Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 3427 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone
Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF ASEC AE AR AG AJ AFIN AU AM APER ABUD ATRN AORC AEMR AMGT ACOA AEC AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC AS AL ASIG ABLD AA AFU ASUP AGMT
BU BR BL BO BM BE BH BTIO BEXP BIDEN BK BY BA BG BF BB BC BBSR BRUSSELS BILAT BX
CJAN CH CU CASC CVIS CMGT CO CI CLINTON CIA CG CF CN CS CAN COUNTER CIS CA CBW CM CE CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CD CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM COUNTERTERRORISM CDG CACM CDB CV
DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DJ DISENGAGEMENT DOD DEAX
EU EFIN EG ETTC EINV ENRG EI ECPS EINT ECON EIND ETRD EPET EUN EZ EMIN ELAB EAID EAGR ET EC EAIR ENVR ES ECA EWWT ER ELTN EFIS EN EXTERNAL ECIN EINVETC ENIV EINN ENGR EUR ESA ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FMLN FJ
GM GG GH GE GV GT GR GTIP GOI GCC GAZA GZ GTMO GA
HA HILLARY HR HUMAN HO HYMPSK HU HURI HK
IR IZ IS IT INRB IRAJ IN INRA INRO IC ID IIP IAEA ITPHUM IV IPR IWC IQ IO ICTY ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC ICAO IMO IF ILC IEFIN INTELSAT ITALY ITALIAN INTERPOL
JO JA JOSEPH JUS JAMES
KE KTFN KDEM KJUS KNNP KGHG KZ KIPR KWBG KIRF KPAO KDRG KHLS KCRM KSCA KPAL KISL KG KACT KN KS KGIC KRAD KU KCOM KBIO KMCA KCOR KV KHDP KTIP KVPR KDEV KWMN KSPR KTIA KHIV KPRP KAWC KOLY KCIP KCFE KOCI KMDR KPKO KTDB KMRS KFRD KLIG KBCT KICC KGIT KSTC KUNR KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KOMC KAWK KO KTER KSUM KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KMPI KNPP KR KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KFIN KGCC KPIN KNUC KPLS KIRC
LE LY LU LG LH LI LO LOG
MARR MOPS MU MASS MY MNUC MCAP MA MO MTCRE MG MASC MX MCC MZ ML MK MTRE MP MIL MDC MTCR MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MR MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MPOS MEPP MOPPS MAPP
NATO NIPP NL NO NG NI NE NS NAR NPT NZ NU NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NATIONAL
OVIP OPRC OREP OIIP ODIP OTRA OSCE OAS OFDP OPIC OPDC OEXC OECD OPCW OSCI OTR OVP OFFICIALS OSAC
PGOV PREL PINS PINR PO PTER PK PHUM PARM PL PE PREF PHSA PBTS PGOF PROP PARMS PA PM PMIL PTERE POL PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PNAT POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PSOE PU POLITICAL PARTIES PBIO PECON POGOV PINL PKFK
QA
RS RU RW RP RIGHTS RICE RO ROBERT RF RFE REGION
SU SA SY SP SNAR SENV SCUL SW SOCI SF SO SR SG SMIG SL SN SHUM SZ SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SI STEINBERG
TI TIP TBIO TR TX TU TSPA TS TRGY TH TT TW TERRORISM TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TPHY TK TNGD TC
UK UNSC UG US UZ UP UNO UNMIK UY UNGA UN UE UNESCO UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS USUN USEU UV
VZ VE VT VM VTPREL VN
WA WI WMO WTRO WTRQ WHO WWARD WTO
XA XT XM XY XG XC XH XL XF XZ XW XR XS XK
YM YI YE
ZI ZP ZK ZF ZB ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09LAPAZ600, GOB BRIEFS DIPLOMATIC CORPS ON "TERRORIST CELL"

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09LAPAZ600.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09LAPAZ600 | 2009-04-23 11:11 | 2010-12-29 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy La Paz

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHLP #0600/01 1131106
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 231106Z APR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0600
    INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 8955
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6335
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0309
    RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0039
    RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0033
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 7518
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4565
    RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0468
    RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 0021
    RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4900
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6249
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 7183
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1947
    RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0014
    RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1760
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000600

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM PINR ENVR ASEC BL PTER
    SUBJECT: GOB BRIEFS DIPLOMATIC CORPS ON "TERRORIST CELL"

