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### Viewing cable 10BEIJING183, SECRETARY'S INTERNET FREEDOM SPEECH: CHINA REACTION

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10BEIJING183 | 2010-01-25 07:07 | 2010-12-04 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing

`

    VZCZCXRO6497
    OO RUEHBC RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHBJ #0183/01 0250728
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 250728Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7730
    INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 000183

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR S, P, D, EAP/CM, EEB, AND H
    NSC FOR BADER, MEDEIROS, AND LOI

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2030
    TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PHUM EINV CH
    SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S INTERNET FREEDOM SPEECH: CHINA REACTION

    Classified By: DCM Robert Goldberg fo Reasons: 1.4(B), (D).

    Summary
    -------
    ¶1. (C) Secretary Clinton's January 21 speech on Internet
    Freedom touched a nerve in China. Official reaction was
    negative, with harsh criticism coming from the Ministry of
    Foreign Affairs in an official statement and from other parts
    of the Chinese system through critical articles and
    editorials in the official press. Chinese Internet censors
    were deployed in force to block online commentary and
    coverage of the Secretary's speech, and as of January 24,
    sites in the United States that carried transcripts of the
    speech were inaccessible without VPN or other
    firewall-evading software. The few Chinese netizens and
    bloggers who did manage to access the speech and then dared
    write about it were generally supportive of the Secretary's
    message. Other Embassy contacts, including academic
    USA-watchers and journalists, lamented that the Secretary's
    speech would strengthen and embolden those in the Chinese
    system who advocated greater control over the Internet in
    China. They expressed concern that Internet freedom would be
    made into an "us vs. them" issue rather than a "right vs.
    wrong" issue. Contacts warned that Chinese officials see
    U.S. efforts to promote Internet freedom as an attack,
    repeatedly invoking the specter of "color revolution." Some
    contacts in the tech industry praised the speech as being
    "spot on" in its coverage of U.S. firms' difficulty with the
    Chinese business environment. Contacts outside Beijing were
    cautious with their comments. Embassy and consulate officers
    will continue to follow the reaction to the Secretary's
    remarks in the weeks ahead to assess their continuing impact
    on government, think tank, media, blogger and business
    actions with regard to the Internet. End Summary.

    Official Reaction Negative
    --------------------------
    ¶2. (C) In a January 22 statement in reaction to the
    Secretary's Internet freedom speech, Chinese Ministry of
    Foreign Affairs spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu, said "we firmly
    oppose such words and deeds, which are against the facts and
    harmful to U.S.-China relations." Ma's remarks followed a
    January 21 press conference by Vice Foreign Minister He
    Yafei's in which he did not refer to the Secretary's speech,
    but urged the United States to refrain from
    "over-interpreting" the Google case, saying it should not be
    allowed to impact bilateral relations. Ma's statement was
    much more negative than initial unofficial comment from
    working-level MFA officers the morning of January 22. Asked
    about the speech, MFA North American and Oceanian Affairs
    Department U.S.A. Division Director An Gang told poloff that
    the MFA noticed that specific Chinese cases or individuals
    were not mentioned in the speech, and that "we are very happy
    about that." (Comment: the contrast between the "softer"
    comments from the USA desk and the harder language from the
    Spokesman several hours later suggests that the negative
    reaction to the speech originated at higher levels in the
    foreign policy hierarchy.)

    Media Reaction Dutifully Echoes MFA Criticism
    ---------------------------------------------
    ¶3. (SBU) Chinese media coverage of the Secretary's speech
    widely quoted the MFA statement. January 22 coverage
    included assertions that the Secretary's call for
    unrestricted access to the Internet could be regarded "as a
    disguised attempt to impose U.S. values in the name of
    democracy." Articles in the nationalist daily Global Times
    stated that the bulk of Internet comment originated in the
    West, "loaded with aggressive rhetoric against other
    countries," against which other countries cannot hope to
    defend. Beijing University Professor of Communications Hu
    Yong, quoted in the 21st Century Business Herald, said the
    Secretary's discussion of sharing technology to allow users
    to circumvent Internet censorship meant that the "Google
    incident is only the beginning of a rolling snowball."

