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### Viewing cable 10KABUL628, MINISTER OF INTERIOR REVIEWS POLICE TRAINING, CN POLICING

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10KABUL628 | 2010-02-18 16:04 | 2011-01-20 19:07 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kabul

`

    VZCZCXRO6962
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
    DE RUEHBUL #0628/01 0491657
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 181657Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5708
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000628

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2020
    TAGS: SNAR PGOV PREL PINS PK RU AF
    SUBJECT: MINISTER OF INTERIOR REVIEWS POLICE TRAINING, CN POLICING
    AND REGIONAL RELATIONS WITH DRUG CZAR

    Classified By: CDDEA Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne reasons 1.4 b & d.

    REF: 10 KABUL 575

    ¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 2 meeting, Director of the White House
    Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) R. Gil Kerlikowske
    joined by Ambassador Wayne, discussed a range of current issues with
    Afghan Minister of Interior Hanif Atmar. Atmar expressed
    satisfaction with the steady development of the Major Crimes Task
    Force (MCTF), especially on corruption, but hoped to see more
    progress on kidnapping, an area where the GIRoA needed better
    intelligence. Atmar hoped to begin sending 12-15,000 Afghan National
    Police (ANP) to train outside of Afghanistan each year, and to
    receive NATO funding and support to use a training facility
    constructed in Jordan for training Iraqi police for Afghan police
    officers. Atmar commended DEA's success in developing elite, vetted
    units of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), supported
    expansion of the CNPA eradication force despite the termination of
    the U.S.-funded Poppy Eradication Force; and welcomed greater U.S.
    and coalition support to develop CNPA investigative capacity at the
    provincial level. Atmar was supportive of existing limited training
    exchanges with Russia, noting that other regional relationships would
    be more effective if pursued through a subject-specific task force
    structure, and requested U.S. support in pursuing such an approach
    with Pakistan (which Kerlikowske agreed to convey to FBI Director
    Mueller). He also commented on recent raids against hawalas
    (reftel). End Summary.

    MAJOR CRIMES TASK FORCE
    ------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Minister Atmar expressed satisfaction with progress on the
    Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), observing that it was slowly emerging
    as a key law enforcement institution in Afghanistan and that he was
    working with the FBI as well as the UK Serious Organised Crime Agency
    (SOCA) to accelerate progress. While good progress had been made on
    the MCTF Corruption and Kidnapping Units, not as much progress had
    been made on specific kidnapping cases, which require better
    intelligence assets than the Afghan government currently possesses.

    POLICE: LOOKING FOR TRAINING ABROAD, INCLUDING IN JORDAN
    ------- --------------------------------------------- ---

    ¶3. (C) Turning to the Afghan National Police (ANP), Atmar sought help
    from international partners to train a new generation of police
    leaders (and noted he planned to raise this issue with FBI Director
    Mueller during his upcoming visit in late February). Since the
    maximum annual training capacity in Afghanistan was about 30,000
    trainees, and there was a need to train 50,000 per year to meet
    expansion targets and offset attrition, Atmar expressed that hope
    that U.S. and European officials could train 12-15,000 officers per
    year outside of Afghanistan. As the U.S. had constructed a big
    facility for police training in Jordan, which he had heard was
    under-utilized, he thought it would make a good site for ANP training
    and especially for officer candidate training. The opportunity to
    study abroad would boost the appeal for ANP recruits, while training
    in safer Jordan would make it easier for the Europeans to provide
    trainers. EUPOL, he noted, had missed its trainer targets for the
    past two years due to the reluctance of European police trainers to
    come to Afghanistan.

    ¶4. (C) Noting that he had sought Ambassador Holbrooke's help in
    lining up the Jordan facility, Atmar expressed hope that the ANP
    would hope to obtain rights to use the facility free of charge, with
    international donors providing meals and incidental expenses to the
    Afghan trainees with NATO transporting the trainees. The Minister
    said he planned to raise this proposal at the NATO Summit in
    Istanbul. He said he also hoped the UAE might contribute to paying
    expenses.

