Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 3420 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone
Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF ASEC AE AR AG AJ AFIN AU AM APER ABUD ATRN AORC AEMR AMGT ACOA AEC AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC AS AL ASIG ABLD AA AFU ASUP AGMT
BU BR BL BO BM BE BH BTIO BEXP BIDEN BK BY BA BG BF BB BC BBSR BRUSSELS BILAT BX
CJAN CH CU CASC CVIS CMGT CO CI CLINTON CIA CG CF CN CS CAN COUNTER CIS CA CBW CM CE CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CD CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COM COUNTERTERRORISM CDG CACM CDB CV
DR DA DHS DOE DEA DK DJ DISENGAGEMENT DOD DEAX
EU EFIN EG ETTC EINV ENRG EI ECPS EINT ECON EIND ETRD EPET EUN EZ EMIN ELAB EAID EAGR ET EC EAIR ENVR ES ECA EWWT ER ELTN EFIS EN EXTERNAL ECIN EINVETC ENIV EINN ENGR EUR ESA ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL
FR FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FMLN FJ
GM GG GH GE GV GT GR GTIP GOI GCC GAZA GZ GTMO GA
HA HILLARY HR HUMAN HO HYMPSK HU HURI HK
IR IZ IS IT INRB IRAJ IN INRA INRO IC ID IIP IAEA ITPHUM IV IPR IWC IQ IO ICTY ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC ICAO IMO IF ILC IEFIN INTELSAT ITALY ITALIAN INTERPOL
JO JA JOSEPH JUS JAMES
KE KTFN KDEM KJUS KNNP KGHG KZ KIPR KWBG KIRF KPAO KDRG KHLS KCRM KSCA KPAL KISL KG KACT KN KS KGIC KRAD KU KCOM KBIO KMCA KCOR KV KHDP KTIP KVPR KDEV KWMN KSPR KTIA KHIV KPRP KAWC KOLY KCIP KCFE KOCI KMDR KPKO KTDB KMRS KFRD KLIG KBCT KICC KGIT KSTC KUNR KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KOMC KAWK KO KTER KSUM KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KMPI KNPP KR KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KFIN KGCC KPIN KNUC KPLS KIRC
LE LY LU LG LH LI LO LOG
MARR MOPS MU MASS MY MNUC MCAP MA MO MTCRE MG MASC MX MCC MZ ML MK MTRE MP MIL MDC MTCR MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MR MQADHAFI MD MAPS MUCN MPOS MEPP MOPPS MAPP
NATO NIPP NL NO NG NI NE NS NAR NPT NZ NU NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NATIONAL
OVIP OPRC OREP OIIP ODIP OTRA OSCE OAS OFDP OPIC OPDC OEXC OECD OPCW OSCI OTR OVP OFFICIALS OSAC
PGOV PREL PINS PINR PO PTER PK PHUM PARM PL PE PREF PHSA PBTS PGOF PROP PARMS PA PM PMIL PTERE POL PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAK PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PNAT POLITICS PEPR PSI PINT PSOE PU POLITICAL PARTIES PBIO PECON POGOV PINL PKFK
QA
RS RU RW RP RIGHTS RICE RO ROBERT RF RFE REGION
SU SA SY SP SNAR SENV SCUL SW SOCI SF SO SR SG SMIG SL SN SHUM SZ SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SK SI STEINBERG
TI TIP TBIO TR TX TU TSPA TS TRGY TH TT TW TERRORISM TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TPHY TK TNGD TC
UK UNSC UG US UZ UP UNO UNMIK UY UNGA UN UE UNESCO UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS USUN USEU UV
VZ VE VT VM VTPREL VN
WA WI WMO WTRO WTRQ WHO WWARD WTO
XA XT XM XY XG XC XH XL XF XZ XW XR XS XK
YM YI YE
ZI ZP ZK ZF ZB ZANU ZOELLICK ZR ZU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09RANGOON205, BURMA'S GENERALS: STARTING THE CONVERSATION

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09RANGOON205.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09RANGOON205 | 2009-04-02 07:07 | 2010-12-12 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Rangoon

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHGO #0205/01 0920733
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 020733Z APR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8841

` `

    S E C R E T RANGOON 000205

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR EAP/DAS MARCIEL AND EAP/MLS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV BM
    SUBJECT: BURMA'S GENERALS: STARTING THE CONVERSATION

    Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Larry Dinger for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

