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### Viewing cable 09STATE14070, RUSSIA'S ANTICIPATED TRANSFER OF IGLA-S (SA-24)

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09STATE14070 | 2009-02-14 16:04 | 2010-12-08 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Secretary of State

`

    O 141605Z FEB 09
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
    AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE

` `

    S E C R E T STATE 014070

    NOFORN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019
    TAGS: ETTC MARR MCAP MOPS PARM PINR PREL PTER
    SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S ANTICIPATED TRANSFER OF IGLA-S (SA-24)
    MANPADS TO VENEZUELA

    REFS:
    (A) 2005 STATE 165022
    (B) 2005 MOSCOW 11807
    (C) 2005 STATE 117165
    (D) 2005 MOSCOW 8915
    (E) 2004 STATE 257697
    (F) 2004 MOSCOW 15123
    (G) 2004 STATE 188657
    (H) 2004 MOSCOW 14726
    (I) CIS DOC.

    CLASSIFIED BY EUR/FO ? IAN KELLY, REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

    ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Moscow,
    please see paragraph 8.

    BACKGROUND

    ¶2. (S) Over the past four years the USG has raised its
    concerns with the Government of Russia (GOR) about the
    Government of Venezuela's (GOV) possible acquisition
    of MANPADS and other conventional weapons. In
    particular, we have highlighted the risk these could
    be diverted to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
    Colombia (FARC) or other regional terrorists and non-
    state actors.

    ¶3. (S/NF) The Igla-S (SA-24) is Russia's most advanced
    MANPADS and considered one of the most lethal portable
    air defense systems ever made (Ref A). Currently,
    Venezuela's tactical air defense inventory consists of
    1970s-era Swedish (RBS-70) and 1980s-era French
    systems (Mistral), which are both crew-served systems.
    If the SA-24 transfer occurs, it would be Venezuela's
    first man-portable air defense weapon. The United
    States and Russia have been very involved in efforts
    to prevent the proliferation of MANPADS and strengthen
    controls over their export. Of particular concern is
    preventing the transfer of such systems into regions
    known to foster unreliable end-users. We are
    concerned with Venezuela?s ability to properly secure
    and safeguard small arms and light weapons (SA/LW).
    We see no indication that Venezuela is prepared to
    implement adequate physical security and stockpile
    management practices for such systems consistent with
    international standards.

    ¶4. (S) In 2005, we reiterated U.S. concerns regarding
    arms sales to Venezuela during a meeting with Anatoliy
    Antonov, MFA Director for Disarmament and Security
    Affairs (Ref B). Antonov said that he and his
    Department's experts had carefully considered the
    points we had presented and had shared them with
    Russian services. Antonov stressed that there was no
    international restriction on selling arms, including
    MANPADS, to Venezuela. Russia recognized the U.S. as
    a competitor in the international arms trade, with the
    motivation of restricting Russia's market access.
    Antonov said Russia respected the U.S. right to
    determine U.S. policy on arms sales to Venezuela, but
    added, "that is your decision, not ours; we have our
    own policy." During the U.S.-Russia MANPADS
    Arrangement Expert Meeting in 2006, when we raised
    this issue with regard to Venezuela, the GOR offered
    no assurances that it would not sell Igla-S to the
    GOV. However, it was suggested that, if a transfer
    occurred, the system would likely be vehicle-mounted.

    ¶5. (U) On November 19, 2008 the Russian News &
    Information Agency Novosti (RIA Novosti) reported that
    Rosoboronexport signed a major contract for the sale
    of Igla-S MANPADS to Venezuela. The media report also
    revealed that a manager of LOMO, a partner company in
    the production of Igla-S, stated that this implied the
    contract for the delivery of several hundred Igla-S
    MANPADS. Copy of this media report can be found at
    http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20081119/118406776 -
    print.html.

    ¶6. (S/NF) At the end of January we received reports
    that the GOV deployed ten Venezuelan specialists to
    Kolomna, Russia, to begin training on the Igla-S
    MANPADS. Reporting indicates that five of the ten
    specialists are to take part in Igla-S equipment
    acceptance inspections, sometime in the last ten days
    of February 2009.

    OBJECTIVES

    ¶7. (S) Post is requested to engage in a discussion on
    the types of weapons systems Russia is selling to
    Venezuela, and request details on procedures Russia
    believes Venezuela has in place to safely secure and
    safeguard these weapons systems, to better inform the
    new Administration as it prepares to engage Russia
    further on its concerns about this transaction. If
    the Russian Government acknowledges the transfer is
    imminent, Post should request the GOR to suspend the
    shipment until the United States and Russian
    Governments can discuss the matter more substantively
    at the appropropriate level.

