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Reference ID | Subject | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08NEWDELHI1489 | NARAYANAN URGES BETTER BILATERAL UNDERSTANDING ON | 2008-06-02 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy New Delhi
08TRIPOLI466 | CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): CONVERSION OF THE RABTA CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITY REF: A) STATE 58476, B) THE HAGUE 482, C) TRIPOLI 119 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: The GOL's lead interlocutor on CWC issues told us: 1) conversion of the Rabta chemical weapons production facility would not be completed until December 2009 (which the GOL appears to have known since early 2006), 2) the GOL would not submit a new National Paper at the upcoming June 24-27 Executive Committee meeting of the OPCW, 3) GOL Delreps would/would read an official statement into the record of the EC's informal session that would address all points stipulated in ref A non-paper; 4) the GOL was ready to facilitate a bilateral visit by U.S. technical experts at any time, and; 5) despite delays, the GOL expects to complete destruction of chemical agents well before the deadline it agreed to with States Parties. End summary. 2. (SBU) P/E Chief conveyed ref A demarche points and non-paper on June 12 to Dr. Ahmed Hesnawy, who heads Libya's CWC compliance efforts, and Adel Ben Issa, who has the lead on CWC issues in the International Organization Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA/IO). Dr. Fathi Asseid, Technical Director of the General Company for the Manufacture of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, which controls the Rabta facility and a related pharmaceutical packaging plant, also attended the meeting. Stressing the GOL's commitment to transparency in declaring its CWC-related equipment, implementing conversion of the Rabta facility and destroying chemical weapon precursors, Dr. Hesnawy thanked the U.S. and U.K. for their "robust" support for Libya's efforts to date. Per ref A, copies of the non-paper and an oral brief on the demarche points were conveyed to U.K. and Italian Embassy counterparts in Tripoli. CONVERSION PROJECT 3. (SBU) On the points of the demarche, Hesnawy indicated the following: - CONVERSION DELAY: Conversation of the Rabta chemical weapons production facility will not be completed before November/December 2009. The GOL signed an original contract with Italian company PharmaChem on February 11, 2002; an addendum to that contract, signed on June 1, 2006 (which Hesnawy showed P/E Chief), stipulated that PharmaChem's portion of conversion work at the Rabta facility would be completed by September 2009. The GOL, factoring in possible unexpected delays, added three months to the timeline, yielding an expected completion date of December 2009. Hesnawy did not respond when asked why Libya had not notified States Parties earlier that conversion would be delayed if it had known since February 2006 that the contract with PharmaChem stipulated a completion date in late 2009. He insisted that the GOL would complete the conversion project and initiate production of pharmaceuticals at Rabta by December 2009. - NEW NATIONAL PAPER: Libya will not submit a new National Paper to the Executive Council (EC) meeting of the OPCW scheduled to begin on June 24. Noting that National Papers are to be submitted at least a month in advance of EC's for review by States Parties, Hesnawy pointed to the fact that the meeting was just ten days away and that there was not sufficient time for review. P/E Chief noted that we had asked since early May that the GOL immediately submit a new National Paper for review. Hesnawy had no response, but said Libya's delegation will instead submit an "official statement" during the Informal Session that would address all points stipulated in ref A non-paper. The informal statement would explain "completely" the reasons for missing the July 29, 2008 conversion deadline and the need for "a correction" to the conversion plan that would eliminate the requirement that a protective sandbag berm be removed. - VISIT BY U.S. TECHNICAL EXPERTS: Hesnawy and his MFA/IO counterpart stressed that the GOL stands ready to facilitate a visit to the Rabta facility by U.S. Embassy officials and/or U.S. technical experts - the U.S. side is "welcome to visit at any time - we have nothing to hide". Such a visit could occur before the upcoming EC meeting or after it. The GOL has already extended invitations through the Italian and U.K. Embassies for their capitals to send teams of technical experts. (Note: