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### Viewing cable 09STATE67105, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAILY

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09STATE67105 | 2009-06-29 16:04 | 2010-12-04 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Secretary of State

`

    INFO  LOG-00   MFA-00   EEB-00   AF-00    AID-00   A-00     CIAE-00
          INL-00   DNI-00   DODE-00  DOTE-00  WHA-00   PERC-00  EAP-00
          DHSE-00  EUR-00   OIGO-00  FAAE-00  FBIE-00  H-00     TEDE-00
          INR-00   IO-00    L-00     MOFM-00  MOF-00   NEA-00   DCP-00
          ISN-00   NSCE-00  OIG-00   PC-01    P-00     ISNE-00  DOHS-00
          FMPC-00  SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    DPM-00   USSS-00
          NCTC-00  CBP-00   SCRS-00  DSCC-00  SCA-00   SAS-00   FA-00
          SRAP-00  SGC-00   PESU-00    /001R

    P 291659Z JUN 09
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO SECURITY OFFICER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
    INFO AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY
    XMT AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
    AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG

` `

    S E C R E T STATE 067105

    NOFORN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: MR
    TAGS: ASEC
    SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAILY

    Classified By: Derived from Multiple Sources

    SECRET//FGI//NOFORN

    Declassify on: Source marked 25X1-human, Date of source: June
    27, 2009

    ¶1. (U) Diplomatic Security Daily, June 27-29, 2009

    ¶2. (U) Iraq - Paragraphs 7-11

    ¶3. (U) Significant Events - Paragraphs 12-23

    ¶4. (U) Key Concerns - Paragraphs 24-43

    ¶5. (U) Cyber Threats - Paragraphs 44-57

    ¶6. (U) Suspicious Activity Incidents - Paragraphs 58-64

    ¶7. (U) Iraq

    ¶8. (S//NF) Alleged plans by various insurgent groups to
    conduct attacks during anticipated U.S. military withdrawal
    from urban areas: According to recent multiple source
    reports, various insurgent groups and militias intend on
    attacking multiple venues throughout Iraq in anticipation of
    U.S. military forces withdrawal from urban areas. Specific
    targets mentioned included the International Zone (IZ),
    Victory Base Complex, joint security stations, and various
    forward operating bases in Baghdad and in Maysan Province
    (southern Iraq). Allegedly, insurgent groups also are
    prepared to target key infrastructure, such as bridges and
    major supply routes used by Coalition forces (CF) and Iraqi
    Security Forces (ISF) convoys. According to one source, an
    unidentified group had access to a large tank of chlorine, 16
    V-8 rockets, and three torpedoes which were supposedly
    recovered by the CF and ISF. The reports mentioned the
    attacks would commence on or about July 1. The Government of
    Iraq is anticipating the offensive and has placed ISF units
    on alert and cancelled all leave effective June 28.

    ¶9. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA would like to note  the series of
    reports are consistent with other recent threat reporting
    indicating the possibility of insurgent groups and militias
    preparing to increase attacks in anticipation of troop
    withdrawal from urban areas. It is possible that
    extremist-affiliated groups would seek to target the IZ and
    the Victory Base Complex, as the venues are symbolic of the
    U.S. diplomatic and military presence in Iraq. It is also
    plausible the groups may surmise that a large attack against
    CF troops in these areas would be ideal, as it would serve as
    propaganda for them, allowing them to take credit for driving
    out "occupying forces."

    ¶10. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA would also highlight the allegation of
    the existence of the weapons cache, as the materials could
    possibly be used as components for improvised rocket-assisted
    munitions or an improvised explosive device (IED). According
    to the Multi-National Forces in Iraq Combined Intelligence
    Operations Cell, the first documented chlorine attack
    occurred in al-Anbar Province (western Iraq) on October 21,
    2006, and the first documented chlorine vehicle-borne IED
    (VBIED) in the Baghdad area occurred in Taji on February 20,
    ¶2007. Despite the claims by insurgent groups and militias of
    chlorine-related attacks, their incident rates remain low and
    inconsistent. While DS/TIA/ITA cannot corroborate the
    veracity of the recent threat reporting, overall, there is
    nothing to suggest that the intention to attack the U.S.
    presence in Iraq will subside once a military troop
    withdrawal is completed. (Appendix sources 1-7)

