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### Viewing cable 08REYKJAVIK199, Iceland's Bid for the UN Security Council

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08REYKJAVIK199 | 2008-09-12 16:04 | 2011-01-13 05:05 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Reykjavik

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHRK #0199/01 2561657
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 121657Z SEP 08
    FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3792
    INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0094
    RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0017
    RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0021
    RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
    RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 0003
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L REYKJAVIK 000199

    NOFORN

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR P, IO A/S HOOK, IO/UNP, EUR, EUR/NB

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018
    TAGS: PREL UNSC UN AU TU IC
    SUBJECT: Iceland's Bid for the UN Security Council

    Classified by: Amb. Carol van Voorst for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1.  (C/NF) Summary:  Iceland's bid for one of two available WEOG
    seats on the UN Security Council in 2009-10 is rapidly drawing to a
    close.  The campaign, hamstrung by a slow start and tepid support at
    home, has found its legs over the last year under the enthusiastic
    direction of Foreign Minister Gisladottir.  Iceland has campaigned on
    a strategy of "every vote counts," but in recent months has taken
    particular aim at competitor Austria.  As a Security Council member,
    Iceland would be generally supportive of U.S. priorities, though
    particular engagement would be necessary on questions of armed
    intervention.  The small size of Iceland's foreign service and lack
    of depth on many issues would force Iceland to look often to its
    friends and neighbors for advice.  Lobbying in other Nordic capitals
    will be of key importance should Iceland win a UNSC seat.  End
    Summary.

    Getting a slow start at home and abroad
    ---------------------------------------
    ¶2.  (C) Iceland is one of three candidates for two Western European
    and Other Group (WEOG) seats on the UN Security Council in 2009-10,
    running against Turkey and Austria.  Iceland's bid for a Security
    Council seat did not begin to properly get organized until late 2006
    under then-Foreign Minister Valgerdur Sverrisdottir.  Previous FMs --
    particularly David Oddsson from 2004-2005 -- did little to win
    support at home or get organized overseas for the effort.  Should
    Iceland fail to win a seat, many supporters of the bid will point the
    finger at Oddsson and the Independence Party as a whole.

    ¶3.  (C) Reflecting the ambivalence inside the government, the
    Icelandic public has also split on the issue.  The campaign's cost
    (roughly $3.33 million from 2001 to 2007, with an additional $800,000
    budgeted through October 2008) is an easy target for those who think
    Iceland should have a less activist foreign policy as well as critics
    of government spending, particularly on the left end of the spectrum.
     However, even some close to the Prime Minister's Independence Party
    and in favor of a robust foreign policy have told PolOff that they
    are dubious that Iceland can effectively carry out the
    responsibilities of a UNSC member.  Under current FM Ingibjorg Solrun
    Gisladottir, who has made winning a UNSC seat a priority, polls show
    support for Iceland's candidacy is only 46 percent, with 36 percent
    against.

    Every vote counts...but especially if we take them from Austria
    -------------------------------------------
    ¶4.  (C) Valgerdur Sverrisdottir made the campaign more of a priority
    than her predecessors during her 2006-2007 tenure as Foreign
    Minister, but it still gained little traction.  Foreign Minister
    Ingibjorg Solrun Gisladottir took several bold moves immediately
    after her arrival in May 2007 at the ministry.  Pledging to make the
    UNSC campaign simultaneously cheaper and more effective, Gisladottir
    appointed a special envoy to head the effort and allowed her to
    assemble a dedicated team.  FM Gisladottir also began a series of
    high-visibility trips to regions outside of the usual
    Nordics-U.S.-Europe circuit: since May 2007, she has gone to the
    Middle East five times, and Africa three times, as well as making
    visits to the Caribbean and Afghanistan.

    ¶5.  (C/NF) Senior MFA officials as well as working-level officers in
    the UNSC campaign office have told post that in addition to the FM's
    travel, the ministry as a whole is racking up frequent-flyer miles.
    Rather than targeting strategic countries to influence a whole
    regional bloc, the Icelandic approach has been one of stumping for
    each and every vote -- a huge strain on a foreign service of only 205
    people worldwide.  In a July 2 meeting with Ambassador, Permanent
    Secretary Gretar Mar Sigurdsson allowed that the campaign "has been
    bloody hard for us," as he described having to spend the better part
    of a week on a Pacific islands trip to counter Micronesia's
    declaration of support for Austria.

    ¶6.  (C/NF) Austria is Iceland's main target in the campaign.  Though
    Ministry officials declined to confirm this directly, the tone and
    content of MFA pitches to Ambassador and visiting USG officials
    indicate that they believe Turkey is a sure winner, but Austria's
    dubious economic and energy ties to Iran and Russia may create an
    opening for Iceland.  Iran's nuclear efforts are likely to be the
    most significant challenge to the UNSC in 2009-2010, MFA PermSec
    Sigurdsson has argued to Ambassador and visiting U.S. officials, and
    Iceland has neither the problematic history of dealings with Iran nor
    the economic exposure that Austria does.  Beyond substantive
    concerns, Icelandic officials have also accused Austria of unfairly
    leveraging Vienna's role as host to multiple UN agencies, and were
    incensed by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon's comments in May 2008
    apparently supporting Austria's bid -- in their eyes, another sign of
    shady campaigning by Austria.