    Summary
    --------

    ¶1. (S) As the review of U.S. policy regarding Burma
    continues amid signs that the military regime wants to engage
    with Washington, we offer some thoughts about the senior
    generals, what motivates them, what they might want from
    engagement, and what the U.S. might place on the table.
    Burma's military machine is top-down, xenophobic and utterly
    focused on preserving national unity. At the same time,
    senior generals are embarrassed by their international pariah
    status and crave respect. Some are concerned with Burma's
    ever-growing dependence on China and its geostrategic
    location amidst historical foes. Others, having seen a
    glimpse of the international community's benevolence
    following Nargis, no doubt wish for a lifting of sanctions
    and economic assistance. No matter the motivations, a
    dialogue with Burma's senior military leaders will be slow,
    frustrating, and, within the U.S., politically charged.
    While dialogue is unlikely to yield major, near-term
    political outcomes such as changes to the constitution, it
    might sow seeds for future change by illustrating to the next
    line of leaders what an improved relationship with the U.S.
    could look like. Above all, a dialogue could lead to
    tangible benefits for Burma's long-suffering people, a
    worthwhile goal in itself. End summary.

    How do they think?
    ------------------

    ¶2. (S) All major decisions in Burma are made at the very
    top. Senior general Than Shwe, Vice Senior General Maung
    Aye, and their inner circles call the shots. Than Shwe's
    dominant personality is keenly felt. Subordinates appear to
    share only good news, leaving the senior generals potentially
    ignorant of many realities. In this information vacuum, the
    generals continue to pursue their "roadmap to democracy" and
    ruinous, top-down economic policies. While self interest
    clearly is a factor in their thinking, it would be a mistake
    to think they are motivated exclusively by self-enrichment.
    These are true believers who are convinced they are divinely
    entrusted in the tradition of the Burmese "warrior kings"
    with doing what is best for the country and the people. They
    feel they are simply misunderstood by the outside world.

    ¶3. (S) These are career military men, most with combat
    experience in Burma's past internal conflicts, who value the
    unity and stability of the state as a top priority. The
    senior generals assert, and seem genuinely to believe, that
    the military is the only guarantor of that unity and
    stability. Thus, they see a dominant role for the armed
    forces in governance to be essential. The senior generals
    inculcate this military ethos, indoctrinating new cadets to
    be "the triumphant elite of the future."

    ¶4. (S) Since only very senior career military men make real
    decisions, such men would need to participate in any serious
    engagement effort with the civilian-led U.S. The Burmese
    military would be far more comfortable at the table in a
    mil/mil environment, their comfort zone.

    ¶5. (S) The generals see themselves as devout Buddhists.
    State media have recently inundated the public with scenes of
    senior generals and their families consecrating the
    newly-constructed Uppatasanti Pagoda in Nay Pyi Taw, a
    replica of Rangoon's legendary Shwedagon Pagoda. Of course,
    such acts of Buddhist merit-making have a public relations
    aspect, but they also do reflect a philosophical base.

    ¶6. (S) Families matter. The senior generals spoil their
    children and grandchildren. They seek to protect their
    families--some were sent to Dubai in September 2007 to ride
    out the Saffron Revolution protests and crackdown. The
    generals also seek to ensure a firm financial footing for
    their families' futures through lucrative positions at home
    and bank accounts offshore. The application of our visa bans
    against the generals' immediate family members irritates.

    ¶7. (S) Western rationality is not always apparent in regime
    decision-making. Than Shwe reportedly relies on favored
    soothsayers. We hear one such seer advised moving the
    capital to the interior because Rangoon would be subject to
    street disturbances and a horrific storm. Numerology also
    factors in. Witness the overnight shift to a currency
    divisible by nines in 1987 and the release of 9,002 prisoners
    last September, reportedly to ensure an auspicious 2009.
    Such decision methods may sound strange to us, but they are
    everyday elements in the lives of many Burmese.

    ¶8. (S) The senior generals are xenophobic. They don't seem
    to understand foreigners and certainly don't trust them,
    particularly those who challenge their legitimacy. This may
    be a reason why Than Shwe reportedly abhors Aung San Suu Kyi,
    who grew up overseas, married a UK citizen and then returned
    to Burma to challenge the military's authority.
    Historically, the Burmese have fought wars with all their
    neighbors, including China, India, and Thailand. While the
    current regime relies heavily on China for investment, trade
    and support in international institutions and accepts a
    degree of Chinese advice as a consequence, it is very
    unlikely that the senior generals would defer to Chinese (or
    any outsider's) demands on core issues, particularly on the
    military's central role in governance.

    ¶9. (S) The generals are paranoid about the U.S., fear
    invasion, and have a bunker mentality. Past U.S. rhetoric
    about regime change sharpened concerns. One rumored
    explanation for Than Shwe's decision to move the capital to
    Nay Pyi Taw, far from the coast, was supposedly to protect
    from a sea-borne invasion force. The regime was truly
    convinced the U.S. was prepared to invade when a helicopter
    carrier sailed near Burmese territorial waters for
    humanitarian purposes after Cyclone Nargis last May.

