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### Viewing cable 05BRUSSELS1530, CUBA: EU COMMISSIONER MICHEL BOLSTERS CUBAN FONMIN

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05BRUSSELS1530 | 2005-04-18 13:01 | 2010-12-15 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brussels

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001530

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/18/2015
    TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR EAID CU EUN USEU BRUSSELS
    SUBJECT: CUBA: EU COMMISSIONER MICHEL BOLSTERS CUBAN FONMIN

    REF: A. A) BRUSSELS 1389
         ¶B. B) BRUSSELS 1217
         ¶C. C) STATE 50857

    Classified By: USEU POLOFF TOOD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

     ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: According to his adviser on Cuba, European
    Commissioner for Development Louis Michel believes the EU
    must bolster Cuban FM Felipe Perez Roque as the best hope for
    improved EU-Cuba relations.  During his March 24-27 visit to
    the island (REFS B-C), Michel offered Perez Roque better
    relations with the EU, apparently implying that the EU wished
    to offset the U.S. embargo.  Michel reportedly was struck by
    the "frozen" world-view of the other Cuban officials he met,
    including Castro, who appeared to believe Cuba's
    relationships with Venezuela and China rendered closer
    relations with the EU unnecessary.  Michel's analysis of
    EU-Cuba relations seems unaffected by his meetings with the
    opposition.  He believes the U.S. embargo soured the
    Communist experiment on the island, and that "constructive
    engagement" with Cuba is the EU's only alternative.  His view
    has the upper hand in the EU, but continued Cuban
    intransigence could result in pressure to toughen EU policy
    by the time of the EU's June/July Cuba policy review.  END
    SUMMARY.

    ----------------------
    A CONFIDENTIAL READOUT
    ----------------------

    ¶2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX (STRICTLY PROTECT), who covers
    Cuba in the cabinet of European Commissioner for Development
    Louis Michel, called Poloff on April 14 for a "confidential"
    readout of Michel's March 24-27 visit to Cuba.  XXXXXXXXXXXX
    accompanied Michel to the island and attended all of his
    meetings except the encounter with Castro.  During his trip
    Michel met with Perez Roque, Vice President of the Council of
    State Carlos Lage, National Assembly President Ricardo
    Alarcon, Minister of Foreign Investment and Economic
    Cooperation Marta Lomas and, for three hours, with Fidel
    Castro.  In addition, Michel met Cardinal Jaime Ortega and
    Cuban opposition figures Oswaldo Paya, Marta Beatriz Roque,
    Vladimiro Roca and the Women in White, a group of wives and
    family members of imprisoned dissidents.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said he
    had offered the readout to assure Poloff that Michel fully
    shared the objective of democratic transition in Cuba and had
    reasons for his differences with the U.S. on tactics.

    ---------------------------
    PEREZ ROQUE: THE GREAT HOPE
    ---------------------------

    ¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX repeated often that Perez Roque was the only
    Cuban official Michel met with whom it was possible to have a
    give-and-take discussion.  Perez Roque appeared to be looking
    ahead to a post-Castro era, and thinking pragmatically about
    how to pursue Cuba's present and future interests.  In this
    context, he listened with interest to Michel's suggestion
    that Cuba join the Cotonou Agreement and thereby establish a
    comprehensive basis for closer political, trade and
    development-assistance relations with the EU.  (NOTE: The
    Cotonou Agreement is the framework for
    development-assistance, trade and political relations between
    the EU and the 79 members of the African, Caribbean and
    Pacific Group of States.  In exchange for a more favorable
    trade and aid relationship, Cotonou would commit Cuba to a
    regular political and human rights dialogue with the EU.  END
    NOTE.)  According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Michel told Perez Roque that
    a Cotonou-based relationship with the EU could act as a
    counterbalance to Cuba's isolation from the U.S.  He further
    suggested that, under Cotonou, the EU might be able to help
    the Cubans in sending medical doctors to countries in the
    region, as they are doing in Venezuela.

    ------------------------------
    PEREZ ROQUE NONCOMMITTAL TO EU
    ------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) Perez Roque's response to the Cotonou offer was
    noncommittal.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Cuban FM's negotiating
    style could be described as "I'll tell you the time if you
    give me your watch."  In that spirit, Perez Roque repeatedly
    told Michel the prerequisite for closer EU-Cuba ties was the
    EU's dropping support for the U.S. CHR resolution on Cuba.
    Denying that Michel had ever advocated dropping support,
    XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Michel's response was always that (1)
    Cuba must release its imprisoned dissidents; and (2) since
    the CHR resolution was purely procedural, the EU could not
    fail to support it.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said Michel raised the
    possibility of Cuba's inviting UN High Commissioner for Human
    Rights Louise Arbour or her Cuba Representative Christine
    Chanet to visit the island, in order to signal Cuba's desire
    to work with the international community.  According to
    XXXXXXXXXXXX, Perez Roque said he would consider the idea but
    never followed up.

