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### Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1411, BRAZIL: SCENESETTER FOR THE DECEMBER 13-14 VISIT OF WHA

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BRASILIA1411 | 2009-12-10 16:04 | 2010-12-17 07:07 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brasilia

`

    VZCZCXYZ0105
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHBR #1411/01 3441608
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 101608Z DEC 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0068
    INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
    RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
    RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
    RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001411

    SIPDIS
    FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARTURO VALENZUELA
    FROM CHARGE D'AFFAIRES LISA KUBISKE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/10
    TAGS: PREL OVIP BR
    SUBJECT: BRAZIL: SCENESETTER FOR THE DECEMBER 13-14 VISIT OF WHA
    ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARTURO VALENZUELA

    REF: BRASILIA 1412 (EPD SCENESETTER)

    CLASSIFIED BY: Lisa Kubiske, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.; REASON: 1.4(D)

    Introduction: New Impetus to a Growing Relationship

    ¶1. (C) Mission Brazil warmly welcomes your visit to Brasilia. It
    is more than a courtesy to say that your trip comes at a
    significant time for U.S.-Brazil relations. A promising start with
    the new U.S. Administration is beginning to ebb as high-level
    initiatives have been delayed and Brazil has staked out positions
    at odds with USG views on such issues as Honduras,
    Colombia/Venezuela, Iran, non-proliferation, and the Middle East
    peace process. At the same time, as Brazil continues its rapid
    transformation from a regional to a global power, USG engagement
    with Brazil has continued to expand on a growing range of issues of
    importance to the United States, including global trade and
    finance, climate change, alternative fuels, regional energy
    integration, food security, UN Security Council matters, and
    trilateral cooperation in Haiti, Africa and elsewhere. The GOB
    remains eager to deepen bilateral engagement, and the possibilities
    to expand our productive economic engagement into other areas
    remain ample. As the Lula Government heads into its final year,
    your visit provides the opportunity to provide new impetus to the
    still-considerable positive momentum in our relationship, and to
    lay the groundwork for a more strategic partnership with a new
    Brazilian government.

    A Rapidly Emerging Global Power...

    ¶2. (SBU) Brazil's status as one of the world's top-ten economies
    has received a boost over the past year from the continuation of
    solid economic management and better-than-expected performance
    through the global financial crisis and economic downturn.
    Brazil's growing economic clout and potential for an estimated 5%
    annual GDP growth during the next several years, combined with an
    aggressive effort by the Lula government to increase the country's
    international reach and the new prominence on the multilateral
    agenda of issues such as climate change on which Brazil is a
    necessary player, is encouraging this former global wallflower to
    make its presence felt on the world stage in ways that would have
    seemed unlikely only a decade ago.

    ¶3. (SBU) Brazil's ascendancy is being driven by a strong and still
    strengthening democracy, a more open and stable economy, a
    competitive inward- and outward-looking private sector, a deepening
    S&T capability, and an ample natural resource base. Brazil is now
    the world's third largest agricultural exporter after the United
    States and the European Union and the second-largest issuer of ADRs
    on the New York Stock Exchange. Already a global leader in
    alternative fuels and self-sufficient in oil, recent discoveries of
    offshore (so-called "pre-salt") oil, while difficult to exploit,
    give Brazil the potential to become a major global oil producer and
    exporter over the next decade. Over the past two years, Brazil has
    played a critical role in shaping the international economic system
    through its participation in the Doha Round and its leadership in
    the G20. Brazil is making a transition from a recipient to a
    provider of assistance, mostly through technical cooperation.
    Brazil officially became an IMF "creditor" country this year and
    has pledged to increase its contribution to the IMF. (For
    additional background on Brazil's economy and economic positions,
    see the scenesetter for the bilateral Economic Policy Dialogue,
    reftel.)

    ¶4. (C) Under Lula, the GOB has dramatically increased its contacts
    with and presence in Africa, Asia (including North Korea), and the
    Middle East (especially Iran), opening some 48 posts abroad over
    the last seven years and increasing its diplomatic corps by 50%.
    While maintaining its focus on South American integration through
    MERCOSUL and UNASUL-institutions largely of its making--and
    preserving its longstanding multilateral encounters with the United
    States through the Summit of the Americas, with the EU through both
    regional and bilateral dialogues, and with Spain and Portugal
    through the Ibero-American Summit, Brazil has been the driving
    force behind a series of new multilateral gatherings, including the
    BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China), IBSA (India, Brazil, South
    Africa), ASSA (Southern Africa-South America), ASPA (South

    America-Arab Countries), and CALC (Summit of Latin America and the
    Caribbean). Brazil's top foreign policy priority remains obtaining
    a seat on the UN Security Council and, as it takes its place in
    January as a non-permanent UNSC member for the tenth time, it is
    aware that its actions will be closely watched.