    ¶10. (S) Than Shwe and his colleagues view the current
    period as one chapter in Burma's long history. They profess
    that democracy requires a guided process of "gradual
    maturity." They believe the U.S. and the West in general are
    trying to force democracy on a country that is not yet
    developed enough to handle it. This is more than a cynical
    excuse to retain power. They think they know best.

    ¶11. (S) At the same time, the generals are proud and crave
    the acceptance of the international community. They hate
    being subject to sanctions and aspire to be treated with the
    respect accorded other world leaders, including some
    authoritarian ones. Interactions with key foreign visitors
    and Burmese attendance at international fora always make
    headlines in the government newspaper.

    Why might the regime want to talk now?
    --------------------------------------

    ¶12. (S) Indications are that the senior generals are hoping
    for a fresh USG approach and are willing to explore
    engagement. Even before the U.S. elections, the generals
    were testing the waters. Last August, they suggested a
    senior U.S. military official should visit Burma. More
    recently, they have made clear they want conversations in
    Washington and have asked to upgrade from Charge d'Affaires
    to Ambassador for that purpose. They recently suggested
    narcotics and POW/MIA issues might be useful topics for
    initial discussion. They provided unusually high access
    when EAP/MLS Director Blake visited Burma last week. What
    motivates the desire to talk?

    ¶13. (S) When the U.S. response to Cyclone Nargis last May
    was a major humanitarian effort rather than a much-feared
    invasion, the generals were reportedly surprised and
    gratified. More broadly, some senior leaders have drawn a
    lesson from the Nargis response that international
    humanitarian assistance can be valuable. Some in the military
    are nervous about an overdependence on China; all recall the
    difficult history with that looming neighbor. President
    Obama's engagement theme intrigues. The generals want the
    international respect that a more normal relationship with
    the U.S. would bring. They feel a degree of pain, or at
    least irritation, from sanctions, and want relief. It may be
    that some neighbors, ASEAN leaders, maybe even the Chinese,
    are urging the generals to try dialogue.

    ¶14. (S) Also, it is entirely possible that the most senior
    generals are looking for an escape strategy. Retirement has
    never been an option for Burmese leaders. Historically,
    Burmese kings or generals and those close to them either have
    died in office, been killed, or been deposed and imprisoned.
    The current senior generals are getting old, but they have no
    desire to be held to account for what the outside world
    perceives as their crimes against the people. Than Shwe
    reportedly has mentioned to some interlocutors, including
    Indonesian President Yudoyono, his strong desire not to
    appear before an international tribunal. All the top
    generals undoubtedly want assurances that, if they
    voluntarily step aside, they and their families will retain
    their assets and will not be prosecuted.

    What might the regime propose?
    ------------------------------

    ¶15. (S) Senior generals likely perceive that they have
    already made concessions. They allow foreign embassies and
    cultural units like the American Center to operate. They
    have received high-level UN visits, including four thus far
    in 2009. They have committed to a "roadmap to democracy,"
    drafted a constitution, held a referendum, and announced
    elections. They have released some political prisoners,
    including several high-profile ones like Win Tin, though not
    yet Aung San Suu Kyi.

    ¶16. (S) We should not expect significant progress on
    political core issues in the near term. The regime is very
    unlikely to reverse course on its "democracy" roadmap, to
    rehash the 1990 elections or to revisit the new constitution.
    The senior generals will not leave the scene willingly
    unless they are confident of their own safety and of
    financial security for themselves and their families.

    ¶17. (S) Some possible offers:

    --The regime might accept some tweaks to the election
    process; a degree of international observation is reportedly
    already on offer.

    --They might relax some terms of ASSK's current detention.

    --They could possibly be persuaded to release some political
    prisoners in advance of the elections. At a minimum, they
    might consider resumption of ICRC access to political
    prisoners.

    --The regime would likely seek cooperation on perceived
    win/win issues like counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism,
    anti-trafficking, economic-policy advice, and disaster-risk
    reduction. They likely would relish mil/mil and law
    enforcement training opportunities.

    --There also may be willingness to make concessions on
    lower-profile issues that affect the operation of our
    Embassy, such as visas, increased in-country travel
    permission, and an expansion of our presence to include a
    re-opening of the former U.S. consulate in Mandalay and/or a
    USAID mission to oversee humanitarian assistance.

    --Symbolic gestures carry much weight with the Burmese. The
    regime has already signaled it wants to upgrade its COM in
    Washington from Charge to Ambassador. It aspires for the
    U.S. to use the country name "Myanmar," not "Burma."