The Italian Ambassador and DCM, but not/not Italian technical experts visited Rabta on June 7. A U.K. technical team is notionally scheduled to visit July 6-9, 2008. End note.) Hesnawy stressed that the GOL was willing to accommodate a series of bilateral visits by technical experts, but was not/not willing to facilitate a visit by a combined team (i.e., of U.S. and U.K. experts) out of concern that the visit's agenda could be broadened. TRIPOLI 00000466 002 OF 003 - NEXT STEPS: Hesnawy indicated that he clearly understood that U.S. support for a conversion plan correction to allow retention of a modified protective berm depended on a commitment to transparency and conduct of a site visit to Rabta. He said that the GOL might/might be amenable to submitting a new National Paper at the next EC after the upcoming meeting in late June, indicating that the GOL would premise its decision in part on conversations with Delreps at the June 24-27 EC meeting. IRANIAN HARASSMENT DURING APRIL 2008 OPCW INSPECTION ALLEGED 4. (C) Referring to the April visit by an OPCW inspection team, Hesnawy complained that an Iranian inspector had raised issues with equipment in Building Number 3 and Building Number 4 that had since 2004 been mutually agreed to have been exclusively commercial in nature. According to Hesnawy, four previous tranches of OPCW inspectors had been informed of the equipment and assured the GOL that the equipment did not need to be declared. Referring to the GOL's decision to vote for a UN Security Council Resolution calling for a third tranche of sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear weapons program, Hesnawy said the Iranian inspector deliberately raised the issue of equipment in the commercial building to harass Libya in retaliation for its UNSC vote. Hesnawy claimed Iranian officials at the OPCW had conceded as much in conversations at The Hague with Libya's representative, Muhammad Gheton. "Libya feels it's being dragged back to 2004", Hesnawy complained, saying previous teams of inspectors should have raised the issue of the equipment earlier if it was indeed a subject of concern. DESTRUCTION: STATUS OF ITALIAN CONTRACT & PROJECT TIMELINE 5. (C) Regarding ref B reports that the timetable for Libya's destruction program had slipped, Hesnawy conceded that there had been delays; however, he maintained that Libya would nonetheless meet the deadline of the States Parties. The GOL envisions the project in two phases: 1) Repackaging of the agent from existing polyethylene containers (which has resulted in diffusion, vice leakage, of the agent) into improved containers for the 800 km trip from the Ruwagha facility in al-Jufra to the Rabta facility; and 2) actual destruction of the material. Hesnawy said the GOL will rely on Italian company SIPSA Enginerring and Libyan civil contractors to complete the repackaging and destruction work. Contract negotiations with the Italian company had been "completed" and terms were mutually understood by the GOL and SIPSA; however, the contract itself had not yet been formally approved by "all relevant GOL entities", according to Hesnawy. Additional details, such as securing GOL approval to establish requisite bank accounts and authority for letters of credit were also still being worked out. 6. (C) Hesnawy offered the following schedule for the destruction program: - January/February 2009: Repackaging of the agent takes place; agent is stored in Bunker 109 at al-Jufra until transport to Rabta in late 2009/early 2010; - March 2009: Construction completed on destruction building at Rabta facility; - March-October 2009: Destruction equipment installed in destruction building at Rabta facility; - December 2009: Cold and hot tests of destruction equipment at Rabta destruction facility; - Early February 2010: Commissioning of destruction facility at Rabta; - May 1, 2010: 1% of agent destroyed per agreement with OPCW. Hesnawy offered that SIPSA and the GOL estimated that destruction of all of the agent would require only 25 calendar days once destruction commenced at the Rabta facility. He anticipated no difficulty meeting the deadline for destruction of the agent, and predicted that Libya would complete the project well in advance of the deadline. 7. (C) Comment: Animated and at times angry, Hesnawy repeatedly stressed the GOL's annoyance at what it perceives as an "endless" series of questions about details of its conversion and destruction plans. Stressing that dignity was more important than anything in Libya, Hesnawy offered that GOL officials had considered whether it would be better to destroy the Rabta facility altogether rather than allow it to be used as a pretext for criticism of the GOL's intentions and performance TRIPOLI 00000466 003 OF 003 by "hostile international actors". STEVENS | 2008-06-15 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08LONDON1761 | CWS/BWC: CLOSE ALLIES MEETING, JUNE 17-18, 2008 | 2008-07-02 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Embassy London
