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### Viewing cable 07ABUDHABI1479, SCENE SETTER FOR ADMIRAL FALLON'S SEPTEMBER VISIT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07ABUDHABI1479 | 2007-09-05 13:01 | 2011-01-21 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Abu Dhabi

`

    VZCZCXRO8665
    OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
    DE RUEHAD #1479/01 2481359
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 051359Z SEP 07
    FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9644
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
    INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001479

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    CENTCOM FOR ADMIRAL FALLON
    STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, PM/FO
    DOD/OSD FOR A/S LONG, DAS KIMMITT, KELSO, QUINN, ANDERSON
    CENTCOM ALSO FOR MAJ GEN FINDLEY, REYES, RODRIGUEZ
    NSC FOR NRAMCHAND, EABRAMS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2017
    TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MARR IR IZ AF LE SY AE
    SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR ADMIRAL FALLON'S SEPTEMBER VISIT
    TO UAE

    REF: A. ABU DHABI 1214, B) ABU DHABI 702, C) SECDEF 31828

    Classified by Charge d'Affaires Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b)
    and (d).

    ¶1. (S) Admiral Fallon, Embassy Abu Dhabi welcomes you for
    your second visit to the UAE as CENTCOM commander. As you
    are aware, deepening ties with the UAE is all about
    relationships, and the relationship that most matters on the
    military front is that with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed
    bin Zayed (MbZ), who is also Deputy Supreme Commander of the
    UAE Armed Forces, has a personal background in the UAE Air
    Force, visited Washington (White House and Pentagon) in
    mid-May, and has engaged senior U.S. military officials for
    some years on key defense issues. Since your visit falls
    during the fasting month of Ramadan, a late evening meeting
    with MbZ will likely be the substantive highlight of your
    stop in Abu Dhabi. MbZ will be interested in current U.S.
    operations in Iraq and forward thinking on how to deal with
    Iran, topics that he also discussed with you at length during
    your April visit. Additionally, MbZ will want your views on
    potential weapons sales to the UAE, designed to deter and
    counter the Iranian threat, and how those proposed transfers
    will fare when they undergo U.S. congressional scrutiny.
    (Note: In spite of Dubai ruler Mohammed bin Rashid (MbR)
    holding the nominal title of Minister of Defense -- in
    addition to his positions as UAE Vice President and Prime
    Minister -- he is not involved in the practical management of
    UAE defense issues. We have requested a meeting with him, at
    which you could thank Dubai for its hosting of U.S. ship
    visits in particular. End note.)

    UAE Cooperation
    ---------------

    ¶2. (S) The U.S. enjoys strong defense cooperation with the
    UAE, working together in key aspects of the war on terror;
    the UAE has special operations troops on the ground in
    Afghanistan and has been a source of security assistance for
    Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority, in addition to
    assisting virtually every trouble spot in the region in need
    of reconstruction support. The nation provides critical
    basing and over-flight for U.S. reconnaissance and refueling
    assets, extensive naval logistics support, and the Navy's
    liberty port of choice in the region (425 ships annually).
    We suggest you thank MbZ for his strong support for the U.S.
    Air Force and Navy in the UAE and encourage continued
    partnership in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region. A
    few quantitative measures of bilateral cooperation include:

    --- 1,300 USAF personnel at Al Dhafra Air Base;
    --- a vigorous training schedule at the Air Warfare Center
    at Al Dhafra;
    --- the F-16 Block 60 program;
    --- approximately 425 port visits last year;
    --- over 24,000 US military overflights/landings in
    2006;
    --- more than 150,000 U.S. servicemen and women
    enjoying liberty annually in the UAE; and
    --- 250 UAE Special Operations forces serving with the
    Coalition in Afghanistan (possibly increasing to
    300) to include BMPs and LeClerc tanks;
    --- 150 conventional ground forces with South African built
    armored
    personnel carriers are planned to deploy in support of
    OEF, to
    work directly with Canadian forces.