    ¶11. (SBU) Indirect fire (IDF) of unknown size was launched
    against the IZ in Baghdad at 9:22 p.m. on June 24. The IDF
    impacted in the river approximately 250 meters south of the
    U.S. Embassy compound. No injuries or damages were reported.
    (RSO TOC Baghdad Spot Report)

    ¶12. (U) Significant Events

    ¶13. (C) WHA Honduras - Honduran military forces arrested
    President Manuel Zelaya June 28 according to orders issued by
    the National Congress and the Supreme Court of Honduras.
    Zelaya was taken to a local air force base and flown to Costa
    Rica. Emergency Action Committee (EAC) Tegucigalpa
    subsequently met to discuss the ramifications of the seizure
    of the president by host-cost country military forces. The
    RSO noted the general climate in the capital was calm;
    however, a standfast order was issued, and additional
    security measures were implemented. The Embassy released a
    Warden Message regarding the actions against Zelaya and urged
    AmCits to remain in the residences or hotels for the day.

    ¶14. (C) Later in the day, Congress officially named Roberto
    Micheletti interim president. The U.S. Ambassador gave a
    press conference outside the Embassy; he insisted that
    President Zelaya was the only democratically elected
    president of the country and urged that freedom of expression
    and circulation be restored. He also demanded the release of
    those government officials said to be in military custody.
    The EAC reconvened to assess the situation. Protest activity
    has centered around the presidential palace, some roads in
    the capital were blocked, and there were some troops on the
    street. However, traffic flow was reported normal in most of
    the city. Authorized Departure for family members was
    discussed, but not warranted at this time. Embassy personnel
    were advised to remain in their homes for the rest of the day
    and to limit their movements today, June 29. All Peace Corps
    volunteers have been accounted for and are on standfast. Post
    will be open today for emergency services only. The EAC will
    continue monitoring events in-country and provide updated
    information as available. (Tegucigalpa Spot Report; telcon;
    Warden Message; Appendix sources 8-10)

    ¶15. (SBU) EUR Germany - A Local Guard Force (LGF) member of
    U.S. Consulate General Frankfurt discovered two suspicious
    cases with protruding wires June 26 while on foot patrol in
    the clustered housing area. The guard notified his
    supervisor, and the area and two nearby apartment buildings
    were evacuated. Responding police requested canine and
    Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) support. After the EOD team
    arrived, a local telecom technician, who had been working
    nearby, arrived at the scene and claimed the unattended
    cases; the technician had inadvertently left the cases. After
    further investigation and corroboration with the technician,
    police declare the area safe. (RSO Frankfurt Spot Report)

    ¶16. (SBU) AF Liberia - Two acts of vandalism were reported to
    U.S. Embassy Monrovia on the night of June 27. One took place
    at the residence of the chief of the DoD Office of Security
    Cooperation, approximately 2.5 miles from Post, where
    graffiti was spray painted on the perimeter wall stating,
    "COL THE WAR HAS JUST BEGAN." The second incident occurred at
    the facility of a USAID-funded project, approximately 1.5
    miles from the Embassy, where the messages "INTERCON MUST
    LEAVE NOW, TAKE INT" and "DANGER" were spray painted on the
    compound wall. The RSO assesses these incidents are
    consistent with the pattern of threats and intimidation used
    by dismissed Embassy guards to obtain a favorable settlement
    with their former employer through the Liberian Ministry of
    Labor. (RSO Monrovia Spot Report)

    ¶17. (SBU) Mauritania - U.S. Embassy Nouakchott received a
    credible threat June 27 regarding a kidnapping against an
    American in the capital sometime during the night (NFI). The
    RSO considers the information credible and made notifications
    to staff to assure that all official Americans were accounted
    for. All residential LGF posts were manned, and radio checks
    were increased. Post also issued a Warden Message advising
    AmCits in-country of the threat. Please see the Key Concerns
    section for further information. (RSO Nouakchott Spot Report)

    ¶18. (C//NF) Mauritania - EAC Nouakchott met June 26 to
    discuss developments surrounding the murder of an unofficial
    American on June 23. Members were updated on the
    investigative progress of local authorities. The EAC reviewed
    the U.S. Embassy's tripwires for consideration of Authorized
    Departure and/or drawdown and determined there was
    insufficient information at this time to recommend either
    action. EAC members were reminded of the importance of random
    arrival arrivals at Post (effective June 25) along with other
    augmented security measures.

