Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 3889 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone
Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF AR ASEC AORC AG AEMR AJ AMGT ACOA AEC AO AE AU AFIN AX AMED ADCO AODE APER AFFAIRS AC AS AM AL ASIG ABLD ABUD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AGMT ATRN
BL BR BM BE BO BH BTIO BEXP BU BIDEN BK BY BA BG BF BB BC BBSR BRUSSELS BILAT BX
CAN CVIS CH CASC CJAN CLINTON CO COUNTER CI CU CIS CA CBW CF CM CMGT CN CE CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CG CS CD CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CDG CJUS CARSON COUNTERTERRORISM CIA CACM CDB CV
DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DJ DISENGAGEMENT DS DOD DEAX
ECON EFIN ETTC EUN ENVR EAIR ENRG ES EIND EINV EAGR ETRD ELAB EAID EPET EU ECPS EG ECA EWWT ER EINT EMIN ELTN EFIS EI EN EC EXTERNAL ECIN EINVETC ENIV EZ EINN ENGR EUR ET ESA ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FJ FMLN FINR
GG GH GM GV GT GE GR GTIP GOI GCC GAZA GZ GA GTMO
HILLARY HUMAN HO HA HYMPSK HR HU HURI HK
IR IZ ID IN IT IC IIP IS IAEA ITPHUM IV IPR IWC IQ IO ICTY ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC ICAO IMO IF ILC IEFIN INRB INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF ITALY ITALIAN INTERPOL IRAJ INRA INRO
JA JOSEPH JO JP JOHNNIE JUS JAMES
KCOR KCRM KDEM KPAO KISL KVPR KPAL KACT KTFN KNNP KJUS KS KN KHLS KGHG KSCA KV KZ KDEV KIPR KIRF KWMN KDRG KGIC KRAD KE KSPR KG KTIA KHIV KWBG KPRP KU KAWC KOLY KCIP KCFE KOCI KMDR KPKO KTDB KMRS KFRD KTIP KLIG KBCT KICC KMCA KGIT KSTC KUNR KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KOMC KAWK KO KTER KSUM KHUM KRFD KBIO KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KMPI KHDP KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFIN KTBT KCRS KRVC KR KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KGCC KPIN KNUC KPLS KIRC KCOM
LG LY LE LH LI LU LO LOG LT
MARR MOPS MASS MCAP MO MNUC ML MTCRE MK MTRE MX MU MP MA MY MIL MDC MTCR MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MR MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MPOS MZ MEPP MOPPS MAPP MG MASC MCC
NI NL NATO NPT NE NS NAR NO NIPP NZ NU NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NG NGO NATIONAL
OIIP OVIP ODIP OTRA OSCE OPRC OAS OFDP OREP OPIC OPDC OEXC OECD OPCW OSCI OTR OVP OFFICIALS OSAC
PGOV PREL PTER PK PINR PHUM PARM PINS PL PBTS PARMS PREF PHSA PROP PE PO PA PM PMIL PTERE POL PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PNAT PROV PEL POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PSOE PU POLITICAL PARTIES PBIO PECON POGOV PINL PKFK PGOF
QA
RU RS RP RIGHTS RW RICE RO ROBERT RF RFE REGION
SNAR SP SL SOCI SENV SCUL SF SN SW SA SY SMIG SHUM SR SO SZ SU SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI STEINBERG SG
TI TU TH TT TW TIP TERRORISM TSPA TO TBIO TX TFIN TD TRGY TSPL TZ TPHY TS TK TNGD TC TR
UK UN UNSC UP UNGA UZ UY UE UNESCO UAE UNO UNEP UG US USTR UNHCR UNMIK UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS UNAUS USUN USEU UV
VT VE VM VZ VTPREL VN
WI WMO WTRO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WTO WA
XC XY XH XM XA XL XF XZ XW XR XG XT XD XS XK
YM YI YE
ZI ZP ZK ZF ZB ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU ZA

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 06KABUL3719, PAG MAKES FIRST RECOMMENDATIONS TO PRESIDENT KARZAI

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KABUL3719.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06KABUL3719 | 2006-08-21 10:10 | 2011-01-23 19:07 | SECRET | Embassy Kabul

`

    VZCZCXRO5681
    OO RUEHDBU
    DE RUEHBUL #3719/01 2331018
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 211018Z AUG 06
    FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2019
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2761
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2909
    RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 6239
    RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 1588

