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### Viewing cable 07THEHAGUE1295, NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: EXTENSION REVIEW

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07THEHAGUE1295 | 2007-07-05 16:04 | 2011-01-17 00:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy The Hague

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHTC #1295/01 1861617
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 051617Z JUL 07
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9745
    INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2662
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0283
    RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEAFVS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001295

    SIPDIS

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR SCA, EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2017
    TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: EXTENSION REVIEW
    OFFICIALLY BEGINS

    Classified By: Am...

    "
    114457,7/5/2007 16:17,07THEHAGUE1295,"Embassy The
    Hague",SECRET//NOFORN,,"VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB
    DE RUEHTC #1295/01 1861617
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 051617Z JUL 07
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9745
    INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2662
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0283
    RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEAFVS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    ","S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001295
    SIPDIS
    NOFORN
    SIPDIS
    STATE FOR SCA, EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2017
    TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: EXTENSION REVIEW
    OFFICIALLY BEGINS
    Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
    ¶1. (C) Summary: The GONL sent a letter to the Dutch
    Parliament on June 30 noting it will decide this summer
    whether to extend its ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The
    decision will follow an exhaustive review of all options,
    including staying in the mission's current capacity, reducing
    its contribution or moving to another location, or even
    withdrawing altogether. Cabinet officials have stressed that
    ""all options are on the table,"" while public statements by
    Defense Minister Eimert van Middelkoop in favor of remaining
    in some capacity may have tipped the hand of the GONL and
    temporarily unsettled the political process. Dutch officials
    are cautiously optimistic that the conditions are in place to
    arrive at a positive extension decision, but stress that
    sequencing is vital: first the review of options, then
    consultations with Allies, followed by a decision and
    subsequent debate with Parliament. End summary.
    Important First Step
    --------------------
    ¶2. (C) Following its June 29 meeting, the Dutch Cabinet sent
    a letter to Parliament stating that the GONL will decide this
    summer whether it will extend its ISAF mission in Afghanistan
    beyond August 2008, and if so, in what capacity. The letter
    notes that the Cabinet will investigate the ""options and
    desirability of continuing to make a contribution"" to ISAF.
    The review will be conducted in accordance with the set
    criteria required for parliamentary consent prior to
    deploying Dutch troops abroad (""toetsingskader""). The letter
    formally begins the Article 100 process -- more importantly,
    it means the GONL can formally solicit contributions from
    other NATO Allies to team with the Dutch in Uruzgan province.
    ¶3. (S) In a July 2 meeting with Ambassador Arnall, Pieter de
    Gooijer (MFA Director General for Political Affairs)
    confirmed that issuing the letter represents an important
    step toward a possible extension. Although, for political
    reasons, the GONL remains restricted from expressing support
    for a particular option, de Gooijer said it ""was fair to say""
    that the Cabinet appears to be quietly moving in that
    direction. He stressed, however, that there is not yet a
    firm consensus within the Cabinet, and some members are still
    holding out for significant concessions (e.g., more money for
    Defense, a significant mission in Africa for Development).
    De Gooijer noted that the six key ministers (the Prime
    Minister, two Deputy Prime Ministers, and the ministers of
    Foreign Affairs, Development and Defense) will meet on July
    12 to consider next steps and hopefully steer the process in
    a positive direction.
    One Step Beyond
    ---------------
    ¶4. (C) Following the June 29 Cabinet meeting, Cabinet
    ministers emphasized to the press that ""all options were