    ¶19. (S//NF) The EAC reconvened June 28, and members were
    introduced to FBI assets assigned to investigate the AmCit's
    murder with host-country law enforcement personnel. Members
    welcomed the team and support their efforts on the
    investigation while in-country. Members also discussed the
    credible kidnapping threat against an AmCit in-country and
    reviewed the enhanced security measures already in place.
    Post issued a Consular short message system alert to the
    American community advising of the threat. The EAC will
    continue to review all threat information as it becomes
    available, while supporting the ongoing murder investigation,
    and the EAC will reconvene as needed. (Appendix sources 11-12)

    ¶20. (SBU) Sudan Update - On June 24, verdicts were issued in
    the trial of the five Sudanese men charged with the January
    1, 2008, murder of U.S. Embassy Khartoum employees John
    Granville and Abdelrahman Abbas. Four of the defendants were
    found of guilty of intentional killing and sentenced to death
    by hanging. The fifth defendant was found guilty on weapons
    charges and sentenced to two years in prison, including
    credit for time served since his January 2008 arrest.
    (Khartoum 0790)

    ¶21. (SBU) The Gambia - EAC Banjul met June 23 for its monthly
    meeting. It was determined that the recent activity in
    Tehran, Iran, should not present any additional danger for
    U.S. personnel or citizens in-country; however, the EAC
    agreed U.S. Embassy staff must be more diligent in practicing
    common-sense security measures. EAC members deemed Post's
    current security posture is sufficient. (Banjul 0190)

    ¶22. (S//NF) NEA Yemen - EAC Sana'a met June 28 to discuss a
    write-in threat concerning a VBIED attack against the U.S.
    Embassy planned for today, June 29. The threat was traced to
    Algeria, and, although such threats are considered relatively
    common, Post officials are taking the threat seriously.
    Members agreed that Post's current security upgrades were
    sufficient to deter and, if need be, withstand an attack;
    however, members deemed it would be prudent to request
    additional security from the Republic of Yemen Government at
    Post's perimeter, in light of the approaching July 4 holiday.
    Please see the Key Concerns section for further details.
    (Appendix source 13)

    ¶23. (C) SCA Bangladesh - U.S. Embassy Dhaka officials met
    with the secretary of Home Affairs to discuss concerns over
    an uptick in crimes directed against foreigners in Dhaka's
    Diplomatic Enclave. The secretary stated the Government of
    Bangladesh (GoB) had increased the police presence in the
    enclave May 7, when threat letters were sent to several
    diplomatic missions. Post officials will continue to monitor
    the situation and keep pressure on the GoB to provide
    adequate security to the U.S. Mission. (Appendix source 14)

    ¶24. (U) Key Concerns

    ¶25. (S//NF) AF Mauritania - AQIM threat to kidnap American
    citizen: According to the Spanish National Intelligence
    Service (CNI), an unidentified source for the CNI service
    center stated al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
    (AQIM) planned to kidnap an unidentified AmCit in Nouakchott
    during the evening of June 27. According to the report's
    context statement, a CNI official provided the information
    during the course of a routine liaison meeting. There are no
    additional details on this information, and the report's
    originators are unable to assess the reliability of the
    ultimate source(s) of the information. In addition, it is not
    known what, if any, vetting or validation procedures the
    Spanish service may use to evaluate its sources. In separate
    reporting, AQIM, as of late June, had sent three unidentified
    members to Mauritania from northern Mali to conduct
    operations against government interests in Nouakchott and
    Nouadhibou, according to the Mauritanian External
    Intelligence Service. It was unknown, according to the
    Mauritanian service, whether AQIM intended to attack
    Mauritanian and/or foreign government facilities in those
    cities. Separately, AQIM Tariq Ibn Ziyad battalion leader
    'Abd al-Hamid (Abu Zaid), as of late June, had delayed an
    order for four men to travel to Nouakchott to conduct
    unspecified operations, according to the Mauritanian service.
    DS/TIA/ITA notes the latest threat information follows last
    week's killing of an American in Nouakchott and the possible
    involvement of AQIM. (Appendix sources 15-16)

    ¶26. (S//NF) Nigeria - Extremists believed to be planning a
    massive terrorist attack: (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Tearline
    states, "Unspecified extremist groups, suspected to be
    operating in concert with Nigerian Shi'ites, Salafiya, or
    Muhammad Yusuf's Nigerian Taliban are reportedly planning to
    launch a massive surprise attack on some piece of critical
    infrastructure or against high-profile targets within
    Nigeria. Probable targets of this attack include top Nigerian
    Government officials or security agents. Members of the
    general public, who might be opposed to the attackers'
    doctrines, were also believed to be possible targets. This
    planned attack is reportedly aimed at sparking sectarian
    clashes across Nigeria."