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 KABUL 003719

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
    EUR/RPM
    STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
    NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
    OSD FOR BREZINSKI
    CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2016
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
    SUBJECT: PAG MAKES FIRST RECOMMENDATIONS TO PRESIDENT KARZAI

    REF: A. KABUL 3566

    ¶B. KABUL 3304
    ¶C. KABUL 3088

    Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

    ¶1. (S) Summary: The security situation in the south remains
    fragile, with an increasingly determined enemy operating
    freely in key areas according to a joint CFC, ISAF, GOA brief
    to President Karzai in a Policy Action Group (PAG) meeting on
    August 16. Wardak said that the enemy is succeeding in
    propaganda efforts that have convinced locals the GOA and
    ISAF are losing their will to fight. It was acknowledged
    that Operation Mountain Thrust had eliminated many
    insurgents, but these are primarily low-level recruits.
    Enemy strength is estimated at 7,000, vice a presence of
    9,000 ISAF and 4,300 ANSF in the south. To address this
    situation, the PAG approved ISAF's basic Afghan Development
    Zone (ADZ) concept combining ISAF and ANSF security with new
    development projects.

    ¶2. (S) The ADZ concept remains vague and will take time to
    launch depending on how long it will take to achieve a level
    of security sufficient for development projects to be
    executed in the provinces, and on how long it will take
    development money to flow. ISAF predicts development
    activity will begin in late August in Qalat, late September
    in Helmand and Uruzgan, and October in Kandahar. ISAF has
    committed to keeping key district centers secure even though
    they are outside the zones, and has promised to take the
    initiative in offensives against insurgent positions outside
    the zones. ISAF's concept depends on donors rapidly
    completing new development projects, but there is
    considerable skepticism about delivery before early 2007.
    Ambassador Neumann proposed that the GOA contribute
    unallocated funds in tandem with donors to show its resolve.
    The GOA responded by asking for a loosening of international
    procurement restrictions. President Karzai instructed that
    no one talk publicly about ADZ's either in Afghanistan or
    foreign capitals for now.

    ¶3. (S) All agreed that &auxiliary8 police forces could be
    used if clearly within the MOI chain of command. There is no
    donor commitment to fund the equipping of such forces.
    Karzai stated that the first priority must go to funding the
    training and equipping of the regular forces. More study of
    &auxiliary8 forces is ongoing. President Karzai said he
    would find the money himself within the GOA if necessary.
    End Summary.

    Worrisome Security Assessment in South
    --------------------------------------

    ¶4. (S) At the first PAG presentation to President Karzai, on
    August 16, Minister of Defense Wardak presented a blunt
    security assessment developed by the Policy Action Group's
    (PAG's) Security Operations Group (full text of report
    follows at end of cable). (Note: The text was coordinated
    among MOD, MOI, NDS, ISAF, CFC-A, CSTC-A, relevant Embassies,
    and the four southern governors. End note.) The security
    situation in the south remains fragile. Operation Mountain
    Thrust inflicted significant losses on insurgents, but
    primarily against low-level, easily replaced recruits. The
    Taliban campaign in outlying areas has convinced significant
    portions of the local population the GOA cannot deliver
    governance and that ISAF and international resolve are
    withering.

    ¶5. (S) The tempo of enemy operations has fallen since

    KABUL 00003719 002 OF 006

    mid-July with the exception of Kandahar, but ISAF and ANSF
    forces remain under attack, inhibiting efforts to improve
    governance and start new development activities. The
    analysis estimated that up to 7,000 Taliban fighters are
    active in the South. (Note: the number of hard-core Taliban
    is probably lower. End Note.) The quality and quantity of
    IED attacks has risen. The Taliban are becoming increasingly
    willing to defend key terrain with large sophisticated,
    well-armed groups of fighters. The Taliban have developed
    significant positions in Kandahar Province's Panjway, Zherai
    and Arghandab districts, as well as Northern and Southern
    Helmand Province. (Note: not all anti-government activity in
    the area is associated with the Taliban. Some is related to
    crime, drugs and warlords. End Note.)

