Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 3891 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone
Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF AR ASEC AORC AG AEMR AJ AMGT ACOA AEC AO AE AU AFIN AX AMED ADCO AODE APER AFFAIRS AC AS AM AL ASIG ABLD ABUD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AGMT ATRN
BL BR BM BE BO BH BTIO BEXP BU BIDEN BK BY BA BG BF BB BC BBSR BRUSSELS BILAT BX
CAN CVIS CH CASC CJAN CLINTON CO COUNTER CI CU CIS CA CBW CF CM CMGT CN CE CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CG CS CD CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CDG CJUS CARSON COUNTERTERRORISM CIA CACM CDB CV
DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DJ DISENGAGEMENT DS DOD DEAX
ECON EFIN ETTC EUN ENVR EAIR ENRG ES EIND EINV EAGR ETRD ELAB EAID EPET EU ECPS EG ECA EWWT ER EINT EMIN ELTN EFIS EI EN EC EXTERNAL ECIN EINVETC ENIV EZ EINN ENGR EUR ET ESA ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FJ FMLN FINR
GG GH GM GV GT GE GR GTIP GOI GCC GAZA GZ GA GTMO
HILLARY HUMAN HO HA HYMPSK HR HU HURI HK
IR IZ ID IN IT IC IIP IS IAEA ITPHUM IV IPR IWC IQ IO ICTY ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC ICAO IMO IF ILC IEFIN INRB INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF ITALY ITALIAN INTERPOL IRAJ INRA INRO
JA JOSEPH JO JP JOHNNIE JUS JAMES
KCOR KCRM KDEM KPAO KISL KVPR KPAL KACT KTFN KNNP KJUS KS KN KHLS KGHG KSCA KV KZ KDEV KIPR KIRF KWMN KDRG KGIC KRAD KE KSPR KG KTIA KHIV KWBG KPRP KU KAWC KOLY KCIP KCFE KOCI KMDR KPKO KTDB KMRS KFRD KTIP KLIG KBCT KICC KMCA KGIT KSTC KUNR KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KOMC KAWK KO KTER KSUM KHUM KRFD KBIO KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KMPI KHDP KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFIN KTBT KCRS KRVC KR KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KGCC KPIN KNUC KPLS KIRC KCOM
LG LY LE LH LI LU LO LOG LT
MARR MOPS MASS MCAP MO MNUC ML MTCRE MK MTRE MX MU MP MA MY MIL MDC MTCR MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MR MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MPOS MZ MEPP MOPPS MAPP MG MASC MCC
NI NL NATO NPT NE NS NAR NO NIPP NZ NU NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NG NGO NATIONAL
OIIP OVIP ODIP OTRA OSCE OPRC OAS OFDP OREP OPIC OPDC OEXC OECD OPCW OSCI OTR OVP OFFICIALS OSAC
PGOV PREL PTER PK PINR PHUM PARM PINS PL PBTS PARMS PREF PHSA PROP PE PO PA PM PMIL PTERE POL PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PNAT PROV PEL POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PSOE PU POLITICAL PARTIES PBIO PECON POGOV PINL PKFK PGOF
QA
RU RS RP RIGHTS RW RICE RO ROBERT RF RFE REGION
SNAR SP SL SOCI SENV SCUL SF SN SW SA SY SMIG SHUM SR SO SZ SU SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI STEINBERG SG
TI TU TH TT TW TIP TERRORISM TSPA TO TBIO TX TFIN TD TRGY TSPL TZ TPHY TS TK TNGD TC TR
UK UN UNSC UP UNGA UZ UY UE UNESCO UAE UNO UNEP UG US USTR UNHCR UNMIK UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS UNAUS USUN USEU UV
VT VE VM VZ VTPREL VN
WI WMO WTRO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WTO WA
XC XY XH XM XA XL XF XZ XW XR XG XT XD XS XK
YM YI YE
ZI ZP ZK ZF ZB ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU ZA

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 10THEHAGUE114, NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: A REDUCED ROLE LIKELY BUT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10THEHAGUE114.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10THEHAGUE114 | 2010-02-24 13:01 | 2011-01-17 00:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy The Hague

`

    VZCZCXRO2029
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
    DE RUEHTC #0114/01 0551330
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 241330Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3800
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0442
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000114

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020
    TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO AF NL
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: A REDUCED ROLE LIKELY BUT
    DETAILS WILL NOT COME QUICKLY

    REF: A. THE HAGUE 109
       ...

