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### Viewing cable 08RABAT727, MOROCCO'S MILITARY: ADEQUATE, MODERNIZING, BUT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08RABAT727 | 2008-08-04 16:04 | 2010-12-02 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Rabat

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHRB #0727/01 2171613
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 041613Z AUG 08
    FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8947
    INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000727

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR PM, NEA/RA AND NEA/MAG

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2028
    TAGS: MARR MASS PGOV PREL PTER KCOR KPKO MO
    SUBJECT: MOROCCO'S MILITARY: ADEQUATE, MODERNIZING, BUT
    FACING BIG CHALLENGES

    Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4
     (a) and (b).

    ¶1.  (C) Summary:  The Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR) are
    modernizing but remain weighed down by long-standing
    problems.  King Mohammed VI, who in 1999 inherited a military
    in need of professionalization, has implemented some needed
    reforms, but much remains to be done.  Civilian control, if
    ascribed to the person of the King, is complete, but there is
    no real Defense Ministry.  Outside the FAR, there is only a
    small administration.  The military remains plagued by
    corruption, an inefficient bureaucracy, low levels of
    education in the ranks, periodic threats of radicalization of
    some of its soldiers, political marginalization, and the
    deployment of most of its forces in the Western Sahara.
    There have been some indications of pending changes in the
    leadership.  In general, the U.S. and Morocco share a robust
    military relationship with prospects for even closer ties in
    the future.  The health of the relationship is evident by
    increased U.S.-Moroccan military training exercises and
    Morocco's purchase of sophisticated weapons from the U.S. to
    include 24 F-16s this year.  We anticipate that the
    U.S.-Moroccan military relationship will continue to flourish
    but Morocco's ability to absorb its new high-end military
    purchases and restrictions on high quality Moroccan
    information sharing with our attaches represent two
    challenges ahead.  This mission-coordinated report draws
    heavily on valuable reporting and analysis from the embassy's
    military components, the Defense Attache Office and the
    Office of Security Cooperation.  End Summary.

    ------------------
    All the King's Men
    ------------------

    ¶2.  (C) As Commander-in-Chief of the Moroccan Royal Armed
    Forces and Minister of Defense, King Mohammed VI maintains a
    highly centralized role over the military.  No troop
    movements, exercises, or even travel of officers domestically
    or abroad happens without the King,s approval.  As a result
    of the 1971 and 1972 coup attempts by the Moroccan Army and
    Air Force respectively, the Palace increased control over the
    military, marginalized it from policy making, and restricted
    its interaction with foreign military interlocutors and the
    press.  The Alaouite dynasty depends upon, among other
    things, a strong military, the leadership of which, however,
    must remain sufficiently docile so as not to arouse
    suspicions of disloyalty.  The only civilian structure
    responsible for the FAR is not a Defense Ministry but rather
    an entity under the Prime Minister responsible for the
    Administration of the National Defense.  It is headed by
    Minister-delegate Abderrahmane Sbai, whose role is
    essentially restricted to that of comptroller.  As far as we
    can tell, political-military policy on issues such as
    peacekeeping appears centered in the Foreign Ministry.  All
    other major defense matters are decided in the Palace.

    ¶3.  (C) Over the past decade, Morocco has transitioned from a
    conscript to an all-volunteer military force of approximately
    218,000 soldiers.  Of the three services, the Army is
    dominant with approximately 175,000 personnel.  There are
    approximately 13,000 personnel in the Air Force and 7,800 in
    the Navy.  Though nominally subordinate within the military
    structure but answering directly to the King, the
    Gendarmerie, which consists of approximately 22,000
    personnel, conducts paramilitary, royal guard, and internal
    and border policing missions.  Though a few legacy conscripts
    remain in the military, professional reforms have made
    voluntary military service an attractive career option for
    Moroccans with opportunities for a steady income and some
    upward mobility.  The average military salary for enlisted
    soldiers is approximately 2,000 dirhams (USD 270) per month.
    An officer's starting salary is approximately 6,000 dirhams
    (USD 850) per month.  With benefits, such as free housing,
    these are reasonably competitive in the Moroccan context.