    ¶5. (C) Brazil has begun to take more visible and assertive
    positions on a broader range of issues of interest to the United
    States-sometimes helpfully, often not. Brazil's participation in
    the Doha Round, G20 talks, and, more recently, the preparations for
    the UNFCCC COP-15, has been serious and generally constructive.
    Unlike the other two giant emerging economies, China and India,
    Brazil is bringing to Copenhagen a goal to reduce its greenhouse
    gas emissions: a reduction of between 36-39% by 2020 compared with
    "business as usual," which translates to about a 25% decline
    compared with 2005. (The USG is proposing a 17% decline for 2020
    compared with 2005.) Brazil's own military and civilian nuclear
    programs have made it more difficult to work with on
    non-proliferation, and have led to the GOB's refusal to sign an
    Additional Protocol and lop-sided advocacy of Iran's rights to
    civilian nuclear technology. Even further from Brazil's historical
    interests, high-level exchanges of visits with Iran and
    increasingly intense engagement in the Middle East peace process
    are among recent high-profile forays into new areas of global
    import. Statements on North Korean missile tests, China's
    crackdown in Tibet, and elections in Zimbabwe are other instances
    where Brazil has stepped into new territory.

    ...With the Emphasis on "Emerging"

    ¶6. (C) If Brazil's rapid emergence on the global stage is
    unquestionable, it is also true that it is very much still
    emerging. Brazil's clear sense of purpose in South America, where
    the overriding importance of maintaining stability on its poorly
    protected borders has led to an emphasis on dialogue and
    integration with its ten neighbors, is not in evidence on most
    extra-regional issues. Brazil's objective in achieving a seat at
    the table on many global issues seems to stop at the seat itself.
    In part, this stems from a general Brazilian disposition to prefer
    dialogue with other countries to confrontation or isolation. It is
    also driven by Lula's determination to develop and maintain
    friendly relations with all global players as Brazil seeks a
    permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The end result is that
    Brazil often remains reticent to take firm positions on key global
    issues and generally seeks ways to avoid them. More often than
    not, the GOB eschews positions of leadership that might require
    overtly choosing sides. Its discomfort with the spotlight has been
    on full display in the aftermath of the Honduras coup: thrust into
    the center of the crisis when President Zelaya appeared on its
    embassy doorstep, Brazil did very little to extricate itself or to
    actively pursue a resolution, instead handing responsibility to the
    United States.

    ¶7. (C) Less obviously, Brazil remains uncomfortable in its
    leadership on MINUSTAH. To the constant refrain of "we cannot
    continue this indefinitely," Brazil has been increasingly insistent
    that international efforts to promote security must go hand in hand
    with commitments to economic and social development-a theme it will
    take to the UNSC in January. Brazil maintains a frustrating
    double-standard on democracy and human rights. Although a founding
    member of the Community of Democracies and Partnership for
    Democratic Governance, Brazil rarely stands firm on these issues;
    even its stubbornly rigid support of Zelaya (more so than
    democracy) in Honduras stands in stark contrast to Lula's
    unquestioning acceptance of Iranian President Ahmadinejad's
    re-election. And in the wake of what it considered a
    near-disastrous brush with election observation in Zimbabwe last
    year, the GOB has opted to focus on technical cooperation related
    to running elections, in lieu of observing them. In the UN, Brazil
    generally chooses to abstain even on resolutions regarding the most
    egregious human rights abuses-such as those in Iran, North Korea,
    and Sudan-unless it considers evidence of non-cooperation with
    international human rights bodies to be clear-cut (as in Burma, for
    example).

    ¶8. (C) Where Brazil's policy is not hesitant, it is often
    ill-informed or straight-jacketed by the policies of the past. As
    it steps out on Middle East issues, the GOB does so with a lack of
    expertise on the region. Inclined to take assertions from the
    Syrians, Iranians, and Hizbullah at face value, it insists that
    peace can be achieved only if all players are at the table, and
    seeks to position itself as a neutral party, "the country who can
    talk to everyone," over against what it perceives as the biased
    U.S. and European efforts. This penchant for dialogue stands
    together with respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in
    internal affairs as the hallmarks of Brazilian foreign policy. But
    as Brazil plays in a growing number of international arenas, it is
    finding it more difficult to remain true to these principles, and
    more difficult to hide its inconsistencies.