    ¶6. (S) Wardak concluded that our aim must be to prevent the
    Taliban from achieving their objectives. He called for ISAF
    and the GOA to take the initiative, warning that weak
    maneuverability prevents ISAF and the ANSF from attacking
    enemy positions. COMISAF, LTG Richards, noted that,
    although bleak, this report was the combined opinion of
    experts, with no doubt as to its accuracy. He said ISAF had
    been looking for a plan to take back the initiative, and that
    the Afghan Development Zone concept was their solution.

    ADZ Concept
    -----------

    ¶7. (S) ISAF's Afghan Development Zone (ADZ) concept (see
    reftels) is designed to address several key challenges in
    bringing security and development to the South: the people
    feel disenfranchised; there is a dissatisfaction with
    governance and the pace of development; the Taliban are
    exploiting this frustration by convincing the public the GOA
    and International Community (IC) cannot deliver; and, limited
    military, police and development resources preclude doing
    everything required everywhere at once. ISAF and the GOA are
    therefore prioritizing their actions in certain geographical
    areas of the south that have key populations, economic
    development and necessary infrastructure. (Note: regular
    assessment of these priorities will continue for months. End
    Note.)

    ¶8. (S) The ADZ solution attempts to unify security and
    development efforts from the GOA and IC to provide a robust
    level of security in key areas of the south and allow for
    rapid roll-out of new reconstruction and development
    projects. ISAF and ANSF forces will provide a security
    shield based in the priority regional centers and support
    maneuver teams patrolling outlying areas. The zones are not
    static and should expand to encompass ever widening
    territories.

    ¶9. (S) The ADZ concept was approved in principle by Karzai
    and the international community at the PAG meeting. Many
    issues and problems remain and whether ADZs will be different
    from current operations is not clear. (Note: The
    Coalition's Mountain series of operations successively
    focuses on certain geographical areas with kinetic and
    non-kinetic means, in a not-too dissimilar way as is proposed
    by the ADZ concept. End Note.) ISAF must take on further
    offensive operations before launching any ADZs. General
    Richards predicted the ADZ in Qalat could be functional by
    late August, Helmand and Uruzgan the second or third week of
    September, and Kandahar would probably take until October due
    to the problem of needing to clear insurgents out of Panjway
    district. In a smaller meeting the evening before, August
    15, Karzai stressed to ISAF LTG Richards that our first
    objective should be to retake all of Helmand. In Kandahar

    KABUL 00003719 003 OF 006

    province, we should also retake the district of Panjway, he
    said, hinting darkly that other factors besides the Taliban
    may be at work there. He said districts that were in our
    hands must be won back.

    ¶10. (S) At the PAG, Karzai insisted that no one talk about
    ADZs publicly; the IC strongly agreed. (Note: it is equally
    important ADZs are not discussed publicly in Washington.)
    Discussion of this idea is fraught with problems. Karzai was
    worried that people might perceive the creation of the zones
    as a sign government control was shrinking, reminding them of
    the Soviet strategy of hunkering down in key cities and
    towns, and retreating. There was also concern that those
    outside the zones might feel vulnerable. Defining the zones
    may lead to attacks before security is in place. Richards
    promised that ISAF would not abandon any key regional centers
    when the zones were established. He stressed that ADZs are
    not a defensive concept, and that ISAF will carry on
    offensive operations to drive the Taliban out of their
    strongholds.

    ¶11. (S) The development portion of the ADZ concept is
    predicated on drawing additional funds that can be delivered
    immediately following the necessary security &clean up8 in
    certain areas. It is not now clear how much will be
    available; most will be implementation of previously planned
    work by the Coalition and NGOs. Ambassador Neumann asked
    that the GOA also move money from programs where funds have
    not been spent to show GOA support and buy-in. Minister of
    Finance Ahady said money was available, but procurement rules
    required by donors prevented its quick usage. President
    Karzai asked that the donor community lessen strictures for
    the use of funds transferred to the GOA. He also requested
    that more funds go to Afghan contractors and companies for
    smaller projects.

    ¶12. (S) Comment: The GOA recognizes they need to win both on
    the ground and in people's minds. The creation of the PAG
    was the GOA's first effort to come towards a solution. The
    ADZ concept remains vague. The GOA, ISAF and the rest of the
    international community have signed on for now. ISAF has
    promised to not only beef up security within the zones, but
    hold on to key villages and launch offensive strikes. The
    Brits, Dutch, Canadians and Australians argue that they can
    provide the security and roll out new projects to bring
    governance and development throughout the south. We will
    support as we can. Problems remain, and the details are not
    fully developed. Doubts linger about tangible development
    results from ISAF being possible quickly. Criticism of the
    zones, and the projects that will be planned for their
    clearly defined areas, is likely to hearken back to the
    Soviets barricading down. For these reasons neither the GOA
    nor the international community will announce or discuss the
    project, allowing any results to speak for themselves. (It
    is important that ADZs not be discussed publicly in
    Washington either.) End Comment.

