorism -- but sees no value
    domestically in aligning himself publicly with the U.S. or
    its policies. In fact, he gets a domestic boost from lashing
    out at perceived pressure and in striking an independent
    pose, a la Charles de Gaulle. Argentina's commercial and
    economic relationship with Venezuela is also of strategic
    importance (refs. a, b), the difference being that,
    domestically, Kirchner does perceive value, in particular
    electorally, in publicly linking himself to Chavez; he is
    bringing home the bacon. The meetings between senior GoA
    ministers and AG Gonzalez and U/S Burns and A/S Shannon were
    uniformly positive, recognizing an important common agenda in
    many areas (refs c-d and septels), and the press play from
    the visits was positive and profuse. In light of this
    dynamic, Kirchner's statements in Venezuela -- that Argentina
    will "not contain Venezuela" and his invitation for Chavez to
    visit in March are indicative of the GoA's desire to maintain
    what they see as a "balance" in relations with the U.S. and
    Venezuela. End Summary.

    ¶2. (C) Attorney General Gonzales' February 6-7 visit, and U/S
    Nick Burns and A/S Shannon's February 8-9 visit to Buenos
    Aires and meetings with senior Kirchner ministers served to
    underscore improving bilateral relations, the breadth of that
    relationship, as well as highlight U.S. policy priorities in
    the region. Kirchner insiders, Cabinet Chief Alberto
    Fernandez and Planning Minister Julio De Vido, confirmed to
    Burns and Shannon the importance of the relationship to the
    GoA, the strong working-level cooperation on
    counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and international support
    for non-proliferation. Together with Foreign Minister
    Taiana, they shared concerns about the situation in Bolivia
    and Ecuador, and the need for strengthening stability in the
    region, including through joint efforts in Haiti. They also
    emphasized the importance they place on attracting U.S.
    investment (although a negative decision made public during
    the visit regarding a U.S. investment fund seeking a share of
    a local energy transmitting company, indicates that the
    actual message to potential investors, at best, is mixed).
    Cabinet Chief Fernandez publicly characterized relations as
    "good" the day after Burns' visit.

    ¶3. (C) The Kirchner style from the beginning, however, has
    been combative in the face of real, imagined and fabricated
    challenges from sources as varied as the Catholic church,
    neoliberalism and the "Washington consensus," the World Bank
    and IMF, parasitic foreign multi-nationals, the press and
    political opponents (whether from within or from outside the
    Peronist party) and -- indirectly stated -- the the U.S.
    This style has stood him in good stead. As the economy
    boomed, buoyed by favorable external factors, his popularity
    ratings have soared, and have remained high, due in no small
    part to his pugnacious character.

    ¶4. (SBU) Kirchner demonstrated again over the last two weeks
    his willingness to attack external institutions for domestic
    political gain. He lashed out on several occasions at the
    IFIs and other international organizations, rejecting their
    latest gentle criticisms of GoA economic policies and blaming
    them again for the 2001/2002 financial crisis and also for
    current high poverty levels. His outburst followed mildly
    critical comments from the World Bank and World Trade
    Organization officials about the sustainability of the GoA's
    economic policies. He was also responding to an IMF
    spokesman's comment to the press that an IMF agreement was
    normally a prerequisite for Paris Club debt rescheduling.
    Despite the IMF's explanation that this was a Paris Club, not
    IMF, requirement, Kirchner blamed the IMF -- his favorite
    whipping boy -- for blocking a Paris Club deal. He and his
    Economic Minister, Felisa Miceli, also used the opportunity
    to pander to the public's extreme hostility towards the IMF
    by rejecting categorically any possibility of a Fund program
    with Argentina.

    ¶5. (C) This dynamic helps explain the two faces of Kirchner
    we see in our bilateral relations. Kirchner is essentially
    pragmatic but excessively focused on domestic issues and
    public opinion. The low point in recent bilateral relations,
    occasioned by the GoA performance at the Mar del Plata Summit
    of the Americas in November 2005, perhaps convinced Kirchner
    he had gone a bit too far down the populist route. Since
    then, we have seen a gradual and steady improvement in
    relations with an increasing willingness by senior-level
    officials in engaging in dialogue with us and in identifying
    areas where we can strengthen cooperation.

    ¶6. (C) However, we do not expect to see a public embrace of
    the U.S. or many of our policies. The public image of the
    U.S. in Argentina is the lowest in the region. Kirchner's
    regular verbal assaults on policies and institutions linked
    in the public mind to the U.S., e.g. globalization and the
    international financial institutions, resonate very well here
    as long as they don't foretell a serious break (see latest
    INR U.S Image paper from the Oct-Nov 2006 Latinobarometro
    poll comparing Argentina with 17 other regional publics).
    Kirchner calculates -- with at least one eye always on the
    next election -- that there is little up-side to being linked
    too closely with the U.S., and little down-side to
    occasionally "standing firm" and "protecting the people's
    interests" before the hegemonic power.

    ¶7. (C) The press here eggs this on, couching many issues as
    the ideological struggle between the U.S. and Venezuela for
    predominance in the region. As a reflection of this, GoA
    actions are either portrayed as pro-Chavez or as a
    rapprochement with the U.S. Contacts inform us that Kirchner
    also sees himself as maintaining this balance between the two
    -- a la Charles de Gualle between the cold war powers U.S.
    and USSR. The Embassy has seen on several occasions, when
    the press appears to be too caught up in portraying the
    improving U.S.- GoA relations, that Kirchner will find an
    opportunity to publicly stick a pin in that balloon. In the
    aftermath of the Gonzalez/Burns/Shannon visits, Kirchner,
    while in Venezuela recently to sign a number of commercial
    agreements, may have felt compelled to "right the balance"
    and demonstrate his independence with his gratuitous remark
    that Argentina would not "contain" Chavez (ref. A). The
    media here has, in fact, tied Kirchner's comments in
    Venezuela to Burns/Shannon remarks made here during their
    recent visit that the U.S. could work well with governments
    like Argentina and Brazil but that Venezuela was "another
    matter."

    ¶8. (C) Comment: It is clear we have foreign policy
    differences with the Kirchner administration, particularly
    over how we view Chavez and his actions in Venezuela and the
    region. Press reports here say Chavez will be paying a
    return visit to Kirchner next week, coinciding with President
    Bush's visit to Uruguay (septel - Senior GoA contacts tell us
    the visit is still unconfirmed). Ambassador has expressed
    our strong concerns that Chavez will use the occasion to
    organize another anti-U.S. rally (as is being reported in the
    press), and that such an act would negatively impact our
    bilateral relations. This, unfortunately, would be the type
    of gesture to be expected of Kirchner; one focused on
    short-term electoral political gain, with little thought for
    longer-term consequences. We should not expect significant
    changes in the GOA's foreign policy or GOA public statements
    in support of the U.S. Nor is Kirchner likely to change many
    of his interventionist economic tendencies. All of this is
    especially true in an election year. But on most of the key
    bilateral and multilateral issues important to the U.S., in
    fact, we believe we can continue to build strong cooperation
    in a quiet, deliberate way.
    WAYNE

`