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### Viewing cable 07BAGHDAD146, DEPUTY PROSECUTOR DESCRIBES TO AMBASSADOR SADDAM'S

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07BAGHDAD146 | 2007-01-15 08:08 | 2010-12-05 12:12 | SECRET | Embassy Baghdad

`

    VZCZCXRO7966
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHGB #0146/01 0150817
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 150817Z JAN 07
    FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9079
    INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
    RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC//
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

` `

    E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000146

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2017
    TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
    SUBJECT: DEPUTY PROSECUTOR DESCRIBES TO AMBASSADOR SADDAM'S
    EXECUTION, CONTROVERSIES

    Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: In a January 6 meeting with the Ambassador,
    Deputy Prosecutor Monqith Al-Faroun described Saddam's
    execution, including the people present, the cell phone video
    and the verbal taunts from guards at the scene. He stated
    that he saw two Iraqi officials using their phones and that
    once the taunting began he admonished the crowd to stay
    silent. The Ambassador questioned the execution's timing -
    one hour before Sunni Eid began - to which al-Faroun replied
    that religious scholars concluded Eid did not start until
    sunrise and therefore the execution could proceed. He
    attributed international condemnation for the execution's
    timing to the fact that many countries are against the death
    penalty. He said that President Talabani did not have the
    authority to change a sentence handed down from the Iraqi
    High Tribunal which is why he was not asked to sign a decree.
    When asked what would be different about the two remaining
    executions, al-Faroun replied that only required witnesses -
    a prosecutor, judge, a religious leader and the prison
    director - would be allowed inside. End Summary.

    --------------------------------------------- --------------
    HOW IT HAPPENED: LAST MINUTE PLANS, GATHERING THE WITNESSES
    --------------------------------------------- --------------

    ¶2. (C) The Ambassador began the meeting thanking Al-Faroun
    for his courage, noting that it was not a risk-free endeavor
    "bringing Saddam to justice." He noted that what happened
    during the execution "tainted" the entire episode and asked
    for the prosecutor's perspective. "We need to look back in
    order to look forward," the Ambassador said, referencing the
    two other executions still scheduled to occur in January.
    Al-Faroun described arriving at the Prime Minister's
    Residence on December 29 after he was informed the execution
    would occur early the next morning. Included in the planning
    and discussions were a group of Iraqi advisors from the PM's
    office and other GOI officials, including National Security
    Advisor Muwafuq Rubaie.

    ¶3. (C) Following this meeting, al-Faroun said, the fourteen
    officials went directly to the helicopter landing zone, LZ
    Washington located in the International Zone adjacent to the
    Embassy Annex, for travel aboard a MNF-I helicopter to the
    execution site. At LZ Washington American personnel searched
    everyone and took the passengers' cell phones, al-Faroun
    explained. It was a very "thorough" search, he said. (Note:
    The Iraqi officials were searched by U.S. Marshals, who took
    the cell phones for operational security reasons and returned
    the cell phones once the 14 passengers landed in LZ
    Washington following the execution. They also checked to
    ensure that no weapons were carried on the aircraft. End
    Note). The fourteen officials then boarded two helicopters
    for the flight to northeastern Baghdad where the execution
    occurred. The Ambassador asked if al-Faroun knew about a van
    that allegedly arrived at the execution site with additional
    people wanting to witness the execution. Al-Faroun did not
    know about the van, but said the only witnesses to the actual
    execution were the fourteen that arrived via helicopter and
    the guards already at the location.

    ¶4. (S) Comment: During a final, hasty meeting the evening of
    29 December, Dr. Rubaie stated to Ambassador Scobey and MG
    Gardner that the GOI had developed a plan for the remaining
    logistical details and accepted the responsibility for the
    execution. The US would securely transport Saddam to the
    site, transfer custody, and potentially help with the
    transportation of remains. No US personnel would be present
    at the execution or in the adjacent courtyard. The GOI
    witness list changed several times prior to the execution and
    at one point included 20-30 personnel. MNF-I agreed to fly
    14 witnesses from LZ Washington. The GOI ultimately decided
    that other witnesses would travel by car. About one hour
    prior to the execution an SUV arrived at the base. The
    guards manning the base entry point searched the vehicle for
    weapons and explosives and then allowed the vehicle to
    proceed to the execution building. The vehicle included six
    personnel identified by the GOI as their video personnel and
    PSD. We do not know if this group was searched by Iraqi
    guards at the execution site. It is also unknown which of
    the 6 actually entered the execution building as no US
    personnel were in the courtyard or building. After the
    transfer of physical custody of Saddam inside the holding
    cell building, MNF-I personnel moved away from the execution
    site to positions around the small MOJ compound. The GOI was
    responsible for the execution building, access to the
    building and courtyard, and the conduct of the execution.
    The GOI's lack of a clear and coordinated plan to control the
    witnesses and conduct the execution resulted in a hastily run
    and confusing event. End Comment

    BAGHDAD 00000146 002 OF 003

    --------------------------------------------- -----------
    FINAL PLANS: UNTIL THIS POINT, NOTHING IMPROPER OCCURRED
    --------------------------------------------- -----------

    ¶5. (C) Al-Faroun and the judge immediately separated from the
    group to meet with Saddam, read the verdict and escort him to
    the execution room. Al-Faroun said he "sympathized" with
    Saddam who entered with his covered head, hands tied and
    shaking involuntarily. The judge then read the verdict and
    the death sentence. At that point Al-Faroun said, Saddam
    became more animated and began speaking, "as if he were still
    the President." Once the readings had finished, al-Faroun
    explained, the three men, accompanied by four prison guards,
    walked down a long corridor lined with the fourteen witnesses
    to the room where the execution would occur.