    ¶9. (C) Brazil's uneven foreign policy is mirrored by continued
    growing pains at home. Impressive strides over the last twenty
    years in establishing stable democratic institutions are tarnished
    by a dysfunctional judicial system, lack of enforcement capability,
    and persistent and widespread corruption. Even as Brazil's middle
    class continues to grow, the income gap remains significant and the
    country is still home to the largest number of poor in the
    hemisphere, with some 50 million concentrated in the northeast.
    Brazil's successful multinationals and vibrant entrepreneurial
    class are constrained by an inhospitable business climate, a costly
    and intrusive but inefficient government bureaucracy, R&D spending
    that focuses on producing articles for publications rather than
    innovation, and inadequate national transportation, communications,
    and energy infrastructure networks. Although it is heading to
    Copenhagen with an ambitious proposal to reduce greenhouse gas
    emissions and the lowest rates of deforestation on record, the GOB
    has made very little headway in straightening out the land
    ownership issues in the Amazon (where only about four percent of
    the land is clearly titled) or in providing sustainable economic
    activities for the more than 25 million people living in the
    region. Without resolving those issues, the pressure to clear the
    Amazon to support one's family will remain as great as ever.
    Though proud of its status as a "melting pot" in which different
    cultures and races exist side-by-side, racism remains a real and
    largely unacknowledged problem, and Brazil's indigenous population
    of some 700,000 individuals, scattered across the country in 225
    different societies, continues to suffer from prejudice, violence,
    and marginalization.

    ¶10. (C) Nonetheless, Brazil continues to make progress across the
    board. Although the average Brazilian remains inward-looking and
    often ignorant of world developments, a burgeoning public interest
    in the United States has made Brazil one of the four largest
    visa-issuing and -adjudicating U.S. missions worldwide. Brazil
    continues to struggle with unresolved military dictatorship-era
    human rights violations, but is nonetheless moving successfully to
    reintegrate the military into the mainstream of national policy.
    Organized crime, urban murder rates often ten times those in the
    most violent U.S. cities, and the second largest consumption of
    cocaine in the world are in need of urgent attention, but Brazil's
    professional, well-trained Federal Police works as an effective
    partner with USG law enforcement agencies. Public education
    remains sub-standard, the Landless Movement (MST) continues to
    attract the rural disenfranchised, and the government is largely
    absent from the favelas of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and other
    major cities, whose millions of residents are often caught between
    criminal gangs and corrupt civil and military (uniformed) police.
    But Brazil has developed innovative social programs, and its Bolsa
    Familia conditional-transfer program is considered an international
    example.

    Relations with the United States: Can Brazil Overcome Its
    Inferiority Complex?

    ¶11. (SBU) This Mission has been saying in its scenesetters that
    bilateral relations are as good as they have ever been-certainly in
    decades. This is true, and the evidence is ample: a burgeoning set
    of government-to-government dialogues covering economic,
    commercial, scientific, defense, and foreign policy has led to
    rapidly expanding cooperation: an MOU on biofuels cooperation,

    increased numbers of joint exercises between our militaries,
    trilateral cooperation in Africa and Haiti on such issues as
    health, food security, and institutional strengthening, and an
    innovative agreement to fight racial and ethnic discrimination.

    ¶12. (C) At the same time, we face significant historical baggage in
    the way Brazil's foreign policy establishment views the United
    States, which slows our ability to build a fully cooperative
    relationship with Brazil. Much of Brazil's foreign policy
    establishment remains cautious and mistrustful toward the United
    States. Bilaterally, a growing and pragmatic interest in
    cooperating with the United States on a range of technical and
    practical issues is often caught up in fears that Brazil will lose
    sovereign control or will find itself a junior partner on its own
    soil to better funded, staffed, and organized USG partners. This
    has led to persistent problems with visas for U.S. law enforcement
    agencies (particularly, but not exclusively, on counterterrorism
    issues), refusal to accept USG assistance, and seemingly
    unreasonable demands and strictures on various types of
    cooperation. More concerted Mission efforts to reach out to
    non-traditional executive branch agencies and non-executive branch
    partners-state and municipal governments, the judiciary,
    prosecutors, legislators, the private sector, and civil
    society-have sometimes been greeted with concern, suspicion, and
    occasional opposition by a Foreign Ministry jealous of its
    historical lead on all international issues and self-designated
    role as both definer and protector of Brazil's national interests
    vis-C -vis the world.

