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### Viewing cable 06PARIS1681, SARKOZY ADVISOR ON FIRST EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, END

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06PARIS1681 | 2006-03-16 15:03 | 2010-11-30 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris

`

    VZCZCXRO1418
    PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
    DE RUEHFR #1681/01 0751531
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 161531Z MAR 06
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5250
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001681

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
    TAGS: PGOV ELAB PREL FR SOCI PINR EUN
    SUBJECT: SARKOZY ADVISOR ON FIRST EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, END
    OF VILLEPIN'S PRESIDENTIAL CHANCES

    REF: PARIS 953

    Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Former Industry Minister and close Sarkozy
    advisor Patrick Devedjian predicted March 15 that student and
    labor union opposition to the First Employment Contract (CPE)
    was spreading and might yet become a major test for the
    government. In any event, he believed that PM de Villepin
    was finished as a potential presidential candidate.
    Devedjian blamed the current impasse squarely on Villepin's
    impetuousness and autocratic methods, which, while leaving
    the governing party (and Sarkozy) no choice but to support
    him publicly, had given the opposition Socialist Party a
    potent rallying call for coalescing against the government.
    He thought it possible but not likely that Villepin would be
    replaced, but ruled out a Sarkozy prime ministership as
    "suicidal." Devedjian nonetheless judged that knowledge of
    Sarkozy's "differences" with President Chirac and Villepin,
    despite his official support for the government, would spare
    him most of the electorate's wrath and leave him well
    positioned to win the 2007 party nomination and presidential
    elections. Devedjian saw Segolene Royal as the opponent to
    be most feared on the left, although he thought she might
    self-destruct if nominated by the PS, and believed that the
    PS would probably prevent her from winning its nomination in
    any case. Comment: Devedjian's views, reported here, are
    four parts hard analysis, one part wishful thinking. End
    comment and summary.

    ¶2. (U) Patrick Devedjian, former Industry Minister and close
    advisor to Interior Minister and UMP President Nicolas
    Sarkozy, met March 15 with Embassy reps from the U.S., the
    UK, Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain and Russia to discuss the
    state of play with respect to the First Employment Contract
    (CPE) and its impact on the current government under PM de
    Villepin, as well as the line-up for the 2007 presidential
    elections.

    CPE and spreading unrest
    ------------------------
    ¶3. (C) Devedjian described growing public opposition to the
    First Employment Contract (CPE) and declared he "was not
    optimistic" for the future, even if there was some hope that
    unemployment figures would begin to improve again. He
    predicted a turbulent period ahead -- beginning with the
    large demonstration planned for March 18 -- which would last
    at least one and one-half to two months, and judged that the
    government's only real option would be to try to ride out the
    storm in the hope that public opinion would eventually turn
    against the protesters. Although the government had promised
    a few amendments to the law to appease public opinion and was
    now expressing a willingness to engage in dialogue, Devedjian
    expressed concern that the manner in which the government had
    proceeded had resulted in uniting, or in his word,
    "coagulating," its adversaries. He concluded that
    developments had now moved "beyond the CPE."

    More important than unrest in suburbs
    -------------------------------------
    ¶4. (C) Devedjian noted ironically that the students
    currently protesting against the CPE were relatively
    privileged and much more likely to find jobs than the
    uneducated and unemployed youths in the suburbs whom the CPE
    was intended to help. He saw nothing particularly unusual
    about this state of affairs, saying this was what always
    happened in France. He termed the November unrest in the
    suburbs "a revolt without a message" (sans discours),
    concluding that it was primarily a cultural revolt by
    third-generation immigrants. At the same time, he argued
    against multiculturalism, saying that the real problem lay in
    France's failure to inculcate adequately French culture and
    values into these unemployed youths and in the government's
    long-time policy of effectively ghettoizing immigrant
    populations in lieu of dispersing them throughout French
    society. He called for some kind of affirmative action and
    stressed the importance of demonstrating visibly that members
    of a minority can make it to the top. In sum, he did not
    appear to take last fall's suburban violence all that
    seriously. While the images of the unrest were spectacular,
    he said, they had little real (political) import.

    Villepin to blame
    -----------------
    ¶5. (C) Devedjian viewed Villepin's impetuous personality and
    autocratic style as largely responsible for the current
    impasse. Villepin's decision, during the recent debate in
    the National Assembly, to let other ministers respond to
    hostile questioning and distance himself personally from the
    CPE would not succeed in attenuating this perception.
    Devedjian blamed Villepin for his refusal to engage in
    dialogue with the labor unions before proceeding -- in

    PARIS 00001681 002 OF 003

    particular with the generally pro-reform-minded CFDT that had
    supported Raffarin's pension reforms, and which had now
    turned against him. He criticized Villepin for repeating
    Balladur's mistake of 1994 of singling out one specific
    segment of the French public for reform, which to the French
    electorate smacked of discrimination and violated the
    principle of equality. Devedjian especially castigated
    Villepin's recourse to article 49.3 of the constitution to
    put a stop to parliamentary debate as "very dangerous" and a
    blow to the strength of democratic institutions. He decried
    France's "monarchical mentality," which viewed decisions in
    terms of decrees and offered solutions before discussing the
    questions.

