Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 3825 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone
Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF AJ AU AG AE ASEC AS AM AR AMGT AORC AFIN APER ABUD ATRN AEMR ACOA AEC AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC AL ASIG ABLD AA AFU ASUP AROC ATFN AGMT
BE BR BA BL BEXP BTIO BM BK BRUSSELS BX BU BO BH BIDEN BY BG BF BB BC BBSR BILAT
CH CA CD CV CVIS CMGT CO CI CU CASC CBW CLINTON CE CJAN CIA CG CF CN CS CAN COUNTER CIS CM CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM CDG CJUS CARSON COUNTERTERRORISM CACM CDB
DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DJ DISENGAGEMENT DS DOD DEAX
ECON EFIN ELAB EU ETRD ENRG EPET EG EAGR EAID ETTC EINV EIND EUN EAIR ER ECIN ECPS EFIS EI EINT EZ EMIN ET EC ENVR ES ECA EWWT ELTN EN EXTERNAL EINVETC ENIV EINN ENGR EUR ESA ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FJ FMLN
GA GG GM GV GH GE GT GR GTIP GOI GCC GAZA GZ GTMO
HU HR HILLARY HA HUMAN HO HYMPSK HURI HK
IR IS IZ INTERPOL IPR IN IT INRB IAEA IRAJ INRA INRO IO IC ID IIP ITPHUM IV IWC IQ ICTY ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC ICAO IMO IF ILC IEFIN INTELSAT IL IA IBRD IMF ITALY ITALIAN
JO JA JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JUS JAMES
KCOR KN KS KDEM KNNP KSPR KPAL KJUS KFRD KCRM KTIP KZ KPAO KTFN KIPR KPKO KSCA KISL KNUC KMDR KGHG KPLS KE KOLY KWBG KUNR KDRG KAWK KIRF KIRC KU KBIO KHLS KG KACT KGIC KRAD KCOM KMCA KV KHDP KVPR KDEV KWMN KTIA KHIV KPRP KAWC KCIP KCFE KOCI KTDB KMRS KLIG KBCT KICC KGIT KSTC KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KOMC KO KTER KSUM KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KMPI KNPP KNAR KWMM KERG KFIN KTBT KCRS KRVC KR KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KGCC KPIN
LE LH LY LU LG LI LO LOG LT
MARR MO MOPS MASS MNUC ML MR MZ MCAP MPOS MOPPS MTCRE MX MTCR MAPP MU MY MA MG MASC MCC MK MTRE MP MIL MDC MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MEPP
NG NATO NL NI NU NIPP NO NPT NE NS NAR NZ NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NGO NATIONAL
ODIP OIIP OREP OVIP OEXC OPRC OFDP OPDC OTRA OSCE OAS OPIC OECD OPCW OSCI OTR OVP OFFICIALS OSAC
PREL PGOV PTER PINR PSOE PHUM PBTS PARM PK PREF PINS PL PHSA PE PKFK PO PGOF PROP PARMS PA PM PMIL PTERE POL PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PNAT PROV PEL POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PU POLITICAL PARTIES PBIO PECON POGOV PINL
QA
RW RS RU RP RIGHTS RICE RO ROBERT RF RFE REGION
SP SOCI SENV SNAR SL SW SY SG SU SA SMIG SCUL SO SF SR SN SHUM SZ SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SH SI STEINBERG
TU TS TBIO TH TX TRGY TSPA TC TI TIP TR TT TW TERRORISM TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TPHY TK TNGD
UV US UK UP UN UNSC UNGA USEU UG USUN UY UZ UNO UNMIK UE UNESCO UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS UNAUS
VT VE VZ VM VTPREL VN
WTRO WA WI WMO WTRQ WHO WWARD WB WBG WTO
XA XF XT XM XY XG XC XH XL XZ XW XR XD XS XK
YM YI YE
ZB ZI ZP ZK ZF ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU ZA

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09SANAA1669, BRENNAN-SALEH MEETING SEP 6, 2009

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09SANAA1669.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09SANAA1669 | 2009-09-15 06:06 | 2010-12-03 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Sanaa

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHYN #1669/01 2580612
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 150612Z SEP 09
    FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2761
    INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0250
    RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1671
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

` `

    S E C R E T SANAA 001669

    SIPDIS
    NOFORN

    NSC FOR APDNSA JOHN BRENNAN AND DENISE MORAGA
    DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2019
    TAGS: PTER PGOV PINR KDRG PINS SA YM
    SUBJECT: BRENNAN-SALEH MEETING SEP 6, 2009

    REF: SANAA 01549

    Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b),
    (c), and (d).