08TRIPOLI574 | U.K. VISIT TO RABTA CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITY | 2008-07-14 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI650 | LIBYA SEEKS TO PURCHASE 130,000 KALASHNIKOVS FOR UNKNOWN END-USERS CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) UK Embassy PolOff told P/E Chief on August 10 that HMG's Embassy in Tripoli had recently received a request from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to vet a request for a license to export to Libya a sizeable quantity of automatic rifles. UK company York Guns, acting as the intermediary between an unidentified Ukrainian arms manufacturer and procurement officials at Libya's Temporary People's Committee for Defense (MinDefense-equivalent), has requested an export license to deliver 130,000 Kalashnikov automatic rifles (NFI on model) to Libya in the fourth quarter of 2008. According to UK PolOff, it is not clear what the rifles would be used for; attempts to solicit further information from York Guns representatives and Government of Libya (GOL) officials have "raised more questions than they answered". 2. (C) He said the UK had received no answer as to whether the weapons would be used to equip Libyan military units, and in any event was skeptical that such would be the case given the quantity involved. (Note: Information available to the DATT suggest that Libya's armed forces comprise approximately 90,000 personnel, of which some 60,000 are in the ground forces. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies puts the total number of military personnel at 76,000. End note.) UK PolOff noted that the UK is concerned that the intention may be to re-export the weapons, particularly to armed rebel factions backed by Khartoum and/or Ndjamena in the Chad/Sudan conflict. He thought the license request would not be approved. 3. (SBU) In a similar case reported in open source media in April, Italian police arrested a number of Italian arms traffickers in February 2007 who were finalizing arrangements for the delivery of 500,000 Chinese-manufacture T-56 automatic rifles to Libya. The 500,000 represented the initial tranche of a deal that was to have included one million automatic rifles and 10 million rounds of ammunition. Media reports and Italian contacts indicated that Italian authorities concluded from their investigation that the weapons were to have been re-exported from Libya to Chad and Sudan. 4. (C) Comment: The fact that York Guns and GOL officials have been vague about the intended end-use of the 130,000 Kalashnikov rifles raises potentially troubling questions about the extent to which Libya is still involved in supplying military materiel to parties involved in the Chad/Sudan conflict. End comment. STEVENS | 2008-08-18 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08STATE109845 | MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): "BROKERING CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES ON DUAL-USE ITEMS" Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (D), AND (H). | 2008-10-14 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Secretary of State
08TRIPOLI868 | U.K. DENIES LICENSE FOR EXPORT OF KALASHNIKOVS TO LIBYA; GOL POTENTIALLY SEEKING ALTERNATIVE SELLERS REF: A) TRIPOLI 650, B) STATE 95271 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) U.K. Embassy PolOff told P/E Chief on October 30 that HMG had decided not/not to approve a license for U.K. company York Guns to export to Libya 130,000 Kashnikov automatic rifles. Per ref A, York Guns was to have acted as intermediary between an unidentified Ukrainian party and procurement officials at Libya's Temporary People's Committee for Defense (MOD-equivalent). Based on the intervention reported ref B and on concerns expressed by the U.K.'s Embassy in Tripoli that the Government of Libya (GOL) might have intended to re-export the weapons to either the governments or armed rebel factions in Chad and Sudan, the U.K.'s Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended about one month ago against approving the export license. After conducting a review of the case, Whitehall concurred on October 30 with the decision to not/not approve the export license. 