    currently on the table,"" and that the GONL would decide
    whether to extend once the review of options had been fully
    completed. During one of the press interviews, however,
    Defense Minister van Middelkoop seemingly tipped the hand of
    the GONL by noting that ""the political intention is to stay,
    be it in a more modest form."" He explained that other Allies
    should take more responsibility, and that some tasks could be
    phased out to Allies, thereby leading to a trimmed-down Dutch
    extension. Van Middelkoop acknowledged that ending the
    mission was an option, but ""the intention is to continue in
    some form.""
    ¶5. (C) Van Middelkoop's remarks prompted a firestorm of
    criticism from both supporters and critics of the current
    mission. Supporters lamented that van Middelkoop hamstrung
    the extension review before it started as critics will argue
    that any such review will be subjective in nature as the GONL
    attempts to achieve van Middelkoop's stated desire to remain
    in Uruzgan. Critics worried that van Middelkoop's remarks
    might send the wrong signal to NATO and Washington, thereby
    lifting them off the hook by telling them it was not
    necessary for military planners to initiate contingencies
    should the Dutch opt not to extend.
    ¶6. (C) Following van Middelkoop's remarks, Prime Minister
    Balkenende clarified the GONL ""official position"" -- the
    Dutch will investigate whether to continue, and if so, ""how
    and in what way."" But in no sense had the GONL made any
    decision on an extension. He emphasized that ""matters should
    be done in the right order,"" and declined to acknowledge any
    current political intention to extend. Balkenende added that
    the decision should be made with careful consideration of all
    arguments -- ""all options remain on the table."" He said the
    GONL's decision would be made this summer, perhaps as late as
    September, following a ""very intensive process.""
    ... And a Step Backwards
    ------------------------
    ¶7. (C) Van Middelkoop began the July 2 parliamentary hearing
    on Afghanistan by backtracking on his earlier comments. He
    characterized his remarks as a ""slip of the tongue,"" and
    emphasized that the GONL would first review all options prior
    to making any decision to extend. Van Middelkoop reiterated
    this clarified position on July 3 in a meeting with
    Ambassador Arnall. He stressed that ""all options were on the
    table"" and that his suggestion that the Dutch remain in a
    limited capacity was ""a mistake,"" and not a case of ""being
    too honest."" Van Middelkoop said his remarks required an
    apology to Parliament, for which he was ""beaten up for 15
    minutes,"" and then the Afghanistan debate continued as it had
    previously.
    ¶8. (C) In his meeting with Ambassador Arnall, van Middelkoop
    commented on the Dutch participation in heavy fighting around
    Chora in the previous few weeks. He said the Dutch had been
    ""very lucky"" that the Dutch commander on the ground had made
    the right tactical decision to stay and fight. Van
    Middelkoop also praised the Afghan security forces, noting
    that they had ""fought well."" He said there was still some
    fighting and instability in the region, which was one of the
    major reasons why he was visiting Afghanistan on July 5-6.
    ¶9. (C) Van Middelkoop also commented on prospects of
    persuading the Dutch Parliament to support an extension. He
    said part of his challenge with Parliament involves the
    position of his predecessor and current parliamentary member
    Henk Kamp, who has adamantly stated that the Dutch deployment
    in Uruzgan should last for two years, and ""only two years.""
    In order to overcome Kamp and others, van Middelkoop said the
    GONL must present sound arguments -- ""the military,
    political, and financial lines of reasoning all must be
    convincing."" Ambassador Arnall commented that van Middelkoop
    has more flexibility on the ground than Kamp, to which the
    Defense Minister smiled.
    ¶10. (C) Officially, the GONL does not yet have an opinion on
    any particular option. But in private, van Middelkoop said
    the best option to extend in Afghanistan probably involves a
    more modest contribution with the support of additional
    partners. He characterized the partnership with Australia as
    good, but said more help was needed from other Allies in
    order to convince Parliament. He said the next step was for
    he and Foreign Minister Verhagen to travel to NATO and make
    the case for additional assistance. He assessed the
    political situation on a possible extension as typical
    ""coalition politics,"" and repeated previously made remarks