    UMP trapped, but Villepin finished
    ----------------------------------
    ¶6. (C) Devedjian described a UMP trapped by Villepin --
    forced to support him on the CPE without enthusiasm because
    it was obligated to support the government. He believed that
    the government, having closed the doors to dialogue, no
    longer had any escape paths. Villepin's decision not to
    allow the opposition to debate the issue in parliament, if
    only as a venting exercise, had ineluctably moved the debate
    into the streets. Devedjian judged that the current unrest
    would spell the death knell for Villepin's presidential
    aspirations. If things got bad enough, he held out the
    possibility that Chirac would have to appoint a new prime
    minister, probably either Defense Minister Michele
    Alliot-Marie or Employment and Social Cohesion Minister
    Jean-Louis Borloo, while judging in the end that Chirac would
    probably stick with Villepin. Devedjian firmly ruled out the
    possibility of Sarkozy accepting the job as prime minister,
    which he said would be "suicidal." He did not believe that
    President Chirac would withdraw the law and suffer yet
    another loss of face. But whether the CPE remains or is
    jettisoned, Devedjian concluded, this would be the last
    reform pushed through by the current government.

    Socialists smell blood
    ----------------------
    ¶7. (C) Devedjian said that the Socialist Party (PS) had now
    smelled blood and had come to the conclusion that its views,
    and not those of the governing party, were more
    representative of a majority of the French electorate.
    Moreover, this was the latest in a string of setbacks that
    included, inter alia, the failed referendum on the EU
    constitutional treaty, growing opprobrium directed against
    Chirac, and the recent wave of social unrest in the suburbs.
    Sarkozy, he asserted, was the best positioned to overcome
    this alienation, since the public and press largely
    understood that he supported the government but was different
    from it (solidaire mais different). This would remain so
    despite efforts by PS presidential hopeful Dominique
    Strauss-Kahn to paint Villepin and Sarkozy with the same
    brush.

    Sarkozy still the one to beat
    -----------------------------
    ¶8. (C) Devedjian expressed certainty that Sarkozy would be
    nominated to represent the governing party during the first
    round of the 2007 presidential elections, and that he would
    fare well enough to be one of two candidates in the second
    round. He judged that Sarkozy's law-and-order reputation
    would ensure that most far-right National Front (FN)
    supporters would vote for Sarkozy in the second round, adding
    that the FN would die out with the passing from the scene of
    Le Pen. Devedjian acknowledged that Sarkozy, having first
    consolidated his right wing, would need to do more to attract
    centrist voters. He argued there was still time for this,
    noting that Sarkozy had already come up with a number of
    proposals that one normally would have expected to originate
    on the left, for instance that immigrant permanent residents
    be allowed to vote in municipal elections.

    Segolene Royal the best on the left
    -----------------------------------
    ¶9. (C) Asked whom he feared most among the Socialist
    candidates, Devedjian named Segolene Royal, citing the
    difficulty of running against an "image". (Comment:
    Throughout the discussion, Devedjian stressed the importance
    of running on projects for the future rather than past
    accomplishments; no one, he said, won elections out of
    gratitude for what they had done. Jospin, despite his record
    of reducing unemployment, was proof of that. End comment.)
    Fortunately, he said only half in jest, the PS would likely
    refuse her the nomination and thereby spare Sarkozy the need
    to defeat her himself ("they will take care of her for us").
    Devedjian said her candidacy could fall apart if she
    continued to commit gaffes such as calling on regional
    leaders to block government subsidies to mayors who apply the
    CPE, which was against the law. Also making fun of her
    repeatedly expressed admiration for British PM Tony Blair,

    PARIS 00001681 003 OF 003

    Devedjian judged that Royal, known for her support for family
    values and the work ethic, tended "to demobilize" the
    far-left, which would hurt her chances in the second round,
    since Communist Party supporters would not vote for her.
    (Note: Devedjian said that, to win, a party has to mobilize
    its own voters and demobilize those of the opposition.)
    Asked who would be the candidate if Royal did not run,
    Devedjian named former PM Lionel Jospin. But he predicted
    that Jospin's age and history would tend to work against him.
    (Comment: By contrast, Socialists often predict that voters
    will react "with nervousness" to the super-charged Sarkozy
    and gravitate toward a more reassuring figure. End comment.)

    Sarkozy's plans if elected
    --------------------------
    ¶10. (C) Asked whether Sarkozy, if elected, would attempt to
    push through a whole series of ambitious reforms in the early
    months of his office, before French opposition to change
    blocks further reforms, Devedjian said this would not be the
    case. The one exception would be the judiciary, where he saw
    a need for deep-reaching changes. He said he was also
    interested in changing the constitution to abolish article
    49.3 and reduce or abolish the possibilities for censure of
    dissolution or the parliament. He believed a move to either
    a more presidential (with the U.S. as model) or parliamentary
    system (as in the UK) could be accomplished by amending the
    existing constitution.

    Devedjian's plans
    -----------------
    ¶11. (SBU) Devedjian said he would expect to be a part of a
    Sarkozy government, but he refused to speculate in what
    capacity, although he subsequently launched into a discussion
    of needed judicial reforms. (Note: Pundits predict Sarkozy
    would name him as Justice Minister.) In departing, he
    recalled warmly his February 3 meeting with EUR PDAS Volker
    and Pol M/C (reftel).

    Comment
    -------
    ¶12. (C) Devedjian was friendly and animated, and in no hurry
    to leave. Sarkozy's circle has come to the conclusion that
    Villepin is now effectively finished as a potential
    presidential candidate, even though this clearly also
    represents wishful thinking on their part. Noteworthy was
    Devedjian's judgment that the CPE may yet prove to be a major
    test for the government, which contradicts the perception of
    many that opposition to the CPE has not reached crisis
    proportions. We'll know more following the March 18
    demonstrations.

    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

    Stapleton

`