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### Viewing cable 09USNATO464, ACTION REQUEST: BALTIC CONTINGENCY PLANNING: SOME

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09USNATO464 | 2009-10-20 16:04 | 2010-12-06 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Mission USNATO

`

    VZCZCXRO4913
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHSL
    DE RUEHNO #0464/01 2931658
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 201658Z OCT 09
    FM USMISSION USNATO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3502
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6537
    RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA PRIORITY 7164
    RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN PRIORITY 0013
    RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PRIORITY 7310
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
    RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000464

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 10/18/2029
    TAGS: MARR MCAP PREL NATO ZB RS
    SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: BALTIC CONTINGENCY PLANNING: SOME
    IDEAS

    REF: A. VILNIUS 533
    ¶B. VILNIUS 527
    ¶C. TALLIN 309
    ¶D. RIGA 514
    ¶E. SECRETARY (SECTO) 007

    Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder.  Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (SBU) This is an action request.  See paragraph 10.

    ¶2. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Leaders in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
    are pressing hard for NATO Article 5 contingency planning for
    the Baltic states.  President Obama and Secretary Clinton are
    on record supporting such contingency planning for Allies.
    At the same time, however, NATO internal processes and
    politics make it difficult to openly carry out such planning,
    particularly if it would require specifying Russia as a
    potential threat.  Nevertheless, there are possible ways to
    meet the substance of Baltic demands.  The existing
    contingency plan for Poland, for example, might be modified
    to include the Baltics or generic plans for the use of the
    NATO Response Force could be exercised and certified in a
    manner consistent with Baltic defense.  We request high-level
    interagency discussion of the issue to develop the substance
    and NATO tactics of Baltic planning and exercises.  END
    SUMMARY

    Why Baltic Contingency Planning?
    --------------------------------

    ¶3. (S/NF) As reported in refs A-D, leaders in Estonia,
    Latvia, and Lithuania are pressing hard for NATO Article 5
    contingency planning for the defense of the Baltics.  The
    Administration at the highest levels is on record supporting
    such efforts.  President Obama told NATO Secretary General
    Rasmussen this during the latter's September 28-29 trip to
    Washington.  Furthermore, Secretary Clinton told her
    colleagues at the September 22 "Trans-Atlantic Dinner" in New
    York that the U.S. wants more work on Article 5 contingency
    plans (ref E).

    The Difficulties
    ----------------

    ¶4. (S/NF) At the same time, the internal processes and
    politics of the Alliance make it unlikely that a Baltic-only
    Article 5 contingency plan could be developed.  NATO
    contingency plans are designed for possible future security
    risks that are consistent with NATO's General Intelligence
    Estimate (MC 161) and NATO Ministerial Guidance.  While
    Admiral Stavridis, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe
    (SACEUR), does have the authority to generate, review and
    revise contingency plans based on changes in the strategic
    security environment, those changes to the security
    environment would need to be reflected in MC 161.  Without a
    change to MC 161, SACEUR does not have the authority to
    develop new Article 5 contingency plans.  Moreover, changes
    to MC 161 are not made by SACEUR.  They must be agreed by the
    NAC.

    ¶5. (S/NF) In this case, the Baltic states clearly believe
    that the Russian Federation represents a future security risk
    and desire a contingency plan to address that risk.  And
    therein lies the problem.  While the exact content of MC 161
    cannot be discussed in this message, post-Cold War NATO has
    consistently said that it no longer views Russia as a threat.
    Allies, for example, agreed to language in the 1997
    NATO-Russia Founding Act that "NATO and Russia do not
    consider each other as adversaries."  As we saw during the
    debates over the Russia-Georgia war, many Allies will take
    great pains to avoid even the suggestion that the Alliance
    and Russia are on course toward a new Cold War.  Countries
    such as Germany are unlikely to agree changes to MC 161 that
    explicitly define Russia as a potential threat, preferring
    instead to argue that the Alliance needs to find a way to
    work cooperatively with Moscow.