    If the U.S. engages, what might we raise and offer?
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶18. (S) Any engagement effort would likely take time, not
    just one meeting or two, but a series of encounters that,
    ideally, would gradually build confidence and a willingness
    on the Burmese side to open up. That is the "Asian way." In
    the early stages, it would be useful to dispel any regime
    concern that the U.S. intends to invade or dominate. We
    should hint that Burma stands to gain from decent
    relationships with the outside world and that there are
    alternatives to reliance on China. When leaders change their
    ways they can have a fruitful relationship with the United
    States based on shared mutual interests.

    -- Still, it would be important up front to reiterate key,
    long-term themes: the need to release political prisoners,
    including ASSK, and initiate genuine dialogue.

    -- Early on, we should accent shared mutual interests, such
    as the win/win topics mentioned above: counter-narcotics;
    trafficking in persons; disaster risk reduction; and remains
    recovery from WWII, with a note that U.S.-facilitated
    training in such areas could be possible.

    -- The effects of the worldwide economic recession offer
    opportunities. Burma's economy is suffering. Positive
    political steps from the regime side could lead to an easing
    of broad-based economic sanctions, spurring growth and
    diversification in Burma's economy. We could dangle World
    Bank and IMF technical assistance and, with progress, loan
    packages. We could consider revisiting current restrictions
    on the ability of UNDP to work with low-level GOB entities.
    With sufficient progress, the sanctions specifically targeted
    at the regime and its cronies could be on offer, too.

    -- We should make clear our desire to provide increased
    humanitarian assistance (outside of regime channels) to help
    meet crying needs. Unstated but true: such aid would subvert
    the regime both by building civil-society capacity and
    illustrating to the grassroots in Burma that the outside
    world helps and the regime doesn't. We should seek regime
    cooperation on the Rohingya issue, offering USG assistance to
    build livelihood opportunities in Northern Rakine State.

    -- We could formally open a PD outreach center in Mandalay,
    utilizing the U.S. consulate that closed in 1980.
    Countrywide, we could offer increased educational exchanges.
    Those who studied in the U.S. even many years ago retain fond
    memories and view the U.S. in a positive light. Access to
    quality education is priority one for Burma's citizens.

    -- We could consider accepting the country name "Myanmar."
    "Burma" is a vestige of colonial times that actually elevates
    the Bamar majority over other ethnic groups. Practically
    everyone inside uses the term Myanmar, as do all countries in
    Southeast Asia, though the NLD has thus far refused to bend
    on that topic.

    -- We could accede to the regime request to upgrade their
    COM in Washington from CDA to Ambassador.

    Comment
    -------

    ¶19. (S) Some propose that getting started at a better
    relationship is more important than insisting on
    difficult-to-achieve democracy and human-rights outcomes in
    the near term. In that view, U.S. regional and global
    interests should drive Burma policy. Others remain adamant
    that to demand less than the right democratic and
    human-rights outcomes would be to sacrifice the efforts of
    Nobel-laureate Aung San Suu Kyi and others in a wishful
    expediency. Any walk down the road of dialogue will require
    great patience and thoughtful judgments about how much to
    offer and how much to demand. The regime's inclination
    toward engagement is surely driven by its own perceived
    interests (reducing sanctions, achieving respect, modulating
    China's influence). However, the senior generals likely see
    rapid movement to the West's democracy and human-rights goals
    as downright dangerous. Still, one never knows how flexible
    the other side will be until negotiations begin. Also, the
    looming 2010 elections may be an opportunity. The process
    will be flawed, but an aspect may be stage one of a
    transition toward a next set of (mostly military) leaders.
    U.S.-Burmese dialogue now could signal to that next
    generation what a positive relationship with the U.S. might
    offer, planting seeds for future change.

    ¶20. (S) Given the likelihood that major successes on the
    democracy front will be slow in coming, we believe it
    important for the U.S. to undertake a long-term effort to
    build the groundwork for future democracy. Per our MSP, we
    want to follow up on post-cyclone aid with a broader
    humanitarian-assistance endeavor. If properly designed, such
    assistance builds the basic capacity of people at the
    grassroots to survive and to think beyond mere subsistence to
    political goals. Such aid is subversive more directly as
    well: recipients understand who helps them (international
    donors) and who doesn't (the regime). In this context,
    "humanitarian" aid can encompass health, non-state education,
    micro-finance, and other local initiatives, all with
    civil-society capacity-building components. The U.S. should
    also focus on elements within the regime that show genuine
    interest in our regional priorities. The units involved in
    counter-narcotics, anti-trafficking, and infectious-disease
    efforts would be good places to start. They have shown
    willingness to act appropriately, but they need training.
    Aside from contributing to our regional goals, assisting such
    elements might encourage some broader re-thinking of regime
    attitudes toward the Western world.
    DINGER

`