    DEVELOPING THE COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICE
    --------------------------------------

    ¶5. (C) Minister Atmar expressed his commitment to strengthening the
    Counter-narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), especially in the
    area of intelligence, adding that he had recently authorized its
    expansion. He said the CNPA Counter-narcotics Training Academy was
    one of our best training facilities. Atmar characterized the CNPA
    as having three tiers: the top end, where vetted units developed by
    DEA (our most trustworthy partner) and SOCA were doing a great job;
    the eradication force, which Atmar said planned to expand despite the
    termination of the U.S. Poppy Eradication Force (PEF) program (We
    need to keep that force to demonstrate that we are serious); and the
    CNPA officers on the ground, responsible for investigating narcotics
    cases, which faced the greatest challenges, especially in the area of
    intelligence. Ambassador Wayne noted that DEA and INL were working
    with DoD's Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan
    (CSTC-A)on how to build capacity within the CNPA, including: using
    some of the personnel from the former PEF, working with the vetted
    National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and providing more training. Atmar
    welcomed this, commenting that his goal was to obtain enough
    resources to establish a functioning CNPA presence in all of

    KABUL 00000628 002 OF 002

    Afghanistan's 365 districts. To that end, he had already allocated
    several hundred more tashkiel (approved personnel register) slots to
    the CNPA, adding that 95 percent of CNPA positions were filled.
    Noting that the drug mafia needs to know the police are after them,
    he observed that while production was concentrated in the South,
    trafficking continued to be a problem even in the North that had
    largely beat back poppy cultivation.

    REGIONAL RELATIONS - MOVING TO A TASK FORCE BASED APPROACH
    ------------------ -------------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) Noting that his next stop would be Moscow, Director
    Kerlikowske asked if there were any areas of cooperation he might
    suggest to the Russians. Atmar responded that Russia had offered to
    provide training, and while there was initially some Afghan
    resistance, he was prepared to expand that, although I don't want to
    send everyone to Moscow. He said it is essential to maintain a
    relationship with Russian law enforcement to foster regional
    cooperation on narcotics and weapons trafficking, particularly with
    the Central Asian republics. Regional cooperation has been
    unsuccessful over the last eight years because of the inadequacy of
    institutional arrangements, not because of the lack of political
    will. He expressed the desire to form working level joint task
    forces with Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, to look
    at issues like trade/smuggling, weapons and narcotics.

    ¶7. (C) Minister Atmar also commented on the difficulty of working
    with the Iranians and Pakistanis. Iran's support for insurgents has
    made cooperation difficult, and Atmar had encountered resistance from
    the Afghan Border Police to working with their Iranian counterparts
    because they resent Iran's support for insurgents. With Pakistan,
    Atmar had had limited success in establishing a joint task force, as
    agreed with FBI Director Mueller and GOP Minister Malik. The key to
    progress on these issues would be to move them from normal diplomatic
    channels to police-centered task forces, away from the bureaucracy,
    he argued. Atmar said he would appreciate U.S. assistance in
    establishing such an approach; Kerlikowske pledged to discuss this
    with Director Mueller in Washington.

    ¶8. (C) Director Kerlikowske asked whether Interpol had a role to play
    in addressing these issues. Atmar responded that it should, for
    example, on drugs, money-laundering, threat finance, and
    counter-terrorism. DEA had told him that people were smuggling
    thirty million dollars a week through Kabul Airport, so Interpol had
    a key role in determining where that money was going (with Afghan law
    enforcement entities responsible for identifying where it came from).
    Another useful role for Interpol would be to arrange the deportation
    of criminals with outstanding arrest warrants who were working
    against Afghanistan in Quetta and Karachi, he stated.

    ¶9. (C) Atmar and Wayne also discussed recent threat finance
    enforcement actions, and next steps (septel).

    ¶10. (SBU) This message has been cleared by ONDCP Director Kerlikowske.

    EIKENBERRY

`