    USNATO 00000464  002 OF 003

    But Hard is Not "Too Hard"
    --------------------------

    ¶6. (S/NF) Despite these difficulties, however, there are
    steps that can be taken to meet the substance of the Baltic
    demands and demonstrate the Allied commitment to their
    defense.  As a start, SACEUR did begin conducting informal
    "prudent planning" efforts within his own Headquarters in the
    wake of the Russian-Georgian war.  These efforts should
    continue.  Furthermore, the existing NATO contingency plan
    for Poland is up for revision.  We could explore the
    possibility of revising this plan to include the
    reinforcement/defense of the Baltics as an element of the
    reinforcement/defense of Poland.  Indeed, this idea was first
    raised by the German PermRep in conversation with Ambassador
    Daalder.  NATO also has a number of agreed generic
    contingency plans for the NATO Response Force (NRF),
    including for relatively high-end "initial entry operations."
    Perhaps these generic NRF plans can be exercised/certified
    in a manner that would be consistent with the defense of the
    Baltics.  Finally, we could pursue a generic Article 5
    Alliance-wide contingency plan which would be applicable to
    multiple threats.

    Necessary for NATO-Russia; Expeditionary Forces
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶7. (S/NF) Baltic reassurance can not be seen in isolation.
    Our ability to move forward with other U.S. priorities at
    NATO will be affected by our ability to reassure the Baltic
    states.  For example, our ability to maintain an Allied
    consensus on re-engagement with Moscow will depend on it.
    Furthermore, the Baltic states have made clear that if they
    do not feel they can trust Allies to defend them, they will
    have to consider developing a force structure focused on
    territorial defense rather than on expeditionary capabilities.

    U.S. Reassurance Does Not Equal NATO Reassurance
    --------------------------------------------- ---

    ¶8. (S/NF) The U.S. has taken a number of bilateral steps to
    reassure the Baltics, including tasking the U.S. European
    Command (which ADM Stavridis heads under his U.S.-only hat)
    to develop a plan for supporting NATO deterrence and defense
    in the Baltic region.  While these efforts can be useful in
    supporting NATO contingency planning and reassurance efforts,
    if done on their own they could actually undermine our
    efforts to reassure the Baltic states that all NATO Allies
    will carry out their Article 5 commitments.  Defense of the
    Baltics must remain a NATO Article 5 commitment, not solely a
    U.S. bilateral one.  Unless consensus can be achieved within
    the Alliance to take positive steps in this direction, the
    Baltic states will continue to lose faith in the Alliance,
    undercutting a key U.S. strategic objective.  Washington
    should not allow U.S. bilateral reassurance efforts to become
    an easy substitute for NATO-wide efforts.

    Recommended Way Ahead
    ---------------------

    ¶9. (S/NF) Ambassador Daalder has been having quiet
    conversations with some Allies, as well as with SACEUR, to
    see what might be possible.  We believe that a key aspect of
    any approach would be to socialize the NAC on the issue
    through briefings by SACEUR on current plans and the extent
    to which they satisfy the requirement to defend Allied
    territory.  In addition to further consideration of the ideas
    in para 6 above, Mission proposes the following as an initial
    way ahead on this issue that we should seek to set in train:

    -- The Military Committee should task NATO Military
    Authorities to review the current family of contingency plans
    to determine if they are sufficient to meet NATO's Article 5
    commitments;

    USNATO 00000464  003 OF 003

    -- The North Atlantic Council should ask SACEUR to brief
    PermReps on the status of these plans and on their ability to
    provide for the defense/protection of Allied territory,
    populations, and Alliance interests;

    -- SHAPE should request that each Ally assess its own
    national plans and national contributions in support of these
    plans;

    -- Strategic communications/public messaging regarding NATO
    contingency planning would allow the Alliance to highlight
    its efforts to provide for the protection of Alliance
    territory from the range of threats;

    -- Ongoing Strategic Concept discussion and seminars should
    be used to identify new security threats and ways to meet
    those threats.  This process could help build consensus for
    new contingency planning efforts;

    -- The U.S. should consider the possibility/suitability of
    adapting the upcoming USEUCOM bilateral exercise, "Baltic
    Host 2010," into a NATO deterrence and defense of the Baltic
    states exercise; and

    -- As NATO contingency plans are developed, task the
    development of supporting USEUCOM contingency plans.

    ¶10. (S/NF) Mission requests that a NATO IPC be scheduled in
    the near future to discuss this issue further, with a view to
    developing a coherent interagency-agreed strategy on how to
    take forward the President's vision of contingency planning
    in NATO.
    DAALDER

`