    ¶4. (SBU) Most regional reporting in China emphasized that
    Internet freedom has now become embedded as a new diplomatic
    tool the U.S. foreign policy. Shanghai's influential Wenhui
    Daily ran a January 23 commentary calling Secretary Clinton's
    remarks "arrogant, illogical, and full of political shows and
    calculations," accusing her of having a "Cold War mentality."
    Some Chinese outlets rebutted U.S. charges by praising
    Chinese Internet practices. January 22 televised news
    programming reported on the benefits for Chinese users of
    Chinese governmental supervision of the Internet. Shanghai
    TV January 22 broadcast programming which painted Chinese
    online police in a positive light.

    BEIJING 00000183 002 OF 005

    Blogger Community: Those that Saw it, Liked it
    --------------------------------------------- -
    ¶5. (SBU) Chinese netizens accessed the Secretary's speech and
    shared reactions through rough real-time translations on
    Twitter, blogs, and Google. The range of opinions among the
    self-selecting demographic of Chinese netizens, who had
    circumvented Chinese government blocks to blog and
    participate in Twitter-based discussions, ranged from
    supportive to skeptical, with the majority expressing
    agreement with the principles outlined in the Secretary's
    speech. In general, Chinese netizen comments focused on
    speculation about linkages between the Secretary's speech and
    Google's announcement that it was considering withdrawing
    from China.

    ¶6. (SBU) Many netizen reactions echoed the statements by
    XXXXXXXXXXXX who tweeted that Secretary Clinton's speech  "clarified the relation between Internet freedom and business  prosperity, which gave better guidance for American companies  operating in China." A Chinese blogger named XXXXXXXXXXXX
    wrote that the speech was "certain to have a positive effect  and was welcomed by Chinese Internet users regarding the  censorship problem in China." Others ommented that the  speech was an indication that the United States was leading  the U.S.-China relationship in the right direction.

    ¶7. (SBU) Some Chinese bloggers viewed the Secretary's speech
    as "confrontational," but nonetheless inspiring to the
    Chinese people.
    - XXXXXXXXXXXX, depicted Secretary  Clinton as Joan of Arc,
    with a widely distributed graphic of  "Hillary leads the people."
    Another Chinese Twitter user  wrote, "What a historic speech
     it is the launching of an  Internet war, the confrontation between
    democracy and  authoritarianism becoming public, and the
    beginning of a new  Cold War."

    - XXXXXXXXXXXX, a blogger based in XXXXXXXXXXXX,
    similarly  characterized the speech as "a declaration of war fro
     a free  nation to an autocracy. It might be as important as
    Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech... I will wait with hope. The
    direct mention of China also calls for a frank and honest
    discussion between Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao."
    -XXXXXXXXXXXX, attending a Mission  sponsored event
    in Beijing (see para 21), said the  Secretary's speech "showed
    the power of the Internet to the  world" and raised the U.S.
     Internet strategy to a new level.
    ¶8. (SBU) Some bloggers expressed skepticism.
    - XXXXXXXXXXXX tweeted, "the U.S.  government
    has been talking about supporting world-wide Internet
    freedom for ages, but it hasn't done much yet."
    - XXXXXXXXXXXX, doubted the sincerity of the United
    States' commitment to the freedoms mentioned in Secretary
    Clinton's speech due to competing commercial and national
    security interests.
    Chinese bloggers, regardless of their outlook, have widely
    reported that Chinese web monitors have been aggressively
    deleting posts and content related to the Secretary's speech.

    China Watchers: Speech Will Provoke the Authorities
    --------------------------------------------- ------
    ¶9. (C) Other contacts analyzed the Secretary's speech the way
    bloggers did, but were pessimistic about the effect of the
    speech on Chinese authorities. On January 22 XXXXXXXXXXXX
     told  poloff that following the controversy generated by
    Google's  announcement, the issue of Internet freedom had been
    discussed several times within the Politburo Standing
    Committee which had agreed that the issue of Internet freedom
    had supplanted traditional human rights issues as a new
    "battleground" between the United States and China. Although
    he was not aware of any specific Standing Committee
    decisions, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that President Hu Jintao
    had provided  general guidance that the issue should not be
    allowed to  cause major disruptions to U.S.-China relations.
    ¶10. (C) On January 21, speaking before the Secretary's
    speech, XXXXXXXXXXXX, told poloff that the
    Communist Party viewed Internet freedom initiatives as a
    direct challenge to its ability to maintain social and
    political stability and, therefore, its legitimacy. He said
    that, in this context, the Party would resist international
    pressure on the Google issue and would increase restrictions
    on the Internet in the period leading up to the 18th Party
    Congress in 2012. He predicted that the Secretary's speech