    that ""we are still in the fog"" regarding an extension, ""but
    we are moving in the right direction.""
    Parliamentary Hearing
    ---------------------
    ¶11. (C) In a three hour parliamentary session o July 2,
    parliamentarians from both sides of thepolitical spectrum
    raised concerns regarding the heavy fighting around Chora and
    subsequent civilian casualties. They initially lambasted van
    Middelkoop for his comments regarding the political intent to
    extend, but later seemed to accept his apology.
    Parliamentarians from the left, including Socialist Harry van
    Bommel and Green Left Mariko Peters, said van Middelkoop's
    comments will send NATO and Washington the ""wrong signal,""
    especially as NATO is ""responsible"" for finding an Ally to
    replace the Netherlands -- ""now NATO will think that the
    Dutch will extend and plans to replace us will not commence,""
    said van Bommel.
    ¶12. (C) No new arguments were raised during the hearing.
    While all members of the parliamentary foreign affairs
    committee raised concerns about civilian casualties, all
    comments made were reasoned and emotionally restrained. Both
    Verhagen and van Middelkoop noted four on-going
    investigations (the Dutch military, the UN, ISAF, and Human
    Rights Watch) following the fighting in Chora, and promised
    to deliver results of the investigations as soon as they
    become available. Separately, MFA Task Force Uruzgan
    Coordinator Pieter Jan Kleiweg de Zwaan told emboffs July 3
    that they expect the Dutch military investigation to be
    completed on or around July 10. Privately Kleiweg was
    worried that the investigations might contradict one another,
    further muddling an already confusing situation.
    ¶13. (C) Other concerns voiced by parliamentarians included
    the cost of the deployment, poppy eradication, and relations
    with Pakistan. Both Verhagen and van Middelkoop said it was
    ""too simplistic"" to classify the Dutch deployment as either a
    military or reconstruction mission -- both are necessary in
    order to be successful. Verhagen argued that intense
    fighting in Chora did not mean that reconstruction in Uruzgan
    was impossible. Development Minister Koenders began to lay
    the foundation necessary to make the argument later in the
    summer and fall that reconstruction was not only possible,
    but in fact working in Uruzgan. In response to a question
    from Labor Party (PvdA) spokesperson Angelien Eijsink, van
    Middelkoop refuted claims made in the Dutch periodical
    Elsevier that the Dutch military had released a senior
    Taliban leader. He explained that Afghan authorities had
    initially made the arrest, and the Dutch offered to hold the
    individual briefly before returning him to Afghan
    authorities.
    Government Strategy
    -------------------
    ¶14. (S) While cautiously optimistic, the working level
    continues to emphasize PM Balkenende's message that the GONL
    ""check all the boxes"" during its review prior to making an
    official extension decision. Kleiweg told emboffs July 2
    that the six ministers most responsible for making a decision
    to extend (Balkenende and Verhagen from the Christian
    Democratic Alliance, Deputy Minister/Finance Minister Bos and
    Koenders from the Labor Party, and Deputy Minister/Minister
    for Youth and Family Affairs Rouvoet and van Middelkoop from
    the Christian Union) have already met on several occasions,
    and dynamics among the ministers are ""good."" Kleiweg
    characterized the ministers as ""moving in the right
    direction,"" and deflected suggestions that Finance Minister
    Bos might be problematic. He said ""The Six"" will meet again
    on July 12 prior to the summer break to discuss various
    extension options.
    ¶15. (C) Kleiweg noted that the Dutch have yet to formally
    solicit contributions from other NATO Allies to any Dutch
    etension in Uruzgan. He said the GONL first will idntify
    options and possible tasks that could be flled by others
    prior to approaching Allies. Kleweg acknowledged that the
    Dutch are ""picky"" whenit comes to the question of which
    Allies to apprach -- any potential partner has to ""speak the
    sae language"" and possess a ""similar outlook"" when i comes
    to reconstution efforts. He also noteda certain
    reluctance on the part of the Dutch miitary to incorporate
    elements from yet another mlitary -- but such hesitancy will
    need to be overome should the review determine the best
    chance f an extension involves teaming with another Ally.
    ¶16. (C) Once tasks and partners are identified,Kleiweg said
    the USG and SACEUR could be helpful in persuading these
    Allies to team with the Dutch -- provided the government opts
