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### Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD11, NAJAF CLERICAL LEADERS FEAR IRANIAN IDEOLOGICAL

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BAGHDAD11 | 2009-01-05 11:11 | 2010-12-05 12:12 | SECRET | Embassy Baghdad

`

    VZCZCXRO9693
    PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHGB #0011/01 0051159
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 051159Z JAN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1100
    INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000011

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2028
    TAGS: PGOV PINS KISL IZ
    SUBJECT: NAJAF CLERICAL LEADERS FEAR IRANIAN IDEOLOGICAL
    DOMINANCE

    Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Robert S. Ford for reasons
    1.4 (b) and (d)

     ¶1.  (S) SUMMARY.  Three well-placed contacts in the Shia
    holy city of Najaf told us December 27 that Iranian influence
    there is strong and that Ayatollah Muhammad Said al-Hakim,
    whose family has ties to Iran, likely will succeed the aging
    Ayatollah Sistani.  They each opined al-Hakim could begin
    changing the Najaf clerical establishment's long-time
    opposition to the concept of clerical rule (velayat-e faqih).
    One contact stated that the Najaf clerics have secured
    permission from the Iraqi government to start refusing to
    extend student visas for Iranians studying in Najaf in order
    to limit Iranian influence.  Like many clerics here, these
    contacts were keenly political and they obviously dislike and
    fear the ISCI political party.  They asked the U.S. to do
    more in Najaf to help limit the Islamic Supreme Council of
    Iraq (ISCI) and Iran but xxxxxxxxxxxxx was insistent this be done indirectly and
    with extreme caution.  END SUMMARY.

    ------------------------------------------
    Iran, ISCI Spreading Velayat-e Faqih in Najaf
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶2.  (S) PMIN and Poloffs on December 27, 2008 discussed with
    contacts close to the Najaf hawza (seminary), Iranian
    influence in Najaf and hopes for U.S. assistance in combating
    those exposing velayat-e faqih (clerical rule).  XXXXXXXXXXXX

    ¶3.  (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX decried the Iranian government's attempt to
    directly and indirectly spread its influence in Najaf.
    During the debate in the Iraqi parliament about the U.S.-Iraq
    Security Agreement, XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Iranian Foreign Ministry
    and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp Qods Force commander
    Qasem Soleimani sent separate envoys to convince the
    marja'iya to speak against the agreement.  XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed
    that the marja'iya responded that it would be inappropriate
    for them to comment on a security/political issue as a way of
    dodging Iranian pressure.  XXXXXXXXXXXX also said Iran is giving
    money to Iranian students in the hawza, primarily through
    Supreme Leader Khamenei's office located in Najaf.  Iran
    generally disperses small amounts -- money for furniture or
    books, for example -- but recently gave a large sum to help a
    hawza student with his medical treatment, XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed.
    XXXXXXXXXXXX said that through financing Shahid
    al-Mihrab (Martyrs of the Pulpit) -- the Islamic Supreme
    Council of Iraq's (ISCI) social and educational organization
    -- Iran aims to spread the popularity of velayat-e faqih.
    (Note.  Shahid al-Mihrab is led by Ammar al-Hakim, ISCI's
    heir apparent.  It is also the name ISCI is using nationwide
    for its provincial election coalition.  End note.) XXXXXXXXXXXX
    said Shahid al-Mihrab must be receiving Iranian funding to be
    able to finance its wide network of offices in Iraq and
    abroad.  (Comment:  While driving through Najaf, PMIN noticed
    the construction of a large Shahid al-Mihrab complex at the
    1920 Revolution Square along the city's main East-West
    boulevard on property owned in 2003 by the now ISCI-dominated
    provincial government.)

    ------------------------------------------
    "Moderates" Unable to Compete With Iranian Money
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶4.  (S)  XXXXXXXXXXXX said in response to alleged infiltration by
    Iranian intelligence, the hawza secured permission from the

    Iraqi government to stand up a committee to review residence
    permits of non-Iraqi students at Najaf's religious schools.
      They have, he stated, allowed only the
    few Iranian students who were present before the U.S.
    invasion to continue their studies in Najaf.  Other Iranian
    students are not receiving renewals on their student
    residence permits and are being asked to leave Najaf when
    their permits expire.

    ¶5.  (S)  XXXXXXXXXXXX did not make a particular pitch on
    politics aside from warning about Iranian influence.  By
    contrast, XXXXXXXXXXXxx -- who also favor the
    "quietist" clerical tradition of Sistani and Fayad -- were
    pessimistic about the chances of "moderates" in the upcoming
    elections because ISCI and Da'wa have been able to disperse
    government jobs and contracts to boost their support.  (Note.
     XXXXXXXXXXXxx is a parliamentarian from former Prime Minister Ayad
    Allawi's party and Kalantar, given the alternatives, probably
    also supports Allawi.  End note.)