    ¶4.  (C) The top military commanders include Military
    Inspector General and Army Commander, Lieutenant General (Lt
    Gen) Abdelaziz Benanni; Operations Chief Lt Gen Boughaid
    Arroub; and Gendarmerie Commander Lt Gen Housni Benslimane.
    Benanni, who has become mired in suspicion of corruption,
    will reportedly be retired soon.  Arroub, who came out of
    recent retirement, is tipped by some to succeed Benanni.
    Arroub, historically pro-French, appears to have become
    increasingly pro-U.S. in the last 5 years.  Another rising
    star in the FAR is General Mohamed Larbi Tamdi, who is
    responsible for army logistics and force sustainment.  There
    is some military staff in the Palace, likely influent, about
    which little is known.

    ¶5.  (C) King Hassan II and his son, King Mohammed VI, have
    maintained the Gendarmerie as a force relatively independent
    from the FAR since 1972, in part as a check against a
    military coup.  While it most visibly serves as a State
    Police/Highway Patrol, it has a wide range of units.  Its
    commander, Lt Gen Benslimane, likely reports in some way
    directly to the King.  He also leads the Moroccan National
    Soccer League, making him a popular figure inside and out of
    military circles.  While there is no direct proof of
    Benslimane being involved in corrupt activity, low ranking
    Gendarmerie assigned to highway patrols are expected to pay
    approximately 4,000 dirhams (USD 540) to their immediate
    supervisors with extralegal earnings from motorists above
    which they can keep for themselves, according to one credible
    anecdote.

    --------------------------------------------- --
    Military Operations Dominated by Western Sahara
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶6.  (C) The FAR is composed of over 200,000 soldiers and
    outclasses most militaries in Africa but has significant room
    for improvement.  Along with concerns regarding aging
    equipment and an overtaxed force, the FAR is plagued by
    institutional corruption, leadership that will not step
    aside, and low morale among mid-level officers.  The FAR is
    preoccupied with operations in the Western Sahara region with
    between 50 and 70 percent of its total strength deployed
    there at any one time.  The force in Western Sahara -- a
    landmass roughly two thirds the size of California -- is
    considered to be stretched thin with a reported estimated
    operational readiness rate of just 40 percent.  Morocco does
    not consider the POLISARIO -- the ethnically Sahrawi
    resistance based in Tindouf, Algeria, seeking to make the
    Western Sahara an independent state -- to be a conventional
    military threat.  However, the FAR remains vigilant in
    guarding against a renewed POLISARIO insurgency effort.
    Morocco built a berm or sand wall along the eastern and
    southern borders of the Sahara in the 1980s, which
    effectively eliminated the POLISARIO's ability to launch hit
    and run raids, leading to the 1981 cease-fire, which has been
    fully respected.  The POLISARIO continues to maintain a
    small, lightly armed presence at a few desert crossroads in
    the small remaining part of Western Sahara outside the berm.
    Despite occasional expressions of concern, the GOM almost
    certainly is fully conscious that the POLISARIO poses no
    current threat that could not be effectively countered.  The
    POLISARIO has generally refrained from classic terrorist
    bombings, etc.  Although the specter is sometimes raised,
    there is no indication of any Salafist/Al Qaeda activity
    among the indigenous Sahrawi population.

    ¶7.  (C) While the border between Morocco and Algeria is
    closed, and relations remain cool, we do not believe that
    Algeria poses an imminent conventional military threat to
    Morocco.  Nonetheless, the FAR has contingency plans and
    "wargames" in training exercises for a possible Algerian
    attack, but the FAR does not have troops deployed along the
    border.  Instead, the FAR remains stationed in garrisons,
    hundreds of kilometers away from the border, from which they
    could deploy in the unlikely event of an Algerian incursion
    into Morocco.  Any confrontation between the two countries
    would likely take place through the proxy of the POLISARIO,
    which Algeria has supported materially in the past and could
    do so again if hostilities between Morocco and the POLISARIO
    recommenced.