    ¶13. (C) Within South America, Brazil sees the United States as a
    competitor and remains deeply suspicious of our motives and
    intentions. Although the notion that the United States harbors
    plans to invade or internationalize the Amazon or to seize Brazil's
    offshore oil may seem preposterous to Americans, concerns about
    such plans surface regularly among senior Brazilian officials,
    academics, and journalists, and are only the most outlandish
    manifestation of generalized mistrust and insecurity with regard to
    the United States presence in the region. Brazil's reaction to the
    U.S. base agreement with Colombia reflected, in large measure, just
    such concerns, as have its veiled efforts to scuttle the 3+1
    Security Dialogue with Paraguay and Argentina. The United States
    is not the only one subject to the Brazilian mistrust; The GOB now
    requires all NGOs operating in the Amazon region to be registered
    and has tightened controls related to land ownership by foreigners
    in the area.

    ¶14. (C) Outside South America, Brazil's discomfort with the United
    States is less in evidence, but it is careful to avoid any
    suggestion that it is toeing a U.S. line, is intent on avoiding
    situations in which it might be perceived as a junior partner, and
    tends to see an "independent" position-i.e., independent of the
    United States in the first instance, and wealthy countries more
    generally-as the preferred default. Nor does Brazil want to be
    lumped in with the mass of developing countries. In multilateral
    settings, Brazil prefers to position itself as a "bridge" between
    the wealthy and developing nations. In cooperating with us in
    Africa, it has been careful to limit cooperation to those areas
    where it can act plausibly as an equal partner. Across the board,
    engagement with the United States has been pragmatic, rather than
    strategic. As it looks for strategic partners, Brazil is showing a
    clear preference for other "independent" emerging powers-South
    Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, Iran, China, India-and for one
    "independent" world power: France. This (long-standing) affinity
    for the French, which has been amply reciprocated by President
    Sarkozy and his government, has been most evident in the FX-2
    fighter competition, in which both Lula and Defense Minister Nelson
    Jobim have expressed a clear preference for the French aircraft
    despite Brazilian Air Force evaluations that show the clear
    superiority and cheaper price of the U.S. fighter.

    An Eager Brazil Gives Us the Opportunity to Invest for the
    Long-Term

    ¶15. (SBU) In spite of their reticence, Brazilians continue to show
    a genuine interest in deepening relations with the United States.

    Economic issues are proving to be the easiest pathway to more
    productive engagement with the GOB, both because, as a large
    emerging economy, Brazil is beginning to have a natural seat at the
    table and because the GOB sees most easily how global economic
    issues directly impact its own well-being and national security.
    The GOB has shown itself a willing partner in efforts on bilateral
    investment and trade issues that will increase business
    opportunities, job growth, and economic development. At the same
    time, we are cooperating with Brazil to address the regulatory,
    legal and infrastructure challenges that constrain Brazil's growth
    and social inclusion goals and hurt U.S. exporters and investors.

    ¶16. (C) We are also building these partnerships with the goal of
    promote regional and global economic and social inclusion
    goals--among them, addressing the global financial crisis, opening
    trade, and stimulating cooperation on economic development.
    Brazil's interest in taking on a mantle of global economic
    leadership offers numerous opportunities for engagement, as we
    encourage Brazil to take on increasingly responsible roles
    globally. As always, it is important to frame approaches to the GOB
    as a partner, and not a junior partner. However, constructive
    engagement in the G20 has given Brazil increased confidence that it
    can and should engage in issues outside its own borders, and the
    GOB takes deserved pride in having overcome many experiences
    (previous financial crises, addressing GINI inequalities,
    infrastructure impact on growth, etc) common to developing country,
    and sees itself as uniquely placed to use its "lessons learned" to
    help other developing countries tackle their own challenges. The
    GOB has been receptive to partnering with us on development
    cooperation, including a newly developing initiative in Mozambique
    and Haiti on agriculture, health and infrastructure development.
    We continue to work with Brazil to build consensus for WTO trade
    liberalization; to promote enhanced cooperation in fora such as
    OECD, WHO, and ICAO; and to create the conditions for global
    development and prosperity.