    ¶1.  (S/NF) SUMMARY.  In a September 6 meeting with Deputy
    National Security Advisor John Brennan, President Saleh
    pledged unfettered access to Yemen's national territory for
    U.S. counterterrorism operations, suggesting that in the
    process, the USG assumed responsibility for the success - or
    failure - of efforts to neutralize AQAP in Yemen.  Saleh
    expressed dissatisfaction with the USG's current level of aid
    for CT and security operations and insisted the ROYG began
    its war against the al-Houthi rebellion in northern Yemen on
    behalf of the U.S.  Saleh stated his preference for Saudi
    Arabia over Jordan as a potential rehabilitation site for
    Guantanamo detainees of Yemeni origin, but claimed the ROYG
    was willing and able to accept them in Yemeni prisons.  In a
    one-on-one that followed, Brennan extended an invitation to
    Saleh to visit President Obama at the White House on October
    ¶6.  END SUMMARY.

    "OPEN LAND, AIR, AND SEA" FOR U.S. STRIKES AGAINST AQAP
    --------------------------------------------- ----------

    ¶2.  (S/NF) In a September 6 meeting with Deputy National
    Security Advisor John Brennan, President Saleh insisted that
    Yemen's national territory is available for unilateral CT
    operations by the U.S.  Dissatisfied with current levels of
    USG funding and military training provided to the ROYG's CT
    forces, Saleh asserted that the USG has produced "only words,
    but no solutions" to the terrorism issue in Yemen.  Saleh
    repeatedly requested more funds and equipment to fight
    al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), while at the same
    time placing responsibility for any future AQAP attacks on
    the shoulders of the USG now that it enjoys unfettered access
    to Yemeni airspace, coastal waters and land.  (NOTE.  The USG
    has been actively engaged since 2001 in training elements of
    Yemen's CT forces, including the Counter-Terrorism Unit
    (CTU), the Yemen Special Operations Force (YSOF), the
    Presidential Guard, the Yemeni Border Troops, Yemen Air Force
    (YAF), and the Yemen Coast Guard (YCG). The USG has expended
    over $115 million equipping CT forces since FY02.  In 2009
    alone, U.S. teams have instructed Yemeni CT forces in
    training valued at $5 million.  END NOTE.)

    ¶3.  (S/NF) While Saleh offered assurances that the ROYG is
    "determined to continue the war against al-Qaeda because
    they're targeting U.S. and Yemeni interests," he continued to
    link increased U.S. access to AQAP targets with full
    responsibility for achieving CT goals.  Highlighting the
    potential for a future AQAP attack on the U.S. Embassy or
    other Western targets, Saleh said, "I have given you an open
    door on terrorism, so I am not responsible."

    THE SA'ADA WAR: "THE HOUTHIS ARE YOUR ENEMIES TOO"
    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶4.  (S/NF) President Saleh expressed his frustration with the
    USG refusal to view the Sa'ada war against the al-Houthis in
    the north in the same light as the fight against AQAP.
    Claiming a need for increased aid and support, Saleh asserted
    that "this war we're launching is a war on behalf of the
    U.S....the Houthis are your enemies too," citing videos of
    al-Houthi followers chanting, "Death to Israel, death to
    America."  (NOTE:  The Houthis have not attacked U.S.
    interests or personnel in the six rounds of fighting between
    the ROYG and the Houthis that began in 2004.  END NOTE.)  The
    USG's failure to view the Houthis as terrorists and equip
    ROYG forces to fight them in Sa'ada undermines the USG's
    claims of friendship and cooperation, according to Saleh.
    Commenting on the status of ROYG forces in Sa'ada, Saleh
    said, "we are suffering a lot of casualties and loss of
    material."  Renewing his requests for armored personnel
    vehicles, aircraft, and medical evacuation vehicles, Saleh
    echoed his criticism of U.S. efforts. "We need deeds, not
    only words," he said.  Brennan responded that the USG is
    prohibited by law from providing military support to the ROYG
    to be used against the Houthis since the USG considers the
    group a domestic insurgency.

    ¶5.  (S/NF) Restating claims of Iranian support to the Houthi
    movement,  ROYG officials present said they had provided
    files supporting an Iranian-Houthi connection to USG
    officials and would provide more if necessary.  (NOTE.  The
    Ambassador acknowledged receiving a file that was reviewed
    here and in Washington; however, no conclusive evidence of an
    Iranian-Houthi link has been made from these or other
    records.  Brennan said that he would request a fresh scrub of
    all available intelligence to see if it turned up any
    evidence of Iranian involvement.  END NOTE.)  Saleh said,
    "Iran is trying to settle old scores against the U.S. by
    ruining relations between Yemen and GCC countries and the
    U.S."  He also made a tangential reference to Hezbollah,
    claiming the organization's influence in the region also
    rendered the ROYG-Houthi war a fight on behalf of the U.S.
    Referencing the high poverty rate and illicit arms flows into
    both Yemen and Somalia, Saleh concluded by saying, "If you
    don't help, this country will become worse than Somalia."