    -----------------------------------------
    MICHEL'S EFFUSIVENESS WAS FOR PEREZ ROQUE
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX said Michel was quite aware that trying to
    buttress Perez Roque was a risk.  No one could be sure
    whether he was acting in good faith in his contacts with the
    EU, or simply "the smartest" member of a completely
    intransigent regime.  Nonetheless, Michel felt that Perez
    Roque represented the EU's only hope of influencing Cuba
    toward reform and respect for human rights.  XXXXXXXXXXX said
    Michel's effusive public optimism about EU-Cuba relations
    after the visit was meant to bolster Perez Roque.  In
    reality, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, Michel came away sobered and
    distressed.  Perez Roque would have to come through soon,
    said XXXXXXXXXXXX, by freeing more dissidents or allowing the UN
    human rights visit, or Michel and the Spaniards would no
    longer be able to advocate full constructive engagement.
    When pressed on whether "soon" meant before the upcoming
    June/July review of EU Cuba policy, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, "we'll
    probably have to give him more time than that."

    ----------------------------------
    MICHEL: CASTRO, OTHERS, DELUSIONAL
    ----------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX was at pains to contrast Perez Roque with
    the other Cuban officials they had met.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said
    Michel was struck by how "frozen" and delusional Cuban
    officials' view of the world was.  The meeting with Vice
    President of the Council of State Carlos Lage was emblematic
    of this, said XXXXXXXXXXXX.  Lage seemed truly to believe that
    all was well on the island, that time was on Cuba's side
    regarding the U.S. embargo, that the Cuban peso revaluation
    would make the economy strong and, above all, that Cuba's
    growing relations with Venezuela and China rendered closer
    relations with the EU unnecessary.  Although XXXXXXXXXXXX did
    not attend the meeting with Castro, Michel told him the
    three-hour encounter started with an almost surreal tour
    through a room Castro had showcasing Chinese products as if
    it were a museum exhibition.  Castro, too, seemed fixated on
    Venezuela and China.  Although the Alarcon meeting was less
    substantive, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Alarcon expressed views
    similar to Lage.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said Minister of Foreign
    Investment and Economic Cooperation Marta Lomas was the most
    wooden of all, sticking so close to her talking points that
    no exchange was possible.

    -------------------------------------
    MICHEL: EMBARGO FEEDS CUBAN DELUSIONS
    -------------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed that a central element of the
    official Cubans' world-view was the U.S. embargo.  The Cuban
    David had weathered the American Goliath's embargo for forty
    years, proving the regime's strength and lending it moral
    legitimacy.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said Michel felt vindicated in his
    opposition to the embargo, since he had now witnessed the
    role it played in Cuban officials' delusions.  XXXXXXXXXXXX
    added that Michel believed that Communism might have turned
    out well for Cuba if the embargo had not helped push the
    regime down the hard-line path.  This was yet another reason,
    XXXXXXXXXXXX said, to choose a Cuba policy of engagement rather
    than isolation.

    -------------------------------------------
    OPPOSITION: LITTLE EFFECT ON MICHEL'S VIEWS
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) Michel's analysis of EU-Cuba relations seems
    unaffected by his meetings with the opposition and the
    Church.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said Michel had three separate meetings
    with dissidents, one with Oswaldo Paya, another with Marta
    Beatriz Roque and Vladimiro Roca, and a third with the Women
    in White.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said little of note was discussed during
    the Paya meeting, and that Roca was the only opposition
    figure who completely opposed the lifting of the EU measures.
     Beatriz Roque, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, opposed it as well, but was
    willing to wait and see what the upshot would be.  The Women
    in White made a deep impression on Michel, according to
    XXXXXXXXXXXX, with their personal stories.  However, they did
    not discuss policy.  XXXXXXXXXXXX had little of substance to say
    about Michel's meeting with Cardinal Jaime Ortega.

    ---------------------------------------
    MICHEL GOING TO MAT FOR FULL ENGAGEMENT
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶9. (C) COMMENT: Michel apparently will stop supporting full
    constructive engagement with Cuba only if Cuban intransigence
    -- and pressure from within the EU -- makes his position
    politically untenable.  He is also willing to sell the EU
    approach to the Cubans as a counterweight to the U.S.
    embargo.  Our sense is that this attitude, buttressed by
    Spanish support, is still carrying the day in the EU.  (NOTE:
    On April 15, Perez Roque called EU support for the CHR
    resolution on Cuba "pathetic;" a Commission spokeswoman's
    response was to say that the EU supported the resolution
    because it did not condemn the Cuban authorities.  END NOTE.)
     As the June/July review of EU Cuba policy approaches, the
    commitment of anti-Castro member states such as the Czech
    Republic and Poland, and, in Brussels, of the center-right
    activists in the European Parliament (REF A) will be key.  If
    the Castro regime remains as uncompromising as it has been in
    its reaction to the CHR resolution, they might have a window
    of opportunity to modify the current policy of full
    engagement.  END COMMENT.

    SCHNABEL

`