    BEIJING 00000183 003 OF 005

    would be viewed as directed at the Communist Party and would
    therefore generate uncertainty about U.S. intentions towards
    China.
    ¶11. (C) On January 23, a prominent XXXXXXXXXXXX
    University media  and public opinion researcher pointed out
    that most Chinese  media reactions to the Secretary's speech
    had simply  republished the MFA statement and were not
    printing any  quotations from the speech itself. Given the
    political  sensitivity of the speech and the Google case, this
    was the  only safe thing to do, he said. Any perceived support
    for  the Secretary's speech in the press would "cross a red line"
    with censors. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Chinese public had
    mixed feelings about the speech and the Google issue. While
    many in China were dissatisfied with Internet censorship,
    they also resented public criticism from U.S. officials, he
    said, predicting that the speech would increase nationalist
    sentiment in China. Another contact, XXXXXXXXXXXX
     agreed that while it might  cause a nationalist response,
    the Secretary's message "needed  to be said." He predicted that
    the Chinese government would  attempt to appeal to nationalism
    to counter the Secretary's  speech. However, he noted that most
    current media commentary  critical of the speech, and Google,
    was not being written by  well known journalists, intellectuals
    or scholars whose  silence could be read as a show of support
    for the speech -  and for Google.
    ¶12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX, told poloff January 23 that he
    had been "disappointed and depressed" when he read the
    Secretary's speech. "Those who tried to control the Internet
    more in China never had much support before," he said. "Most
    people believe information should be open, and the Internet
    should be open. The conservative, security people were the
    minority and many people just laughed at them." The
    Secretary's speech, however, gave great new energy to the
    "controllers" who could now plausibly argue that the United
    States was explicitly using the Internet as a tool for regime
    change. "The Internet belongs to every country," he
    complained; "we all can go there, we all can add to it, we
    all can learn from it. We Chinese were free there. Now the
    United States has claimed it for itself and so it will become
    an ideological battlefield." He asserted that, in the past,
    the Chinese authorities had paid relatively little attention
    to controlling the Internet, focusing only on the issues that
    were the most urgent and letting most netizens alone. "That
    is finished now. The Secretary's 'information curtain'
    remark will give the authorities what they need to
    'harmonize' the Internet for all Chinese citizens."
    (Comment: 'harmonize' is an acidly sarcastic term in Chinese
    to describe official deletion or blockage of Internet
    content. XXXXXXXXXXXX is nearly always laid back and
    even-tempered.  His commentary on this issue was more
    emotional and bitter  than poloff has seen from him in dozens
    of encounters over  three years, even on extremely sensitive
    issues such as XXXXXXXXXXXX.
    ¶13. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX  warned that Google's announcement
    had become a new irritant  to the bilateral relationship with the
    potential to be even  more dangerous than the Taiwan and Tibet issue.
    XXXXXXXXXXXX said  that many Chinese citizens believed that
    Google's decision  was part of a coordinated public/private effort by
    the USG to  impose U.S. values on China, what he referred to as an
    "E-color revolution." As confirmation of this theory,
    XXXXXXXXXXXX  cited Secretary Clinton's January 7 "21st
    Century Statecraft"  dinner with several tech sector CEOs
    (including Google),  Google's donations to President Obama's
    presidential  campaign, and Secretary Clinton's January 21 speech
    on  Internet freedom.