    250450,2/24/2010 13:30,10THEHAGUE114,"Embassy The
    Hague",SECRET//NOFORN,09THEHAGUE759|10THEHAGUE108|10THEHAGUE10
    9|10THEHAGUE97,"VZCZCXRO2029
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
    DE RUEHTC #0114/01 0551330
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 241330Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3800
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0442
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE
    HAGUE 000114
    NOFORN
    SIPDIS
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020
    TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO AF NL
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: A REDUCED ROLE LIKELY BUT
    DETAILS WILL NOT COME QUICKLY
    REF: A. THE HAGUE 109
    ¶B. THE HAGUE 108
    ¶C. THE HAGUE 097
    ¶D. 09 THE HAGUE 759
    Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Edwin R. Nolan for reasons 1.4 (
    b) and (d).
    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The most immediate result of the February 20
    collapse of the Dutch government (reftel B) is the absence of
    a cabinet decision on post-2010 commitments to
    ISAF/Afghanistan. In that absence, the default position,
    withdrawal of Task Force Uruzgan by December 2010, stands.
    It will likely be mid-March before the scope of authority of
    the interim ""caretaker"" government is known. At best, it
    will have limited decision-making capability on existing
    mandates regarding Afghanistan. This will compel Dutch
    forces to redeploy from Uruzgan beginning in August 2010.
    While there may be political support for some commitment in
    Afghanistan, there is no possibility of an extension as lead
    nation of Task Force Uruzgan. The earliest possible
    designation of a follow-on lead of Task Force Uruzgan will
    provide the Dutch a partner for developing realistic joint
    capabilities. Post recommends giving the Dutch time and
    political space to develop consensus on their way ahead in
    Afghanistan. We will look for opportunities over the coming
    weeks to discreetly express our hopes for continued
    meaningful Dutch military involvement in Afghanistan.
    However, we need to remain cognizant of the fact that,
    although the caretaker government favors an Uruzgan
    extension, it is a minority government with highly limited
    authority. We must be highly circumspect in becoming
    involved in what could be an emotional election issue in the
    coming months leading up to the June 9 parliamentary
    election. END SUMMARY.
    TOO SOON TO CALL ""NO DECISION""
    ------------------------------
    ¶2. (S/NF) It is too soon to assume there will be a government
    decision on Afghanistan, in part or in total, that will
    result in a continued significant Dutch commitment. There
    has been Christian Democrat (CDA)/PM Balkenende political
    support for a commitment to Afghanistan, with the only
    questions being types of missions, locations, and what, if
    any, troop levels. There is no/no majority support for a
    continuation of the mission in Uruzgan, and public opinion is
    decidedly negative. On February 23, the Queen accepted the
    resignation of all Labor Party ministers and asked the Prime
    Minister to closely consult with parliament on &whether
    there is support for subjects that cannot bear delay.8 Once
    these consultations are complete, we will have more clarity
    on what types of decisions the caretaker government will be
    able to make. National parliamentary elections are scheduled
    for June 9. The formation of a new coalition government
    likely will take between two and nine months thereafter. The
    Dutch cabinet and parliament likely will prefer to put off
    some controversial decisions regarding ISAF/Afghanistan until
    after the new coalition government is formed. However,
    decisions on Afghanistan will influence what coalition can be
    formed, as the coalition platform must be pre-agreed. Any
    continued Dutch military mission in Uruzgan is virtually
    certain to be among those issues deferred, according to Karl
    van Oosterom, Senior Advisor to the PM. Meanwhile, other
    Qvan Oosterom, Senior Advisor to the PM. Meanwhile, other
    Afghanistan issues might be included in the list of subjects
    that the Prime Minister and parliament agree &cannot bear
    delay8 and need to be decided earlier by the caretaker
    government. In that case, the caretaker government will need
    to secure an ad hoc majority in parliament on each issue.
    PARAMETERS OF EXPECTED COMMITMENTS
    ----------------------------------
    ¶3. (S/NF) Regardless of the fact that no decision has been
    taken, the realities of the Dutch political landscape,
    coupled with the limitations of the Dutch military, provides