    ¶27. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA cannot immediately corroborate the
    current threat with additional intelligence. While no
    connection can be made between this threat and previous
    reports, DS/TIA/ITA is concerned about recent activity
    surrounding extremists associated with the Nigerian Taliban.

    ¶28. (S//NF) A well-trained veteran Chadian extremist,
    Abu-Mahjin (Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE)
    number 24350378), who has limited ties to al-Qa'ida
    associates, recently traveled to Nigeria. He may be planning
    to conduct or facilitate a terrorist operation. Indeed,
    tearline from May 1 claimed, "An Islamic extremist named
    Abu-Muhjin has recently been in northeast Nigeria. It is
    likely that he will be joined by other Islamic extremists in
    the coming weeks." More recent tearline stated,
    "Nigerian-based probable Chadian extremist Abu-Mahjin is keen
    to obtain more funds in connection with some sort of
    nefarious activity (possibly terrorism related) he is engaged
    in. However, it is not clear when he will receive this
    additional finance." Little more is known about Abu-Mahjin's
    apparent efforts to organize a near-term operation.

    ¶29. (S//NF) Though neither the Nigerian Taliban nor its more
    militant subset -- Tanzim al-Qa'ida group -- has ever
    attacked Western interests, they have discussed targeting
    foreign embassies in the past. In 2007, they reportedly
    plotted to attack the U.S., British, and Israeli embassies in
    Abuja, according to a single source that remains
    unsubstantiated. (Appendix sources 17-19)

    ¶30. (C//NF) NEA Algeria/Yemen - Unsubstantiated threat
    claiming suicide bombing against U.S. embassies: On June 26,
    a write-in to a USG website provided a message involving an
    unsubstantiated threat to U.S. embassies in Algiers, Algeria,
    and Sana'a, Yemen. The message was posted in Arabic and
    appeared to originate in Algeria. The writer warned of a "big
    attack against your embassies in Algeria and Yaman by suicide
    car on 29/06/2009" and claimed to be an agent of the Algerian
    Intelligence Service. The writer provided an apparent
    telephone number for confirming his information and warned,
    "The second attack what you will see it is in Hassi Messaud
    in Sahara by a big number of terrorists." The report's
    originators note that they have no further information to
    corroborate the information, and the source may have intended
    to annoy, mislead, or disrupt rather than to provide
    legitimate information. The originators further note that the
    vast majority of such information is not true, but, since
    volunteers have provided authentic leads on occasion, the
    information is provided for evaluation purely due to its
    threat content. (Appendix source 20)

    ¶31. (S//NF) Yemen - Al-Qa'ida possibly planning Embassy
    attacks: (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) According to tearline
    information, "Saudi authorities learned in late June that
    al-Qa'ida may be planning an attack on Western and Middle
    Eastern embassies in Yemen. There was no additional
    information on the timing or exact location of the planned
    attack."

    ¶32. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA notes this report is likely related to
    recent information provided by a Yemeni security official in
    late June regarding possible unspecified al-Qa'ida in the
    Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) attacks against the embassies of the
    U.S, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and
    unnamed European nations in Sana'a. No further information
    was provided on this general threat report.

    ¶33. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA also notes the continuing AQAP threat
    to Western and host-nation interests both in Sana'a and
    throughout Yemen. Previous AQAP attacks illustrate a
    willingness and capability to target Western citizens and
    diplomatic facilities, highlighted by the brazen attack
    against U.S. Embassy Sana'a in mid-September 2008. The lack
    of host-nation political will to combat AQAP contributes to
    an extremely permissive operating environment for extremist
    elements, suggesting threat reporting against U.S. and other
    foreign interests in Yemen will continue in both the near and
    medium term. (Appendix sources 21-22)

    ¶34. (S//NF) SCA Afghanistan - Threat to unspecified American
    in Kandahar: As of late June, Kandahar Taliban members Sadiq,
    Mullah Hamdullah, and Qari Yousef intended to kidnap an
    unspecified American who travels from Kandahar Airfield to
    work in Kandahar city to hold for ransom. The kidnappers
    planned to use a local Afghan who the American trusted to
    place a substance in his food to render him unconscious.
    Hamdullah, a.k.a. Bari Alai, worked under the command of
    Mullah Faizel who was currently in detention at Guantanamo
    Bay.