    ¶17. (C) Our economic engagement provides a bridge to building our
    relationship with the GOB on other issues. Although they generally
    require more careful groundwork and legwork to ensure success, the
    possibilities to do so remain ample. In a country that seeks
    nothing so much as recognition of its "rightful" place on the
    international stage, there is widespread understanding that no
    other country can legitimize Brazil's aspirations in so meaningful
    a way as the United States. More immediately, the prospect for
    advancing beyond a pragmatic partnership received a significant
    boost with the election of President Obama. Although Brazilians
    generally admire the United States and maintain a strong interest
    in our culture and politics, from President Lula to the man on the
    street they see in the President a kindred spirit whom they are
    eager to engage. The Administration's early statements and actions
    with regard to Latin America-the President's meeting with UNASUL
    and efforts to reach out at the Summit of the Americas, the spirit
    of negotiation at the OAS General Assembly, efforts to reinitiate
    dialogue with Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia-were all well received
    in Brazil, and heightened expectations of an even closer
    relationship. Brazilian officials were impressed by what they
    heard from General Jones, Under Secretary Tauscher, and other
    senior officials during their visit in August.

    ¶18. (C) In the intervening months, both official and non-official
    Brazilians have become increasingly disappointed with what they
    perceive as a lack of attention from the United States. While
    acknowledging that the United States has pressing domestic and
    international priorities, Brazilians feel more than ever that their
    successes-their performance through the financial crisis,
    constructive engagement in the WTO and Copenhagen, creative social
    programs, and even their successful bids for the 2014 World Cup and
    the 2016 Summer Olympics-have earned them a more prominent place on
    the U.S. agenda. With regard to the GOB in particular, the
    Colombia bases problem seemed to be evidence of a lack on the part
    of the USG both of transparency in our dealings in the region and
    of consideration regarding matters that have a direct impact on
    Brazil's security. Although initially pleased with the USG
    response to the coup in Honduras, and despite having publicly
    insisted the problem was ours to resolve, the GOB saw our position

    in support of Honduran democratic process (rather than a firm
    insistence on Zelaya's restoration) as a step away from
    consensus-building in the region.

    ¶19. (C) Despite this frustration, the GOB remains eager to engage,
    and holds out continued hope that Brazil will receive a visit from
    President Obama in the coming months. The Foreign Ministry is in
    the process of creating and increasing staffing for a higher level
    department (equivalent to a Department of State bureau) to handle
    United States, Canada, and Inter-American Affairs.
    Uncharacteristically, the Foreign Ministry has extended a series of
    new offers and taken up others it has long delayed: it is eager to
    launch the proposed high-level dialogue, has sought to replicate
    the success of the Joint Action Plan to Fight Racial Discrimination
    by proposing an MOU on gender issues, is moving forward on a
    Defense Cooperation Agreement, Pol-Mil talks, trilateral
    cooperation in Haiti and Africa, and a Tropical Forest Conservation
    Act agreement, has offered an MOU on climate change, and has
    expressed repeated interest in establishing joint counternarcotics
    cooperation with Bolivia. While getting to yes on these
    initiatives will undoubtedly require the same patience and care to
    avoid Brazilian sensitivities that mark almost all of our daily
    interactions with the GOB, the evident interest at senior levels of
    the presidency and foreign ministry in building up the relationship
    should help smooth the way over the next months.

    ¶20. (C) As keen as they are to cultivate the Obama Administration,
    GOB officials are also driven by the knowledge that their timeframe
    for making meaningful progress is short. There is little more than
    a year left of the Lula government; only ten months until elections
    for president, all 27 governors, two-thirds of the senate, and all
    federal and state deputies; just over six months before official
    campaigning begins; and less than four months until ministers who
    intend to run for office-perhaps as many as half of Lula's
    cabinet-must resign. This election-year calendar will be further
    complicated by the traditional slowdown during Brazil's extended
    summer/Christmas/Carnival break. Nonetheless, the continuity
    provided by Brazil's influential diplomatic corps and the
    likelihood of broad continuity on both foreign and domestic policy
    under either of the two strongest contenders to succeed Lula on
    January 1, 2011 means that initiatives put into place now will lay
    the groundwork for the new Brazilian government.

    ¶21. (C) The GOB will be looking for signs in your visit that USG
    interest in engaging Brazil as a global partner has not waned.
    While GOB officials are unlikely to give on the issues that have
    proved contentious over the last months, they will value the
    opportunity to explain their views, will want to hear the
    Administration's perspective and aspirations with regard to Brazil,
    and will seriously entertain suggestions for additional engagement.
    Your visit provides the opportunity to forge a durable working
    relationship over the next year and to lay the foundation for a
    strategic bilateral relationship with the next Brazilian government
    that will also be essential to influencing the direction of
    Brazil's development as a maturing global actor.
    KUBISKE

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