    ¶14. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX warned that there were  people
    in China and other countries such as Iran who might  see
    the "shadow of color revolution" in recent USG policies
    promoting Internet freedom and 21st century e-diplomacy. For
    example, Iranians might perceive Washington's new initiatives
    on Internet freedom or the advocacy of new technologies such
    as Twitter to be "aggressive" or harboring ulterior motives,
    such as promoting regime change, said XXXXXXXXXXXX
    Informed Chinese netizens already know how to circumvent the
    Great Firewall to  access Facebook and Twitter, Guo said, including
    by using  commercially available software. He feared, however, tha
     if  the USG provided free software that helped Chinese netizens
    overcome filters, this might politicize the issue of Internet
    freedom and force the PRC government to react. One possible

    BEIJING 00000183 004 OF 005

    consequence, warned XXXXXXXXXXXX, was that China might
    make it illegal  to download either U.S.-provided or commercially
    available software that helped Internet surfers circumvent the Great
    Firewall.

    ¶15. (C) Professor XXXXXXXXXXXX said January 22 that
    restricting the  Internet access of Chinese netizens would
    theoretically  hamper development of cutting edge industries,
    but was  skeptical this had happened in reality. Professor
    XXXXXXXXXXXX, said in the same  meeting that the problem
    was that China's leaders did not yet  feel comfortable with thes
     new communications technologies  and thus preferred to proceed
    cautiously. The Google issue  and Secretary Clinton's speech
    were likely to prompt them to  shift from a low-profile to a
    higher-profile response on  Internet freedom.

    IT Industry: Speech Accurately Portrayed Business Environment
    --------------------------------------------- ----------------

    ¶16. (C) The president of XXXXXXXXXXXX, called the Secretary's
    speech "spot  on, "directly capturing industry concerns about a
    business climate that is getting worse on a "day-to-day basis." He
    applauded the Secretary's speech as a means of bringing the
    Chinese to the table to address key concerns about the
    business environment and said the decision taken by Google
    was of enormous magnitude, indicating the depth of concern
    over issues it is facing here. As a result, he believes, the
    Chinese government's failure to respond to its people's
    opposition to censorship would embolden the netizen community
    in its efforts to evade government controls.

    ¶17. (C) Another high-tech industry consultant expressed
    concern that the Secretary's speech would dampen the
    U.S.-China business climate and drive it "to a new low." The
    consultant observed that "China has noticed that the NSA and
    the Pentagon have dominated cyberspace policy for over a
    year." Key officials, academics, and military leaders,
    according to this consultant, hold paranoid fears that the
    U.S. would one day launch a "zero-day" attack on all of
    China's critical infrastructure. The Secretary's speech and
    Google's recent actions, would amplify this belief.

    ¶18. (C) Reaction in northern China, where Intel has a
    multi-billion dollar manufacturing factory investment under
    construction, however, has thus far been limited
    XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX that
    the Secretary's speech had thus far not created a stir.
    XXXXXXXXXXXX had in the past several days met with
    several Dalian Vice Mayors, and reported Google and Internet
    freedom  issues had not been raised.

    ¶19. (C) South China-based Internet portal contacts were
    reluctant to talk with ConGenoffs about ongoing media
    coverage of Google or broader internet freedom issues. A
    public relations manager from XXXXXXXXXXXX initially
    refused to  comment, saying it was not appropriate for her
    to offer an  opinion on policy matters, but then guardedly
    reverted to  official-sounding comments about why Internet
    regulation is  important for the well-being of Chinese users
    and the  maintenance of a positive online environment.

    ¶20. (C) A working-level official from the XXXXXXXXXXXX
     went further in sharing  pro-government comments with
    ConGenoff, saying that Google is  a business and should restrict itself
    To business matters,  rather than venturing into political territory. The
    official  said 2009 was a very strong year for internet companies in
    China and that internet restrictions had not dampened  individual
    user's online experiences or companies' earnings.

    Mission Outreach on the Secretary's Speech
    ------------------------------------------
    ¶21. (C) January 22, Embassy Beijing and Consulates General
    Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenyang hosted a simultaneous
    digital video conference viewing of the Secretary's speech
    for dozens of local bloggers, with an additional 300 netizens
    attending via the Internet. Mission estimates indicate
    Twitter communications and blog entries will reach a combined
    audience of millions of persons. Following the speech,
    participating bloggers, who were generally supportive of the
    Secretary's message, engaged in a lively discussion focused
    on what specific measures the United States government could
    take to promote Internet freedom in China and whether the
    speech constituted a new direction for U.S. foreign policy on

    BEIJING 00000183 005 OF 005

    China.
    HUNTSMAN

`