    a narrow range of possibilities regarding a future
    commitment. The Dutch can be expected to provide training
    through Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT), Police
    Mentoring Teams (PMT), F-16 aircraft, intelligence elements,
    headquarters staff elements, and development funding. The
    commitment of assets to Uruzgan province, re-deployment of
    THE HAGUE 00000114 002 OF 002
    the Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) to another
    province, or a significant commitment of troops (400 to 700)
    to another mission will be the focus of the post-2010
    decision. Although there has been support from opposition
    parties to keep the PRT in Uruzgan with enablers and force
    protection, there has not been support to extend as lead
    nation of the Task Force, nor to extend a commitment for a
    battle group. And, during the pre-election campaign period,
    previous expressions of support could be modified or limited.
    At best, there is a possibility, albeit slim, the Dutch will
    keep their PRT in Uruzgan with a significant force protection
    element of approximately 500 troops. Karel van Oosterom,
    Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister, told the DCM February
    20 that senior officials will be making ""discreet contacts""
    with the USG and NATO on viable options that can demonstrate
    a strong Dutch commitment to ISAF/Afghanistan.
    PRACTICALITIES OF CURRENT MANDATE
    ---------------------------------
    ¶4. (C) The Dutch military will carry out their mission in
    accordance with the current mandate. Although there is some
    ambiguity, the mandate calls for the re-deployment of Task
    Force Uruzgan beginning August 1, 2010, with completion by
    December 1. The Head of Team Uruzgan at the Ministry of
    Foreign Affairs told POLMILOFF February 23 that although the
    military has well-laid plans for re-deployment, the Chief of
    Defense (CHOD) has indicated he is well aware of the fluidity
    of the current situation and can adjust at any time to comply
    with a change in tasking.
    COMMENT
    -------
    ¶5. (S/NF) COMMENT: The state of play within the Dutch
    government will be unpredictable in the near term, with
    consultations between the caretaker government and parliament
    culminating in an agreed-upon scope of authority for the
    interim government. Post believes it best to wait for these
    initial decisions before speculating on future Dutch
    commitments to ISAF/Afghanistan and recommending specific
    courses of actions that may be irrelevant or unhelpful if
    taken too soon. Post emphasizes that it will be virtually
    impossible to solicit a Dutch commitment to extend their lead
    of Task Force Uruzgan beyond the current mandate. The
    earlier a Task Force Uruzgan lead nation successor is
    announced, the greater the likelihood of obtaining any
    substantial commitment by the Dutch to partner in Uruzgan.
    Nonetheless, we must caution against any optimism that a
    Dutch mission in Uruzgan can be expected. With a caretaker
    government in place consisting of only Christian Democrats
    (CDA) and Christian Union (CU) Ministers, official voices are
    likely to be telling us what we want to hear. If in fact the
    June elections enable a new center-right coalition to be
    formed under PM Balkenende, new opportunities may open.
    However, a Labor party victory with some type of center-left
    coalition minus Balkenende, or even a broad centrist
    coalition, is likely to allow only very modest Dutch
    contributions. Accordingly, we believe, it would be
    ill-advised for NATO planning to count on any Dutch military
    presence in Uruzgan beyond December 2010. (Note: The
    re-election of Balkenende as CDA party leader (in hope of a
    Qre-election of Balkenende as CDA party leader (in hope of a
    continuation of him as Prime Minister) has been viewed by
    some political observers as compromising the CDA's prospects
    in the upcoming Parliamentary election End Note)
    ¶6. (S/NF) For the immediate future, the Dutch should be given
    time and political space to develop a consensus on
    Afghanistan in this new environment. We should also refrain
    from commenting publicly, unless asked to do so by the Dutch
    themselves. The Dutch are intensely sensitive to perceptions
    of outside meddling, and we must be discreet but clear in
    approaching the interim government as well as relevant
    political parties that will likely play a role in the future
    government. We should be cautious that our approach does not
    provide fodder for more radical elements of the Dutch
    political scene, but we will actively engage across the
    political spectrum for continued meaningful Dutch involvement
    in Afghanistan. END COMMENT.
    LEVIN

`