    ¶35. (S//NF) While the Taliban operatives named in this report
    are indeed active in and around Kandahar city to include
    involvement in kidnapping plots, DS/TIA/ITA questions the
    source's access to operational plans by the Taliban. In past
    reporting, the source has reported primarily on Taliban
    member atmospherics and movements in southern Afghanistan and
    only occasionally on threats. DS/TIA/ITA assesses information
    provided by the source regarding the January 2008 kidnapping
    of an American non-governmental organization (NGO) worker to
    be inaccurate.

    ¶36. (S//NF) That said, periodic reporting indicates
    extremists remain keen to abduct another Westerner in
    Kandahar city, possibly while traveling to/from Kandahar
    Airfield. Tearline states, "Taliban insurgents reportedly
    planned in late January to kidnap a U.S. national as he
    traveled between Kandahar Airfield and Shur Andam Pass,
    Kandahar Province." Reporting from November 2008 alleged the
    Taliban planned to kidnap two foreign women possibly from
    their residence in northeast Kandahar city or at the Rang
    Rezano market they frequented.

    ¶37. (S//NF) Mullah Faizel (variants: Faisal, Fazilfazul; TIDE
    number 72569) was being held at Guantanamo Bay as of early
    April 2008. Mullah Hamdullah (possible TIDE number 75483) is
    characterized in late-2008 sensitive reporting as a group
    commander of a large number of Taliban in Helmand Province.
    The same report noted Sadiq, the brother of the Taliban's
    second-in-command Mullah Berader (TIDE number 76541), worked
    at an unnamed U.S. NGO and was involved in planning an
    unspecified kidnapping. (Appendix sources 23-30)

    ¶38. (S//FGI//NF) Pakistan - Militants may be planning to
    abduct U.S. and UK citizens from NGOs and consulates;
    dual-citizens in Peshawar: Tearline intelligence reports,
    "Militants attached to Pakistan's Mumtaz Group may be
    planning to kidnap U.S. and UK citizens working in NGOs and
    consulates, as well as dual-citizen Pakistanis who are either
    visiting or residing in Peshawar, as of June 26. Peshawar's
    University Town could be the likely venue for such an
    operation. Further, the following individuals who probably
    reside in (the) Peshawar area could be supporters of the
    Mumtaz Group: Fahim, son of Ihsanullah; Ayaz; Abdul Rehman
    Khan (Awami National Party) and his son, Yunas Khan,
    residents of Kafir Dheri, Peshawar; Garib Shah Badshah; and
    Muazzam Badshah, son of Shah Badshah."

    ¶39. (S//FGI//NF) DS/TIA/ITA assesses the Mumtaz Group may be
    a reference to operations linked to al-Qa'ida leader Hamza
    al-Jawfi (a.k.a. Mumtaz; TIDE number 70390) who died in a
    late-February explosion in North Waziristan. Mumtaz is an
    oft-used alias by senior al-Qa'ida leaders that is arguably
    inauspicious. The now-deceased Hamzah Rabi and Abu Khabab
    al-Masri both used this alias as well. Worryingly, the other
    operatives DS/TIA/ITA suspects belong to this group are
    linked to ongoing, credible planning against Peshawar
    cantonment as well as American personnel and convoys
    belonging to U.S. Consulate Peshawar.

    ¶40. (S//FGI//NF) Although al-Jawfi is dead, it is possible
    the operations referenced can be linked to al-Jawfi's former
    courier and Imran (TIDE number 14399906), who collaborates
    closely with Mohmand Agency-based Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
    (TTP) commander Hakimullah Mahsud. Early-April reporting from
    Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) links Imran -- described as
    an Uzbeki militant responsible for the November 12, 2008,
    murder of a USAID contractor and the August 26, 2008, ambush
    of the principal officer's (PO's) vehicle in Peshawar -- to
    TTP operative Faruq's ongoing planning for an attack on
    Peshawar's cantonment using multiple suicide operatives.
    Faruq is also likely involved in conducting al-Qa'ida-linked
    operational surveillance against the PO of U.S. Consulate
    Peshawar, a four-vehicle SUV protective convoy, and a vehicle
    workshop also affiliated with Post. Of note, however, ISI
    reported the capture of an individual named Imran in
    mid-June; although, it cannot be confirmed if this is the
    same Uzbeki Imran mentioned in earlier reporting. (Appendix
    sources 31-38)