    ------------
    Peacekeeping
    ------------

    ¶8.  (C) Motivated to win over other countries to its claims
    to Western Sahara, Morocco is active in United Nations (UN),
    engages in peacekeeping activities, and occasionally sends
    troops to assist friendly countries.  Morocco is an
    experienced contributor to UN peacekeeping efforts, deploying
    to countries like Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti and
    Somalia.  It currently has over 1,500 peacekeepers deployed
    to Cote d,Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
    (DRC).  Morocco also supports a military hospital in Kosovo
    under NATO command.  Morocco has sent medical personnel to
    Niger to assist with famine relief and recently re-deployed
    military forces to Senegal for an annual five-month &cloud
    seeding8 operation for drought relief.  Peacekeeping
    contributions in recent years have been tarnished by
    allegations of sexual wrongdoing in the DRC and Cote
    d,Ivoire.

    --------------------------------------------- ---
    Corruption Remains the Single Greatest Challenge
    --------------------------------------------- ---

    ¶9.  (C) Corruption is prevalent at all levels of Moroccan
    society and the military is also plagued by it, particularly
    at the highest levels.  This may partly reflect a grand
    bargain struck by King Hassan II following at least two
    nearly successful coups in the 1970's:  remain loyal, and you
    can profit.  (Those whose loyalty was in question were
    subject to sometimes decades of harsh imprisonment.)
    Credible reports indicate that Lt Gen Benanni is using his
    position as the Commander of the Southern Sector to skim
    money from military contracts and influence business
    decisions.  A widely believed rumor has it that he owns large
    parts of the fisheries in Western Sahara.  Benanni, like many
    senior military officers, has a lavish family home that was
    likely built with money gleaned from bribes.  Leadership
    positions in regional sectors are a significant source of
    extralegal income for military leaders.  There are even
    reports of students at Morocco's military academy paying
    money to increase their class standings in order to obtain
    positions in lucrative military postings.  Command in the
    southern sector, i.e., Western Sahara, given the predominance
    of military activity there, is considered to be the most
    lucrative of the sectors in this regard.  Because command in
    the southern sector is also considered critical to high level
    advancement in the FAR, positions there are highly sought
    after.  Consequently, positions in this sector are often
    jealously "guarded" by a number of influential families in
    the military.  The GOM seems to be looking for ways to stop
    corruption, especially among the formative military ranks of
    Colonel and below, but not much is being done to stop the
    corruption in the general officer ranks.

    -------------------------------------------
    Retiring High Level Officers Also a Problem
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶10.  (C) Senior officers refusing to retire to allow younger
    officers to move up the ranks has become a significant
    problem for the FAR.  Officers nearing the mandatory
    retirement age do not want to retire since this would mean
    relinquishing bribes, money-skimming, and some related
    sources of income.  Even for those officers not &on the
    take,8 giving up government positions and paychecks is
    economically difficult for a sustained retirement.  This
    "gerontocracy" problem, coupled with the King's notorious
    micro-management of the military has had a negative impact on
    the morale of mid-level military leaders.

    --------------------------------------------- ------
    Radicalization:  Under Control But Lingering Menace
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶11.  (C) Though now viewed as a minor problem, reporting
    suggests that small numbers of FAR soldiers remains
    susceptible to Islamic radicalization.  The GOM first
    encountered this problem following the 2003 Casablanca
    bombings when investigators identified military members as
    co-conspirators.  Following the bombings, the FAR undertook
    steps to identify extremists and implement preventative
    measures, such as closing prayer halls on military bases, to
    address the problem.  Subsequently, Morocco,s internal
    security services have identified and apprehended several
    military and gendarmerie personnel in other terrorist cells,
    some of whom had stolen weapons from their bases for
    terrorism.  Acknowledging this threat in a speech to the
    armed forces in May 2008, the King stated his desire to
    "immunize" the armed forces from the threat of radicalization
    and to promote the values of tolerance and moderation in the
    ranks.  During this same time frame the military forced 30
    officers to retire early, allegedly because they were deemed
    potentially radical and hostile to the Government.
    Subsequently, the FAR removed all mosques from army bases and
    deployed military counterintelligence, i.e., 5th Bureau,
    undercover officers to monitor local "off-post" mosques for
    potentially radical activities.  These officers refer cases
    to the Gendarmerie if criminal charges can be pursued.