    ¶7.  (C/NF) The "every vote counts" perspective has also influenced
    Icelandic performance on other foreign policy issues over the last
    year.  Increased ties to the Middle East have translated into
    contacts with both Syria and Iran.  Similarly, Iceland has appeared
    reluctant to annoy Russia on recognition of Kosovo and the conflict
    with Georgia.  Though in both cases Iceland eventually lined up with
    USG views -- recognizing Kosovo within a couple of weeks of
    independence and eventually calling in the Russian Ambassador here
    regarding events in Georgia -- there were some questions as to
    whether the UNSC bid made the MFA more gun-shy than it might
    otherwise have been.

    What would UNSC member Iceland do?
    ----------------------------------
    ¶8.  (C/NF) Iceland has made a principled case for a UNSC seat based
    on its impeccable democratic credentials, support for the UN system,
    and the idea that all UN member states should have the chance to sit
    on the Security Council.  What it has not done is present a concrete
    picture of what kind of Security Council member (and chair) it would
    be.  Post's analysis is that Iceland would be generally in agreement
    with USG priorities.  Some disagreements do exist, and the FM's
    discomfort with the use of military force would require strong
    engagement on questions of intervention.  Iceland's initiatives would
    closely mirror the interests of FM Gisladottir: Iceland would work
    for progress on the empowerment and security of women, the broader
    concept of human security, and possibly even environmental security
    concerns.

    ¶9.  (C/NF) In approaches to USG officials, Iceland has consistently
    appealed to the history of our bilateral relationship and our common
    membership in NATO.  Post believes that our close defense ties and
    the U.S. treaty obligations as Iceland's first defender in war --
    notwithstanding the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iceland
    in September 2006 -- and Iceland's voting record at the UN would
    translate into a commonality of views on most issues.  We have
    consistently been on the same side of human rights issues in the UNGA
    Third Committee and the UN Human Rights Council, and Iceland has been
    a staunch supporter of U.S. efforts on UNSCR 1820 on the security of
    women in conflic and the UNGA declaration on Prisoners of
    Conscince.

    ¶10.  (C/NF) Areas of disagreement do exist which may be exacerbated
    by Iceland's lack of amilitary and the Foreign Minister's personal
    discmfort with the use of force.  Iceland shares a broad European
    skepticism on USG policy towards Cuba, and has not voted our way on
    the Cuba embargo resolution.  Similarly, Iceland has followed the
    Nordic line on anti-Israel resolutions in recent years.  On Iraq, the
    previous Icelandic government pledged its political support to the
    invasion of Iraq in 2003 and later sent personnel in support of
    explosive ordnance disposal and the NATO Training Mission-Iraq.
    However, FM Gisladottir campaigned in the 2007 elections on a pledge
    of "removing Iceland's name" from the Coalition of the Willing and
    called back the lone Icelander at NTM-I.  Beyond simple opposition to
    the Iraq war, FM Gisladottir's views are colored by the fact that
    Iceland has no military, which she thinks gives Iceland a unique
    moral role, as an honest broker and example, in  world affairs.  This
    does not translate into a complete opposition to armed intervention
    -- under Gisladottir, the MFA has maintained financial and logistical
    support for NATO operations in Afghanistan -- but it means that
    Iceland will need to be fully convinced that diplomatic efforts have
    run their course.

    ¶11.  (C/NF) A final complication is the tiny size of Iceland's
    foreign service, which greatly limits both the information at hand as
    well as the ability to process that information.  The International
    Organizations Department Head noted wryly to PolOff that until now,
    Iceland had the luxury of deciding which issues to follow, but that
    this will come to a swift end in October should Iceland be voted in.
    The MFA's Security Council campaign office has carefully examined the
    UNSC experience of Costa Rica, another comparatively small state
    without an army.  Much of the expense of the UNSC campaign stems from
    the expansion of the permanent mission in New York; current plans are
    to double the size of the mission to 20 diplomats should Iceland win
    election.  Given that this is nearly 10 percent of Iceland's total
    diplomatic corps, the entire personnel transfer season for this year
    is on hold pending the vote results.

    ¶12.  (C/NF) In practical terms, this means the Icelanders will look
    more than usual to their Nordic colleagues for background and advice
    on key issues.  A division of labor across issues already exists,
    according to MFA contacts and the Norwegian Embassy in Reykjavik, and
    the Norwegians are expecting to be asked for quite a bit more help.
    This stems both from the traditionally close relationship between the
    two countries as well as the warm ties between FMs Gisladottir and
    Stoere.  Though Iceland has formally abandoned a previous proposal to
    dual-accredit other Nordic diplomats at the UN, Nordic ties and
    collaboration in New York and capitals will be very close if Iceland
    wins its bid.  For the USG, this will mean that engagement in other
    Nordic capitals will take on new significance in influencing
    Iceland's position.

    ¶13.  (C/NF) Comment:  Despite some policy differences and the
    challenges of working with such a short-staffed diplomatic corps,
    Post is confident that Iceland would work closely and productively
    with us on the Security Council.  Iceland is a member of NATO with
    impeccable diplomatic credentials, and its default worldview is
    generally in line with U.S. values and priorities.

    VAN VOORST

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