2. (C) Separately, Muhammad el-Obeidi, a Libyan businessman with ties to some quarters of Muammar al-Qadhafi's regime, told P/E Chief on October 23 that he had signed a contract with a Romanian company (NFI) for the export from Romania to Libya of 100,000 AK-47S automatic rifles. (Note: El-Obeidi's older brother was Libya's Minister of Defense from 1954-1969; his nephew is a former Prime Minister and the current MFA Secretary (U/S-equivalent) for European Affairs. End note.) El-Obeidi signed the contract in late September in Paris during a business trip there. El-Obeidi said he had been tapped to help facilitate procurement for the Jafl al-Khamis ("Khamis Brigade"), a special forces unit headed by Khamis al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi. He said Captain Ahmed Ben Shraga'a, head of procurement for the unit, has instructions to work through el-Obeidi on a number of "special procurement issues". El-Obeidi was open about the contract, but avoided the question as to whether the rifles were to be used in Libya or re-exported to another destination. STEVENS | 2008-11-06 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08STATE135048 | SHIELD S04B-08: SYRIA ARRANGING TO ACQUIRE CW | 2008-12-30 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Secretary of State
08TRIPOLI991 | READOUT OF U.S.-UK-LIBYA TSCC BIO SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING, NOVEMBER 24-26 REF: 06 TRIPOLI 498 CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, Acting DCM, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) | 2008-12-31 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI32 | LIBYAN ATOMIC ENERGY ESTABLISHMENT CONFIRMS DESIRE TO SELL URANIUM YELLOWCAKE | 2009-01-15 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09RIGA45 | LATVIA SEEKS MEMBERSHIP IN MTCR | 2009-01-22 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Riga
09MADRID98 | SPAIN TAKING STEPS TO SAFEGUARD NUCLEAR MATERIAL | 2009-01-29 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Madrid
09TRIPOLI100 | UN SEEKS USG ASSISTANCE FOR LIBYAN DE-MINING PROGRAM | 2009-02-04 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09STATE18867 | SHIELD S04D-08: PREVENTING INDIAN FIRMS FROM | 2009-02-27 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET//NOFORN | Secretary of State
09STATE32931 | AUSTRALIA GROUP: GUIDANCE FOR INFORMAL | 2009-04-03 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Secretary of State
09STATE39054 | REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON THE ARREST OF | 2009-04-20 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Secretary of State
09STATE40237 | UKRAINE: REPORTING ON THE FEBRUARY 24-25, 2009 | 2009-04-22 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Secretary of State
09STATE67207 | AUSTRALIA GROUP: PROMOTING PARTICIPATION IN | 2009-06-29 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Secretary of State
09STATE68250 | german test chamber sold by chinese subsidiary to | 2009-07-01 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Secretary of State
09BUJUMBURA302 | NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT BUJUMBURA REF: STATE 030541 Classified By: CDA JoAnne Wagner for reasons 1.4 (b) (d). | 2009-07-02 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Embassy Bujumbura
09TOKYO1598 | AUSTRALIA GROUP: JAPAN'S RESPONSE | 2009-07-14 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Embassy Tokyo
09BUJUMBURA378 | NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT BUJUMBURA REF: A. STATE 75013 B. BUJUMBURA 00302 Classified By: CDA Charles Twining for reasons 1.4 (b) (d). | 2009-08-07 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Embassy Bujumbura
09BERLIN992 | AUSTRALIA GROUP: GERMANY TO SUBMIT PROPOSAL FOR PARIS PLENARY | 2009-08-13 | 2011-02-01 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Berlin
09ASTANA1541 | KAZAKHSTAN: A KEY PARTNER ON NON-PROLIFERATION REF: A. A. ASTANA 00607 B. B. ASTANA 01090 C. C. ASTANA 01164 D. D. 08 ASTANA 01867 E. E. 08 ASTANA 01648 F. F. 08 ASTANA 01649 G. G. ASTANA 02232 H. H. ASTANA 00200 I. I. ASTANA 00623 J. J. STATE 76904 K. K. ASTANA 00521 L. L. 08 ASTANA 02298 M. M. 08 ASTANA 02316 N. N. ASTANA 00254 O. O. ASTANA 01536 Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b/d) | 2009-09-18 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Embassy Astana
09STATE97434 | AUSTRALIA GROUP: SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDANCE FOR AUSTRALIA GROUP PLENARY, SEPTEMBER 21-25, 2009 REF: (A) 08 STATE 2956, (B)07 MOSCOW 5535 Classified by: ISN TFoley. Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). | 2009-09-18 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Secretary of State