    ACTION REQUEST

    ¶8. (S) Post is requested to approach appropriate host
    government officials to discuss the potential transfer
    of Igla-S missile systems to Venezuela. Post may draw
    upon the following points:

    (S/REL to RUSSIA) Begin Talking Points

    -- The U.S. and Russia have committed to enhancing the
    control of MANPADS to prevent their acquisition and
    use by non-state actors and the proliferation to
    countries that do not have strong export control and
    stockpile management procedures.

    -- In this context, we would like to discuss with you
    the reports indicating Russia may sell the Igla-S
    system to Venezuela.

    -- We have recently seen press reports indicating that
    Rosoboronexport has signed a contract with the St.
    Petersburg-based Leningrad Optical-Mechanical
    Association (LOMO) for the sale of Igla-S MANPADS to
    Venezuela.

    -- As we have previously discussed, our governments
    have a shared concern about FARC's activities,
    including the acquisition of lethal military items.

    -- We understand there are no international
    restrictions on selling arms, including MANPADS, to
    Venezuela.

    -- However, we have worked together to lead efforts
    multilaterally to control MANPADS because of their
    appeal to terrorists and insurgents and their threat
    to civilian aircraft.

    -- Most recently, we reached agreement in the
    Wassenaar Arrangement to tighten our national
    controls, particularly toward end-users who are unable
    to protect against theft, loss, misuse, or diversion.

    -- This is the basis of serious U.S. concern in this
    possible transaction, as Venezuela's ties to the FARC
    represent a serious proliferation/diversion risk.

    -- We appreciate the frank and useful exchanges we
    have had on Latin America during WHA A/S Thomas
    Shannon's visit to Moscow and our continuing
    cooperation on non-proliferation and counterterrorism.

    -- In previous discussions on this issue, Russia has
    advised that it has stringent end-use requirements
    (consistent with the Wassenaar guidelines) for such
    sales and requested more specific information on why
    the U.S. views this possible transaction as a risk.
    A/S Shannon advised in his meeting that information
    gleaned from FARC hard-drives obtained by the
    Colombian government in March 2008 indicate Venezuelan
    government officials have tried to facilitate black
    and gray arms market deals for the FARC. This
    information was widely disseminated in major
    mainstream international media outlets.

    -- More specifically, information on the hard-drives
    indicated specific discussions between the Government
    of Venezuela and FARC on the provision of MANPADS.
    This highlights the basis of U.S. concerns.

    -- In September 2008, the U.S. Department of
    Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
    designated two senior Venezuelan government officials,
    Hugo Carvajal Barrios and Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva,
    and one former official, Ramon Rodriguez Chacin, for
    materially assisting the narcotics trafficking
    activities of the FARC. This action was taken under
    the Kingpin Act. Carvajal is the director of
    Venezuela's military intelligence DIM); Rangel Silva
    is the head of civilian intelligence (DISIP). Chacin
    is the former interior and justice minister. He
    resigned September 8, 2008. (For more information, go
    to www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1132.htm on
    Opennet)

    -- In light of Venezuela's relationship with the FARC,
    corruption within the Venezuelan military, and our
    assessment that Venezuela's stockpile and security
    management practices do not meet international
    standards, we are concerned there is a significant
    risk that these weapons could be diverted to the FARC.
    We also do not rule out the possibility that the
    transfer of the IGLA-S weapon system could displace
    and make available existing weapon systems for FARC?s
    use.

    -- Further, we fear that should these sophisticated
    systems fall into the hands of the FARC, they could
    possibly be sold or traded to drug organizations,
    including those in Mexico, which are actively seeking
    to acquire powerful and highly sophisticated weapons
    for use against government forces.

    -- The U.S. is particularly concerned about this
    possibility because FARC's acquisition of MANPADS
    would constitute a new capability for the group to
    undermine peace and security in the region as well as
    threaten counter-narcotics operations in Colombia.

    -- Given these serious risks, we have serious concerns
    about this transaction going forward. If this
    shipment is to be transferred imminently, we
    respectfully ask that your government suspend delivery
    of these sophisticated weapons so we may have a more
    substantive discussion. The United States also would
    welcome more details on the steps you have planned to
    take or assurances that you could share with us
    regarding Venezuela's procedures to safely secure and
    protect these types of weapons systems in order to
    prevent their proliferation or theft.
    End Talking Points.

    ¶9. (SBU) Washington appreciates Posts' assistance on
    this matter. Department points of contact are Lou
    Ganem, (202) 647-2329, ganemlc@state.sgov.gov. and Nate
    Young (EUR/PRA), 202-647-7278, YoungNH@state.sgov.gov.
    Please slug all replies to ISN/CATR, EUR/PRA, and
    WHA/AND.

    CLINTON

`