    ¶6. (S) The Ambassador asked whether this was the same site
    Saddam used to execute Dawa party members. Al-Faroun
    affirmed that it was the same place, but noted that it had
    also been used for other executions as well. EmbOff
    confirmed the location has been used previously and that
    Americans constructed the execution platform. Al-Faroun
    interjected that the original platform was not built to
    proper standards, and that as a result criminals were
    suffering during execution. The new platform requires
    prisoners to climb a flight of stairs and ensures less
    suffering, al-Faroun said. The Ambassador then asked whether
    the four guards were members of Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), the
    militia loyal to Shia extremist Moqtada al-Sadr. Al-Faroun
    replied that as far as he knew they were official prison
    guards.

    ¶7. (C) Rubaie then approached Saddam and asked him if he was
    afraid. Saddam responded that he was not afraid, that he had
    been "anticipating this moment" since he first came to power,
    knowing that as President he had many enemies. Saddam had
    been holding a Koran and asked who among the witnesses would
    ensure Awad al-Bandar's son received it. Al-Faroun agreed to
    take the book and after Saddam handed it to him the guards
    retied his hands. Al-Faroun emphasized that up until this
    point nothing "improper" had occurred.

    --------------------------------------------- ----------
    ...AND THEN THE TAUNTING, THE YELLING, THE PHOTOS BEGIN
    --------------------------------------------- ----------

    ¶8. (S) The guards then began to tie Saddam's feet at which
    point he asked who would help him climb the stairs. It was
    at this moment, al-Faroun said, that a guard told Saddam to
    "go to hell." Al-Faroun raised his voice immediately and
    warned people that "he would not allow the guards or
    witnesses to speak" to Saddam. He turned around, he said, to
    further admonish the witnesses and saw two government
    officials openly taking photos with their mobile phones.

    ¶9. (S) Two guards escorted Saddam upstairs and offered to
    cover his head with a hood. Saddam refused. The executioner
    explained that the noose could cut his neck and offered him a
    cloth to prevent any pain. The prison guards, standing below
    the platform watched Saddam as he prayed. Before Saddam
    finished, al-Faroun said, one person shouted "Moqtada,
    Moqtada, Moqtada." The prosecutor claimed that he again
    raised his voice to silence the witnesses. This disruption,
    he said, occurred only once and did not delay the execution.
    Saddam Hussein died instantaneously. He was removed from the
    platform and placed in a bag. A religious leader later
    ensured that Saddam's body had been washed according to
    Islamic custom.

    --------------------------------------------- ----------------
    CONTROVERSIES - TIMING AND LEGAL ISSUES - AND LESSONS LEARNED
    --------------------------------------------- ----------------

    ¶10. (S) Al-Faroun told the Ambassador that despite the
    controversies, he witnessed "a condemned person convicted in
    a legal trial" which had proven Saddam "killed thousands."
    The Ambassador agreed that Saddam's supporters would use the
    execution as an excuse to condemn what had been a fair and
    just trial. However, he continued, there were many people
    who had been happy to see Saddam brought to justice who were
    now upset by how the execution occurred. The Ambassador
    asked about the execution's timing, commenting that having
    the execution one hour before Sunni's celebrated Eid has
    angered some people. Al-Faroun replied that there are both
    social and legal opinions about implementing the death
    penalty during holidays. The legal opinion, he said, states
    that criminals cannot be executed on a holiday. The GOI
    examined the timing, he said, and experts concluded that if

    BAGHDAD 00000146 003 OF 003

    it finished before sunrise it would not coincide with Eid.
    The social opinion shared by some members of the
    international community, he continued, is that the death
    penalty should not be used at any time regardless of whether
    it occurs during a holiday. Al-Faroun disregarded this
    argument, noting that law "does not take into account
    people's feelings."

    ¶11. (S) The Ambassador stated that some have questioned the
    execution's legality given the absence of an "administrative
    affirmation" from President Talabani. The Ambassador noted
    that if the PM did not believe an affirmation was necessary,
    they should have asked Iraqi Chief Justice Medhat to declare
    this in writing. The prosecutor responded that under Iraqi
    law the President has the ability to reduce sentences for
    normal crimes. Saddam's sentence was not presented to the
    President because in this instance he had no authority to
    commute the sentence. Article 27 of the Iraqi Criminal
    Courts law, al-Faroun said, states that sentences issued from
    the Iraqi High Tribunal cannot be reduced. The reason for
    this, he explained, is because cases prosecuted here are
    crimes against humanity instead of crimes against Iraq. An
    Iraqi leader, therefore, does not have the authority to
    reduce these sentences.

    ¶12. (C) The Ambassador asked al-Faroun what the GOI will
    change in the next two upcoming executions. Al-Faroun
    responded emphatically that the only witnesses who will be
    permitted are those required by law: a public prosecutor, a
    judge, a religious leader and the prison director. This, he
    concluded, will prevent unacceptable behavior and unnecessary
    controversy.
    KHALILZAD

`