    MUDDLED MESSAGES ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶6.  (S/NF) Saleh expressed his preference for the existing
    Saudi Arabia option as a potential site for rehabilitating
    Guantanamo detainees of Yemeni origin over a proposed
    Jordanian option, citing closer familial ties and cultural
    bonds in Saudi Arabia as mechanisms for more effective
    treatment.  Saleh commented that he thought the Jordanians
    were &too poor8 to support a rehabilitation program, but
    did not dismiss Jordan as an option. However, he signaled
    that rehabilitation is not his concern, but rather "the
    U.S.'s problem" as he is ready and willing to accept all
    Yemeni detainees into the Yemeni prison system.  (COMMENT.
    Saleh would, in our judgment, be unable to hold returning
    detainees in jail for any more than a matter of weeks before
    public pressure ) or the courts ) forced their release.
    END COMMENT.)  Saleh urged the USG to design and implement a
    rehabilitation and education program for the detainees and to
    build a rehabilitation center in Yemen, but reiterated that
    the U.S. would have to fund these projects, repeatedly
    asking, "How many dollars is the U.S. going to bring?"
    However, when Brennan offered $500,000 as an initial
    investment currently available for the crafting of a
    rehabilitation program, Saleh dismissed the offer as
    insufficient.  Saleh also assured Brennan that he was
    committed to "freeing the innocent people after a complete
    and total rehabilitation," suggesting a lack of clarity on
    his own policy and on the status of Guantanamo detainees in
    the ROYG legal system.

    ECONOMIC REFORM AND CORRUPTION
    ------------------------------

    ¶7.  (S/NF) Saleh welcomed the letter from President Obama
    that Brennan hand-carried, and expressed appreciation for
    U.S. concern over the stability and economic hardships facing
    the country.  He agreed to move forward with the 10-point
    plan outlining necessary economic reforms (reftel) but did
    not provide details regarding dates or implementation goals.
    Responding to Brennan's concerns that economic and other
    assistance might be diverted through corrupt officials to
    other purposes, Saleh urged the U.S. to donate supplies and
    hardware rather than liquid funds in order to curb
    corruption's reach.  Saleh also told US officials that they
    could have full access to financial records to ensure proper
    usage of donor funding. (COMMENT.  Saleh's preference for
    infrastructure and equipment over cash displays a lack of
    confidence in his own regime's ability to handle liquid
    assets and hardly provides a viable solution for stemming the
    curb of corruption in the long run.  END COMMENT.)

    VISIT TO WASHINGTON & OTHER ISSUES
    ----------------------------------

    ¶8.  (S/NF) Saleh again asked to visit the U.S., arguing that
    it was necessary to resolve issues regarding the Guantanamo
    detainees and increased military assistance.  "We see this
    visit as very important to reach mutual understanding and so
    that you understand our requests and demands."  Brennan
    undertook to look into Saleh's claims of "promised" military
    equipment that has not been delivered. In a one-on-one
    session that followed the formal meeting, Brennan extended an
    invitation to Saleh to meet President Obama at the White
    House on October 6.  Saleh also stated that there would be no
    more delays in the U.S. Embassy's request to purchase lands
    for the building of more secure housing facilities and that
    the Shari'a Council would approve the transfer of the lands
    from waqf (or publicly held) status to free-hold status.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶9.  (S/NF) COMMENT.  Saleh was in vintage form during the two
    hours he spent with DNSA Brennan, at times disdainful and
    dismissive and at others, conciliatory and congenial.  One
    might easily conclude that his repeated assertion that
    Yemen's national territory is open to the US to conduct
    operations against AQAP reflects his interest in outsourcing
    the CT effort in Yemen to the USG, especially in view of his
    somewhat ominous claim that, should AQAP attacks occur in the
    future, they will be the result of the U.S. having failed to
    do enough to put the organization out of business.
    Additionally, a concerted USG anti-terrorism campaign in
    Yemen will free Saleh to continue to devote his limited
    security assets to the ongoing war against Houthi rebels in
    Sa'ada.  The net effect, and one we strongly suspect Saleh
    has calculated, of both the American and ROYG "iron fist"
    unleashed at the same time in Yemen will be a clear message
    to the southern movement or any other party interested in
    generating political unrest in the country that a similar
    fate awaits them.

    ¶10.  (S/NF) COMMENT CONTINUED.  Not surprisingly, Saleh was
    far less animated when Brennan attempted to focus his
    attention on the need for immediate action to relieve Yemen's
    deteriorating socio-economic situation, largely limiting his
    response to a pitch that the USG persuade recalcitrant donors
    to speed up and increase their assistance to Yemen.  After
    stating petulantly in the group session that he was no longer
    interested in an invitation to the White House, telling
    Brennan that "my relationship with you is sufficient,"
    Saleh's mood changed noticeably for the better when the
    invitation was extended, and he had captured the prize he has
    been chasing after for months.  END COMMENT.
    SECHE

`