    ¶3. (S) These contributions are significant in scope but also
    enduring in their continuity over a number of years. The
    ports of Jebel Ali and Fujairah are vital to U.S. Navy
    interdiction operations, re-supply and sustainment, and
    combat support efforts across the region. Jebel Ali in Dubai
    has hosted more port visits for each of the past three years
    than any other port outside the United States. In expressing
    appreciation for this outstanding partnership, you might also
    remind MbZ that the evolving nature of military requirements
    mandates an ongoing focus on joint planning, coordination,
    and strategic interoperability.

    Iraq
    ----

    ABU DHABI 00001479 002 OF 004

    ¶4. (S) While the UAE has offered some political and economic
    support for Iraq and identifies Iraqi stability as a regional
    priority, the UAE's (all-Sunni) leadership has over the past
    several months exhibited a hardened attitude toward Prime
    Minister al-Maliki, perceiving him as beholden to Iran and
    incapable of moving beyond sectarian bias to lead a unified
    Iraq. The UAE has in the past favored former Prime Minister
    Iyad Allawi and has stalled on its commitment to relieve
    Iraqi debt (of $3.5 billion) in order to avoid al-Maliki
    claiming credit. The UAE has expressed concern over the
    continued violence and chaos in and around Baghdad as well as
    the failure of the al-Maliki government to improve overall
    security in the country. While clearly skeptical of
    al-Maliki's leadership, MbZ also told SecDef on August 2 that
    Iraq had not followed up on signals that the UAE would
    welcome an al-Maliki visit -- albeit with a rather cautious
    welcome mat (ref C).

    ¶5. (S) Meanwhile, the UAE has been engaged in regional
    efforts to facilitate reconciliation between Sunni and Shi'a
    forces. The UAEG has frequently expressed alarm regarding
    Iranian influence in Iraq, and has made attempts to reach out
    to moderate Shi'a to encourage their engagement in the Iraqi
    political process independently of Iran. The UAE values and
    seeks reassurance of continued close consultation on U.S.
    plans and strategy involving Iraq (and Iran). As for its
    direct consultations with Baghdad, Iraqi National Security
    Adviser Muwaffaq al-Rubaie was in Abu Dhabi in late June, a
    visit during which the UAE leadership apparently sensed that
    al-Rubaie took the attitude that current UAE outreach actions
    in Iraq were hostile and indirectly justified Iranian
    counter-influence. Al-Rubaie reportedly focused his efforts
    on urging the Emiratis not to support the Iraqi Sunnis. MbZ
    will certainly be interested in your thoughts on General
    Petraeus' report to Congress on Iraq.

    ¶6. (S) The UAE sent a team to Baghdad in August to explore
    options for re-opening its Embassy. You may wish to inquire
    with MbZ about any reports back from the delegation. (Note:
    Concern has been expressed by the Coalition about the use by
    terrorists of the UAE's abandoned Embassy compound; coalition
    forces captured the security chief of the compound, Abu
    Shinan, and continue to hold him due to his connections with
    Sunni insurgent groups. The UAE has expressed concern over
    his potential release to Iraqi forces, fearing his execution.
    The UAE has not maintained diplomatic staff in Baghdad since
    the May 2006 kidnapping of one of its diplomats. End note.)

    Iran
    ----

    ¶7. (S) MbZ reiterated to SecDef that Iran is the UAE's most
    serious and long-term threat, a theme we hear repeated often
    in UAE defense circles (but not a theme we hear from the more
    business-oriented leadership of Dubai). MbZ may opine that
    any attempt at dialogue by Iran should be regarded as a pure
    faade and he is urgent about setting up a defense
    architecture against Iranian missiles. Nonetheless, the
    leadership has also told us they are not in a position to
    sacrifice $16 billion in annual trade with Iran, while
    realizing that this same neighbor and major trading partner
    is also a potential threat to the UAE. It is worth recalling
    that the May 10-12 visit of Vice President Cheney to the UAE
    was immediately followed by a one-night stopover by Iranian
    President Ahmadinejad, who was given a red carpet welcome and
    gave a defiant anti-U.S. speech at a Dubai sports arena
    during his stay.