    ---------------
    Winds of Change
    ---------------

    ¶12.  (C) Since the 1970's the military itself has been
    perceived as the greatest threat to the throne and internal
    security in Morocco, not surprising given Morocco's own
    history and the broader context of the coup-ridden Middle
    East and Africa.  Of late, however, there is a general

    perception that the relationship between the Palace and the
    FAR is beginning to change to one of greater trust.  The
    King's growing confidence is partly signaled by a recent
    significant increase in military spending, particularly for
    modern hardware, although this is primarily a function of the
    GOM's perceived threat from Algeria and the fact that it is
    cost prohibitive at a certain point to maintain older
    military equipment.  The GOM increased the military's
    operating budget to more than USD 2 billion in 2007,
    significantly more than in previous years.  Likewise, the FAR
    is undergoing a significant modernization process, paying
    over USD 2 billion for 24 F-16 aircraft and over USD 300
    million for T-6 training aircraft from the U.S.  The GOM has
    commercially financed these transactions, thus far, but the
    upfront payments have come from the treasury, which has also
    committed to cover monthly payments.  The King recently
    allowed armed military flights north of Ben Guerir (located
    approximately 200 kilometers south of Rabat), an act not
    permitted in the past due to the King,s desire to keep the
    military far away from the Palace in Rabat.  The GOM is also
    looking to make significant purchases of M-1 Abrams battle
    tanks in the future.

    --------------------------------
    U.S.-Moroccan Military Relations
       Strong but Could Be Better
    --------------------------------

    ¶13.  (C) In general, the U.S. and Morocco share a robust
    military relationship with prospects for even closer ties in
    the future.  The health of the relationship is evidenced by
    increased U.S.-Moroccan military training exercises and the
    aforementioned military sales.  Morocco has also increased
    its activities under a partnership arrangement with the Utah
    National Guard, which regularly deploys to Morocco to conduct
    joint training and humanitarian relief operations.  We have
    submitted draft proposed language for the Moroccans to
    consider for an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement
    (ACSA) and a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and have
    received comments on the ACSA draft from the GOM.  In the
    future, the Embassy hopes to see improvements in the FAR's
    information sharing and accessibility to military units and
    facilities with our Defense Attache Office.  Although the FAR
    regularly dialogues with our attaches, quality information is
    lacking.  The FAR also does not recognize the Embassy Attache
    circle, an organization of Military Attaches from various
    countries residing in Morocco who elect a president to
    discuss issues of collective concern with the FAR.  It is
    apparent that the Palace continues to tightly control the
    FAR's interactions U.S. and other foreign governments.

    ---------------------------
    AFRICOM Viewed with Caution
    ---------------------------

    ¶14.  (C) Previous interactions with GOM officials indicate
    that military leaders are opposed to AFRICOM basing a
    headquarters element in Morocco.  However, Morocco has
    offered to send a military liaison officer to the AFRICOM
    headquarters in Germany and has offered to assist U.S.-led
    efforts engaging with African countries.  Morocco has also
    approached AFRICOM representatives to solicit AFRICOM support
    in providing chemicals needed for their cloud-seeding
    operations in Senegal and providing logistics to assist with
    a proposed locust control program.

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶15.  (C) The Mission is optimistic that the U.S.-Moroccan
    military relationship will continue to improve, but there are
    potential speed bumps in future.  We anticipate that
    cooperative joint training exercises will continue to occur
    at a robust pace, although the vast majority of this activity
    will likely take place in Morocco because of continued
    restrictions on the travel of FAR personnel.  While we
    anticipate that the Palace will continue to modernize the
    military, with the notable possible acquisition of M-1 Abrams
    tanks, we are increasingly concerned that Morocco, not used
    to the high operating costs of these high end items (and
    other budgetary pressures) may make it increasingly difficult
    for the Moroccans to make payments on purchases.  If payments
    become a problem for the GOM, this could sour relations
    temporarily.  While we believe that there are some signs of
    the King's increased confidence in the FAR, we believe that
    the monarchy still calculates that the military represents
    the biggest potential threat to the crown.  FAR officers
    will, therefore, continue to be distanced from policy making

    input and restricted from engaging in detailed discussions
    about Moroccan military strength and intentions with foreign
    military officers, including our attaches.

    *****************************************
    Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
    *****************************************

    Riley

`