    ¶41. (S//FGI//NF) Pakistan - Threats against Punjab and
    Islamabad: Reporting continues to circulate detailing ongoing
    plans by Pakistani extremists to launch suicide operations in
    Punjab Province and Islamabad. In Islamabad, threats specify
    the targeting of embassies located in the F-6/2 sector,
    police post Aabpara in Islamabad, the Imam Bargah in G-6/2,
    Senator Tariq Azim, and Barri Imam Shrine. In Lahore and
    greater Punjab Province, suicide operatives may seek to
    strike against foreigners in crowded areas or the Barbar Data
    Sahib Shrine. Although it remains unclear if these named
    targets are an accurate reflection of extremists' operational
    plans, it is of note late-June reporting also mentions the
    cultivation and use of sympathetic madrassas and extremists
    located in targeted cities to carry out future attacks.

    ¶42. (S//NF) As of late June, TTP reportedly tasked Abdul
    Malik Mujahid to launch suicide attacks against unspecified
    foreigners in crowded places in Punjab, with Mujahid
    considering the use of sympathetic madrassas as shelter prior
    to conducting an attack. Madrassas under consideration
    included the Jami Ashrafia and Jamiat ul-Manzur ul-Islami in
    Lahore. Separately, tearline from late June reports,
    "Militant commander Khan Bahadur, son of Sher Bahadur, is the
    local militant commander in the Watkai area. Bahadur
    currently may be residing in Islamabad, while reorganizing
    his group to operate in difference parts of Pakistan, as of
    June 25." Although there is limited information regarding the
    identity of Khan Bahadur (possible TIDE number 238258),
    earlier sensitive intelligence suggests he has served as an
    interlocutor in urban areas for Waziristan-based militants
    since 2007. According to late-January 2008 tearline, "... A
    Khan Bahadur (or Bhadur) in Lahore was involved in efforts to
    arrange talks and perhaps a government announcement for a
    cease-fire and helping coordinate a separate announcement
    from the Mujahidin, hopefully by October 13...."

    ¶43. (S//FGI//NF) As underscored by the events during and
    following the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) confrontation in
    Islamabad in July 2007, the continued existence of networks
    in Islamabad that can organize and facilitate protests and
    terrorist activity in the vicinity of the capital is indeed
    troubling. Notably, a body of intelligence reporting
    preceding the Lal Masjid confrontation suggests
    Pakistan-based extremists viewed the brewing tension between
    the madrassas and Islamabad one part of a larger
    comprehensive effort to re-energize and expand their jihadi
    operations from their strongholds in the tribal areas and
    Northwest Frontier Province. Interestingly, reporting from
    May 2007 citing a commander 10 corps lieutenant also noted 70
    mosques in and around Islamabad would likely support
    extremist activity associated with the now-infamous Lal
    Masjid, which was also an unauthorized mosque. Of concern,
    since 2008 attacks in Pakistan have repeatedly targeted
    Westerners, coinciding with an unprecedented number of
    attacks in both Lahore and Islamabad. (Appendix sources 39-47)

    ¶44. (U) Cyber Threats

    ¶45. (U) EUR CTAD comment: The latest version of the National
    Security Strategy released by the UK Government includes a
    public cyber security strategy. The report calls for the
    establishment of two new offices with cyber security
    responsibilities and approves the use of offensive operations
    as a countermeasure to attacks against British systems. The
    Office of Cyber Security, falling under the Cabinet Office,
    will be the central body charged with coordinating with
    industry and developing strategy. The Cyber Security
    Operations Centre based at Government Communications
    Headquarters, the UK's primary signals intelligence agency,
    will be responsible for conducting offensive operations.
    According to press reports, the UK Government has hired
    several former hackers to staff the centre.

    ¶46. (S//NF) NEA CTAD comment: DoD reporting indicates as of
    mid-May, several Persian-language hacker forums are sharing
    information pertaining to a variety of hacking codes, tools,
    and video tutorials. One of the more notable findings was a
    PHP-based "simattacker code" -- a backdoor Trojan horse
    program that allows for remote exploitation of an affected
    system and can provide denial-of-service capabilities. This
    particular malicious code is reportedly similar to a tool
    used against Georgian systems in 2008 (NFI).