    for an extension. When asked about possibly teaming with
    U.S. forces, Kleiweg said the Dutch ""have no problem"" with
    U.S. forces under ISAF command. He noted, however, that
    OEF/ISAF deconfliction continues to be a sensitive issue in
    the Netherlands, especially as the dividing line between the
    two becomes more blurry.
    ¶17. (C) Low public support for both the current mission and
    any extension continues to be a problem. Kleiweg said the
    GONL is looking at respected ""international voices"" to enlist
    to try and influence public opinion. He noted that the GONL
    had arranged through NATO the visit of several Afghan
    parliamentarians to the Netherlands. While the trip was a
    success, Dutch and Afghan media considered the visit ""NATO
    propaganda,"" Kleiweg said. He noted that the individual with
    the most power to change Dutch public opinion was Afghan
    President Karzai, but acknowledged even that might have
    changed in recent weeks given Karzai's criticism of the Dutch
    military action in Chora. Kleiweg said Karzai intends to
    visit the Netherlands in December -- ""hopefully long after
    the Dutch have made a decision on extending,"" he added.
    Uruzgan Gov. Monib might be another option, although Kleiweg
    said GONL relations with Monib are no longer that strong as
    Monib appears more interested in events in Kabul than in
    Uruzgan, while Monib's travel ban remains problematic. Other
    international respected voices might include individuals such
    as UN SYG Ban Ki-Moon, Kleiweg said.
    Detention Policy
    ----------------
    ¶18. (C) Kleiweg told emboffs July 3 that the GONL has
    circulated a draft letter among RC-South contributing nations
    to the Afghan government requesting greater access for the
    Afghan Independent Human Rights Council to detainees held in
    Afghan prisons. The draft letter was an action item derived
    from the latest RC-South conference held in The Hague in June
    ¶2007. According to Kleiweg, the GONL, as well as the
    governments of Canada, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and
    Australia have all approved the draft letter. He inquired if
    the USG had reviewed the letter and had any comments; emboffs
    said they would check with Washington.
    Inter-Governmental Dynamics
    ---------------------------
    ¶19. (S//NOFORN) Working level contacts describe the
    relationship between Verhagen and Koenders as ""contentious
    but not outright hostile."" Instead of direct confrontation,
    the two often wage battles through their staffs at the
    working level, said MFA Security Affairs Chief Robert de
    Groot. That said, when the two ministers agree, the
    resulting decision has added weight and is often ""ironclad.""
    Van Middelkoop is described as ""the third wheel,"" or the
    ""inexperienced junior partner"" by working level contacts.
    While substantively knowledgeable, his inexperience in the
    government is obvious, and he often defers to Verhagen and
    Koenders.
    ¶20. (S//NOFORN) According to working level contacts, Koenders
    has a ""voracious apetite"" for information on Afghanistan --
    ""he want to know how many grains of sand are in Uruzgan,""
    said Kleiweg. While he has an almost equal statu to
    Verhagen on Afghanistan behind closed doors,Koenders resents
    being viewed as subordinate to he other two ministers in
    public. ""He cannot stad waiting for two hours to speak
    during a parliaentary hearing, and then be restricted to
    only tn minutes of speaking time,"" said Task Force Deput
    Coordinator Dewi van de Weerde. Working level ontacts also
    describe him as incapable of making decision, which could
    play into extension consierations.
    Comment
    -------
    ¶21. (S) Van Middelkoop's comments -- while seemingly positive
    from our perspective -- temporarily unsettled the political
    debate on extending. Cabinet members were reportedly
    incensed by van Middelkoop's blunder, but his public mea
    culpa seems to have appeased naysayers in Parliament.
    Despite it, the GONL once again appears to be on the same
    page in its efforts to create the conditions necessary to
    arrive at a positive extension decision. There is a process
    -- an exhaustive review followed by consultations -- that
    must be followed in order for this to work, and Balkenende is
    shepherding it through. Finance Minister Bos could still
    prove problematic, but working level contacts suggest he will
    be reasonable. As the Dutch are fond of saying, ""do not
    disturb the brooding hen"" -- which we will no doubt hear
    often over the course of the summer and into the fall.
    ARNALL

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