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### Viewing cable 07MADRID432, SPAIN/ETA: RELEASE OF PRISONER TRIGGERS POLITICAL

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07MADRID432 | 2007-03-08 09:09 | 2010-12-09 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid

`

    VZCZCXRO9436
    PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
    DE RUEHMD #0432/01 0670927
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 080927Z MAR 07
    FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2032
    INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 2509
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 000432

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2017
    TAGS: PTER PGOV SP
    SUBJECT: SPAIN/ETA: RELEASE OF PRISONER TRIGGERS POLITICAL
    BATTLE

    REF: MADRID 17

    MADRID 00000432 001.2 OF 004

    Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens; reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

    ¶1. (C) Summary. Just two months after ETA's December 30 bomb
    attack at Madrid's airport set off a bitter debate regarding
    the Zapatero Government's handling of the Basque issue,
    Zapatero has drawn fresh criticism for allowing a hunger
    striking ETA member to serve the remainder of his sentence in
    house arrest for "humanitarian" reasons. The prisoner, Jose
    Ignacio de Juana Chaos, had served 17 years of a 30-year
    sentence for his role in the deaths of 18 individuals in the
    1980s, most of them members of the Spanish police and
    security forces. However, as he was about to be released in
    2005, prosecutors charged him with continued ETA activities
    while in prison and eventually won an additional 3-year
    conviction against him. De Juana undertook two hunger
    strikes, igniting fervor among young Basque radicals and
    becoming a central element in the national political debate
    on how -- or even whether -- to maintain peace talks with
    ETA. Former Minister of Defense Jose Bono told the
    Ambassador that the Zapatero Government had determined that
    De Juana was truly near death and that his "martyrdom" would
    unleash a wave of ETA violence and definitively derail the
    Basque peace process. There are rumors that Socialist elder
    statesmen are privately critical of the De Juana decision,
    even as they voice public support for Zapatero. The
    opposition Popular Party (PP) and terrorist victims' groups
    reacted with indignation and mass rallies, charging that
    Zapatero has given in to ETA blackmail. The Socialist Party
    (PSOE) has responded vigorously, asserting that De Juana's
    treatment is no different than former President Aznar's
    relocation of ETA prisoners to the Basque Region during
    Aznar's own attempt to negotiate peace with ETA.

    ¶2. (C) The De Juana decision, along with the Government's
    low-key response to the December 30 Barajas airport attack
    and apparent willingness to consider allowing ETA's political
    front to participate in May municipal elections in the Basque
    Region, represent a huge gamble for the Zapatero Government.
    Zapatero is betting that the electorate will prefer continued
    talks with ETA, even under distasteful circumstances, to a
    tough Government reaction that results in renewed ETA
    violence. A key element of Zapatero's strategy is to equate
    his own overtures to ETA with those undertaken by the PP in
    the 1990s. Polls suggest widespread public disgust with De
    Juana's release, but this has not translated into greater
    political support for the PP. The inability thus far of the
    PP to gain traction on this issue may explain why Zapatero
    appears willing to place his Government's fortunes in the
    hands of ETA and its political allies. End Summary.

    //A NOTORIOUS ETA TERRORIST//

    ¶3. (U) De Juana Chaos, a former member of the Basque Regional
    Police, became among the most vicious ETA terrorists and a
    leader of ETA's feared "Madrid Commando" during the 1980s.
    He was captured in January 1987 and was convicted of killing
    12 Civil Guards and wounding 58 people in one attack, killing
    five Civil Guards in another attack, and killing a Navy
    Viceadmiral in a third attack. De Juana is accused of
    involvement in as many as seven more deaths as well. In
    1989, he was convicted to a total of 2,655 years in prison, a
    symbolic punishment since he was convicted under the 1973
    Penal Code which allowed for a maximum of 30 years
    imprisonment.

    ¶4. (U) De Juana became eligible for release in 2005 under
    normal penal guidelines allowing prisoners to reduce their
    prison terms through "good behavior" and similar benefits.
    However, a National Court magistrate blocked De Juana's
    release in 2005 by charging him with making "terrorist
    threats" in two articles he authored for the radical Basque
    daily "Gara" near the end of his prison term. Also, although
    many ETA terrorists had benefited from early release programs
    during the Gonzalez, Aznar and Zapatero administrations,
    Spanish public opinion was strongly against De Juana's
    release because of the number of his victims and because he
    had never expressed remorse.