    ¶47. (SBU) EAP CTAD comment: According to South Korean press
    reporting, the Republic of Korea's (RoK's) Defense Security
    Command (DSC) has declared intrusion attempts against the
    RoK's military computer networks have increased 20 percent in
    2009, compared to those detected in 2008. The DSC further
    stated that 89 percent of the attempts are unsophisticated
    efforts to hack into servers and Internet homepages, whereas
    the remaining 11 percent appear to be more advanced attempts
    to obtain intelligence information. Of note, in an effort to
    deal with the increasing cyber threat, the RoK's National
    Intelligence Service has recommended President Lee Myung-bak
    appoint an aide to assist with the country's cyber security
    issues.

    ¶48. (S//NF) SCA CTAD comment: According to Defense
    Intelligence Agency reporting, the Government of India (GoI)
    continues efforts to advance its computer security programs
    -- particularly in light of increased concerns over Chinese
    computer network exploitation efforts -- but progress is
    hampered by significant disagreements within its departments.
    The key GoI organizations involved in developing and
    implementing security policies are identified as the Ministry
    of Telecommunications and the Research and Analysis Wing.
    Although the Indian Army is primarily responsible for the
    security of military networks, Indian officials acknowledge
    Army representatives have been largely left out of
    discussions. Additionally, some other key groups, such as the
    National Technical Reconnaissance Organization and the Indian
    Defense Intelligence Agency, have reportedly failed to offer
    significant contributions. Private security companies are
    also concerned that the lack of input from the private sector
    may lead to unfair regulations regarding telecommunications
    monitoring.

    ¶49. (SBU) Domestic CTAD comment: On June 22, Websense
    Security Labs issued an alert after discovering the official
    website of the Embassy of Ethiopia in Washington, DC, had
    been subverted with obfuscated JavaScript code hidden in an
    inline frame (IFrame) with the goal of infecting visitors to
    the site with malicious software (malware). The code
    redirected users to sites where malware, including Trojan
    downloaders, were installed without explicit user action.
    According to the alert, the site that hosted the malicious
    JavaScript is currently down. On March 20, security company
    Sophos discovered a similar IFrame infection on the same
    website. At the time, researchers at Sophos noted it
    resembled the attack on the Washington, DC, Embassy of
    Azerbaijan website that occurred in early March. The
    researchers also indicated the redirected sites had been used
    by Russian cyber criminals in previous malware infections.
    (Appendix sources 48-50)

    ¶50. (C) EAP China - Beijing TOPSEC founder indicates PRC
    investment:

    ¶51. (S//NF) Key highlights:
    o Founder of TOPSEC and iTrusChina notes PRC funding and
    directive in media interview.
    o TOPSEC is China's largest provider of information security
    products and services.
    o TOPSEC provides services and training for the PLA and has
    recruited hackers in the past.
    o Potential linkages of China's top companies with the PRC
    illustrate the government's use of its "private sector" in
    support of information warfare objectives.

    ¶52. (SBU) Source paragraph: "During an interview with
    journalists from China News Network, chairman of both Beijing
    TOPSEC and iTrusChina, He Weidong, spoke about the two
    companies, to include investment and contract from the
    Chinese Government (People's Republic of China (PRC)) ....
    Tianrongxin's capital came from two parts. The Chinese
    Government share one part of the investment, and the
    management department (of Tianrongxin) share the other part.
    He further stated that Tianrongxin was not really a company
    but a research institute; in 1995, the company took contracts
    from the government's research and development tasks."

    ¶53. (S//NF) CTAD comment: In November 1995, He Weidong
    founded the security company Tianrongxin, a.k.a. Beijing
    TOPSEC Network Security Technology Company, Ltd. TOPSEC is a
    China Information Technology Security Center (CNITSEC)
    enterprise and has grown to become China's largest provider
    of information security products and services. TOPSEC is
    credited with launching China's first indigenous firewall in
    1996, as well as other information technology (IT) security
    products to China's market, to include virtual private
    networks, intrusion detection systems, filtering gateways,
    and security auditing and management systems. Additionally,
    in September 2000, Weidong founded the company
    Tianweichengxin, a.k.a. iTrusChina, which became the first
    experimental enterprise to develop business Public Key
    Infrastructure/Certification Authority services approved by
    China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.