    REF: A. LA PAZ 593
    ¶B. LA PAZ 290
    ¶C. 08 LA PAZ 2483
    ¶D. 08 LA PAZ 2374

    Classified By: Charge Kris Urs for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Bolivian Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera
    and other senior administration members, during an address to
    the diplomatic corps on April 21, underscored the seriousness
    of what they labeled a series of three terrorist attacks and
    the presence of a terrorist cell with at least ten members.
    On April 16, Bolivian police forces killed three alleged
    terrorists in a downtown Santa Cruz hotel (reftel A). In an
    interview released posthumously, the group's leader advocated
    the secession of Santa Cruz department, Bolivia's largest and
    most prosperous state, but explicitly denied having any plans
    to attack La Paz or overthrow the government. Nevertheless,
    Garcia Linera repeatedly pledged to carry the investigation
    to its "final conclusions," raising fears of possible arrests
    of members of the Santa Cruz-based political opposition.
    President Evo Morales rejected requests by the Hungarian,
    Irish, and Croatian governments to investigate the three
    deaths, saying they had no right to demand explanations.
    Charge reassured Garcia Linera that there was no USG
    involvement as per President Obama's recent public statement;
    the Vice President responded that the GOB knows that the USG
    is with them. Striking his chest for emphasis, Garcia Linera
    said "President Obama's words brought us here." End summary.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    Presentation to Diplomatic Corps
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶2. (C) Following the deaths of three and arrest of two
    alleged terrorists April 16 in Santa Cruz by the Bolivian
    SWAT team (reftel A), the Bolivian government has released
    preliminary results of its ongoing investigation into what it
    claims is a cell of at least ten terrorists. The government
    said the group is also responsible for recent attacks on the
    homes of Deputy Autonomy Minister Saul Avalos and Cardinal
    Julio Terrazas. In a packed meeting of the diplomatic corps
    April 21 in the Presidential Palace's Hall of Mirrors, Vice
    President Alvaro Garcia Linera, Government Minister Alfredo
    Rada, and Presidency Minister Juan Ramon Quintana justified
    the killing of the three alleged terrorists and reviewed what
    they emphasized was just "ten percent" of the information
    they had captured regarding the group's aims and activities.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    VP: "Terrorists" and "Assassins"
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶3. (C) Garcia Linera noted that after the explosion at
    Cardinal Terraza's house, the government intensified its
    focus on the suspected terrorist cell, leading ultimately to
    the April 16 shootout at the Santa Cruz hotel. He said
    during the raid the five men attacked the police with gunfire
    and explosives. The vice president emphasized that the men
    were neither tourists nor random fanatics, but rather part of
    a structured terrorist cell that was well-funded and trained
    to achieve their ultimate goal of secession for Santa Cruz
    and the assassination of Morales, Garcia Linera, and "three
    ministers."

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    Investigation Not a Witch Hunt, Really
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶4. (C) Garcia Linera told the group of diplomats that La Paz
    Prosecutor Marcelo Sosa was the case's main investigator and
    said the government would abide by the results of the
    investigation, including any established links to Santa Cruz
    businessmen and/or political opposition members. Garcia
    Linera said the effort would be impartial and would not be a
    witch hunt. However, he pledged to take the results of the
    investigation to their "final conclusion." (Note: Garcia
    Linera used similarly firm language after the September 2008
    violence in Pando (reftel B-D), after which the government
    illegally jailed Prefect Leopoldo Fernandez and violently
    detained over forty more, many of them prominent political
    opposition members. End note.)

    - - - - - - - - - -
    Rada: Cell Structure
    - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶5. (C) Government Minister Rada discussed the alleged
    structure of the cell, including the five members found in
    Bolivia. He said Hungarian-Bolivian Eduardo Rozsa Flores was
    the leader of the group, that he had obtained the rank of
    colonel in the Croatian army, and was believed to be
    responsible for the murder of a journalist in Croatia. Rada
    described Irishman Michael Martin Dwyer as second-in-command,
    saying he had military and security experience. Rada said
    Romanian-born Hungarian Arpad Magyarosi was used as a
    sharpshooter/sniper. Rada referred to the two captured men,
    Mario Tadic Astorga (a Croatian-Bolivian) and Elod Toaso (a
    Hungarian), as a member of the Croat army responsible for the
    Terrazas attack and as the main computer specialist,
    respectively. Rada said that in addition to the five
    captured or killed, information seized by the police
    indicated there were others involved.