    Police
    ------

    ¶13. (S) It was agreed that police rebalancing may not move
    fast enough to solve the short-term problem of providing
    sufficient police forces at the local level where they are
    needed now. In a private briefing that included Ambassador
    Neumann and President Karzai the evening before (August 15),
    Intelligence Chief designate Amerullah Saleh stressed that
    the GOA is losing Pashtun manpower in Afghan security forces.
    He said it must either become more active in recruiting

    KABUL 00003719 004 OF 006

    locally into National forces or make far more use of the
    tribes. He pointed out that police brought from outside the
    area - specifically from Kunduz - have all deserted. He said
    that rebalancing the police is simply not working and not
    producing the forces needed in time. The weakness of the
    police forces is also reducing intelligence gathering
    ability. Saleh said the GOA was losing access to
    intelligence because police from outside are deserting and
    police from inside are no longer in contact with local
    villagers so they are getting less information.

    ¶14. (S) At the PAG meeting, President Karzai opened the
    discussion of police forces by expressing strong displeasure
    at reports from Ghazni that indicate 1042 police are on the
    payroll, while far fewer actually exist. He was certain
    fraud exists throughout the country. Karzai decided ANP
    priorities are to determine actual numbers of police, then
    recruit to the ceiling and then see if additional numbers of
    regular police are needed. However, he clearly wants to move
    forward on auxiliaries so there is not a clear &do all the
    police first8 prioritization.

    ¶15. (S) Minister of Interior Zarar outlined a GOA plan to
    recruit &auxiliary8 police in border regions and areas of
    high security threats. (Note: The proper nomenclature for
    these forces is a work in progress. End note.) The first
    group would be trained and given a one-year contract. The
    requirements for hiring will be similar to the ANP, with
    background checks, and following the same procedures. They
    would be under the command of the local police chiefs, and
    would receive one month of training in police procedures.
    (Comment: Zarar did not say that the GOA would want to use
    the Police Regional Training Centers for this purpose but it
    probably will. End comment.) The &auxiliaries8 would also
    require equipment: weapons, communications and
    transportation. Zarar explained the MOI does not have the
    needed equipment and would need IC help.

    ¶16. (S) International representatives accepted
    &auxiliaries8 could be used if clearly within the MOI chain
    of command. Details and numbers need to be worked out. The
    IC has no commitment to pay or equip.

    ¶17. (S) President Karzai jumped in, saying that, &finally,
    today everyone speaks my mind and what I've been saying for a
    year and a half. We need to re-empower traditional and
    trusted forms of authority.8 (At the previous night's
    meeting, Karzai had enthusiastically, if gloomily, spoke
    about how we are losing the population. He intimated that
    much of the trouble has come from premature removal of key
    tribal figures (while he did not say so, this seemed to refer
    to the former Governors of Uruzgan and Helmand). Karzai said
    we have systematically disempowered the locals. They are
    hostile to us as a result, and therefore we must go back to
    more local government.

    ¶18. (S) The internationals backed a U.S. suggestion that the
    auxiliary police be paid and controlled directly by the MOI
    rather than governors. Ambassador Neumann urged a more
    detailed plan - who, where and how many. Karzai responded
    that we should have started this program a year ago, and that
    the IC should help with auxiliary police and strengthening
    communities, but if not he would find the money somehow.

    ¶19. (S) Comment: The issue of police numbers is more
    challenging, with the GOA planning to move ahead with an
    &auxiliary8 police program, but asking for international
    support in money and equipment. The GOA still doesn't have a
    concrete plan, and though we support the idea, neither we nor

    KABUL 00003719 005 OF 006

    anyone else in the international community has committed to
    fund it. End Comment.

    Southern Afghanistan Security Assessment (Full Text)
    --------------------------------------------- -------

    (S) Begin Text:

    This assessment has been produced by the Security Operations
    Group and reflects the combined views of the Ministries,
    organizations and Embassies represented. It has also been
    shown to members of the Implementation and Coordination Team
    and their comments incorporated.