    ¶54. (SBU) CTAD comment: During an interview with China News
    Network, Weidong stated that half of TOPSEC's start-up
    capital came from the PRC, with the other half coming from
    the company's management department. Additionally, he pointed
    out that TOPSEC began not as a company, but as a small
    research institute that took contracts from the government's
    research and development tasks (NFI). The turning point for
    TOPSEC came in 1996 when the company won a significant
    contract bid from the Chinese State Statistics Bureau. Since
    winning the bid, TOPSEC maintained a 100-percent sales growth
    in the following years. Weidong noted the company started out
    with 30,000 RMB (approximately $4,400) in 1995, and by 2002,
    had earnings of 3 billion RMB (approximately $440,000,000).
    Interestingly, shareholders did not receive bonuses, as all
    earnings went for future investment. Weidong also stated a
    bank loan was never used.

    ¶55. (S//NF) CTAD comment: Of note, the CNITSEC is responsible
    for overseeing the PRC's Information Technology (IT) security
    certification program. It operates and maintains the National
    Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT security and
    performs tests for information security products. In 2003,
    the CNITSEC signed a Government Security Program (GSP)
    international agreement with Microsoft that allowed select
    companies such as TOPSEC access to Microsoft source code in
    order to secure the Windows platform. XXXXXXXXXXXX

    ¶56. (S//NF) CTAD comment: Additionally, CNITSEC enterprises
    has recruited Chinese hackers in support of nationally-funded
    "network attack scientific research projects." From June 2002
    to March 2003, TOPSEC employed a known Chinese hacker, Lin
    Yong (a.k.a. Lion and owner of the Honker Union of China), as
    senior security service engineer to manage security service
    and training. Venus Tech, another CNITSEC enterprise privy to
    the GSP, is also known to affiliate with XFocus, one of the
    few Chinese hacker groups known to develop exploits to new
    vulnerabilities in a short period of time, as evidenced in
    the 2003 release of Blaster Worm (See CTAD Daily Read File
    (DRF) April 4, 2008).
    ¶57. (S//NF) CTAD comment: While links between top Chinese
    companies and the PRC are not uncommon, it illustrates the
    PRC's use of its "private sector" in support of governmental
    information warfare objectives, especially in its ability to
    gather, process, and exploit information. As evidenced with
    TOPSEC, there is a strong possibility the PRC is harvesting
    the talents of its private sector in order to bolster
    offensive and defensive computer network operations
    capabilities. (Appendix sources 51-52)

    ¶58. (U) Suspicious Activity Incidents

    ¶59. (SBU) EUR Iceland - A man and a woman photographed in the
    area north of U.S. Embassy Reykjavik June 25. They then
    walked toward the backside of the Post, where they took
    additional photographs before departing on foot. The man was
    seen photographing in the neighborhood for an additional 3
    hours. The Surveillance Detection Team found it unusual the
    subjects photographed sites other than tourist attractions.
    (SIMAS Event: Reykjavik-00257-2009)

    ¶60. (SBU) AF Guinea - Two young men were photographed U.S.
    Embassy Conakry June 25. A gendarme stopped the pair and took
    them to a nearby security booth where they were interviewed
    by Post's foreign security national investigator. Their
    photos of the Embassy were deleted, and the subjects were
    released with a warning.

    ¶61. (SBU) Record Check/Investigation: Subject 1: Mamdou
    Mouminatou Diallo. XXXXXXXXXXXX Labe, Guinea. Cell phone
    number: XXXXXXXXXXXX Subject 2: Mamadou Diallo. XXXXXXXXXXXX
    Koundara, Guinea. Cell phone number: XXXXXXXXXXXX (SIMAS
    Event: Conakry-01492-2009)

    ¶62. (SBU) NEA Tunisia - A man sat at Marsaoul Caf in Tunis
    focusing on the road leading to the U.S. Ambassador's
    residence June 4. After 30 minutes, the subject got into his
    car and departed the area. The man was previously seen at the
    caf on May 15 for approximately 1 hour.

    ¶63. (SBU) RSO Action/Assessment: The caf is located at the
    foot of the hill near the Ambassador's residence (the
    residence is located at the end of the road, approximately
    one-quarter to one-half mile away). This is the second time
    the individual and vehicle were spotted. However, Tunisian
    police do not share information concerning routine traffic
    stops or suspicious persons questioned/seen near the Embassy
    or Ambassador's residence. If the vehicle is seen again, the
    RSO will attempt to retrieve information on the owner.

    ¶64. (SBU) Record Check/Investigation: Vehicle: Gray
    Volkswagen; License plate: 8020TU97. (SIMAS Event:
    Tunis-02054-2009)

    SECRET//FGI//NOFORN

    Full Appendix with sourcing available upon request.
    CLINTON

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