    ¶8. (S) Iran is the large neighbor that will not go away, so
    the UAE feels a need to engage (particularly on the economic
    side and especially in Dubai) with a potential foe in this
    rough and unforgiving neighborhood. While assisting our
    mission in the region, the UAE leadership has consistently
    pursued a cautious, non-confrontational public posture
    towards Iran. In the past the UAE has been hesitant to
    participate in certain military exercises designed to show a
    strong defensive front against Iran. The UAE did, however,
    send observers to Leading Edge 07 in October 2006 in the
    Gulf, which had a Proliferation Security Initiative theme.
    The decision to host Eagle Resolve 2008, with a Theater Air
    and Missile Defense theme, should be seen as a praiseworthy

    ABU DHABI 00001479 003 OF 004

    step. Iran is an adversary to prepare defenses against,
    which the UAE is doing, yet it considers economic engagement
    one of those defenses.

    Afghanistan
    -----------

    ¶9. (S) While the UAE contributes 250 Special Operations
    troops to the Coalition effort in Afghanistan (with a
    potential increase of 50), it has not yet publicly
    acknowledged this participation. The UAE pursues Afghanistan
    reconstruction aid with an emphasis on road networks,
    mosques, medical facilities and schools and has made efforts
    at political mediation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In
    January 2007 LTG Eikenberry escorted Afghan Armed Forces
    Chief of Staff General Bismillah Mohammadi Khan to Abu Dhabi
    in a bid to deepen direct engagement between the UAE and
    Afghanistan. The UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff declared
    himself willing to help in any way possible, including
    training Afghan troops. UAE subsequently disbursed another
    $30 million in general assistance and is renovating two
    runways in Afghanistan for military use. During the June
    visit of Afghan Defense Minister Wardak to Abu Dhabi, MbZ
    agreed to donate ten Mi-17 helicopters to Kabul. One of
    MbZ's oft-stated interests in sending Emirati Special Ops
    troops to Afghanistan is to get his military forces
    battle-hardened so they may effectively confront imported or
    domestic extremism when called upon to do so back home. The
    UAE contribution in Afghanistan warrants our frequent
    expressions of appreciation.

    Elsewhere in the region
    -----------------------

    ¶10. (S) The UAE provides significant humanitarian and
    security assistance to Lebanon; MbZ spoke with SecDef at some
    length about the need to bolster Lebanon's ability to stand
    against Syrian influence. The UAE has been at the forefront
    of reconstruction efforts, continuing a longstanding
    de-mining operation, and contributing resources for school
    construction and hospitals. UAE Air Force C-130s and
    helicopters have been used in relief efforts. The UAE has
    also provided UAE-manufactured pistols (Caracal) and
    ammunition to the LAF. Earlier in the summer the UAE Foreign
    Minister had a conversation with Lebanese PM Siniora on a
    proposal for a Muslim force for Lebanon (under UN mandate).
    The UAE seeks to strengthen the Siniora government, having
    delivered $300 million in assistance to Lebanon this year,
    while also seeking limited engagement with Syria (to include
    a mid-July visit by UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al
    Nahyan and a donation of $10 million towards the support of
    Iraqi refugees and $100 million to build a hospital in Syria).

    ¶11. (S) The UAE would like to see tangible progress on the
    Middle East Roadmap, rejects the Hamas agenda, and continues
    to support the Palestinian people through more than $400
    million in housing and humanitarian assistance since 2000.
    MbZ and his brothers, Foreign Minister Abdullah and National
    Security Advisor/State Security Director Hazza, are in close
    contact with President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam
    Fayyad. As the result of the May 2007 visit of USSC General
    Dayton, the UAE transferred $80 million to the Palestinian
    president.

    Weapons packages -- high UAE expectations
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶12. (S) The UAE has committed billions to current and
    anticipated Foreign Military Sales cases, in addition to over
    $8.5 billion in direct commercial sales in the Block 60 F-16
    program, one of the premier security assistance portfolios in
    the region. At the invitation of the Pentagon and State
    Department to deepen the security relationship by cooperating
    on an integrated missile defense shield, the UAE has recently
    submitted Letters of Request on the Patriot (nine PAC-3/GEM-T
    batteries), Surface Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air
    Missile (SL-AMRAAM), and Theater High Altitude Air Defense
    (THAAD) system (3 fire units), for an estimated total value
    of $8 to 12 billion. It is now incumbent upon the USG to
    make good on our offer of enhanced engagement by pressing for
    expeditious Congressional notification this fall (pressing at
    every opportunity for favorable results in any congressional

    ABU DHABI 00001479 004 OF 004

    review of the weapons package). The UAE will see our posture
    as a critical measure of USG willingness to truly stand by
    the UAE in a contingency involving Iran.