    The situation in the south remains very fragile. Operation
    Mountain Thrust inflicted significant losses on the
    insurgents, especially in Uruzgan and Northern Helmand, but
    most are assessed to have been among their lower-level,
    short-term or peripheral fighters, who are easily
    replaceable.

    We assess that the Taliban campaign to drive Government
    elements from outlying areas, convince the people that the
    Government cannot deliver and undermine the resolve of ISAF
    and the international community will continue. Some fighting
    is motivated by tribal or criminal factors and not directly
    related to the Taliban insurgency, and instability is
    exacerbated by the negative influence of former Governors and
    Police Chiefs, especially in Helmand and Uruzgan.

    Except in Kandahar, the past month has seen a reduction in
    the tempo of enemy operations compared with mid-July.
    However, ISAF and ANSF units remain under threat of attack in
    large parts of the region, making it extremely difficult to
    deliver effective governance and development. The threat
    from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) continues to
    increase in both quality and quantity.

    Recent engagements show that we are facing an increasingly
    determined and sophisticated enemy prepared to defend key
    terrain in large groups (100-plus fighters) in developed
    defensive positions and to use these as a base for ambushes
    against key lines of communication. There are reliable
    reports of a significant Taliban build-up in the Panjway,
    Zherai and Helmand, and that planning has been conducted for
    an offensive.

    Taliban operations in the vicinity of the Highway 1 corridor,
    particularly near Kandahar City, Lashkar Gah and Qalat, are
    judged to pose the greatest risk to security in the near term.

    Zabol: The Romanian Task Force completed its relieve in
    place with Task Force Warrior. The largest engagement since
    they arrived took place on 8 August in south-eastern Qalat,
    and there are indications of increasing insurgent activity in
    the province. The Governor's key concerns are highway
    security and the district of Seorai.

    Uruzgan: Dutch Task Force continued its deployment and
    conducted security patrols around Tarin Kowt and Dehrawud.
    They intend to facilitate a major shura to reinforce the
    Governor's authority. The districts of Charchina (Shahidi
    Hassas) and Gizab are particular areas of security concern,
    largely outside the control of government authorities.

    Helmand: Major operation conducted to relieve and reinforce
    Musa Qaleh district center. Northern and Southern parts of
    the province remain of concern due to high levels of

    KABUL 00003719 006 OF 006

    insurgent activity. Significant UK forces remain fixed
    defending static locations in the north of the province.

    Kandahar: Heavy fighting in Panjway and Zherai districts,
    which remain a key Taliban focus. Taliban have established
    strong defensive positions and fought with determination.
    Continued enemy activity in the Arghandab district is likely
    in order to maintain their line of communication to Uruzgan.

    ENEMY FORCES/FRIENDLY FORCES

    Though hard to assess accurately, there are estimated to be
    up to 7,000 active Taliban fighters across the south. This
    compares with 4,300 ANA, over 7,000 ANP (on paper; in
    practice far fewer present for duty and effective) and about
    9,000 ISAF personnel in Regional Command South.

    Lack of capacity, including protected mobility and firepower,
    hinders ANSF ability to conduct offensive operations against
    the enemy. Corruption, poor leadership and misuse of police
    resources remain widespread. Work continues to address these
    issues and to improve the sometimes poor co-ordination
    between provincial authorities, ANSF and ISAF.

    In the weeks following transfer of authority, ISAF will
    continue to demonstrate to local officials and the people its
    will and ability to conduct robust and effective security
    operations across the region. Current and forthcoming ISAF
    operations to relieve units in place (ongoing for Canadian,
    Romanian and Dutch Forces, September for UK Forces) will have
    a short-term impact on their combat capability.

    CONCLUSION

    Our aim must be to prevent the Taliban achieving their
    objectives in any forthcoming offensive while positioning
    ourselves to take the initiative and provide effective
    security in support of development and governance. The
    current lack of maneuver capability hinders ISAF and ANSF
    ability to threaten the enemy in their strongholds.

    We need to wrest the initiative from the enemy. I believe
    the Development Zone Concept, which the Security Operations
    Group and the other inter-Agency Groups have helped to
    develop, has the potential to play an important role in
    helping us do so. I will now give the floor to LTG Richards
    to describe the status of his work.

    End Text.
    NEUMANN

`