    ¶5. (U) The new charges triggered a complex legal contest
    pitting prosecutors and police against De Juana and ETA
    support groups, at a time when the Zapatero Government was
    undertaking tenuous peace talks with ETA. In November 2006,
    the National Court agreed with the new charges against De
    Juana and sentenced him to 12 more years in prison. On
    appeal, the Supreme Court in February 2007 partially
    overturned his conviction and reduced his sentence to 3 years
    in prison for a single count of making terrorist threats.

    MADRID 00000432 002.2 OF 004

    This three-year term would have made him eligible for release
    in 12 to 18 months (summer 2008), under normal prison
    guidelines.

    //DE JUANA BECOMES AN ETA HERO//

    ¶6. (U) While the treatment of ETA prisoners, and particularly
    their dispersal throughout Spain, has long been a central
    issue for ETA negotiators, the De Juana case did not gain
    special status until De Juana announced a hunger strike on
    August 8 to protest his continued incarceration. Observers
    in the Basque Region reported rumors that ETA leaders had
    opposed De Juana's hunger strike out of concern that it would
    inflame ETA supporters and complicate peace talks with the
    Zapatero Government. De Juana abandoned his hunger strike in
    October, but initiated a second hunger strike on November 7,
    a day after the National Court sentenced him to a further 12
    years in prison. His condition reportedly declined despite
    forced feeding by doctors, and in early February De Juana's
    attorneys released pictures of him appearing emaciated and
    attached to IV tubes to keep him hydrated. Between August
    and February, De Juana became the most important symbol of
    ETA resistance to Madrid, particularly among the young ETA
    hardliners who have reportedly taken over the organization
    and who were behind the December 30 attack at Barajas Airport
    that killed two people.

    ¶7. (U) The February 12 decision of the Spanish Supreme Court
    to reduce De Juana's sentence from 12 years to 3 years paved
    the way for the Zapatero Government to release him. The
    reduced final prison term made him eligible for release under
    special humanitarian guidelines for prisoners facing
    relatively short sentences. On February 28, Minister of
    Interior Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba approved the transfer of De
    Juana from a Madrid prison hospital to a hospital in San
    Sebastian, near De Juana's home, as well as authorizing De
    Juana to complete the remainder of his prison term in his
    home under police and electronic surveillance once he has
    recovered enough to leave the hospital. In a press
    conference announcing the Government's decision to ease De
    Juana's conditions, Rubalcaba emphasized the Government's
    determination that De Juana was near death, or at least on
    the point of suffering irreperable physical damage, and that
    the Government's decision was made on humanitarian grounds.
    Other Government officials defended the decision as
    appropriate for an inmate with little more than a year left
    in his prison term, also noting that De Juana had expressed
    support for the Basque peace process. A judge officially
    approved Rubalcaba's decision on March 1 and De Juana arrived
    at a San Sebastian hospital the same day to a hero's welcome.

    //BASQUE EXTREMISTS CHEER VICTORY, PP CONDEMNS RELEASE//

    ¶8. (U) An ETA prisoner support group quickly claimed a
    political victory for radical Basque nationalists and urged
    the release of seven more ETA prisoners who are in poor
    health. A representative of ETA political front group
    "Batasuna" demanded the immediate release of sick ETA
    prisoners and the relocation to the Basque Region of all
    other ETA prisoners (a long-standing Batasuna demand). While
    some in Batasuna and ETA seem willing to downplay De Juana's
    release to avoid embarrassing Zapatero, most ETA supporters
    clearly view the hunger strike as an effective weapon in
    negotiations with the Government. Several prisoners
    (including several common criminals) have announced their own
    plans for hunger strikes.

    ¶9. (U) The PP and groups representing victims of terrorism
    were quick to respond to news of De Juana's release,
    denouncing the decision as tantamount to succumbing to ETA
    blackmail. A PP youth group staged an unauthorized
    demonstration in front of the Ministry of Interior the day De
    Juana's release was announced and several "semi-spontaneous"
    demonstrations called by victims rights groups have taken
    place throughout the country, attracting several thousand
    people each. Several demonstrations have been marred by the
    participation of far-right Francoist and fascist groups. The
    PP is organizing a massive protest march for March 10 (by
    coincidence, the eve of third anniversary of the March 11,
    2004 Madrid train attacks by Islamist extremists) under the
    motto "Spain for Liberty - No More Concessions to ETA."

