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### Viewing cable 10KABUL672, ELECTIONS, KANDAHAR AND KARZAI

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10KABUL672 | 2010-02-23 13:01 | 2011-01-23 19:07 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kabul

`

    VZCZCXRO0895
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
    DE RUEHBUL #0672/01 0541305
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 231305Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5817
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000672

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B
    STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
    USFOR-A FOR POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2020
    TAGS: PGOV KDEM KCOR PREL MOPS CAN AF PK
    SUBJECT: ELECTIONS, KANDAHAR AND KARZAI

    Classified By: Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

    ¶1. (C) Begin Summary. In a frank discussion, Canadian
    Ambassador Crosbie explained to Ambassador Eikenberry that
    getting the electoral process right is a bottom-line position
    for Canada, and said we must be prepared for confrontation
    with Karzai on this issue, or risk losing credibility among
    our own population if we go along with a rigged election.
    While accepting the need to seek electoral reform Ambassador
    Eikenberry cautioned that despite private statements, Afghans
    will not support a dominant international role, and that if
    we dig ourselves deeper into Afghan politics, we'll entrench
    ourselves deeper into the country with fewer options. They
    also agreed that it would make sense to restructure the
    reporting relationship of the Kandahar PRT to have it report
    directly to Regional Command-South rather than the
    Canadian-led Task Force Kandahar to ensure coherence and
    integration of all civilians in Kandahar. They agreed that
    the jury is still out on whether current coalition efforts in
    the South will work, but if Karzai becomes more confident and
    the government has the space to focus on sustainable national
    governance, there will be progress. End Summary.

    Electoral Reform
    ----------------

    ¶2. (C) Ambassador Eikenberry and Canadian Ambassador Bill
    Crosbie shared a frank exchange of views during a breakfast
    meeting at the U.S. Embassy on February 20. Ambassador
    Crosbie said that Canada is very concerned about the
    electoral reform process. He said they had not seen the copy
    of the final decree submitted to the Parliament on electoral
    reforms. Ambassador Eikenberry explained the key issues:
    conflicting Constitutional process issues (no action allowed
    the year of an election but requirement to act on emergency
    decrees within 30 days); the lack of a specific mention of an
    ISAF or coalition role in the vetting process; and the
    proposed formula of two of five ECC members being
    internationals appointed by UNAMA (either South African
    judge, Bangladeshi expert or Palestinian expert are the
    likely choices).

    ¶3. (C) Ambassador Crosbie told the Ambassador that getting
    this right is a bottom line issue for the Canadians. He was
    emotional, saying the issue makes my blood boil, as he
    described the Canadian view that the international community
    must stand up for the silent majority or be blamed for
    letting Karzai and his family establish across the country
    the system of patronage and control that exists in Kandahar.
    We must be prepared for confrontation with Karzai on this
    issue, he said, or risk losing credibility among our own
    population if we go along with a rigged election. He argued
    that a new generation of Afghans is working to run for
    Parliament and they are watching to see if the electoral
    changes will happen. We can't be seen to collude with it,
    he said. He argued that we need to give the Afghans looking
    to make a difference space to speak out and be able to turn
    the course of their country.

    ¶4. (C) Ambassador Eikenberry questioned Canada's assessment,
    noting that Afghans will not stand up publicly to support a
    dominant international role in their election process,
    regardless of what might be said privately. The reality, he
    said, is that leaders like Abdullah and Mirwais Yasini are
    not interested in reform but rather their own political
    interests and alliances in Parliament. He cautioned that if
    we dig ourselves deeper into Afghan politics, we'll entrench
    ourselves deeper into the country with fewer options. We
    need to focus on what is good enough while still supporting
    key institutions.

    ¶5. (C) Crosbie conceded these points, but said we cannot go
    backwards in terms of the last election. Ambassador
    Eikenberry agreed, noting that having less
    Coalition/international ownership of the election is also a
    measure of progress. We need to focus, he said, on strategic
    options rather than being mired in Afghan politics. For
    example, increasing the competence and level of the ANA and
    ANP are clear priorities, and we must avoid losing the coming
    spring and summer mired in election reform issues.
    Ambassador Crosbie did not dispute this, but said that for
    Canada a red-line has to be ensuring improvements over the
    last election.

    Kandahar
    --------

    ¶6. (C) Crosbie said we need to have a discussion in Kabul to
    complement work in Kandahar by the Canadians, the NATO ISAF

    KABUL 00000672 002 OF 003

    RC-South Commander, and the Senior Civilian Representative
    for the South. He said we need to get discussion organized
    for addressing power brokers (Note: A discussion was started
    during a meeting held at the Canadian Embassy two weeks ago
    attended by Ambassador Wayne, the UK, Netherlands, Australia,
    and the NATO ISAF IJC. End Note.). The strategy, he said,
    must address how we manage malign actors and improve the
    management of contracts.