    ¶6. (C) Rada reported that after the gun battle, the police
    found pistols, dynamite, C4 explosives, and ammunition
    corresponding to 5.56mm weapons. Noting that the weapons
    cache found at the Cotas stand in the ExpoCruz fairgrounds
    did not include any weapons of this type, he said there were
    likely other weapons caches in the ExpoCruz area. (Note: The
    Embassy participates in the ExpoCruz fair only through its
    association with the American Chamber of Commerce, and does
    not have its own stand or storage area. End note.) Rada
    said the materiel seized corresponded to the explosive
    devices left at both Avalos' and Cardinal Terrazas' homes,
    which included dynamite, C4, nails, and other metal pieces.
    He then indicated the government had information showing the
    group's next attacks included the president, vice president,
    and three ministers (whom Rada left unnamed).

    - - - - - - - - - - -
    VP: We Want Your Help
    - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶7. (C) Garcia Linera spoke again, saying there was much more
    information to be reviewed. He said the group had maps of
    Bolivian military bases they apparently planned to attack,
    that they were recruiting other members, and that they had
    "specialized arms" even the Bolivian government did not
    possess. The vice president said they found many photos,
    some including Bolivians from Santa Cruz and Beni, and that
    they were in the process of identifying these people. He
    insisted the photos were not "montages" or
    otherwise-assembled works by the government, and that the
    photos also indicated there had been plans for an attack
    around the January 25 constitutional referendum which did not
    come to pass. He specifically referred to a photo of Rozsa
    with Cruceno autonomy activist Mauricio Iturri and averred
    that he was trained by Rozsa. Garcia Linera ended with a
    simple plea to the assembled group, saying "we want your
    help."

    - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    Quintana: Troop Movements
    - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶8. (C) Presidency Minister Quintana then took the floor
    briefly to note that, in his opinion, the attacks occurred
    because the political opposition created a context in which
    they were possible and because the government's authority in
    the area was not strong enough. He identified six border
    provinces within Santa Cruz department where the government
    would deploy troops to strengthen control.

    - - - - - - - -
    Questions Remain
    - - - - - - - -

    ¶9. (C) Despite the GOB's coordinated presentation that
    maintained the group's intentions to assassinate the
    president, in an interview with Hungarian television
    (released posthumously and characterized as his "final
    testimony"), Rozsa explicitly stated he did not seek to
    attack the central government in La Paz or to assassinate
    Morales or other administration officials. In a conversation
    with Charge after the administration's presentation, the
    German DCM remarked that it seemed there was "not enough" to
    justify the government's claims of a well-funded terrorist
    network, given that the supposed terrorists were easily
    captured and did not appear to be well trained.

    - - - - - - - - - - -
    Charge Press Statement
    - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶10. (U) After the presentation, Charge met briefly with the
    press, saying that "if asked" the USG would be pleased to
    study potential assistance we could give to the
    investigation. The Cubans offered assistance as well.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    Morales Gets Mad at Europe
    - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶11. (U) In a press conference later on April 21, President
    Morales bristled at requests by the governments of Hungary,
    Ireland, and Croatia for more information about the deaths of
    their citizens. Morales said the three countries "have no
    authority to ask me for an explanation... I am tempted to
    sue them, that is what I want to do, but I am not a lawyer.
    How can they defend people who came here to attack the
    president? That is very grave. I could think that they (the
    governments) were the ones who sent them in to attack me, to
    attack democracy." Irish Foreign Minister Michael Martin
    said Morales was being unreasonable and mentioned evidence
    suggesting the three men died in an "ambush" and not in a
    prolonged gun battle. Similarly, Hungarian Foreign Minister
    Peter Balazs said he doubted Rozsa and the others were
    plotting assassinations. "We can assume they were the
    victims of domestic Bolivian politics," he said.

    - - - -
    Comment
    - - - -

    ¶12. (C) While the existence of a paramilitary group
    dedicated to the defense and potential secession of Santa
    Cruz seems clear, the other goals attributed to the group by
    the Bolivian government are more difficult to verify.
    Observers fear the government may leverage the group's
    presence to go after the political opposition in Santa Cruz,
    similar to their round-up of Pando political opposition.
    Just as in Pando, the government has claimed sole prosecution
    authority falls in the hands of police and investigators from
    La Paz. Post notes that ex-Pando Prefect (and Morales rival)
    Fernandez has now been in prison for seven months under
    dubious legal pretext and without a trial. We are also wary,
    given the president's penchant for accusing the Embassy of
    supporting the opposition (and despite the vice president's
    chest-pounding affirmation to Charge), of a potential GOB
    accusation that the Embassy or the USG generally supported
    Rozsa's "terrorist" attacks. End comment.
    URS

`