    //ZAPATERO WALKING A FINE LINE//

    ¶10. (C) The Zapatero Government understands that it has
    assumed a significant political risk, both in releasing De
    Juana and in continuing to seek peace with ETA. Former
    Minister of Defense Jose Bono told the Ambassador that the

    MADRID 00000432 003.2 OF 004

    Zapatero Government had determined that De Juana was truly
    near death and that his "martyrdom" would unleash a wave of
    ETA violence and definitively derail the Basque peace
    process. While releasing De Juana under pressure was certain
    to cost Zapatero political support, Zapatero and the PSOE
    reportedly determined that ETA's resurgence would be far
    worse, both in terms of human lives and in political
    consequences. Though all senior PSOE leaders, past and
    present, have expressed public support for Zapatero's
    decision on De Juana, Bono and former President Gonzalez were
    rumored to be adamantly opposed in private. During his
    tenure as MOD, Bono was outspoken in his opposition to Basque
    nationalists.

    ¶11. (C) The Government will soon face yet another political
    challenge: deciding whether to fight or support the
    participation of ETA political group Batasuna in Basque
    municipal elections in May. Although many observers
    discarded any possibility of Batasuna's participation in
    elections after the December 30 airport attack, it now seems
    that Zapatero and his advisers are inclined to support
    participation by Batasuna, or its candidates running under
    another banner. A Batasuna role in Basque elections would be
    certain to draw relentless criticism by the PP, and likely
    grumbling from within the PSOE as well.

    //POLITICAL KNIVES SHARPENED//

    ¶12. (C) While the De Chaos case will be the immediate cause,
    the PP hopes its March 10 demonstration will convey
    widespread dissatisfaction with Zapatero's ETA/Basque policy
    and prove a political liability for the Socialists in the May
    27 regional/municipal elections. Various polls conducted
    following the announcement of De Juana's release indicate
    broad disgust with the decision. In a poll by Spain's second
    leading daily, "El Mundo," 63 percent of respondents called
    De Juana's release "Bad or Very Bad" and 63 percent
    (including 58 percent of self-identified PSOE voters) said
    they expected Zapatero's decision would negatively affect the
    PSOE in upcoming elections. A separate poll indicated strong
    public support (80 percent) for tougher sentencing
    guidelines, but tracked with other polls in indicating that
    the PSOE would still edge out the PP the general elections
    (scheduled to take place by March 2008, but there is
    speculations that Zapatero could call elections as early as
    November).

    ¶13. (C) Zapatero and the PSOE are countering PP criticism by
    equating the De Juana decision to former President Aznar's
    decision to move a number of ETA prisoners to the Basque
    Region as part of 1998 negotiations with ETA. The PSOE has
    produced two videos detailing Aznar administration overtures
    to ETA and calling the current PP attacks hypocritical.
    Zapatero has also threatened to divulge previously "secret"
    PP dealings with ETA during the Aznar Government, leading PP
    figures to threaten to resurface the so-called "GAL Case,"
    the PSOE's dirty war against ETA during the Gonzalez
    Government. The political environment surrounding these
    various ETA issues is likely to become even more volatile
    through the May 27 municipal/regional elections, and through
    the runup to the national elections in late 2007 or early
    ¶2008.
    //COMMENT//

    ¶14. (C) As the De Juana episode makes clear, Zapatero is
    willing to raise the ante in pursuit of avoiding violence and
    furthering the Basque peace process, which he views as the
    central legacy of his administration. To a significant
    extent, he has placed his political future in ETA's hands.
    In fact, many within Zapatero's PSOE ranks privately believe
    that these high stakes are unreasonable, particularly in the
    wake of the December 30 ETA bombing at Barajas airport.
    Nevertheless Zapatero is counting on the PP to fumble the
    opportunity and not be able to mount a successful challenge
    to the PSOE's leadership in the national elections - as long
    as ETA violence is held in check. ETA is doubtlessly aware
    that it holds the wildcard in those elections and will
    extract whatever concessions it can over the next several
    months. However, the Zapatero Government cannot concede on
    core ETA demands, such as Basque self determination, and the
    key question is whether the Government will be able to do
    enough to stave off another ETA blast, with its attendant
    political consequences. Thus far, the PP and its leader
    Mariano Rajoy have not been able to gain substantial
    political momentum beyond their own core base, despite all of
    the issues surrounding Zapatero's ETA policy - mainly because
    the Spanish public views the PP as too right wing and too
    associated with Aznar's perceived mistakes following the

    MADRID 00000432 004.2 OF 004

    March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid.
    AGUIRRE

`