    ¶7. (C) They also discussed the proposals to realign the
    reporting structures of the Canadian-led PRT in Kandahar.
    Crosbie said that Canada is willing to be integrated into a
    new organization and won't stand on form. He agreed with the
    objective to bring coherence and integration of all civilians
    in Kandahar. While he has not talked yet to Ottawa about
    these issues, he believes that the following changes will be
    acceptable: 1) Canada will continue to lead the PRT, with the
    U.S. serving in the Deputy role (co-leads don't work, he
    said); 2) the PRT will report to RC-South as opposed to Task
    Force Kandahar; 3) civilians will report up the civilian
    chain, which they view at the RC-South level as the U.S.
    Senior Civilian Representative Frank Ruggiero -- he proposed
    dual-hatting Ruggiero to be both a U.S. and ISAF SCR; 4) the
    Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) and the PRT head
    should be me
    Ambassador to Argentina will be the next senior Canadian and
    will be based at the PRT; and 5) Canada will place more
    civilians at the PRT to enhance integration, but he
    understands that the U.S. will lead the effort in certain
    areas/districts where U.S. resources are focused.

    ¶8. (C) Ambassador Eikenberry said he too was flexible on how
    to reorganize and believed that we have reasonable structures
    in the South and East. He also strongly endorsed the concept
    of RC-West and RC-North adopting the same model. While we're
    putting a lot of resources in the South and East, he said,
    the system needs to work regardless of whether there is an
    American flag. It's a mistake for NATO to see the Afghan
    issues only through the prism of the military; the SCR
    structures need to be enhanced. Ideally, the Spanish and
    Italians would create a regional SCR in the West, and the
    Scandinavians and Germans would create one in the North. He
    also encouraged Crosbie to consider placing Canadian
    civilians at Regional Platform-South. SCR Ruggiero would mix
    them into his staff, he said, which would ensure greater
    coordination. Crosbie promised to review this and thought it
    probably made sense. He also noted that additional Canadians
    will go to Kandahar in March to support the civ-mil planning
    activity underway for governance and development in the wake
    of the upcoming military operations in Kandahar.

    Strategy in the South and Impact on Overall Effort
    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶9. (C) Crosbie said that Canada is comfortable with the
    overall strategy in Kandahar, which envisions additional
    pressure and activity in Kandahar in April-May. He said the
    police mentoring by U.S. Army Military Police and Canadian
    police, who live and work with the ANP in their district
    police stations, has proved effective. This effort is
    contributing to the sense of Afghan authority expanding in
    the city, he said, although he noted that it is proving
    difficult in Dand district where there are continued IEDs and
    security issues. Still, there's a sense we're on the right
    path, he said.

    ¶10. (C) Ambassador Eikenberry noted that the efforts in
    Helmand and the troop surge generally are intended to reverse
    the malaise and enhance the confidence of the Afghan leaders.
    He recounted a recent meeting with Abdullah Abdullah in
    which he described his perceptions of better security from a
    year ago. The operation in Helmand, Abdullah said, is not
    yet getting the national effects but it could when the ANA
    and ANP officers return to their homes and share accounts of
    their operations. Similarly, Abdullah said that the
    security in Kunduz is much better than six months ago. The
    jury is still out on whether current coalition efforts will
    work, but if Karzai becomes more confident and the government
    has the space to focus on sustainable national governance,
    there will be progress. A key problem, though, is the
    limited human capacity in most ministries and at the
    provincial and district level, Ambassador Eikenberry said.
    He noted the Embassy is working on a cable to better outline
    the limits of Afghan (and even U.S.) capacity to accomplish
    the strategies we have laid out. For example, the Minister
    of Agriculture is really only about one-two staff deep and he
    relies heavily on foreign advisors.

    ¶11. (C) Crosbie agreed, citing the example of ANP literacy.

    KABUL 00000672 003 OF 003

    We're never going to make them literate but can make them
    literate enough. He cited two examples of progress: 1) in
    Kandahar, some police are starting to at least be able to
    read license plates when investigating cases; and 2) in a
    recent customs officer training, the officers at least
    acknowledged corruption exists and that it's wrong, which he
    said is not the case in many third world countries. Crosbie
    said that we'll win when the Afghans have confidence they can
    run this country, but we can't get too dug into supporting
    Karzai; it's critical we build support for others. Crosbie
    said he has a sinking feeling whether Karzai is actually in
    control, or whether it's his brothers and other advisers who
    are running him.

    ¶12. (C) Ambassador Eikenberry agreed and said that while we
    support efforts to press him to be a more visible Commander
    and Chief and push him to get outside of the Palace, we need
    to avoid self-delusion that he is really stepping up to lead
    the country and embrace mutual strategic goals until he
    clearly does so of his own volition. As the meeting ended,
    Crosbie mentioned the former ANA senior command and former
    Kandahar Governor General Raufi (Note: He served as Governor
    from August 2008 - December 2008 before being sacked
    reportedly for taking on Karzai's half brother and Kandahar
    powerbroker Ahmed Wali Karzai (AWK)) and noted that he would
    be a good person to use in a position of interest.
    Ambassador Eikenberry said he knew him and agreed he could
    contribute in a positive way.
    RICCIARDONE

`