09MEXICO3378 | PORTAL DETECTION AT MANZANILLO, MEXICO (FALSE ALERT) | 2009-12-01 | 2011-02-01 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Mexico
09MOSCOW2943 | ALLEGED NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT AT THE RUSSIA-KAZAKHSTAN BORDER REF: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN FSN AND RUSSIAN CUSTOMS OFFICER RELAYED TO EXBS ADVISOR Classified By: DCM ERIC RUBIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, C, D). | 2009-12-04 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Embassy Moscow
09BUJUMBURA689 | NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT | 2009-12-17 | 2011-02-01 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Bujumbura
10WINDHOEK7 | Namibia's Rossing Uranium -- A USG Evaluation | 2010-01-25 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Windhoek
09CAIRO746 | ADMIRAL MULLEN’S MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN | 2009-04-30 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Cairo
08TRIPOLI12 | GOL TELLS IRANIAN VP IT OPPOSES IRAN RESOLUTION, SHARES | 2008-01-09 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI119 | GOL POSTPONES ISN VISIT TO LIBYA'S RABTA SITE, TRILATERAL | 2008-02-14 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI225 | LIBYA: INVITATION TO GLOBAL INITIATIVE'S 3RD EPG DELIVERED | 2009-03-16 | 2011-01-31 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI279 | DEMARCHES DELIVERED: RESPONDING TO NORTH KOREA MISSILE | 2009-04-06 | 2011-01-31 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI310 | MUATASSIM'S WASHINGTON DEBUT: BURNISHING HIS IMAGE AND TESTING U.S. WATERS TRIPOLI 00000310 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) | 2009-04-17 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI321 | LIBYA: UPDATE ON DPRK SANCTIONS | 2009-04-22 | 2011-01-31 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI364 | LIBYAN DELEGATION INFORMATION FOR JUNE GICNT PLENARY AT THE | 2009-05-04 | 2011-01-31 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI490 | ITALY SAYS GOL DELIBERATELY STALLING ON SIGNING CHEMICAL | 2009-06-18 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI599 |  | 2009-07-27 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI638 | PRODDING LIBYA TO ACTION ON TIME SENSITIVE ISSUES REF: A) TRIPOLI 599; B) TRIPOLI 632 TRIPOLI 00000638 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) | 2009-08-05 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI639 | PRODDING LIBYA TO ACTION ON TIME SENSITIVE ISSUES -- CORRECTED COPY REF: A) TRIPOLI 599; B) TRIPOLI 632; C) TRIPOLI 638 TRIPOLI 00000639 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) | 2009-08-05 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI751 | DEMARCHE DELIVERED: INVITATION FOR SEPTEMBER 24 UNSC SUMMIT | 2009-09-17 | 2011-01-31 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI777 | DEMARCHE RESPONSE: EXISTENCE OF COVERT URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY IN IRAN REF: STATE 100153 | 2009-10-01 | 2011-01-31 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI795 | Hesnawy is a charismatic and gregarious character, who spoke fluent American English. He used American expressions and slang with ease and was clearly trying to endear himself to P/E Chief. He said that he has been head of Libya's Chemical Weapons Program for the last 12 years and was intimately aware of every technical detail relating to that program. According to xxxxxxxxxxxx, Hesnawy may be working with National Security Advisor, Muatassim al-Qadhafi, on missile purchase requests. | 2009-10-05 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI817 |  | 2009-10-12 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI933 | LIBYA RESPONSE: FOLLOW UP ON TRANSPARENCY MEASURES FOR THE ANNUAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION CONFERENCE REF: A) State 115619; B) Tripoli 795 TRIPOLI 00000933 001.2 OF 002 | 2009-11-23 | 2011-01-31 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI938 | LIBYA HALTS HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL TRANSFER | 2009-11-25 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI941 | LIBYANS SEEK RENEWED COMMITMENT FROM U.S. IN RETURN FOR | 2009-11-30 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI943 | LIBYAN MFA BRIEFED ON HEU SECURITY CONCERNS | 2009-12-01 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI950 | LIBYAN HEU SHIPMENT SECURE; NO DECISION YET REGARDING NEXT | 2009-12-07 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli

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