    BAGHDAD 00000011  002 OF 003

    ¶6.  (S) XXXXXXXXXXXxx joked about ISCI's campaign slogan "With you,
    with you," by rhetorically asking "with who? Iran?"  When
    asked about ISCI's history in Najaf, XXXXXXXXXXXxx pointedly said
    ISCI had zero support prior to 2003 but were able to use its
    Iranian-origin militia, the Badr Corps (now Badr
    Organization), to gain power.  Despite switching its
    religious source of emulation to Sistani, XXXXXXXXXXXXX claimed
    his Badr Organization contacts still refer to the Iranian
    Supreme Leader as "Sayyid al-Wali" (the Master).

    ------------------------------------------
    Fears of Grand Ayatollah Hakim Succeeding Sistani
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶7.  (S) Our three hawza contacts fear that Iran's push in
    Najaf coupled with ISCI's political dominance in the province
    are increasing the likelihood that Grand Ayatollah Muhammad
    Said al-Hakim will succeed Sistani as Iraq's lead cleric.
    Hakim -- a nephew to ISCI chairman Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim --
    favors Iranian velayat-e faqih, all three contacts said.
    XXXXXXXXXXXXX claimed it was telling that Hakim last year told his
    followers to celebrate the festival marking the end of
    Ramadan (Eid al-Fitr) on the day announced by Iran's
    Khamenei, not Sistani.  XXXXXXXXXXXX was certain Hakim was now the
    probable replacement.  Rubai highlighted that fellow Najaf
    Ayatollah Bashir al-Najafi al-Pakistani has begun speaking in
    favor of Hakim, something he was not doing only a couple of
    years ago. XXXXXXXXXXXX  each claimed that al-Hakim
    and Sistani each give out relatively generous gifts of money
    to needy students and professors -- this is how one helps
    build influence, they observed.  By contrast, al-Najafi and
    Fayad have few resources for such gifts, they noted.

    -------------------------------------
    Seeking U.S. Support, But Carefully Done
    -------------------------------------

    ¶8.  (S)XXXXXXXXXXXX  bluntly told PMIN the U.S. should, with a
    hidden hand, fund moderate hawza groups to counter ISCI and
    Iran.  However, XXXXXXXXXXXX said the United States regularly
    irritates the marja'iya by, for example, clumsily -- if only
    briefly -- detaining important clerical figures.  Perceived
    American protection of the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) also
    raises questions about American judgment and intent, he
    claimed.  (He didn't argue when PMIN reviewed our policy on
    MEK but he said our position was not at all clear in Najaf.)
    XXXXXXXXXXXX added that U.S. officials releasing to the media the
    contents of private discussions between the Coalition
    Provisional Authority and top Najaf clerics had led the
    clerics to decide not to speak to the U.S. directly.  XXXXXXXXXXXxx
    advised that the U.S. should not associate itself with ISCI
    cleric Jalal ad-Din al-Saghir because he is hostile to the
    Najaf hawza.  When asked how "moderate" groups planned to
    compete in the provincial and national elections in 2009,
    XXXXXXXXXXXxx clearly were defeatist and lacked a
    practical vision.  XXXXXXXXXXXxx fatalistically repeated that
    "there must be a (political) explosion" before Iraq rids
    itself of the religious parties.

    --------
    Comment
    --------

    ¶9.  (S) Our meetings with XXXXXXXXXXXxx
    reflect a broad trend in Iraq: the disenchantment and
    disorganization of those Shia leaders who feel locked out of
    the political process and who feel ISCI and Da'wa have used
    their positions in government to write rules favorable to
    themselves.  Many Shia still believe ISCI is controlled by
    the Iranian government and that the Badr Organization wields
    power covertly in Iraq.  These Shia dismiss evidence that
    ISCI is becoming increasingly responsive to its Iraqi
    QISCI is becoming increasingly responsive to its Iraqi
    constituents and over the past few years have explicitly
    acted against Iranian interest -- for example, by supporting
    the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement.

    ¶10.  (S) Comment continued.  The looming passing of Grand
    Ayatollah Sistani makes Najaf pivotal for Iraq's ideological
    future.  XXXXXXXXXXXxx is a long-time contact of ours and, XXXXXXXXXXXXX is well-placed to give us insights
    into the top clerics' thinking.  He was extremely nervous
    about being seen with PMIN and other American diplomats,
    insisting on doing the meeting in XXXXXXXXXXxx not Najaf.  His
    skittishness reminds of how cautious Sistani and the other
    ayatollahs are about being seen to meet with or collaborate
    with the Americans.  XXXXXXXXXXXxx was adamant that we should help
    contain Iranian influence in Najaf but that it had to be done
    indirectly by helping Iraqi organizations who themselves want
    to limit Iranian influence.  Overaggressive or direct U.S.
    involvement in Najaf's religious scene would, according to

    BAGHDAD 00000011  003 OF 003

    his analysis, backfire, undercutting those pro-American
    Iraqis walking a fine between religious purity and earthly
    power that could be derived from U.S. support.  If XXXXXXXXXXXxx
    analysis is correct, Iraqis (and to a lesser extent Iranians)
    will always be better placed than the U.S. to understand and
    work within the nuances of Najaf's religious society.  END
    COMMENT.
    CROCKER

`