    ¶13. (S) The UAE recently signed the High Mobility Artillery
    Rocket System (HIMARS) Letter of Offer and Acceptance for
    counter battery, a case valued at $597M. Both Boeing and
    Northrop-Grumman have provided Requests for Information on an
    Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft later this year.
    The UAE has also expressed a short-term interest in
    purchasing three E2-C Hawkeye AEW&C aircraft as an interim
    solution until delivery of a more permanent AEW&C platform.
    (Note: That decision is expected in mid-2008. End note.)
    The UAE has also made a request to buy 40 UH-60 Blackhawk
    helicopters for its Special Operations Command. They have
    already signed the Letter of Offer and Acceptance for 26
    Blackhawks, plus a training package, a case valued at $807M.
    They have also purchased 10 Blackhawks via Direct Commercial
    Sales from Sikorsky. The UAE is upgrading its AH-64 Apache
    helicopters to the D (LONGBOW) model and has requested 1300
    Hellfire missiles with the expectation of a request for an
    additional 1200 missiles. Three separate Letters of Request
    for additional weapons for their F-16s have been received,
    valued at over $800M. (The current UAE portfolio of active
    cases handled by USLO stands at 44 cases, valued at just over
    $4 billion with another $1.56 billion in cases under
    development, most of which are expected to be signed by the
    end of the calendar year. These figures do not include the
    $8-12 billion for the missile defense requests or $1-3
    billion estimated for the AEW&C platform.)

    Defense Cooperation Agreement
    -----------------------------

    ¶14. (S) In spite of differences on status of forces issues
    and the use of passports/visas versus military IDs/orders for
    UAE entry and exit, overall mil-to-mil cooperation with the
    UAE has been excellent, with consistently reliable support at
    Jebel Ali and Fujairah ports and at Al Dhafra Air Base. We
    recently moved routine military cargo flight operations from
    UAE civil airports in the northern Emirates to the Minhad air
    station, in accordance with a UAE request. The request
    enhances force protection considerations but comes with a
    one-time cost of approximately $4.5 million. Minhad is
    generally better positioned geographically to support CENTCOM
    needs. In very limited circumstances when a C-5 is required
    to land at Fujairah, the UAE has granted all requested
    clearances.

    ¶15. (S) The Embassy believes the timing may be right to make
    progress on negotiating a new Defense Cooperation Agreement
    (DCA) with the UAE and has suggested submission of a USG
    counter-draft in answer to the UAE draft DCA presented for
    possible discussion at October 2-3 Joint Military Committee
    (JMC) working group meetings in Tampa and a full JMC meeting
    tentatively set for January 2008 in Abu Dhabi. We
    recommended urging the UAE to sign a new DCA superseding the
    un-ratified 1994 version as the official basis for existing
    and expanding military-to-military cooperation (taking care
    NOT to link the DCA issue with pending sales or other routine
    cooperation, which would be seen as unhelpful pressure.)

    Getting the relationship right
    ------------------------------

    ¶16. (S) The UAE's reliable and enduring support for mutual
    military interests in the region creates both a sense of
    momentum in the relationship and high expectations on the
    part of our hosts. They will be looking for your endorsement
    of our partnership in the form of ongoing consultations on
    U.S. intentions in the region (particularly Iraq and Iran,
    but also Afghanistan and Lebanon), an honest sense of the
    congressional mood in terms of weapons sales in the region
    (keeping in mind that the UAE seeks congressional
    notification of its systems this fall and notification to be
    handled separately from any other nation, GCC or otherwise),
    and genuine appreciation for the UAE role in the region.
    QUINN

`