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### Viewing cable 09BRASILIA73, BRAZILIAN SERVICE CHIEFS PRAISE DEFENSE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BRASILIA73 | 2009-01-16 10:10 | 2010-12-05 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brasilia

`

    VZCZCXRO8741
    RR RUEHRG
    DE RUEHBR #0073/01 0161053
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 161053Z JAN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
    TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3353
    INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8969
    RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7152
    RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3398
    RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000073

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2019
    TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS ETTC BR
    SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN SERVICE CHIEFS PRAISE DEFENSE
    COOPERATION, COMPLAIN ABOUT STATE DEPARTMENT

    REF: A. BRASILIA 34
    ¶B. BRASILIA 35
    ¶C. BRASILIA 41
    ¶D. 08 BRASILIA 1589
    ¶E. SAO PAULO 27

    Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL. REASON: 1.5 (D)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On January 14, Ambassador Sobel hosted the
    Chiefs of the three Brazilian Services, Gen. Enzo Peri, ADM
    Julio Soares de Moura Neto and Brig. Juniti Saito for a
    discussion of the U.S.-Brazil defense relationship and
    possibilities for future cooperation. Each of the Chiefs
    said cooperation with their counterpart U.S. service was
    excellent and gave his priorities for upcoming cooperation.
    Ambassador Sobel highlighted opportunities for defense
    industrial cooperation citing Boeing's efforts to find
    partners for the FX2 program as a model. The three stressed
    the need for better transparency of U.S. export licensing,
    with Saito saying that the perception in Brazil that slow
    licensing times reflect a State Department policy aimed at
    restricting Brazil's access to military technology was
    creating "problems at the political level," a veiled
    reference to high level resistance to the purchase of Boeing
    Super Hornet fighters. The Chiefs all cited the new Defense
    Strategy as an important step forward as it gave the issue of
    national security greater prominence in the national
    political scene. They were less positive on whether there
    would be resources available to carry out the ambitious
    strategy but felt the document would allow for a stronger
    case for resources to be directed to defense. Regarding
    future cooperation, Moura Neto underlined the importance of
    in country construction of major projects, e.g. ships. END
    SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (C) At a January 14 lunch, Ambassador Sobel invited the
    service Chiefs to discuss U.S.-Brazil security cooperation,
    in particular, their views on areas for enhancing the
    relationship. All three began by saying that they enjoyed
    close and productive relationships with their counterpart
    U.S. services. Admiral Moura Neto cited personnel exchanges
    as a success for the navy and hoped to expand such exchanges, if approved, to include the U.S. Coast Guard (the Brazilian navy performs the coast guard mission) as well. Brigadeiro Saito stated that while the overall relationship was strong with the U.S. as Brazil's most
    important supplier, there was room for improvement in the
    processing of export licenses by the State Department. General Enzo
    mentioned exchanges of army engineers as a fruitful area for
    cooperation.

    FUTURE EQUIPMENT - TO BE MADE IN BRAZIL
    ---------------------------------------
    ¶3. (C) All three chiefs underlined the growing emphasis the
    Brazilian government is placing on developing Brazilian
    industry. Moura Neto said the Navy's highest priority was
    coastal patrol craft, to be followed by a new generation of
    frigates ("escort ships"), but the government would only
    authorize acquisition of such ships if they were to be built
    in Brazil. (NOTE: He did not mention the politically popular
    submarine program as a priority. End note.) The other
    Chiefs had similar views. Enzo noted that Brazil was seeking
    to be able to perform maintenance of Black Hawk helicopters
    in
    country, rather than in the U.S. Saito and Moura Neto agreed
    that future aircraft procurement for the navy and air force
    would depend on building aircraft in country. Ambassador
    Sobel cited AVIBRAS, whom he met with recently (ref e), as a
    company intent on exploiting the potential for greater
    cooperation between U.S. and Brazilian defense industries.

    CHALLENGES - IT'S ALL THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S FAULT
    --------------------------------------------- -----
    ¶4. (C) The service chiefs each weighed in on what they
    perceive as the major problem with the U.S.-Brazil security
    relationship -- State Department export licensing. Each
    service has examples of cases in which delays in the
    licensing process have caused difficulties for the
    Brazilians. Examples include gyroscopes for the air force,
    Black Hawk parts for the army and a radar antenna. (Note:
    While these problems have most typically been due to exporter
    error, the common denominator has been State Department
    licensing. End note.) Saito said that he believes our

    BRASILIA 00000073 002 OF 002

    system is "run by bureaucrats," adding that State policies
    are based on an unwarranted view that Brazil cannot be
    trusted to protect sensitive technologies. Enzo emphatically
    stated that he believes State's actions to limit exports
    reflect the lack of a "policy of state" in favor of advancing
    the defense partnership with Brazil . Ambassador Sobel
    pointed out that data indicate no worse a rate of denial and
    RWA for Brazil than most other major importers of ITAR controlled items and noted that the recently convened Technology Security Dialogue can help remove misunderstandings. With a clear view toward the FX2 decision, Saito warned that the perceived State
    Department opposition to technology transfer to Brazil was
    creating "problems at a political level."

    DEFENSE STRATEGY - POSITIVE FOR THE MILITARY
    ---------------------------------------------
    ¶5. (C) Responding to a question of how the ambitious plans
    for military modernization would be resourced, Moura Neto
    stated that while this was an economic (as opposed to
    military) question, the advantage of the strategy document
    (see ref a for discussion) was that it made the question of
    defense resources a national one. By recognizing Brazil's
    "strategic vulnerabilities," the strategy had put the
    question of defense in the forefront of the national debate.
    Enzo added that this would be a much more positive
    development for the military as it put them "inside" of
    national development instead of on the sidelines where they
    have been since the end of military rule. While the strategy
    document contains many demands on limited resources,
    including equipment, support to inefficient industries and
    training for national service, the military views it as
    positive because it signifies a greater
    understanding of the importance of the military.

    COMMENT
    -------
    ¶6. (C) The warning from Saito, whom post considers a key
    ally in our FX2 bid, is the clearest indication yet that the
    obstacles to the F18 sale cited in refs c and d are real and
    that we still have considerable ground to cover in countering
    the perception that the USG, and the State Department in
    particular, cannot be counted on to approve the necessary
    technology transfer. The service chiefs got the point that
    the offer of the F18 signified an unprecedented willingness
    to approve technology for Brazil that would pay dividends in
    both military and defense industry cooperation in the future,
    but the political problem cited by Saito remains acute.
    SOBEL

`